FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
EDG16 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 913
Appeal from: EDG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCCA 650 File number(s): VID 214 of 2021 Judgment of: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 7 August 2025 Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing appellant’s application for judicial review of decision of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship – where Minister refused to grant visa and determined appellant was “excluded fast track review applicant” –where appellant previously applied for protection and was refused – definition of “excluded fast track review applicant” – whether “significantly new claims” within definition of “excluded fast track review applicant” – appeal dismissed with costs Legislation: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB
Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth)
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, (1), (a)(iii), 7AA
Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2015 (Cth)
Cases cited: ACM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1051
EDG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCCA 650
Division: General Division Registry: Victoria National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Number of paragraphs: 23 Date of last submission/s: 5 November 2024 Date of hearing: 12 November 2024 Place: Brisbane Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Foster Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Swan Solicitor for the Appellant: Sentil Solicitors Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor ORDERS
VID 214 of 2021 BETWEEN: EDG16
Appellant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 AUGUST 2025
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The name of the respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2.The amended notice of appeal filed on 18 October 2024 be dismissed.
3.The appellant pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
COLLIER J:
Before the Court is an appeal from a decision of a single Judge of the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) in EDG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCCA 650. On 1 April 2021, the FCCA dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of a delegate of the respondent (Minister) made on 12 December 2016. In that decision the Minister refused to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa and also determined that the appellant was an “excluded fast track review applicant” within the meaning of s 5(1) and Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
In these proceedings, the appellant relied on an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 18 October 2024. The appellant pleaded one ground of appeal, namely:
The Lower Court erred when it…
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- Case
- [2025] FCA 913
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue was whether the primary Judge erred in dismissing the appellant's appeal based on the Full Court's decision in FMM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 20. The appellant argued that FMM17 only applied where the claims for asylum made in Australia were the same as or similar to claims previously made in another country. However, the Court held that FMM17 established that the mere fact of a previous unsuccessful claim for protection in another country is sufficient to engage the definition of "excluded fast track review applicant." The Full Court's reasoning, which did not depend on the similarity of the claims, was binding and correctly applied by the primary Judge.
The Court found that the appellant's claims in Australia overlapped with those made in Norway, and the Full Court's interpretation of the statutory definition was not fact-dependent. Therefore, the primary Judge did not err in dismissing the appeal, and the Court dismissed the appellant's appeal with costs. The name of the respondent was amended to "Minister for Immigration and Citizenship," and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The name of the respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.
2. The amended notice of appeal filed on 18 October 2024 be dismissed.
3. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In summary, the respondent submitted:·The appellant met the definition of “excluded fast track applicant” as defined in s 5 of the Migration Act because he had made claims for protection in Norway which had been refused between 2010 and 2012.·The submissions of the appellant were contrary to the Full Court’s decision in FMM17. ·Even if the appellant was making “significant new claims” in Australia, FMM17 makes it clear that it is the mere past act of making a claim for protection in another country which results in a person falling within the definition of excluded fast track applicant.·Nothing in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2015 (Cth) indicates an interpretation of the definition of excluded fast track applicant other than that which the plain words require. Further, a policy document cannot affect the correct interpretation of the Migration Act.·FMM17 makes plain that the definition of excluded fast track review applicant calls for no comparison between the nature or extent of the claims previously made in Norway and later made in Australia.CONSIDERATION Part 7AA of the Migration Act and the definition of “excluded fast track review applicant” in s 5(1) of the Migration Act were repealed by the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth). It does not appear to be in dispute however that the relevant legislative provisions in the Migration Act to which I must direct my attention were those in force prior to those amendments, and that the appeal is to be determined in accordance with the law as it then stood. At the material time s 5(1) of the Migration Act defined “excluded fast track review applicant”, in so far as is presently relevant, as follows:excluded fast track review applicant means a fast track applicant:(a) who, in the opinion of the Minister:...(iii) has made a claim for protection in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country... The key issue in this appeal is whether the primary Judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s appeal on the basis of the decision of the Full Court in FMM17. In particular, the appellant contended that the primary Judge erred in failing to recognise that a visa applicant could only be an excluded fast track review applicant pursuant to the decision in FMM17 in circumstances where the visa applicant’s claims for asylum made in Australia were the same as or similar to claims previously made in another country. A contention by an appellant in very similar terms was examined by Goodman J in ACM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1051 (ACM17). In that case his Honour relevantly observed:17.The essence of the appellant’s argument is that: (1) as a matter of statutory construction the “claim for protection made in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country” must be a claim for protection in the same, or substantially similar, terms to the claim for protection under consideration in Australia; and (2) as a matter of fact, in the present case the evidence does not establish that the protection claims made by the appellant in Germany and the United Kingdom were in the same or substantially similar terms to his claim for protection in Australia.18.The issue of statutory construction was considered by the Full Court in FMM17. In that case, FMM17 was refused a protection visa on the basis that he had made a previous claim for protection in France that had been refused. The Minister’s delegate applied paragraph (a)(iii) of the definition of “excluded fast track review applicant” in s 5(1) of the Act on the basis that it was sufficient that there had been a previous unsuccessful claim for protection, regardless of the degree of congruence, if any, between the previous claim for protection and the claim for protection under consideration. An application for judicial review of the delegate’s decision was dismissed by the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia.19.The Full Court on appeal considered whether, as a matter of statutory construction: (1) it was sufficient that a previous claim for protection had been made in another country and had been refused (as the Minister contended – see 154 ([4] and [8], final sentence); and 157 [21]); or (2) this was insufficient and it was also necessary that the claim for protection made in a country other than Australia have been based upon alleged facts that are materially the same as those relied upon as the basis of the claim for protection made in Australia (as FMM17 contended – see 154 [8]).20.The Full Court held the former construction was correct (at 157 [10] to 160 [34]). In doing so, the Full Court considered and rejected various arguments as to statutory construction which the appellant repeats on this appeal.21.The appellant in the present case does not contend that FMM17 was incorrectly decided. Instead, he seeks to distinguish it. The appellant submits that: (1) FMM17 involved a different factual scenario than the present case in that FMM17’s previous claim for protection made in France and FMM17’s application for protection in Australia were the same; and (2) thus the reasoning of the Full Court on the question of statutory construction did not form part of the ratio decidendi of that decision. That submission must be rejected, for the following reasons.22.First, the ratio decidendi of FMM17 is that the fact that a claim for protection was made in another country and refused is sufficient to engage the expression “... claim for protection made in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country” used in paragraph (a)(iii) of the definition of “excluded fast track review applicant” in s 5(1) of the Act. A corollary is that it is not necessary for the claim for protection made in a country other than Australia to have been based upon alleged facts that are materially the same as those relied upon as the basis of the claim for protection made in Australia.23.Secondly, that ratio decidendi, which involved a question of statutory construction, is not fact dependent.24.Thirdly, in any event, the reasons of the Full Court operate upon the basis that FMM17’s claims for protection in France and in Australia were different. So much is clear from FMM17 at 154 [8]: “The appellant says his claim for protection was based upon new matters that occurred after he returned to Sri Lanka from France and therefore he is not an excluded applicant”.25.Thus, there is no basis upon which to distinguish FMM17. The primary judge was correct to follow that decision.(bold, underlining emphasis added)