FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Edensor Nominees Pty Ltd v Australian Securities & Investments Commission [1999] FCA 1722
FEDERAL COURT – Jurisdiction – Primary judge found contraventions of Corporations Law and Trade Practices Act – Orders made pursuant to ss 737 and 739 of Corporations Law – Corporations Law confers power to make orders on “court” – “court” defined to include Federal Court when exercising State jurisdiction – Whether jurisdiction to make orders in view of decision in Wakim that State jurisdiction cannot be conferred on federal courts – Accrued jurisdiction – Whether single justiciable controversy – Whether accrued jurisdiction is federal or State jurisdiction – Whether power to make orders under s 39B of Judiciary Act or s 22 of Federal Court Act.
Corporations Law ss 58AA, 615, 737, 739
Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) s 22
Judiciary Act 1903 s 39BTrade Practices Act 1974 s 52
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally (1999) 163 ALR 270 cited
Stack v Coast Securities (No 9) Pty Ltd (1983) 154 CLR 261 applied
Fencott v Muller (1983) 152 CLR 570 applied
Gould v Brown (1998) 193 CLR 346 cited
Smith v Smith (1986) 161 CLR 217 considered
Rochester Communications Group Pty Ltd v Adler (1996) 65 FCR 572 cited
Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (1998) 153 ALR 643 cited
Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd (1981) 148 CLR 457 applied
National Parks and Wildlife Service v Stables Perisher Pty Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 573 cited
McLeish v Faure (1979) 40 FLR 462 citedThomson Australian Holdings Pty Ltd v Trade Practices Commission (1981) 148 CLR 150 cited
EDENSOR NOMINEES PTY LTD v AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION, YANDAL GOLD PTY LTD, YANDAL GOLD HOLDINGS PTY LTD, NORMANDY MINING LIMITED, NORMANDY MINING FINANCE LTD, NORMANDY CONSOLIDATED GOLD HOLDINGS PTY LTD and NORMANDY MINING HOLDINGS PTY LTD
V 352 OF 1999
HILL, SUNDBERG and MANSFIELD JJ
10 DECEMBER 1999
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V352 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
EDENSOR NOMINEES PTY LTD
ApplicantAND:
AUSTRALIAN SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS COMMISSION
First RespondentYANDAL GOLD PTY LTD
Second RespondentYANDAL GOLD HOLDINGS PTY LTD
Third RespondentNORMANDY MINING LIMITED
Fourth RespondentNORMANDY MINING FINANCE LTD
Fifth RespondentNORMANDY CONSOLIDATED GOLD HOLDINGS PTY LTD
Sixth RespondentNORMANDY MINING HOLDINGS PTY LTD
Seventh Respondent
JUDGE:
HILL, SUNDBERG and MANSFIELD JJ
DATE:
10 DECEMBER 1999
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
THE COURT:
On 12 January 1999 Yandal Gold Pty Ltd (“Yandal Gold”), the second respondent, served on Great Central Mines Ltd (“Great Central Mines”), a company listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, a takeover offer for all of the 308,960,662 shares on issue in Great Central Mines and a Part A statement in relation thereto. The offer was pitched at $1.50 per share.
Yandal Gold was a wholly owned subsidiary of Yandal Gold Holdings Ltd (“Yandal Gold Holdings”), the third respondent. The shares in Yandal Gold Holdings were owned as to…
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- Case
- [1999] FCA 1722
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether the Corporations Law conferred the necessary power to make orders on the "court," which was defined to include the Federal Court when exercising state jurisdiction. The issue hinged on whether the state jurisdiction could be conferred on the federal court in light of the decision in Wakim, which held that such jurisdiction could not be conferred. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the accrued jurisdiction was federal or state, and whether the power to make the orders was pursuant to section 39B of the Judiciary Act or section 22 of the Federal Court Act.
The court found that while the primary judge did not have the jurisdiction to make the orders, the Federal Court did have jurisdiction to make the orders under section 39B of the Judiciary Act. The court reasoned that the accrued jurisdiction was federal, and therefore the Federal Court had the necessary power to make the orders. The court held that the jurisdiction to make such orders was indeed vested in the Federal Court, despite the initial findings by the primary judge.
As a result of the court's determination, it confirmed that the Federal Court had the jurisdiction to make the orders under the relevant sections of the Judiciary Act. This decision clarified the jurisdictional boundaries between federal and state courts in matters involving orders under the Corporations Law and Trade Practices Act.
Background
Background to the litigation
The Corporations Law specifically confers the power to make these orders on a "court," with the definition of "court" including the Federal Court when exercising State jurisdiction. This jurisdictional aspect forms a significant part of the dispute, particularly in light of the decision in Wakim v Re, which held that State jurisdiction cannot be conferred on federal courts. The case therefore raises questions about the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to make the orders in question, and whether the court has accrued jurisdiction over the matter.
The matter came before the Federal Court following the primary judge's decision that Edensor Nominees had contravened the Corporations Law and Trade Practices Act. This led to the primary judge making orders under sections 737 and 739 of the Corporations Law. Edensor Nominees sought to challenge the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to make these orders, arguing that the decision in Wakim v Re precluded the Federal Court from exercising State jurisdiction. The case proceeded to the Federal Court, where the central issue was whether the court had the jurisdiction to make the orders in question. The court considered the definition of "court" in the Corporations Law, the implications of the Wakim decision, and the nature of the accrued jurisdiction in the case.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to make orders under sections 737 and 739 of the Corporations Law can be conferred when exercising State jurisdiction, in light of the decision in Wakim v Re.
2. Whether the Federal Court has accrued jurisdiction over the matter to make the orders.
3. If accrued jurisdiction exists, whether it is classified as federal or State jurisdiction.
4. Whether the power to make the orders is under section 39B of the Judiciary Act or section 22 of the Federal Court Act.
Held
1. The court held that the jurisdiction of the Federal Court to make orders under sections 737 and 739 of the Corporations Law can be conferred when exercising State jurisdiction, despite the decision in Wakim v Re.
2. The court found that the Federal Court had accrued jurisdiction over the matter to make the orders.
3. The accrued jurisdiction was classified as State jurisdiction.
4. The court concluded that the power to make the orders was under section 39B of the Judiciary Act.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court began by considering the language of sections 737 and 739 of the Corporations Law, which confer power on the "court" to make certain orders. The term "court" was defined to include the Federal Court when exercising State jurisdiction. The court noted the decision in Wakim v Re, which held that State jurisdiction cannot be conferred on federal courts. However, the court distinguished Wakim on the grounds that the orders in question were made pursuant to a statute which expressly authorised the Federal Court to make them when exercising State jurisdiction. The court found that the Federal Court had accrued jurisdiction over the matter, as the controversy had arisen under the State law but the Federal Court had been called upon to exercise its concurrent federal jurisdiction. The court held that the accrued jurisdiction was classified as State jurisdiction, as it arose from the State law under which the contraventions were found. Finally, the court considered whether the power to make the orders was under section 39B of the Judiciary Act or section 22 of the Federal Court Act. The court concluded that the power arose under section 39B, as it was ancillary to the Federal Court's exercise of its original jurisdiction under section 39A of the Judiciary Act. The ratio decidendi of this case is that the Federal Court can be conferred with jurisdiction to make orders under sections 737 and 739 of the Corporations Law when exercising State jurisdiction, and that such jurisdiction is classified as State jurisdiction. The court followed the decision in Wakim insofar as it held that State jurisdiction cannot be conferred on federal courts, but distinguished it on the grounds that the orders in question were authorised by statute. The court also departed from prior authority in finding that accrued jurisdiction can arise from the exercise of State jurisdiction by the Federal Court.