EDG16 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

Link copied
Case Copied 18 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

EDG16 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 913 

Appeal from: EDG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCCA 650
File number(s): VID 214 of 2021
Judgment of: COLLIER J
Date of judgment: 7 August 2025
Catchwords: MIGRATION – appeal from decision of Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissing appellant’s application for judicial review of decision of Minister for Immigration and Citizenship – where Minister refused to grant visa and determined appellant was “excluded fast track review applicant” –where appellant previously applied for protection and was refused – definition of “excluded fast track review applicant” – whether “significantly new claims” within definition of “excluded fast track review applicant” – appeal dismissed with costs
Legislation:

Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 15AB

Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 5, (1), (a)(iii), 7AA

Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2015 (Cth)

Cases cited:

ACM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1051

EDG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCCA 650

FMM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 20

Division: General Division
Registry: Victoria
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Number of paragraphs: 23
Date of last submission/s: 5 November 2024
Date of hearing: 12 November 2024
Place: Brisbane
Counsel for the Appellant: Mr G Foster
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr N Swan
Solicitor for the Appellant: Sentil Solicitors
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

VID 214 of 2021
BETWEEN:

EDG16

Appellant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

COLLIER J

DATE OF ORDER:

7 AUGUST 2025

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The name of the respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2.The amended notice of appeal filed on 18 October 2024 be dismissed.

3.The appellant pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

COLLIER J:

  1. Before the Court is an appeal from a decision of a single Judge of the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) in EDG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2021] FCCA 650. On 1 April 2021, the FCCA dismissed the appellant’s application for judicial review of a decision of a delegate of the respondent (Minister) made on 12 December 2016. In that decision the Minister refused to grant the appellant a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa and also determined that the appellant was an “excluded fast track review applicant” within the meaning of s 5(1) and Part 7AA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

  2. In these proceedings, the appellant relied on an Amended Notice of Appeal filed on 18 October 2024. The appellant pleaded one ground of appeal, namely:

    The Lower Court erred when it…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read EDG16 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2025] FCA 913
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellant, a Sri Lankan citizen, appealed against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) dismissing his application for judicial review of a decision of the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. The Minister refused to grant the appellant a visa and determined that he was an "excluded fast track review applicant" under section 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The appellant had previously applied for protection in Norway, which was refused, and subsequently applied for a visa in Australia, claiming he was unable to return to Sri Lanka due to fear of persecution.

The central legal issue was whether the primary Judge erred in dismissing the appellant's appeal based on the Full Court's decision in FMM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 20. The appellant argued that FMM17 only applied where the claims for asylum made in Australia were the same as or similar to claims previously made in another country. However, the Court held that FMM17 established that the mere fact of a previous unsuccessful claim for protection in another country is sufficient to engage the definition of "excluded fast track review applicant." The Full Court's reasoning, which did not depend on the similarity of the claims, was binding and correctly applied by the primary Judge.

The Court found that the appellant's claims in Australia overlapped with those made in Norway, and the Full Court's interpretation of the statutory definition was not fact-dependent. Therefore, the primary Judge did not err in dismissing the appeal, and the Court dismissed the appellant's appeal with costs. The name of the respondent was amended to "Minister for Immigration and Citizenship," and the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The name of the respondent be amended to “Minister for Immigration and Citizenship”.

2. The amended notice of appeal filed on 18 October 2024 be dismissed.

3. The appellant pay the costs of the respondent, to be taxed if not otherwise agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

This ground was extensively particularised, and I shall return to the ground and the particulars later in these reasons.BACKGROUND The appellant is a citizen of Sri Lanka, having been born there in March 1988. The appellant first arrived in Australia on 17 September 2012 as an unauthorised maritime arrival. On 13 December 2015, the appellant applied for a Safe Haven Enterprise (Class XE) (Subclass 790) visa. In support of his visa application, the appellant claimed, inter alia, the following:(a)In 2007, the appellant was attending high school in Jaffna and joined the union that represented the school with the LTTE. The LTTE asked the appellant to give them names of certain students. The appellant became aware that other students performing a similar role had been kidnapped by the Sri Lankan Army.(b)Members of the Army came to the appellant’s area and asked to speak with him. The appellant fled to Vavuniya, discovered it was not safe there, and subsequently fled to Malaysia.(c)The appellant then travelled to Norway. In 2010 he applied for protection in Norway, however his visa application was refused in 2012. The appellant was deported back to Sri Lanka.(d)Upon his return to Sri Lanka, the appellant was interrogated and beaten by the CID. He was released after paying a bribe. While the appellant was in Colombo, two CID officers went to his house in Jaffna and questioned his mother. The CID returned a second time, at which point the appellant decided to leave Sri Lanka for Australia.(e)The appellant cannot return to Sri Lanka because he will be further interrogated and harmed. On 23 August 2016, the Department of Immigration and Border Protection wrote to the appellant and invited him to comment on adverse information that the appellant had made a claim for protection in Norway in 2010 which was refused. By letter dated 20 September 2016, the appellant’s migration agent acknowledged that the appellant had previously made a claim for protection in Norway which had been refused. This letter also indicated that the appellant’s claim for protection in Australia was based on what had happened to him since he was returned to Sri Lanka from Norway. On 12 December 2016, the delegate refused the appellant’s visa application and determined that the appellant was an excluded fast track review applicant under s 5(1) of the Migration Act.DECISION OF THE FCCA On 28 December 2016, the appellant applied to the FCCA for review of the decision of the delegate. In those proceedings, the appellant pressed two grounds, namely:·The delegate erred in finding the appellant was an excluded fast track review applicant under s 5(1) of the Migration Act; and·The delegate erred in not accepting:·The appellant held membership or a position of leadership with the TSU;·The appellant had substantial personal dealing with a LTTE cadre named Crazy; and·The appellant would have been imputed as an affiliate or member of the LTTE. The first ground pressed by the appellant in the FCCA proceedings is the same as pressed in the present matter. In considering the first ground pressed by the appellant in the FCCA, the primary Judge found:10.Consideration of this ground must begin with a review of the definition of ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ within section 5(1) of the Act. The definition relevantly provides that a person will be an ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ if the person is ‘a fast track applicant’ who ‘has made a claim for protection in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country’: see paragraph 5(1)(a)(iii) of the definition of ‘excluded fast track review applicant’.11.It is not in dispute that the Applicant had made a claim for protection previously in Norway and that his claim had been refused. For this reason, the Delegate held that the Applicant was an ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ within the meaning of section 5(1) of the Act.12.In FMM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 20 (‘FMM17’), a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia considered the construction of the term ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ in section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the Act. The Full Court held that the section is to be interpreted as applying even where new claims for protection have arisen after the determination of refugee status in another country and even after the person has returned from the country of rejection to their own country before arriving in Australia: see paragraphs [24]-[34] of the decision in FMM17.13.The Applicant in the present matter accepted that FMM17 was binding on this Court but sought to distinguish it from the facts of this case. The Applicant submitted, in effect, that FMM17 was a decision that arose out of circumstances where the claims being raised in Australia by the appellant were the same as those that had been raised by the appellant in France. In the present matter, it was submitted that the Applicant had made a range of new claims (Court Book 144) and that the Court was therefore not required to follow FMM17.14.I do not accept the Applicant’s contention that the present matter is significantly different from the facts in FMM17. A review of the primary decision, FMM17 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 1500 discloses at paragraph [25] that the Applicant made a submission that ‘the applicant’s present claims for protection occurred after the applicant had been removed from France and that he should not be considered to be an “excluded fast track review applicant’. That is the same situation with which I am confronted.15.I am not persuaded that the present matter is distinguishable from FMM17. In my view I am required to follow FMM17. Given that the Applicant has previously made a claim for protection in Norway that has been refused, and given those claims overlap with claims he advances before me, the Delegate did not fall into error in holding that the Applicant was an ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ as defined in section 5(1) of the Act. This ground of review should therefore be dismissed.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 12 December 2016, the delegate refused the appellant’s visa application and determined that the appellant was an excluded fast track review applicant under s 5(1) of the Migration Act.DECISION OF THE FCCA On 28 December 2016, the appellant applied to the FCCA for review of the decision of the delegate. In those proceedings, the appellant pressed two grounds, namely:·The delegate erred in finding the appellant was an excluded fast track review applicant under s 5(1) of the Migration Act; and·The delegate erred in not accepting:·The appellant held membership or a position of leadership with the TSU;·The appellant had substantial personal dealing with a LTTE cadre named Crazy; and·The appellant would have been imputed as an affiliate or member of the LTTE. The first ground pressed by the appellant in the FCCA proceedings is the same as pressed in the present matter. In considering the first ground pressed by the appellant in the FCCA, the primary Judge found:10.Consideration of this ground must begin with a review of the definition of ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ within section 5(1) of the Act. The definition relevantly provides that a person will be an ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ if the person is ‘a fast track applicant’ who ‘has made a claim for protection in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country’: see paragraph 5(1)(a)(iii) of the definition of ‘excluded fast track review applicant’.11.It is not in dispute that the Applicant had made a claim for protection previously in Norway and that his claim had been refused. For this reason, the Delegate held that the Applicant was an ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ within the meaning of section 5(1) of the Act.12.In FMM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 20 (‘FMM17’), a Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia considered the construction of the term ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ in section 5(1)(a)(iii) of the Act. The Full Court held that the section is to be interpreted as applying even where new claims for protection have arisen after the determination of refugee status in another country and even after the person has returned from the country of rejection to their own country before arriving in Australia: see paragraphs [24]-[34] of the decision in FMM17.13.The Applicant in the present matter accepted that FMM17 was binding on this Court but sought to distinguish it from the facts of this case. The Applicant submitted, in effect, that FMM17 was a decision that arose out of circumstances where the claims being raised in Australia by the appellant were the same as those that had been raised by the appellant in France. In the present matter, it was submitted that the Applicant had made a range of new claims (Court Book 144) and that the Court was therefore not required to follow FMM17.14.I do not accept the Applicant’s contention that the present matter is significantly different from the facts in FMM17. A review of the primary decision, FMM17 v Minister for Immigration [2019] FCCA 1500 discloses at paragraph [25] that the Applicant made a submission that ‘the applicant’s present claims for protection occurred after the applicant had been removed from France and that he should not be considered to be an “excluded fast track review applicant’. That is the same situation with which I am confronted.15.I am not persuaded that the present matter is distinguishable from FMM17. In my view I am required to follow FMM17. Given that the Applicant has previously made a claim for protection in Norway that has been refused, and given those claims overlap with claims he advances before me, the Delegate did not fall into error in holding that the Applicant was an ‘excluded fast track review applicant’ as defined in section 5(1) of the Act. This ground of review should therefore be dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In summary, the respondent submitted:·The appellant met the definition of “excluded fast track applicant” as defined in s 5 of the Migration Act because he had made claims for protection in Norway which had been refused between 2010 and 2012.·The submissions of the appellant were contrary to the Full Court’s decision in FMM17. ·Even if the appellant was making “significant new claims” in Australia, FMM17 makes it clear that it is the mere past act of making a claim for protection in another country which results in a person falling within the definition of excluded fast track applicant.·Nothing in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2015 (Cth) indicates an interpretation of the definition of excluded fast track applicant other than that which the plain words require. Further, a policy document cannot affect the correct interpretation of the Migration Act.·FMM17 makes plain that the definition of excluded fast track review applicant calls for no comparison between the nature or extent of the claims previously made in Norway and later made in Australia.CONSIDERATION Part 7AA of the Migration Act and the definition of “excluded fast track review applicant” in s 5(1) of the Migration Act were repealed by the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth). It does not appear to be in dispute however that the relevant legislative provisions in the Migration Act to which I must direct my attention were those in force prior to those amendments, and that the appeal is to be determined in accordance with the law as it then stood. At the material time s 5(1) of the Migration Act defined “excluded fast track review applicant”, in so far as is presently relevant, as follows:excluded fast track review applicant means a fast track applicant:(a) who, in the opinion of the Minister:...(iii) has made a claim for protection in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country... The key issue in this appeal is whether the primary Judge erred in dismissing the appellant’s appeal on the basis of the decision of the Full Court in FMM17. In particular, the appellant contended that the primary Judge erred in failing to recognise that a visa applicant could only be an excluded fast track review applicant pursuant to the decision in FMM17 in circumstances where the visa applicant’s claims for asylum made in Australia were the same as or similar to claims previously made in another country. A contention by an appellant in very similar terms was examined by Goodman J in ACM17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1051 (ACM17). In that case his Honour relevantly observed:17.The essence of the appellant’s argument is that: (1) as a matter of statutory construction the “claim for protection made in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country” must be a claim for protection in the same, or substantially similar, terms to the claim for protection under consideration in Australia; and (2) as a matter of fact, in the present case the evidence does not establish that the protection claims made by the appellant in Germany and the United Kingdom were in the same or substantially similar terms to his claim for protection in Australia.18.The issue of statutory construction was considered by the Full Court in FMM17. In that case, FMM17 was refused a protection visa on the basis that he had made a previous claim for protection in France that had been refused. The Minister’s delegate applied paragraph (a)(iii) of the definition of “excluded fast track review applicant” in s 5(1) of the Act on the basis that it was sufficient that there had been a previous unsuccessful claim for protection, regardless of the degree of congruence, if any, between the previous claim for protection and the claim for protection under consideration. An application for judicial review of the delegate’s decision was dismissed by the (then) Federal Circuit Court of Australia.19.The Full Court on appeal considered whether, as a matter of statutory construction: (1) it was sufficient that a previous claim for protection had been made in another country and had been refused (as the Minister contended – see 154 ([4] and [8], final sentence); and 157 [21]); or (2) this was insufficient and it was also necessary that the claim for protection made in a country other than Australia have been based upon alleged facts that are materially the same as those relied upon as the basis of the claim for protection made in Australia (as FMM17 contended – see 154 [8]).20.The Full Court held the former construction was correct (at 157 [10] to 160 [34]). In doing so, the Full Court considered and rejected various arguments as to statutory construction which the appellant repeats on this appeal.21.The appellant in the present case does not contend that FMM17 was incorrectly decided. Instead, he seeks to distinguish it. The appellant submits that: (1) FMM17 involved a different factual scenario than the present case in that FMM17’s previous claim for protection made in France and FMM17’s application for protection in Australia were the same; and (2) thus the reasoning of the Full Court on the question of statutory construction did not form part of the ratio decidendi of that decision. That submission must be rejected, for the following reasons.22.First, the ratio decidendi of FMM17 is that the fact that a claim for protection was made in another country and refused is sufficient to engage the expression “... claim for protection made in a country other than Australia that was refused by that country” used in paragraph (a)(iii) of the definition of “excluded fast track review applicant” in s 5(1) of the Act. A corollary is that it is not necessary for the claim for protection made in a country other than Australia to have been based upon alleged facts that are materially the same as those relied upon as the basis of the claim for protection made in Australia.23.Secondly, that ratio decidendi, which involved a question of statutory construction, is not fact dependent.24.Thirdly, in any event, the reasons of the Full Court operate upon the basis that FMM17’s claims for protection in France and in Australia were different. So much is clear from FMM17 at 154 [8]: “The appellant says his claim for protection was based upon new matters that occurred after he returned to Sri Lanka from France and therefore he is not an excluded applicant”.25.Thus, there is no basis upon which to distinguish FMM17. The primary judge was correct to follow that decision.(bold, underlining emphasis added)