Edmonds and Repatriation Commission
[2006] AATA 672
•1 August 2006
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 672
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No Q2006/89
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION ) Re DENNIS EDMONDS Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Dr KS Levy, Member Date1 August 2006
PlaceBrisbane
Decision The Tribunal sets aside the decision of the Veterans’ Review Board of 29 November 2005, and substitutes in its place, that DENNIS EDMONDS is entitled to be paid disability pension at the Special Rate under section 24 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986, with effect from 23 June 2004.
.......[Sgd]........
KS Levy
Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ AFFAIRS – veterans’ entitlements – disability pension – special rate – entitlement to pension at above the General Rate – decision set aside
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 s 24
Fentjar v Repatriation Commission (1997) 48 ALD 1
Repatriation Commission v Hendy (2002) 76 ALD 47 at 54
Repatriation Commission v Van Heteren (2003) 75 ALD 703
Cavell v Repatriation Commission (1988) 9 AAR 534 at 539
Repatriation Commission v Strickland (1990) 20 ALD 10
Chambers v Repatriation Commission (1995) 129 ALR 219
Repatriation Commission v Sheehy (1995) 39 ALD 286REASONS FOR DECISION
1 August 2006 Dr KS Levy, Member Decision Under Review
1. The Repatriation Commission originally determined that disability pension for the applicant be increased to 90% of the General Rate from and including 23 June 2004 (decision date of 13 May 2005). That increase was based on acceptance of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder and Alcohol Abuse or Alcohol Dependence.
2. On 29 November 2005, the Veterans’ Review Board set aside the Commission’s decision and increased the rate of disability support pension to 100% of the General Rate from and including 8 August 2004. That increase was based on the acceptance of a condition of goitre and was in addition to the basis upon which the previous decision of the Commission of 13 May 2005 was made.
Issue
3. The issue for the Tribunal to determine is whether the applicant, Dennis Edmonds, is entitled to pension at above the General Rate provided for in section 24 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (“the Act”).
Standard of Proof
4. The standard of proof to be applied is to the reasonable satisfaction of the Tribunal (section 120(4) of the Act). That is, the Tribunal must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities.
Date of Effect
5. The application in this matter was made out of time. Therefore, if the applicant succeeds in his appeal, the earliest date of effect, will be 23 June 2004.
Background
6. The applicant is currently 66 years of age, his date of birth being 7 April 1940. He was 64 years of age at the time that his application was submitted. He was born in the United Kingdom and originally left school and worked for the Post Office in England. At 20 years of age, he joined the British Army and served as an infantry soldier for nine years. In 1969, after enquiries at Australia House in London, he travelled to Australia and joined the Australian Army. He enlisted as a Private soldier and after 27 years in the Australian Army, he retired with the rank of Major. He served in the Royal Australian Infantry Corps in both regimental training and logistics postings.
7. During the applicant’s service with the Australian Army, he served on operational service in Vietnam. He was commissioned in 1975 and thereafter, rose to the rank of Major. On the then compulsory retirement age of 55 years, he was asked to extend for a further two years. That was in 1995. He then retired compulsorily at the age of 57 years in 1997.
8. The applicant has the following accepted disabilities by the Department of Veterans’ Affairs:
· Bilateral sensorineural hearing loss with tinnitus
· Osteoarthrosis of both knees
· Solar keratosis, limbs and face
· Lumbar spondylosis
· Non melanotic malignant neoplasm of the (L) forearm
· Post traumatic stress disorder
· Alcohol dependence or abuse
9. The latter two conditions have been accepted relevantly recently following psychiatric assessment and treatment.
Legislation
10. Section 22 sets out provisions which entitle an applicant to the General Rate of pension and extreme disablement adjustment. Section 23 deals with the Intermediate Rate of pension and section 24 provides for the Special Rate of pension.
11. It was common ground that the applicant has been accepted for 100% of the General Rate of pension. The applicant must therefore satisfy section 24 of the Act. Section 24 provides as follows:
“24 Special rate of pension
(1) This section applies to a veteran if:
(aa)the veteran has made a claim under section 14 for a pension, or an application under section 15 for an increase in the rate of the pension that he or she is receiving; and
(aab)the veteran had not yet turned 65 when the claim or application was made; and
(a) either:
(i)the degree of incapacity of the veteran from war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, is determined under section 21A to be at least 70% or has been so determined by a determination that is in force; or
(ii)the veteran is, because he or she has suffered or is suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis, receiving or entitled to receive a pension at the general rate; and
(b)the veteran is totally and permanently incapacitated, that is to say, the veteran’s incapacity from war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, is of such a nature as, of itself alone, to render the veteran incapable of undertaking remunerative work for periods aggregating more than 8 hours per week; and
(c)the veteran is, by reason of incapacity from that war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, alone, prevented from continuing to undertake remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking and is, by reason thereof, suffering a loss of salary or wages, or of earnings on his or her own account, that the veteran would not be suffering if the veteran were free of that incapacity; and
(d) section 25 does not apply to the veteran.
(2) For the purpose of paragraph (1)(c):
(a)a veteran who is incapacitated from war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, shall not be taken to be suffering a loss of salary or wages, or of earnings on his or her own account, by reason of that incapacity if:
(i)the veteran has ceased to engage in remunerative work for reasons other than his or her incapacity from that war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both; or
(ii)the veteran is incapacitated, or prevented, from engaging in remunerative work for some other reason; and
(b) where a veteran, not being a veteran who has attained the age of 65 years, who has not been engaged in remunerative work satisfies the Commission that he or she has been genuinely seeking to engage in remunerative work, that he or she would, but for that incapacity, be continuing so to seek to engage in remunerative work and that that incapacity is the substantial cause of his or her inability to obtain remunerative work in which to engage, the veteran shall be treated as having been prevented by reason of that incapacity from continuing to undertake remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking.”
Evidence
12.The following documentary exhibits were admitted:
·Exhibit 1 The “T” documents admitted under section 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975
· Exhibit 2 Statement by Dennis Edmonds dated 7 February 2006
· Exhibit 3 Statement by Dennis Edmonds dated 30 June 2006
· Exhibit 4 Statement by Margery Edmonds dated 30 June 2006
· Evidence of the applicant
13. The applicant gave sworn evidence. In examination-in-chief, his Counsel, Mr Anthony Harding, referred the applicant to Exhibits 2 and 3. He stated both of those statements were true and correct. The applicant described his military experience outlined in “Background” above. He further detailed his duties in the Army which were contained in section 2 of Exhibit 3. This revealed approximately six (6) years service in Corps postings in the Royal Australian Infantry and the remainder of his service being in non-Corps postings. In the latter category, he referred to his experience in logistics and stores accounting. He stated his training and his personal skills were in areas that required close attention to detail.
14. At compulsory retirement age of 55, the applicant was asked to extend a further two years. This he did, retiring in 1997 at the age of 57 years. He was happy to be invited to stay on after spending most of his life in the Army and he wanted to continue to work. He left the Army only because of statutory requirement, not because of personal choice.
15. The applicant stated he also intended to continue to work after he left the Army. His goals were to keep working using his military skills and he knew of many other former servicemen who had successfully integrated into “civvy street”. He referred to an example of a former colleague who was then a trainer in the State Emergency Service in New South Wales. He thought his chances of employment after he left the Army would be very good. The Army resettlement scheme paid for him to have a professional resume made up by an expert using non-military jargon. He said he took steps to gain employment and approached employers direct by writing to them and providing his resume. This he commenced doing approximately one month after leaving the Army and settling on the central coast of New South Wales. He sent his resume to Local, State and Federal Government Offices, the New South Wales Police and other employers. He stated he received no replies.
16. The applicant’s evidence was that he was motivated to get work after leaving the Army. He said his superannuation seemed to be enough at first, but he had to convert 40% of it for a deposit on a house. In addition to paying off a mortgage, which came from income of the balance of his superannuation account, he and his wife also supported their youngest son who was an apprentice and living in Sydney. The applicant’s evidence was that accommodation for his youngest son living on an apprentice wage in Sydney was very difficult and he and his wife needed to provide some support to him.
17. The applicant also applied for and secured two positions as a Storeman, but each of these were of short duration. The first was with Clarksons’ “cash and carry” Warehouse. He was there for only one week and said that he became depressed very quickly. He also had osteoarthritis. However, his main difficulty was that he could not establish a relationship with the people with whom he worked. He said it was not a problem of an age difference because he has always worked with young soldiers. But he maintained that from his background, he was hyperactive and could not adjust to the work ethic of the people around him who displayed a lack of diligence. The second position was with Solomon’s Carpets. His duties were to receive, acknowledge and store goods and to later put them in a delivery van. He was not challenged by this work and said it that it could be taught easily to the lowest level of soldier.
18. However, in both these positions, he was “tense and anxious” and was unable to concentrate. He realised then he was going through a transition from leaving the Army. He recalled being competent when he was doing something for which he was well qualified and for which he was challenged intellectually. The applicant gave notice at the end of one week in this second position also and he said that his boss was happy to release him. He indicated that the boss knew that he was not coping with the job or the environment. He said he could not now remember much detail and his doctor had said that that was characteristic of people who suffered depression and post traumatic stress disorder.
19. The applicant stated that during his Army service, his annual confidential reports mentioned from time to time that he was aggressive in his response to soldiers. He said that was whilst working in the Army, but he was not aggressive at home. Such behaviour at home had previously been uncharacteristic of him. However, on leaving the Army, he started to become aggressive at home because of the frustration and the depression which he was then experiencing in finding and mainitaining employment.
20. Counsel then referred the applicant to Exhibit 2 which indicated that the applicant had performed volunteer work at the Copacabana Progress Association. He did this for six to eight hours per week and seemed relatively successful.
21. In cross-examination, he indicated that he did not inform his prospective employers of any medical problems. The applicant stated that any medical difficulties which he had were not a requirement for the jobs for which he applied. He mentioned also however, that he did not apply for any positions through an agency nor through Centrelink. He chose to follow what he understood was the pattern of his former colleagues which was, to approach employers direct.
22. He clearly found work in Clarksons’ Cash and Carry and Solomon’s Carpets as demeaning. That was in early 1998. They were the only jobs he had been successful in obtaining apart from the volunteer work which he did in the Progress Association. He was relatively successful and became President of the Association. He indicated on questioning by the respondent’s advocate that this was a position for which he was voted in and therefore he had six years of a good relationship with the people involved.
23. He more recently moved with his wife to the Glass House Mountains. He has not looked for work since moving there and has almost become a recluse. He had difficulty with his neighbours before they moved to the Glass House Mountains and his wife had virtually insisted that he receive professional help.
24. The applicant stated that on seeking assistance from a psychiatrist, he then was able to understand that what he accepted as a normal part of military life, was in fact, abnormal. He believes he is now suffering trauma although he had not previously defined his military service as his being traumatic and had not identified that he was not coping. He maintained that today he is suffering from war-caused disabilities and he attributes these to the state of his present condition and his inability to obtain and retain employment. After leaving the Army, he stated he did not even apply for a war service pension until relatively recently.
· Evidence of Mrs Margery Edmonds (by telephone)
25. Mrs Edmonds was examined by Mr Harding and acknowledged her statements were true and correct (see exhibit 4; and T28 folio 175-177). The witness stated that financially, the applicant had a pension of $27,000 per annum out of which they had to pay a mortgage and provide rent assistance and support for their son David in Sydney, of approximately $50 per week. She stated they had only about $17,000 per annum to live on. Her husband was keen to obtain work and had always been in work. He had been delighted to work on for an additional two years in the Army which, was not only good for them financially, but their son could stay in the same private school and finish his High School certificate.
26. She said her husband was surprised when he did not get a job easily. Initially, she was not prepared to discuss his mental health with anyone. She regarded it as a personal matter. Ultimately, when she did reveal details she could not talk about it but had to write it down.
27. At home, Mrs Edmonds described the applicant as being difficult to live with and would progressively pick a fight with anyone over the slightest issue. It got to the stage where they could not bear to be together. She gave an example of his challenging one their neighbours who is a senior police officer about his dog barking. She also described an incident where their other neighbour had children in the garden which provoked a further dispute with neighbours. By 1997, she said he had concealed his depression for many years. He then began a downward spiral. Mrs Edmonds stated that she and her husband had not shared a bedroom for a long time and that the applicant now lives in a den which she described as “his little dug-out”. It was not that they did not communicate, but almost every communication sparked an argument. She said his self esteem was so low that he behaved childishly which had not been in his nature previously.
28. The witness again reiterated that her husband wanted to work; he had a very low self esteem; and that he had become very difficult to live with. This had persisted existed from 1998 until just over a year ago when he sought medical help. She stated that she had given him an ultimatum as he was abusing her. She finally typed a letter for him which he took to a psychiatrist about her perceptions also of his behaviour. Since receiving psychiatric treatment over the past 12 months however, he has now become far more bearable to live with.
29.The witness was cross-examined by Mr Kelly.
· Medical Evidence
30. Two psychiatric reports were provided. One was by Dr Jerome L Gelb, Consultant Psychiatrist, dated 14 March 2005 (see T doc folio 110-120) also, psychiatric reports were provided by Dr B Anderson dated 30 May 2005 (T docs, folio 164-166) and a report dated 27 October 2005 (T docs, folio 162-163).
31. Dr Gelb diagnosed the applicant with chronic post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and Alcoholic Dependence/Abuse. Dr Anderson also diagnosed PTSD and secondary alcoholic dependence/abuse, and considered he also had depression, but thought the latter diagnosis was unnecessary as it was integral to the diagnosis of PTSD.
Submissions
32. The applicant’s Counsel provided detailed written submissions. In particular, Counsel referred the Tribunal to the legislative provisions in section 24 as well as significant case law. The respondent’s advocate also made detailed submissions and analysed the significant cases and its application to the facts.
Analysis and Consideration
33. This is a de novo review. As a result, the Tribunal has thoroughly considered all of the relevant evidence, the statutory provisions and case law which are relevant in reaching a decision in this matter.
34. In order to qualify for the special rate, a veteran must be at least 65 years old when the application was made, must have a degree of incapacity of at least 70% and must be incapable of undertaking remunerative work for periods aggregating more than eight hours per week, or suffering a loss of salary or wages that the veteran would be able to earn if he was free of that incapacity. The special rate is not payable if it is shown that the veteran ceased remunerative work for reasons other than incapacity from war-caused injury alone.
35. Section 24(1)(a) of the Act requires that the veteran be in receipt of pension of at least 70% of the General Rate. Section 24(1)(b) of the Act requires that the veteran be incapable of performing remunerative work in excess of eight hours per week. The psychiatric reports support that the applicant satisfies this sub-section. The applicant has submitted, and the respondent has accepted, that both of those sub-sections are satisfied. The point of contention arises as to whether the applicant has satisfied section 24(1)(c). In particular, the question arises as to what is “remunerative work” in the present case and whether the two brief periods of one week working in a warehouse can constitute “remunerative work” for the purposes of the Act.
36. The Full Court of the Federal Court in Flentjar v Repatriation Commission (1997) 48 ALD 1 identified four steps or questions which must be answered when dealing with the issues contained in section 24(1)(c). Branson J, with whom Beaumont and Merkel JJ agreed, said at pages 4-5:
“In my view the issues before the Tribunal in this case were as follows:
1. What was the relevant ‘remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking’ within the meaning of s 24(1)(c) of the Act?
2. Is the veteran, by reason of war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, prevented from continuing to undertake that work?
3. If the answer to question 2 is yes, is the war-caused injury or war-caused disease, or both, the only factor or factors preventing the veteran from continuing to undertake that work?
4. If the answers to questions 2 and 3 are, in each case, yes, is the veteran by reason of being prevented from continuing to undertake that work, suffering a loss of salary, wages or earnings on his own account that he would not be suffering if he were free of that incapacity?”
37. In relation to Question 1, the term “remunerative work” is not a defined term within the Act. But under section 24(1)(c) it refers to “remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking”. It has been held that this is not to be narrowly defined in relation to a particular position but rather, it refers, more broadly to “….the substantive remunerative work that the veteran has undertaken in the past” (see Repatriation Commission v Hendy (2002) 76 ALD 47 at 54). Also, in Repatriation Commission v Van Heteren (2003) 75 ALD 703, where at page 708, Finn J said:
“18. First, the ‘remunerative work’ to which the paragraph refers is the remunerative work undertaken by the veteran before he or she was prevented from continuing to undertake that work. The term, though, does not refer simply to a particular job with a particular employer: Banovich v Repatriation Commission (1986) 69 ALR 395 at 402; nor merely to the last remunerative work undertaken before the veteran’s inability to work became complete: Starcevich v Repatriation Commission (1987) 18 FCR 221 at 225. It signifies the type of work which the veteran previously undertook but which because of war-caused incapacity alone he or she can no longer undertake: Banovich at 402. The Act requires identification of that type of work as part of the veteran’s demonstration that he or she has suffered a real and substantial loss consequent alone upon war-caused incapacity: see Starcevich’s case, at 225. It is that remunerative work and not remunerative work at large with which s 24(1)(c) is concerned”.
38. The Tribunal is satisfied that based on the above judicial reasoning and the applicant’s military training and experience, that warehousing work is related to the logistical training and experience of the applicant. It may not have been of the same level and status of his work in the Army, that was his choice and also, it was the only employment available to him. The Tribunal therefore accepts his two short term periods of employment were “remunerative work” for the purpose of this question.
39. In relation to Question 2 of Flentjar, the Tribunal accepts that the applicant is prevented from continuing to undertake the work for which he regarded himself as being well qualified for. In particular, it has been conceded that section 24(1)(b) is satisfied that the applicant is totally and permanently incapacitated from undertaking work of more than eight hours per week. Whether he is incapacitated by service-related disabilities and is prevented from continuing to undertake that work, it was suggested by the applicant’s solicitors that this is so because of his hearing difficulties, his lumbar spondylosis and because of his post traumatic stress disorder. The Tribunal did not hear any arguments raised about the applicant’s hearing difficulties and none were observed at the hearing. Likewise, the lumbar spondylosis was, by the applicant’s own admission, not particularly relevant for the positions for which he had applied. However, the main issue in this case is whether his post traumatic stress disorder and general intolerance in interpersonal situations was of such a degree that prevents him from continuing to undertake “remunerative work that the veteran was undertaking”.
40. Counsel referred the Tribunal to Repatriation Commission v Sheehy (per Sackville J) (1995) 39 ALD 286 and the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court in relation to whether a short period can satisfy the legislative requirement of undertaking “remunerative work”. As the facts in this case show, the applicant has successfully performed remunerative work in that field previously (in both the British Army and the Australian Army), and had performed it in a technical sense in the two short periods of employment he had after leaving the Army. However, the recent periods of work were not effective performance by virtue of his inability to interact successfully.
41. On the one hand, the Tribunal formed the impression that the applicant, either because of his long military experience or because of a personality trait, was, particularly rigid in his outlook and that the issue was more of a personality factor. However, he also presented as being an extremely polite and personable individual. The evidence of two psychiatrists support that the applicant is incapable of working and it has already been accepted by the respondent that the applicant suffers post traumatic stress disorder. There is also the evidence of the applicant that his annual confidential reports within the Army sometimes described him as being particularly aggressive towards soldiers. His inability to cope with the two positions for which he applied, for more than five days, and the evidence that one of those employers acknowledged that he was not coping and was pleased for him to resign, is consistent with the other evidence of his annual performance reporting history. The applicant’s wife also described him as a person who had not made a transition from military to civilian life and could not integrate effectively into the civilian workforce. The Tribunal accepts that his narrowness and intransigence have their origins largely in his post traumatic stress disorder condition, and this has now prevented him from continuing to undertake relevant remunerative work.
42. In relation to Question 3 of Flentjar’s case, this refers to whether the applicant’s war-caused incapacity is the only factor which prevents him from continuing to undertake remunerative work. If it is not the only factor, then the applicant will, without anything further, be ineligible for pension at the Special Rate.
43. In assessing this question, the Tribunal is guided by the principle espoused by Birchett J in Cavell v Repatriation Commission(1988) 9 AAR 534 at 539. There, his Honour said:
“It is a decision that should not be made on nice philosophical distinctions, but with an eye to reality, and is a matter in respect of which common sense is the proper guide.”
44. The Tribunal is satisfied that Mr Edmond’s depression and post traumatic stress disorder is supported, not only by the assessment of two psychiatrists, but also the evidence of his wife about his aggressive, almost petulant behaviour. While he has in the past few years been able to successfully conduct himself in volunteer work, the Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence demonstrates that the overwhelming cause, “with an eye to reality”, is the war-caused injuries. Question 3 is therefore satisfied.
45. Question 4 of Flentjar’s case is concerned with the second limb of section 24(1)(c). That is, has the veteran’s war-caused incapacity prevented him from continuing to undertake remunerative work and because of that, is the veteran suffering a loss of salary or wages which he would not be suffering if he were free of that incapacity?. In answering this question, regard must be had to section 24(2)(a).
46. Section 24(2)(a) provides that the veteran will not be suffering a loss of salary or wages for the purpose of section 24(1)(c), if:
(1)If the veteran has ceased to engage in remunerative work for reasons other than his war-caused incapacity; or
(2)The veteran is incapacitated or prevented from engaging in remunerative work for some other reason.
47. If either of these conditions are satisfied, the veteran will not be regarded as suffering a loss of salary or wages.
48. In relation to section 24(2)(a)(i), the Tribunal has determined that the Applicant’s psychiatric disability is the principal cause of his inability to continue to engage in remunerative work. The Tribunal finds that the other factual issues raised which resulted in the veteran’s inability to cope and satisfactorily integrate into the workforce since leaving the Army are integral with but subsidiary to the Applicant’s psychiatric condition. Consequently, there are not other reasons referred to in section 24(2)(a)(i) which are relevant.
49. In relation to section 24(2)(a)(ii), the question arises whether there are “some other reasons” for his being prevented from engaging in remunerative work. Counsel for the Applicant submitted that there are not any non-accepted medical conditions which could be relevant apart from his psychiatric condition. He also submitted that age and/or time out of the workforce may be relevant factors. Age 65 or over is “not an irrelevant matter” (see Repatriation Commission v Strickland (1990) 20 ALD 10). However, Counsel for the Applicant argued that as a general principle, these factors may have some validity, but that there is no evidence of their relevance in this case.
50. The Tribunal must be concerned about these other factors as at the date of this application and specifically, between 1998 and the date of the application. There is evidence that the applicant is physically fit and rides a bike for 10 kilometres a day. The Tribunal accepts that there is no evidence to indicate the applicant’s age is a relevant factor or that his time out of the workforce have ever been specifically relevant in his non employment. There is no suggestion that technological skill or any other issue has come into play in preventing the applicant’s re-employment since leaving the Army. His psychiatric disability which has manifested in various personality and interpersonal characteristics, are the only factors which have been raised as being relevant in preventing his employment.
51. The Tribunal has considered the definition of “assessment period” in section 19 and the three matters contained in section 28 (see Chambers v Repatriation Commission 1995 129 ALR 219).
52. The Tribunal is therefore satisfied on the balance of probabilities, the requirements of section 24(1)(c) are satisfied. While the Tribunal formed the view that the applicant’s lack of success was not because of incompetence in any technical skill, the Tribunal also formed the view, however, that the applicant was rigid, intransigent and inflexible. The Tribunal is satisfied that his interpersonal problems associated with these characteristics are attributable, on the evidence, to his psychiatric disability alone. While the effectiveness of his employment search techniques can legitimately be questioned, the Tribunal found the applicant to be a person of truth. The evidence of Mrs Edmonds and the psychiatric evidence was regarded as internally consistent and corroborative of the applicant’s claims.
53. The Tribunal determines that the applicant is entitled to be paid a pension at the Special Rate.
54. The Tribunal sets aside the decision of the Veterans’ Review Board of 29 November 2005, and substitutes in its place, that DENNIS EDMONDS is entitled to be paid disability pension at the Special Rate under section 24 of the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986, with effect from 23 June 2004.
I certify that the 54 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr KS Levy, Member
Signed: J Lauriston
(for) Legal Research OfficerDate/s of Hearing 4 July 2006
Date of Decision 1 August 2006
Counsel for the Applicant Mr A Harding
Solicitor for the Applicant Terry O’Connor
Respondent Mr J Kelly, Departmental advocate
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