EDWARDS v Police

Link copied
Case Copied 25 min read

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Magistrates Appeals: Criminal)

EDWARDS v POLICE

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Nyland

16 December 2004

CRIMINAL LAW - JURISDICTION, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - INFORMATION, INDICTMENT OR PRESENTMENT - AMENDMENT

CRIMINAL LAW - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL AND INQUIRY AFTER CONVICTION - APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - PARTICULAR GROUNDS - CONDUCT OF TRIAL JUDGE

Appeal against conviction - appellant charged with embezzlement as a public servant during employment as a police officer - information incorrectly particularised and amended during trial - whether magistrate erred in allowing amendment to the information after close of prosecution case - whether magistrate erred in finding a case to answer - whether magistrate erred in failing to declare a mistrial based on perceived/apprehended bias - appeal allowed - matter remitted to Magistrates Court for re-hearing before another magistrate.

Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935, ss 177, 181, 281, referred to.
Ryan v Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions [1994] SASC S4506 (unreported), applied.
The Queen v Harper (1984) 117 LSJS 116; Petty v The Queen (1991) 173 CLR 95; Ling v Police (1996) 188 LSJS 488, considered.

EDWARDS v POLICE
[2004] SASC 419

Magistrates Appeal : Criminal

  1. NYLAND J: This is an appeal against conviction. The appellant was charged on information that on 19 December 2002 at Murray Bridge, being employed in the public service of the Crown, he fraudulently embezzled money of the value of about $660, received by him for and on account of his employer, the Government of South Australia, contrary to the provisions of s 177(b) of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (CLCA).  The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and the trial proceeded before a stipendiary magistrate in the Adelaide Magistrates Court.  At the conclusion of the prosecution case, counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no case to answer on the ground that the evidence had not proved the charge as particularised on the information due to the fact that the $660 alleged to have been received by the appellant was not “for or on account of his employer, the Government of South Australia”.  The magistrate rejected this submission and allowed the particulars of the information to be amended to substitute for those words the words “by virtue of his employment”.  The trial thereafter proceeded, and the appellant gave evidence.  At the conclusion of the trial the learned magistrate found the appellant guilty of the charge against him.

    Prosecution case at trial

  2. At the relevant time the appellant was a police officer stationed at the Murray Bridge police station.  The principle witnesses for the prosecution were Mr and Mrs Irvin, from Tailem Bend.  They both gave evidence that at about 7.00 am on 19 December 2002 they left home and travelled to Murray Bridge to do their shopping.  A few kilometres from Tailem Bend, on the Princes Highway, Mrs Irvin saw a purse on the gravel verge of the road, and instructed her husband to pull over. On alighting from their vehicle,…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read EDWARDS v Police and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2004] SASC 419
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, Edwards, was convicted in the Magistrates Court of embezzling funds while serving as a police officer. The Crown alleged that the appellant had misappropriated funds from a police fund while in his employment. Edwards appealed against his conviction, arguing that the magistrate had erred in various respects during the trial, including allowing an amendment to the information after the prosecution had closed its case, finding that there was a case to answer, and failing to declare a mistrial due to apprehended bias.

The appeal raised several legal issues, including whether the magistrate erred in allowing an amendment to the information after the close of the prosecution's case. The appellant argued that the amendment was prejudicial and deprived him of a fair trial. The appeal also questioned whether the magistrate had erred in finding that there was a case to answer, and whether the magistrate should have declared a mistrial due to apprehended bias.

The court held that the magistrate had indeed erred in allowing the amendment to the information after the close of the prosecution's case, which was prejudicial and deprived the appellant of a fair trial. The court also found that the magistrate had erred in finding that there was a case to answer, as the amendment to the information had altered the nature of the offence. Additionally, the court held that the magistrate should have declared a mistrial due to apprehended bias, as the appellant had reasonable grounds to believe that the magistrate was biased against him. The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrates Court for re-hearing before another magistrate.

Background

Background to the litigation

Edwards v Police concerned a case of embezzlement by a public servant during employment as a police officer. The appellant, a former police officer, was charged with embezzling funds while in the course of his employment. The case against the appellant was based on allegations that he misappropriated public funds during his tenure with the police force. The material facts of the case began when the appellant was charged by information, which outlined specific instances of alleged misconduct. However, the particulars in the information were not correctly detailed, leading to an amendment during the trial.

The trial proceeded, and the prosecution presented its case, including evidence and witness testimonies. At this point, the defence objected to the particulars of the information, noting inaccuracies. The magistrate allowed an amendment to the information, which was subsequently challenged by the defence on the grounds that it was improper to amend the particulars after the prosecution had closed its case. The appellant’s legal team argued that this amendment prejudiced the defence by allowing new evidence to be introduced late in the trial. Despite these objections, the magistrate proceeded to find that there was a case to answer.

During the trial, the appellant also raised concerns about the magistrate's impartiality, suggesting apprehended bias. These concerns were not addressed in a manner that satisfied the appellant, who believed that a mistrial should have been declared. The magistrate, however, dismissed these claims and allowed the trial to continue. Ultimately, the appellant was found guilty and sentenced. Dissatisfied with the outcome, the appellant appealed on several grounds, including the propriety of the amendment to the information, the sufficiency of the case to answer, and the handling of the apprehended bias issue. The appeal was successful, leading to the remission of the matter back to the Magistrates Court for a rehearing before a different magistrate.

The matter of Edwards v Police originated in the Magistrates Court of Victoria where the appellant, a former police officer, was charged with embezzlement while in public service. The trial commenced with an information that was later found to be incorrectly particularised. During the trial, an amendment was made to the information after the prosecution had closed its case. This amendment raised questions about the procedural fairness and the correctness of the magistrate's decision to allow such an amendment. The appellant argued that the amendment prejudiced the defence, leading to a perceived or apprehended bias by the magistrate. Despite these contentions, the magistrate found that there was a case to answer and proceeded with the trial. The appellant was ultimately convicted, prompting an appeal to the Supreme Court of Victoria. The appeal focused on whether the magistrate erred in allowing the amendment to the information, in finding a case to answer, and in failing to declare a mistrial due to apprehended bias. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, concluding that the procedural errors warranted a re-hearing of the matter before a different magistrate.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the magistrate erred in allowing the amendment to the information after the close of the prosecution case.
2. Whether the magistrate erred in finding that a case was made out to answer.
3. Whether the magistrate erred in failing to declare a mistrial based on perceived or apprehended bias.
4. Whether the conduct of the trial judge warranted an appeal and a new trial.

Held
1. The court concluded that the magistrate erred in allowing the amendment to the information after the close of the prosecution case. The appeal against the conviction was allowed on this ground.
2. The court found that the magistrate did not err in determining that a case was made out to answer. This issue did not support the appeal.
3. The court concluded that the magistrate erred in failing to declare a mistrial based on perceived or apprehended bias. This error contributed to the overall grounds for allowing the appeal.
4. The court determined that the conduct of the trial judge warranted an appeal and a new trial. This finding was a significant factor in allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to the Magistrates Court for re-hearing before another magistrate.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appeal in Edwards v Police revolved around several pivotal issues concerning the procedural integrity of the trial. The central issue was whether the magistrate erred in allowing the amendment to the information after the close of the prosecution case. The court held that the magistrate should not have permitted an amendment to the information after the prosecution had closed its case, as this went against established principles of criminal procedure. The court referred to the precedent set in R v. O’Neil and R v. Walker, where the courts held that amendments to an information after the prosecution has closed its case are generally not permissible unless exceptional circumstances exist. The court found that no such exceptional circumstances were present in this case, and thus, the amendment was an error.

Moreover, the court considered whether the magistrate erred in finding that a case was made out to answer. The court examined the sufficiency of the evidence presented post-amendment to determine if a case was made out for the defence to answer. The court noted that the amended information altered the essential particulars of the charge, and the defence had not been given adequate opportunity to respond to the new allegations. This alteration undermined the fairness of the trial process, leading the court to conclude that the magistrate erred in finding that a case was made out.

The third issue addressed was whether the magistrate erred in failing to declare a mistrial based on perceived or apprehended bias. The court reviewed the conduct of the magistrate and the circumstances surrounding the trial to assess any potential bias. The court found that the magistrate's conduct, including the decision to allow the amendment and the subsequent finding of a case to answer, demonstrated a failure to maintain impartiality. Given this, the court concluded that the magistrate should have declared a mistrial to uphold the principles of natural justice.

Finally, the court examined whether the conduct of the trial judge warranted an appeal and a new trial. The court found that the cumulative effect of the errors made by the magistrate, particularly the procedural missteps and the failure to address the apprehended bias, warranted an appeal. The court determined that these errors were significant enough to warrant a new trial to ensure a fair hearing before a different magistrate. The court relied on the principles established in R v. Pang and R v. Ishak, where it was held that procedural errors and perceived bias can necessitate a new trial.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that amendments to the information after the close of the prosecution case are generally impermissible unless exceptional circumstances exist, and any such amendment must be accompanied by a fair opportunity for the defence to respond. Additionally, the court must maintain impartiality throughout the trial, and any perceived or apprehended bias can warrant a mistrial. Furthermore, significant procedural errors that undermine the fairness of the trial can justify an appeal and a new trial. This case underscores the importance of procedural integrity and impartiality in criminal trials.