Edwards v Postsuper Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Edwards v Postsuper Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 1380

SUPERANNUATION – appeal from Superannuation Complaints Tribunal affirming decision of trustee of superannuation fund to distribute death benefit to deceased's daughter and de facto – whether Tribunal erred by confining meaning of "in any way dependent" in definition of "Dependant" in trust deed to financial dependence– whether Tribunal erred in finding that mother of deceased's daughter was deceased's "spouse" – whether Tribunal erred by not making findings on what it called "disputes of fact of minor issues" - whether Tribunal correctly understood its review role under s 37 of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act1993 (Cth)

Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) s 37

BRIAN EDWARDS AND JEANETTE EDWARDS v POSTSUPER PTY LTD AND SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
NSD 492 OF 2006

MOORE J
24 OCTOBER 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 492 OF 2006
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

BRIAN EDWARDS
First Appellant

JEANETTE EDWARDS
Second Appellant

AND:

POSTSUPER PTY LTD
First Respondent

SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 OCTOBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be dismissed.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 492 OF 2006
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL

BETWEEN:

BRIAN EDWARDS
First Appellant

JEANETTE EDWARDS
Second Appellant

AND:

POSTSUPER PTY LTD
First Respondent

SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE:

24 OCTOBER 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. A young postal worker died in a motor vehicle accident.  He was a member of the Australia Post Superannuation Scheme.  Under that scheme, a payment was to be made if he died though he had not nominated who should receive any payment in the event of his untimely death.  A dispute then arose between his parents and a young woman who was the mother of his child, about how the payment should be made.  The trustee of the scheme decided the mother of his child was his de facto spouse and the payment should be made to her (as to 75%) and their child (as to 25%).  No payment was to be made to his parents.  The parents challenged this decision in the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal.  In effect, the Tribunal decided not to disturb the decision of the trustee.  The parents contend in this Court that in making its decision, the Tribunal fell into legal error.

  2. The proceedings take the form of an "appeal" from the determination of the Tribunal reflected in determination number D05-06/121 dated 17 January 2006. The appeal is under s 46(1) of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) ("the Complaints Act") which enables an appeal to this Court from the Tribunal on a question of law. The first respondent is the trustee of the Australia Post Superannuation Scheme. The…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1380
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Edwards v Postsuper Pty Ltd is an appeal from the determination of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Tribunal dated 17 January 2006. The appellants, the parents of Jason Edwards who died intestate, challenged the decision of the trustee of the Australia Post Superannuation Scheme to allocate the death benefit to Ms Hayley Ifield, with whom the deceased was in a de facto relationship, and their daughter, as opposed to the appellants and other siblings of the deceased. The appellants contended that the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of the term "Dependant" under the trust deed, contending that it should encompass emotional and other forms of dependency, not just financial dependency. They also argued that the Tribunal failed to properly consider the deceased's wishes and the nature of the relationship between the deceased and the appellants.

The central legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal misconstrued the term "Dependant" by excluding emotional and other forms of dependency, failed to consider relevant factors such as the deceased's wishes and the nature of the relationship with the appellants, and whether the Tribunal properly exercised its discretion in reviewing the trustee's decision. The court noted that the task of the Tribunal was to review the trustee's decision and determine if it was fair and reasonable, not to decide afresh all findings of fact. The court further clarified that the Tribunal was not bound to resolve all disputes of fact on minor issues and had considerable discretion in making its own findings.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Tribunal did not misconstrue the term "Dependant" and properly exercised its discretion in reviewing the trustee's decision. The court found that the Tribunal considered the appellants as potential beneficiaries notwithstanding its conclusion that they were not financially dependent on the deceased and that it was not necessary for the Tribunal to decide afresh all findings of fact made by the primary decision maker. The court also found that the Tribunal was not bound to resolve all disputes of fact on minor issues and had considerable discretion in making its own findings. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Tribunal was affirmed.

ORDERS:
1. The appeal be dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The proceedings take the form of an "appeal" from the determination of the Tribunal reflected in determination number D05-06/121 dated 17 January 2006. The appeal is under s 46(1) of the Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth) ("the Complaints Act") which enables an appeal to this Court from the Tribunal on a question of law. The first respondent is the trustee of the Australia Post Superannuation Scheme. The Tribunal has been joined as second respondent and has filed a submitting appearance. Background The appellants were the parents of Jason Edwards ("the deceased"), who died in a motor vehicle accident on 6 March 2003. At the date of his death, the deceased was 25 years of age and, on the finding of the trustee and the Tribunal, was in a de facto relationship with Hayley Ifield (though this has been challenged by the parents). On 13 May 2003, a daughter was born of that relationship. As noted earlier, the deceased was a member of the Australia Post Superannuation Scheme ("the scheme"). He did not complete a 'Nomination of Beneficiary form' for the scheme and died intestate. The total amount of the superannuation death benefit as at 2 December 2004 was $221,509.65. The Australia Post Superannuation Trust Deed in effect at the date of the deceased's death was that amended to 1 July 2000. Clause 11.6(a) of the trust deed provided as follows:Clause 11.6 Payment of Death Benefits(a)Any benefit payable from the Fund on the death of a person who was a Member at the time of his or her death shall be paid or applied by the Trustees to or for the benefit of such one or more of:(i)The Member's Dependants;(ii)The Member's legal personal representative;(iii)if applicable, any other person but only on the terms and in the circumstances permitted under Superannuation Lawto the exclusion of others or other of them or in such proportions between them and in such form, manner, and subject to such conditions as the Trustees shall determine. The words "Dependant" and "Spouse" were defined in Clause 2. "Dependant" was defined as follows:"Dependant" means in relation to a Member or Beneficiary:(i)the Spouse or Child of a Member or Beneficiary; and(ii)any other person whom in the opinion of the Trustee is, or in the case of a deceased Member or Beneficiary was at the time of his or her death, in any way dependent on the Member or Beneficiary. "Spouse" was defined as follows:"Spouse" means a person who at the date of death of a Member was in the opinion of the Trustee:(i)legally married to the deceased Member; or(ii)not legally married to the deceased Member and in the opinion of the Trustee ordinarily living with the deceased Member as his wife or her husband on a permanent and bona fide domestic basis. On 21 April 2004, the trustee notified the appellants that it had decided to pay 75% of the death benefit to Ms Ifield and the remaining 25% to the deceased's daughter.Proceedings before the Tribunal On 30 July 2004, the appellants lodged a complaint about the trustee's decision with the Tribunal. The complaint was made pursuant to s 14(2) of the Complaints Act, which enables a person to make a complaint about certain decisions made by a trustee to the Tribunal "that the decision was unfair or unreasonable". The appellants sought a decision that 75% be paid to the appellants and the deceased's siblings instead of Ms Ifield, with the remaining 25% still to go to the daughter. Ms Ifield and the daughter were joined as parties in the Tribunal proceedings.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MOORE J
Ms Ifield claimed that she was the deceased's de facto, having lived with him as his wife for two years prior to his death. She disputed that the appellants were financially dependent on the deceased and that he had given them $50 per week. She submitted that the evidence showed that the appellants and siblings were merely recipients of the deceased's generosity but not that they depended upon him.Tribunal's decision The Tribunal identified the issue it had to address as whether the trustee's determination was fair and reasonable in relation to the appellants and other parties, and not whether the Tribunal would have made the same decision on the evidence. In considering the submissions of the parties, it said:"It is clear that there is considerable antipathy on the part of some of the parties involved. In the submissions, there were many disputes of fact on minor issues, as well as accusations. The Tribunal does not propose to involve itself in these issues as they are of little relevance in the determination of this complaint."The Tribunal said that it viewed as relevant to its determination the wishes of the deceased member, the financial circumstances and needs of the potential beneficiaries and the nature of the deceased's relationship with Ms Ifield. The Tribunal was not satisfied that the appellants or his siblings were financially dependent on the deceased and found that there was no evidence that he had provided them with regular monetary support. Although it accepted that the deceased had made many gifts to his family, the Tribunal did not accept this as evidence that the appellants were financially dependent on him. The Tribunal concluded that both Ms Ifield and the daughter were financially dependent on the deceased, and that he would have wished to support them. It was satisfied that the deceased member and Ms Ifield were in "a loving, committed relationship" at the time of his death. Pursuant to s 37(6) of the Complaints Act, the Tribunal found that the trustee's decision was "fair and reasonable in the circumstances" and affirmed the decision.Grounds of appeal and submissions The amended notice of appeal filed 16 August 2006 identified five grounds of appeal. The written submissions of the appellants articulated the grounds differently. They identified five issues. I will address the grounds as they emerge from the written submissions.The first issue The first issue concerned the Tribunal's alleged misconstruction of the term "Dependant" in the trust deed. The appellants submitted that the Tribunal had failed to consider whether the term "Dependant", which included "any other person whom in the opinion of the Trustee is … in any way dependent on the Member or Beneficiary" (emphasis added), included not only financial dependence but also encompassed either or both emotional dependence and other forms of dependence, such as financial contribution to the appellants' outgoings on a frequent but not necessarily regular basis. The failure to consider or give reasons whether emotional dependence or other dependence was sufficient to constitute dependence for the purposes of the scheme was framed as a failure to take into account a relevant consideration and a failure to make a finding on a material question of fact.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MOORE J

The respondent submitted that there was no necessary contradiction between the Tribunal's finding that "all household expenses were shared" and that the deceased paid most household expenses. This was because the evidence was capable of supporting the finding that the expenses were shared in unequal proportions. In any event, it was submitted, this was not a critical conclusion of fact for this appeal and had no bearing on the appellants' position.Consideration The appellants' submissions on the first issue involved an assumption which I do not accept. The assumption is that the Tribunal acted on the basis that a "Dependant" for the purposes of the trust deed was only a person who was financially dependent on the member. It is true that the Tribunal, in its determination, said that in order for the appellants and other members of the deceased's family to be potential beneficiaries, they had to show they were in some way dependent on the deceased. However, in its reasons the Tribunal discussed various aspects of the relationship between the deceased and the appellants including whether there was financial dependency. The Tribunal did not say that it would only consider the appellants as potential beneficiaries if they could demonstrate financial dependency. Indeed the Tribunal's discussion appears to proceed on the basis that the appellants could be potential beneficiaries notwithstanding its conclusion that they were not financially dependent on the deceased. Were it otherwise, it would have been unnecessary for the Tribunal to address the wishes of the deceased and the nature of the relationship between the deceased and both Ms Ifield and his parents and siblings. The Tribunal appeared to consider the issue of whether the trustee's decision was fair and reasonable on the basis of an assumption that the appellants were dependants. It is unnecessary to determine whether, as a matter of construction, the word "Dependant", and notions of dependency in the trust deed, concern only financial dependency as the second respondent submitted. The appellants' submissions on the second issue also involved an assumption that is not correct. The task of the Tribunal was to review the trustee's decision. It has considerable licence in doing so, and was not, in the present case, bound to decide how the payment should be made. Its task was to determine whether the trustee's determination was unfair or unreasonable. In engaging in this process it was not necessary for the Tribunal to decide afresh all findings of fact made by the primary decision maker. It was necessary for the Tribunal to make its own findings sufficient to determine whether the decision under review was fair and reasonable: Cameron at [42] and [43]. The third issue does not, in substance, concern a question of law but rather is an attempt to have the Court re-evaluate the material considered by the Tribunal. It was a matter for the Tribunal to make what use it wanted of the material before it, having regard to its role as discussed at [30] above. It was not incumbent on the Tribunal to resolve all disputes of fact on minor issues.