Edn17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2022] FedCFamC2G 433
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
EDN17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 433
File number: MLG 1997 of 2017 Judgment of: JUDGE LADHAMS Date of judgment: 3 June 2022 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for judicial review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the Authority denied the applicant procedural fairness – whether the Authority constructively failed to review the decision of the first respondent – whether the Authority failed to consider discretion under s 473DC of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 5AA, 5H, 36, 46A, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, 473DE 476, 477 Cases cited: ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 439; [2020] HCA 34
BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29; [2019] HCA 34
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; [1995] HCA 58
DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 551; [2018] FCAFC 12
Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 397 ALR 1; [2022] FCAFC 3
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30
MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590; [2021] HCA 17
Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217; [2018] HCA 16
Division: Division 2 General Federal Law Number of paragraphs: 61 Date of hearings: 16 May 2022 and 27 May 2022 Place: Perth Applicant: The applicant appeared in person Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms B Roscoe Second Respondent: Submitting appearance, save as to costs Solicitor for the Respondents: Mills Oakley Lawyers ORDERS
MLG 1997 of 2017 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: EDN17
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, MIGRANT SERVICES AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE LADHAMS
DATE OF ORDER:
3 JUNE 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE LADHAMS:
INTRODUCTION
By way of application filed on 18 September 2017, the applicant seeks judicial review of a decision made by the Immigration Assessment Authority (Authority). On 28 August 2017 the Authority affirmed an earlier decision made by a delegate of the Minister not to grant the applicant a Temporary Protection (subclass 785) visa (protection visa). The application to the Court is filed pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act).
For the reasons that follow, I have found that there is no jurisdictional error in the Authority decision. Accordingly, the application to this Court is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The applicant is citizen of Iran. He entered Australia by sea at Christmas Island in August 2013 and is an unauthorised maritime arrival within the meaning of s 5AA of the Migration Act.
On 20 November 2015 the Minister’s Department sent an invitation to the applicant to apply for a protection visa. The letter advised the applicant that the Minister had exercised the power in s 46A(2) of the Migration Act to lift the bar in s 46A(1) which had, until that time, prevented him from applying for a protection visa.
On 30 May 2016 the applicant lodged a valid application for a protection visa. The applicant’s claims for protection were set out in a statement that accompanied his protection visa application. The applicant claimed to fear harm from the Iranian authorities on the basis of his Christian religion and imputed political views.
On 15 March 2017 the applicant attended an interview with an officer of the Minister’s Department to discuss his claims for protection.
On 21 April 2017 a delegate of the Minister made a decision not to grant the applicant a protection visa. The matter was then referred to the Authority pursuant to s 473CA of the Migration Act.
On 17 May 2017 the applicant provided to the Authority a submission prepared by a migration agent, and new information comprising a medical certificate and a certificate of baptism.
On 28 August 2017 the Authority affirmed the decision of the delegate not to grant the applicant a protection visa.
AUTHORITY DECISION
Information before the Authority
The Authority had regard to the material referred by the Secretary under s 473CB of the Migration Act and the submission provided on behalf of the applicant on 17 May 2017 to the extent that it comprised argument rather than new information.
The Authority identified the baptism certificate and medical certificate as new information. The Authority found that it could not consider these documents because the requirements of s 473DD of the Migration Act were not met.
The Authority noted that the certificate of baptism was dated prior to the protection visa application, and found that it was not credible personal information which might affect consideration of the applicant’s claims in light of his evidence at the protection visa interview that he no longer believed in God. The Authority was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the certificate of baptism.
The Authority was satisfied that the medical certificate was credible personal information and could not have been provided before the delegate’s decision. However, the Authority found that there were no exceptional circumstances to justify considering the medical certificate, noting the lack of detail in it and that the applicant was on notice of the need to provide supporting evidence and did not seek medical certificate sooner.
Authority’s consideration of protection claims
The Authority expressed concerns about the credibility of the applicant’s claims and noted inconsistencies in the applicant’s evidence given at his arrival interviews, in his protection visa application and at his protection visa interview. The Authority noted that the applicant claimed in his written statement of claims that his sister was present during the incident at Laleh Park in 2004, but did not mention at the protection visa interview that his sister had been present at that incident. The Authority also noted that the applicant presented different claims in relation to his departure to Dubai and the reason he left Iran in his second arrival interview and his protection visa interview. The Authority found that the applicant deliberately changed his evidence about the details of his brother A’s departure from Iran to correspond with evidence provided by A to the Department.
The Authority did not accept that A was arrested, detained and sentenced to death and that he was subsequently released following a bribe. The Authority also did not accept that the applicant, his other brother and sister were at Laleh Park when the protest occurred or that they escaped from the authorities, that their house was raided one week later, and that the authorities pressured the applicant’s parents to take their children out of Iran.
The Authority noted that the applicant at his arrival interview stated that the authorities smashed his father’s car window, but did not mention that his father had been under house arrest for a 10 year period, as he claimed in his protection visa interview. The Authority considered it to be implausible that there would be no documentary evidence if the applicant’s father had been under house arrest for some 13 years and found that the applicant had fabricated this claim. The Authority did not accept that the applicant’s father was dismissed from his job and prevented from working for the government. The Authority also did not accept that the applicant’s brother M faced restrictions from the authorities and noted that the applicant’s story in relation to M seemed to evolve as he presented his evidence.
The Authority accepted that the applicant lived, studied and eventually worked in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) from 2005 until his departure in 2013. The Authority found that the applicant was not a credible witness and that he had presented his claims regarding events in Dubai to strengthen his claimed fear of being returned to Iran. The Authority rejected claims advanced by the applicant to have been treated poorly at a particular school in Dubai, finding the claims to be implausible. The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant left the UAE because he feared being returned to Iran. The Authority found that the applicant was evasive in his evidence about obtaining his Iranian passport from the Iranian embassy in the UAE in 2010, and noted that country information indicated that checks are carried out at the time of issue in relation to any outstanding security issues which would prevent the issuing of a passport. The Authority found that the applicant was able to obtain a passport without difficulty because he and his family members were not of any interest to the Iranian authorities. The Authority accepted that the applicant may have had visa troubles in the UAE, but did not accept that he was abused or sexually assaulted by the police, noting that he did not mention this at the protection visa interview.
The Authority noted that the applicant claimed to have become a Christian while in detention, but at his protection visa interview stated that he no longer believed in God. The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant genuinely converted to Christianity or that he declared publically that he was a Christian. The Authority found that the applicant’s conversion to Christianity and attendance at church was for the sole purpose of strengthening his claims for protection.
The Authority accepted that the applicant no longer practices Islam and is an atheist. Taking into account country information, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant would face a real chance of serious harm because he no longer practices Islam and may be perceived as an apostate.
The Authority accepted that the applicant’s personal information including his name, date of birth and nationality was inadvertently published on the Department’s website in 2014. There was no evidence before the Authority to suggest that the Iranian authorities were aware of the data breach or were able to access the applicant’s personal information. The Authority was not satisfied that the applicant would face a real chance of persecution as a result of the data breach.
The Authority found that the applicant did not meet the requirements of the definition of a refugee in s 5H(1) of the Migration Act and did not meet s 36(2)(a).
The Authority also found that the applicant did not meet the complementary protection criteria in s 36(2)(aa) of the Migration Act. In addition to the same factual findings it made for the purposes of the refugee assessment, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant’s non-genuine conversion to Christianity and his attendance at church in Australia would come to the attention of the Iranian authorities.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COURT
The application for judicial review was filed on 18 September 2017 which is within 35 days of the date of the Authority decision, as required by s 477(1) of the Migration Act.
The application raises the following three grounds:
1.The Second Respondent denied the Applicant procedural fairness in its failure to alert the applicant to new issues arising before the Authority of which the applicant was not previously aware, and in the alternative the Second Respondent denied procedural fairness because the Authority's reasoning departed from the Department's reasoning, resulting in in a practical injustice to the Applicant.
2.The Second Respondent constructively failed to review the decision of the delegate, and failed to conduct a review as required under section 473CC(l) of the Act, by failing to inform the applicant of issues arising on review, and failing to consider its discretion under section 473DC to get new information from the applicant.
3.I have made an application for assistance through Victoria Legal Aid and am waiting for a decision
On 30 May 2018 a Registrar of this Court made orders to progress the matter to hearing. Those orders required the applicant to file and serve 28 days before the hearing any amended application, supplementary court book and written submissions. The applicant did not file any documents in accordance with these orders. The Minister filed written submissions on 9 May 2022.
The hearing of this matter took place over two separate days. The matter first came before the Court for hearing on 16 May 2022. On that occasion, I explained to the applicant the role of the Court, the need for him to establish jurisdictional error and how the hearing would proceed. At my request Ms Roscoe, who appeared for the Minister, provided an overview of the Authority decision for the applicant’s benefit. I otherwise adjourned the hearing because the Minister had filed a supplementary court book on the last working day before the hearing, the applicant had not yet seen it, and it was not obvious to me on the face of the document that the document included in the supplementary court book relates to the applicant.
On 20 May 2022 the Minister filed an affidavit of Lachlan Charles Albert Glass and based on that affidavit I am satisfied that the document in the supplementary court book relates to the applicant and was before the Authority.
The matter came before the Court for hearing again on 27 May 2022 and on that occasion both parties made submissions in relation to the application for judicial review.
CONSIDERATION
Jurisdictional error
The role of a court in considering an application for judicial review was explained by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 397 ALR 1; [2022] FCAFC 3, where the Full Court said at [17]:
… an application for judicial review is one in which the judicial branch of government reviews, by reference to legality or lawfulness, the decision or decisions of the Executive branch of government… The Court does not consider the merits or wisdom of the decision; nor does it remake the decision. The task of the Court is to rule upon the lawfulness or legality of the decision by reference to the complaints made about it.
In order to be entitled to relief by this Court, the applicant must establish that the Authority decision is affected by jurisdictional error. The Authority will have made a jurisdictional error if it ‘exceeded the limits of the decision-making authority conferred by the statute in making the decision’: MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 390 ALR 590; [2021] HCA 17 at [29].
The High Court identified a number of examples of jurisdictional error in Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163; [1995] HCA 58 (Craig). In that case the High Court said at [14] that if the decision-maker:
…falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it.
The examples of jurisdictional error set out in Craig are not exhaustive: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323; [2001] HCA 30 at [82]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZMTA (2019) 264 CLR 421; [2019] HCA 3 (SZMTA) at [81]. There might be jurisdictional error in an Authority decision if the Authority fails to conduct the review in accordance with the provisions in Division 3 of Part 7AA of the Migration Act, or if the Authority fails to exercise its discretionary powers in those provisions reasonably: see, for example, Plaintiff M174/2016 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 264 CLR 217; [2018] HCA 16 at [21] (Plaintiff M174); and ABT17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2020) 269 CLR 439; [2020] HCA 34 (ABT17) at [3].
To amount to a jurisdictional error, any error by the Authority must be material, in the sense that the error could realistically have deprived the applicant of the opportunity of a successful outcome: SZMTA at [45].
Matters raised in the applicant’s oral submissions
I gave the applicant the opportunity at the hearing to explain his grounds or to otherwise tell the Court what he believes the Authority did wrong.
The applicant’s oral submissions at the hearing did not relate in any way to his grounds of application and instead fell into two broad categories:
(a)submissions about his claims for protection, including any difficulties he faced in presenting his claims; and
(b)submissions about why he is a good member of the community.
The applicant’s submissions in relation to his claims for protection can be summarised as follows:
(a)due to a hit to his head, he has lost some of his memory capability, and struggles to remember dates and events, especially when under stress as he was at the time of the interview;
(b)he lived in Dubai for 10 years before coming to Australia and tried to get a visa while in Dubai but had difficulties, he has not seen his parents for 17 or 18 years, and he spent two and a half years in detention in Australia, and these things show how serious he is and that he could not return to Iran;
(c)he would not have taken the risk of coming to Australia by sea, putting himself in danger of drowning, and then spending time in detention in Australia with the associated dangers if he could have returned to Iran;
(d)he was injured by the Basij and the back of his head was cracked, but he could not seek proper medical attention because the Basij would have picked him up and his brother was missing and in jail at the time;
(e)because he was young at the time of his injury, he left it to the adults to decide what to do and they used band aids to heal him;
(f)in relation to him telling the delegate that he did not believe in God:
(i)with what happened to him in his childhood and having been in detention in Australia, he wonders if there is a god why he has had to go through these things; and
(ii)he was stressed at the interview and anything can come out of his mouth when he is stressed;
(g)information was leaked from the immigration website, the Iranian government might have got hold of it and this might be an issue for the applicant; and
(h)he forgot to mention at the interview that his sister was at Laleh Park due to the stress he was under at the time.
None of these matters allege any jurisdictional error in the Authority decision. For the most part, the matters raised by the applicant either attempt to persuade the Court that he should be found to be a refugee or they attempt to explain mistakes that he made in advancing his case before the delegate. Insofar as the matters raised were or might have been addressed by the Authority, I make the following observations.
First, I am unable to locate in the evidence before the Court any claim to the Department or Authority to the effect that the applicant sustained a head injury that affects his memory. The applicant said in his written claims that he and his siblings were beaten during the Laleh Park incident in 2004, but he did not claim to have sustained any injury. The Authority noted at [13] of its reasons that at the protection visa interview, the applicant said that the police started beating them when they were on the ground, and that he had to hide in the taxi on the way home because his nose was bleeding. The Authority considered these claims and based on various inconsistencies and implausibility in the applicant’s evidence rejected his claim to have been caught up in the incident at Laleh Park. In the absence of any specific claim to have sustained a head injury, there was no obligation on the Authority to consider such a claim.
In a submission to the Authority, the applicant’s representative suggested that the applicant may have given inaccurate details at the protection visa interview because ‘lengthy detention in Immigration Detention Centre has deteriorated the applicant’s mental health’. As summarised above, the Authority did not have regard to the medical certificate provided with the submission, because it was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information. There was no claim in the submission to the Authority that the applicant had problems with his memory due to any past injury.
Second, the Authority clearly had regard to the evidence the applicant gave about his Christianity at the protection visa interview and his statement that he no longer believed in God. There is no suggestion by the applicant that he did not say that he no longer believes in God and no assertion of error in the Authority’s approach to considering his evidence.
Third, the Authority considered whether the applicant would face a chance of harm due to the data breach and found that he would not, in circumstances where there was no evidence to suggest that the Iranian authorities were aware of the data breach or were able to access the applicant’s information. Again, the submission to this Court does not assert error in the Authority decision. Rather, the applicant engaged in speculation in an attempt to persuade the Court that he might face harm as a result of the data breach. It is beyond the jurisdiction to the Court to consider whether the applicant would face harm as a result of the data breach. The Authority’s findings in relation to the data breach were open to it on the evidence before it.
Fourth, the Authority considered at [15] of its reasons that it was a ‘significant discrepancy’ that the applicant made no mention at his protection visa interview of his sister being at Laleh Park with him and his brothers, contrary to what he said in his written claims. The applicant did not assert error in the Authority decision in this regard, but rather sought to explain to the Court that he was under stress when he failed to mention his sister. There is nothing before the Court to suggest that there was anything improper in the significance that the Authority placed on the discrepancy.
The applicant’s submissions about why he is good member of the community can be summarised as follows:
(a)since he has been in Australia, he has looked at the immigration website and tried to fill skills shortages in Australia;
(b)he has tried to be a useful member of society and only relied on Centrelink for four to five months and the rest of the time he has been here he has stood on his own two feet and made money;
(c)even during COVID-19 he did not get help from the government and instead relied on his savings, asked for help from friends, and reduced his food intake;
(d)he has studied to the extent permitted by his visa and the efforts he has gone to with his studies show that he wants to try and fill the skills gap in construction to the extent that he can and he is currently studying in construction and trying to be a useful member of society;
(e)he is doing an apprenticeship in the field of carpentry and he has had to pay for his certificate and further expenses;
(f)he wants to be a useful member of society and is not an economic migrant;
(g)he has worked and paid taxes while he has been in Australia;
(h)he has worked long hours and does his study after work, sometimes late in the evening;
(i)he did not ask for help from the mental health centre due to costs;
(j)because of his past injury he sometimes forgets things, and his employer suggested that he approach Centrelink for disability support, but the applicant does not consider himself to be disabled; and
(k)he wants to have a stable life where he can be useful and use the skills he has acquired.
While the applicant should be commended on the efforts he has made to be a good community member, these are not matters that I can take into account in assessing whether there is jurisdictional error in the Authority decision. As I explained to the applicant at the hearings, the Court does not have the power to grant him a visa. In any event, the contribution that an applicant may make to the community is not a criteria for a protection visa.
The matters raised by the applicant in his oral submissions do not establish jurisdictional error in the Authority decision.
Ground 1
The error alleged in ground 1 is that the Authority denied the applicant procedural fairness by failing to alert him to new issues arising before the Authority, or alternatively because the Authority departed from the delegate’s reasoning and this resulted in practical unfairness to the applicant.
The ground fails at a factual level because the issues before the Authority were largely the same as the issues before the delegate. The only issue considered by the Authority that was not considered by the delegate was whether the applicant would face harm as a result of the Department’s data breach, and the applicant expressly requested that the Authority consider this issue, based on information that was before the delegate, in his submission to the Authority.
In any event, the Authority did not owe the applicant the procedural obligations asserted by this ground.
The Authority’s procedural fairness obligations are set out in Division 3 of Part 7AA of the Migration Act. Section 473DA(1) of the Migration Act provides that Division 3 of Part 7AA, together with two other provisions that have no application in the present case, ‘is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Immigration Assessment Authority’. This exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule leaves no room for the operation of common law rules of procedural fairness in relation to reviews conducted by the Authority: BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2019) 268 CLR 29; [2019] HCA 34 (BVD17) at [31], [33].
Section 473DB(1) of the Migration Act provides that, subject to Part 7AA, the Authority is to review a fast track reviewable decision by considering the review material provided to it in accordance with s 473CB, ‘without accepting or requesting new information’ and ‘without interviewing the referred applicant’. Thus, a review conducted by the Authority will ordinarily be done on the papers.
There is an obligation imposed on the Authority by s 473DE of the Migration Act to give to an applicant, and invite the applicant to comment on, clear particulars of any new information which is to be considered by the Authority pursuant to s 473DD and which would be the reason or part of the reason for affirming the fast track reviewable decision. However, in the present case, the Authority did not consider any new information that was not before the delegate and the obligation in s 473DE did not arise.
There is nothing in Part 7AA which imposes a procedural fairness obligation on the Authority to alert the applicant to new issues that arise before the Authority or to any proposed departure from the delegate’s process of reasoning. The Full Court in DGZ16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 258 FCR 551; [2018] FCAFC 12 confirmed at [72] and [76] that the ‘Authority is not required to inform [an applicant] of specific reservations about the [applicant’s] case and to provide the [applicant] with an opportunity to respond’ and that it is ‘open to the Authority to disagree with the delegate’s evaluation of the material without providing the [applicant] an opportunity to respond’.
Ground 1 is not established.
Ground 2
Ground 2 alleges that the Authority constructively failed to review the delegate’s decision by failing to inform the applicant of issues arising on the review and failing to consider the exercise of its discretion in s 473DC of the Migration Act to get new information from the applicant.
As indicated above, the only new issue arising in the review by the Authority was the consideration of whether the applicant would face a real chance of harm as a result of the data breach, and that issue was raised by the applicant in his submission to the Authority, as well as in his protection visa application. It is also apparent that credibility was an issue before the delegate and the Authority, and both had significant concerns about inconsistent information provided by the applicant. No jurisdictional error arises from any failure by the Authority to inform the applicant of the issues arising on the review.
The Authority clearly considered the information in the materials referred to it in accordance with s 473CB of the Migration Act. It did not have regard to new information provided by the applicant because it was not satisfied that the requirements of s 473DD were met, and it gave reasons for its findings in relation to s 473DD at [6]-[8] of its reasons. After considering the material before it, including the applicant’s protection claims, the Authority concluded at [49] and [56] that the applicant did not meet the requirements for a protection visa and affirmed the decision under review. The Authority discharged its obligation in s 473CC of the Migration Act to conduct a review.
The applicant also asserted that the Authority erred by failing to consider the exercise of its discretion in s 473DC of the Migration Act to get new information from the applicant. Section 473DC(1) confers on the Authority a discretion to get new information that was not before the delegate and that the Authority considers may be relevant to the review. The Authority’s discretionary powers are conferred on it subject to the implied condition that they will be exercised reasonably: Plaintiff M174 at [21]; BVD17 at [15]; ABT17 at [3].
In circumstances where:
(a)no new issues arose on the review that the applicant had not previously had an opportunity to comment on;
(b)the applicant had been afforded an opportunity to discuss his claims for protection before the delegate and the Authority had access to the audio recording of that interview;
(c)the Authority had before it all information it required in order to conduct the review; and
(d)the delegate and the Authority shared similar concerns about the applicant’s credibility and the applicant was on notice of these from the delegate’s decision,
there was nothing unreasonable in the Authority not exercising the discretion, or considering the exercise of the discretion, in s 473DC to get new information.
Ground 2 does not establish jurisdictional error.
Ground 3
Ground 3 is simply a statement that the applicant had applied for legal aid. It does not allege any jurisdictional error and is not a proper ground of application.
CONCLUSION
I have found that there is no jurisdictional error in the Authority’s decision. It follows that the application to the Court must be dismissed.
I certify that the preceding sixty-one (61) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Ladhams. Associate:
Dated: 3 June 2022
0
13
0