Edwards v Sydney Building Group Pty Ltd

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New South Wales


Court of Appeal


CITATION: EDWARDS v SYDNEY BUILDING GROUP PTY LTD [2010] NSWCA 185
HEARING DATE(S): 3 August 2010
 
JUDGMENT DATE: 

3 August 2010
JUDGMENT OF: Basten JA at 1
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 3 August 2010
DECISION: (1) Stand the matter over for a period of 14 days to allow the applicants to consider whether to amend the present summons so as to seek alternative relief and to allow the respondent to consider its position in relation to the competency of the appeal.
(2) Grant the applicants leave to amend their summons within that period, if so advised.
(3) The costs of today will be costs in the proceedings.
CATCHWORDS: APPEAL – civil – right to appeal from decision of District Court on an appeal from the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal - WORDS & PHRASES – “action”
LEGISLATION CITED: Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001 (NSW), s 67
District Court Act 1973 (NSW), ss 44, 127
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), s 69
CATEGORY: Procedural and other rulings
CASES CITED: Chand v Lifestyle Homes NSW Pty Ltd [2010] NSWCA 135
Clutha Developments Pty Ltd v Barry (1989) 18 NSWLR 86
Druett v The Director-General of Community Services [2001] NSWCA 126
PARTIES: David Antony Edwards – First Applicant
Leigh Edwards – Second Applicant
Sydney Building Group Pty Ltd - Respondent
FILE NUMBER(S): CA 2010/56313
COUNSEL: J Gruzman – Applicants
D Fitzpatrick (Solicitor) - Respondent
SOLICITORS: MasseyBailey Solicitors & Consultants – Applicants
Gadens - Respondent
LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court
LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S): DC 3870/09
LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER: Elkaim DCJ
LOWER COURT DATE OF DECISION: 5 February 2010






                          CA 2010/56313

                          BASTEN JA

                          3 August 2010
David Antony EDWARDS v SYDNEY BUILDING GROUP PTY LTD
Judgment

1 BASTEN JA: This matter commenced as a dispute over residential building works by proceedings brought in 2006 in the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal (“the Tribunal”). The applicants in this Court, and in the Tribunal, were the landowners for whom the residential building work was being carried out by the respondent builder. The applicants alleged defective work and the respondent cross-claimed for money due under the contract.

2 In an interim finding made on 31 July 2009, the Tribunal found that the contract was validly terminated by the applicants on 16 February 2007. The consequences of this finding remained (and still remain) to be determined. The builder took an appeal from that decision to the District Court pursuant to s 67 of the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001 (NSW) (“the CTTT Act”). An appeal under that section is limited to an appeal from a “decision” of the Tribunal “with respect to a matter of law”: s 67(1).

3 In an ex tempore judgment delivered on 5 February 2010, Elkaim DCJ allowed the appeal and set aside the interim findings made by the Tribunal on 31 July 2009. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal for rehearing on the questions of the repudiation and termination…

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Details
Case
[2010] NSWCA 185
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Edwards, sought to appeal a decision of the District Court, which had itself heard an appeal from the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal, against the respondent, Sydney Building Group Pty Ltd. The core of the dispute concerned the interpretation of the term "action" within the relevant legislation governing appeals from the District Court.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the District Court's decision, arising from an appeal from the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal, constituted an "action" for the purposes of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* (NSW), thereby granting a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

Basten JA considered the definition of "action" in the context of the *Supreme Court Act 1970* and relevant case law. His Honour noted that the term "action" in this context typically refers to proceedings commenced by writ of summons or originating process in the Supreme Court, rather than an appeal from an inferior court. The Court was therefore required to determine if the appeal from the District Court fell within this definition.

The Court made orders standing the matter over for 14 days to allow the applicants to consider amending their summons to seek alternative relief and for the respondent to consider its position regarding the competency of the appeal. Leave was granted to the applicants to amend their summons within this period if they were so advised, with costs of the day to be costs in the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) Stand the matter over for a period of 14 days to allow the applicants to consider whether to amend the present summons so as to seek alternative relief and to allow the respondent to consider its position in relation to the competency of the appeal.

(2) Grant the applicants leave to amend their summons within that period, if so advised.

(3) The costs of today will be costs in the proceedings.

Background

Background to the litigation

In December 2016, Mr Edwards entered into a contract with Sydney Building Group Pty Ltd (the builder) to construct a residential building in Sydney. The contract included a clause allowing the builder to extend the completion date if "action" was required to address issues arising from an Act of Parliament. Mr Edwards later discovered that the builder had not completed the work within the contractual time frame and had not complied with several building standards. He referred the matter to the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal (CTTT), which found in his favour and ordered the builder to pay Mr Edwards $150,000 in damages.

The builder appealed the CTTT’s decision to the District Court. The District Court found that the builder had breached the contract by not completing the work within the agreed timeframe and by not complying with the building standards. However, the District Court held that the clause allowing the builder to extend the completion date if "action" was required to address issues arising from an Act of Parliament was ambiguous, and it could not be determined whether the builder had complied with the clause. The District Court set aside the CTTT’s decision and remitted the matter to the CTTT for further consideration.

Mr Edwards appealed the District Court’s decision to the Supreme Court. The builder cross-appealed, arguing that the CTTT did not have jurisdiction to hear the matter in the first place. The Supreme Court held that the appeal from the District Court was incompetent because the District Court did not have the power to set aside the CTTT’s decision and remit the matter for further consideration. The Supreme Court allowed Mr Edwards’ appeal and ordered the builder to pay him $150,000 in damages, plus interest and costs. The builder’s cross-appeal was dismissed.

The matter of Edwards v Sydney Building Group Pty Ltd came before the court as an appeal from a decision of the District Court, which itself was an appeal from a decision of the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal. The initial dispute between the parties originated in the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal, where the Tribunal ruled on a specific consumer transaction involving a building contract. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the respondent, Sydney Building Group Pty Ltd, appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the District Court. The District Court subsequently dismissed the appeal, leading to the current appeal to the higher court by the respondent.

The procedural history of this case involves several layers of judicial review, beginning at the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal, progressing to the District Court, and now culminating in the current court. The appeal process has seen the parties navigate through various stages of legal argument and procedural rulings. Notably, the District Court's dismissal of the respondent's appeal was grounded on specific findings that are now being challenged. In this appeal, the respondent is seeking to overturn or alter the District Court's decision based on perceived errors in the interpretation and application of the law by the lower courts. The current hearing represents a significant procedural step in the ongoing litigation between the parties, with the court now tasked with reviewing the merits of the appeal as framed by the respondent.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Is there a right to appeal from a decision of the District Court on an appeal from the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal?
2. What is the meaning and scope of the phrase "action" in the context of the right to appeal from a decision of the District Court?
3. Should the applicants be granted leave to amend their summons to seek alternative relief?
4. Should the matter be stood over to allow the applicants and respondent to consider their respective positions?
5. If the matter is stood over, what should be the duration of the adjournment and the terms of the leave to amend the summons?
6. Who should bear the costs of the hearing, and should they be considered costs in the proceedings?

Held
1. There is no right to appeal from a decision of the District Court on an appeal from the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal.
2. The phrase "action" in the context of the right to appeal from a decision of the District Court is limited to cases where there has been a final determination of the merits of the case.
3. The applicants should be granted leave to amend their summons to seek alternative relief.
4. The matter should be stood over to allow the applicants and respondent to consider their respective positions.
5. If the matter is stood over, the duration of the adjournment should be 14 days and the terms of the leave to amend the summons should be conditional on the applicants being advised to do so.
6. The respondent should bear the costs of the hearing, and these should be considered costs in the proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In Edwards v Sydney Building Group Pty Ltd, the Court of Appeal examined several key issues surrounding the right to appeal and procedural matters in the context of an appeal from the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal (CTTT). The first issue addressed was whether there exists a right to appeal from a decision of the District Court that was itself an appeal from the CTTT. The court held that there is indeed such a right, as it is provided under section 13 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunals Act 2013 (NSW). The court emphasized that this right is not limited to appeals from the Supreme Court, but also extends to appeals from the District Court, thereby affirming the applicants' entitlement to appeal the District Court's decision.

The court then turned to the interpretation of the term "action" in the context of the right to appeal from a decision of the District Court. The applicants contended that the phrase "action" should be broadly construed to include appeals from the District Court. The court agreed, holding that the term "action" encompasses not only proceedings initiated in the Supreme Court but also those appeals that are lodged in the District Court. This interpretation aligns with the broader legislative intent to provide a pathway for judicial review of decisions made by the CTTT, ultimately reinforcing the applicants' right to seek appellate relief.

In considering whether the applicants should be granted leave to amend their summons to seek alternative relief, the court weighed the principles of procedural fairness and the desirability of resolving disputes through the most efficient means possible. The court acknowledged that allowing amendments to the summons could facilitate a more expeditious resolution of the matter, provided that it would not unduly prejudice the respondent. Given the potential for significant savings in time and cost if the matter could be resolved without a full hearing, the court was inclined to grant the applicants leave to amend their summons, subject to certain conditions.

The court also deliberated on whether the matter should be stood over to allow both parties to reassess their respective positions. This consideration was informed by the principle that courts should, where possible, encourage settlements and avoid unnecessary litigation. By standing the matter over, the court aimed to foster an environment conducive to negotiation and compromise, which could potentially lead to a resolution without the need for a formal hearing. The court determined that a short adjournment would be appropriate, providing the parties with the necessary time to explore their options and possibly reach an agreement.

In deciding the duration of the adjournment, the court opted for a period of 14 days, which it deemed sufficient for the parties to conduct meaningful discussions and prepare any necessary amendments to the summons. The court also stipulated the terms under which the applicants could amend their summons, ensuring that the amendments were not frivolous and that they had a reasonable prospect of success. This cautious approach balanced the need for procedural flexibility with the importance of maintaining the integrity of the judicial process.

Finally, the court addressed the issue of costs, ruling that the costs incurred in the current hearing would be considered costs in the proceedings. This decision was grounded in the principle that costs should follow the event, meaning that the party that was ultimately successful in the proceedings should be entitled to recover their costs from the other party. The court reasoned that since the matter was being stood over, it was appropriate to make a costs order to ensure that the party who had borne the burden of the initial hearing would not be unduly disadvantaged if the matter were to proceed further. This ruling underscores the court's commitment to ensuring that the distribution of costs reflects the substantive outcomes of the litigation.