ED and ID
[2015] WASAT 123
•29 OCTOBER 2015
ED and ID [2015] WASAT 123
| STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL | Citation No: | [2015] WASAT 123 | |
| 02/11/2015 | |||
| GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA) | |||
| Case No: | GAA:3561/2015 | 29 OCTOBER 2015 | |
| Coram: | JUDGE D R PARRY (DEPUTY PRESIDENT) MR J MANSVELD (SENIOR MEMBER) MS D QUINLAN (MEMBER) | 29/10/15 | |
| 14 | Judgment Part: | 1 of 1 | |
| Result: | Application for review dismissed Determination to dismiss application by applicant for filing and service of records and accounts by respondents affirmed | ||
| B | |||
| PDF Version |
| Parties: | ED ID LD-G |
Catchwords: | Practice and procedure Extension of time in which to seek review by Full Tribunal of determination dismissing application for records and accounts kept by donees of dealings and transactions in connection with enduring power of attorney Whether 'good reason' for making request out of time Whether applicant has a 'proper interest' in the matter Whether some reason requiring or justifying order for filing and service of records and accounts |
Legislation: | Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 3(1) ('determination'), s 17A, s 17A(1), s 17A(2), s 109(1), s 109(1)(a), s 109(1)(b) State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27 |
Case References: | Di Virgilio v McCleary (2012) WASC 437 EW [2010] WASAT 91; (2010) 72 SR (WA) 49 KS [2008] WASAT 29 |
Summary | The applicant applied for an extension of time in which to seek review by a Full Tribunal of a determination of a single member to dismiss the applicant's application for intervention in relation to an enduring power of attorney (EPA) by which the applicant's mother appointed his brother and sister to be her attorneys. The donor had passed away. The applicant sought an order that the donees file with the Tribunal and serve on him a copy of all records and accounts kept by them of dealings and transactions made by them in connection with the EPA. He alleged that the donees had transferred all the donor's property into their possession and control and used the property for their own benefit.,The Full Tribunal determined that the applicant had 'good reason' for making the request for review 33 days out of time, as he had written to the Tribunal about a week after the determination indicating that he wished to 'appeal' once he had accessed the transcript or the recording of the hearing and he sought review within a reasonable period after receiving the full recording.,However, the Tribunal dismissed the application for review, because the applicant did not have a 'proper reason' in the matter and there was no reason requiring or justifying an order requiring the donees to file with the Tribunal and serve on the applicant a copy of all records and accounts kept by the donees of dealings and transactions in connection with the EPA.,The applicant did not have a proper interest in the matter, because he had no relationship with his mother during the last 15 years of her life (during which period she executed the EPA and it operated, and when she was diagnosed with Alzheimer's dementia and subsequently deteriorated significantly), he had no interest in his mother's deceased estate, and he did not present any cogent evidence in support of his allegations. On the evidence before it, the Full Tribunal did not have any concern in relation to the operation of the EPA such as would justify or require an order for the filing and service of accounts and records. |
JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL ACT : GUARDIANSHIP AND ADMINISTRATION ACT 1990 (WA) CITATION : ED and ID [2015] WASAT 123 MEMBER : JUDGE D R PARRY (DEPUTY PRESIDENT)
- MR J MANSVELD (SENIOR MEMBER)
MS D QUINLAN (MEMBER)
- GAA 3562 of 2015
- Applicant
AND
ID
LD-G
Respondents
Catchwords:
Practice and procedure Extension of time in which to seek review by Full Tribunal of determination dismissing application for records and accounts kept by donees of dealings and transactions in connection with enduring power of attorney Whether 'good reason' for making request out of time Whether applicant has a 'proper interest' in the matter Whether some reason requiring or justifying order for filing and service of records and accounts
Legislation:
Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA), s 3(1) ('determination'), s 17A, s 17A(1), s 17A(2), s 109(1), s 109(1)(a), s 109(1)(b)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 27
Result:
Application for review dismissed
Determination to dismiss application by applicant for filing and service of records and accounts by respondents affirmed
Summary of Tribunal's decision:
The applicant applied for an extension of time in which to seek review by a Full Tribunal of a determination of a single member to dismiss the applicant's application for intervention in relation to an enduring power of attorney (EPA) by which the applicant's mother appointed his brother and sister to be her attorneys. The donor had passed away. The applicant sought an order that the donees file with the Tribunal and serve on him a copy of all records and accounts kept by them of dealings and transactions made by them in connection with the EPA. He alleged that the donees had transferred all the donor's property into their possession and control and used the property for their own benefit.
The Full Tribunal determined that the applicant had 'good reason' for making the request for review 33 days out of time, as he had written to the Tribunal about a week after the determination indicating that he wished to 'appeal' once he had accessed the transcript or the recording of the hearing and he sought review within a reasonable period after receiving the full recording.
However, the Tribunal dismissed the application for review, because the applicant did not have a 'proper reason' in the matter and there was no reason requiring or justifying an order requiring the donees to file with the Tribunal and serve on the applicant a copy of all records and accounts kept by the donees of dealings and transactions in connection with the EPA.
The applicant did not have a proper interest in the matter, because he had no relationship with his mother during the last 15 years of her life (during which period she executed the EPA and it operated, and when she was diagnosed with Alzheimer's dementia and subsequently deteriorated significantly), he had no interest in his mother's deceased estate, and he did not present any cogent evidence in support of his allegations. On the evidence before it, the Full Tribunal did not have any concern in relation to the operation of the EPA such as would justify or require an order for the filing and service of accounts and records.
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant : In Person
Respondents : In Person
Solicitors:
Applicant : N/A
Respondents : N/A
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Di Virgilio v McCleary (2012) WASC 437
EW [2010] WASAT 91; (2010) 72 SR (WA) 49
KS [2008] WASAT 29
1 The following are the reasons for decision of the Tribunal in proceedings GAA 3561 of 2015 and GAA 3562 of 2015, brought by Mr ED.
Introduction
2 Mr ED (applicant) has applied for an extension of time in which to seek review by a Full Tribunal under s 17A of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) (GA Act) of the determination made by a single member of the Tribunal, Ms Lisa Eddy, on 11 June 2015, to dismiss the applicant's application for intervention in relation to an enduring power of attorney (EPA) under s 109(1) of the GA Act. The application for review was made by the applicant on 12 August 2015 and is therefore 33 days out of time.
3 As only a Full Tribunal can extend time when it considers that there is 'good reason' to do so under s 17A(2) of the GA Act, on 26 August 2015, Judge Parry listed the application for an extension of time for hearing today concurrently with the application for review of the determination if an extension of time is granted by the Full Tribunal.
Background
4 Mrs MRD (donor) was born on 23 November 1923. She married and subsequently had 12 children. The donor was widowed in 1981. On 3 August 2001, the donor made a will. On 14 May 2002, the donor executed the EPA appointing two of her children, Mr ID and Ms LDG (donees), as her donees. The EPA was witnessed by Mr AB, a legal practitioner, who prepared the document.
5 Shortly before the donor made the EPA, on 8 April 2002, she was apparently diagnosed as suffering from Alzheimer's type dementia. However, there is no evidence before the Tribunal that the donor lacked capacity to execute the EPA at the time she did so.
6 The donor sadly passed away in September 2013.
7 On 17 December 2014, the applicant, who is a son of the donor, applied to the Tribunal under s 109(1)(a) and s 109(1)(b) of the GA Act for orders requiring the donees to file with the Tribunal and serve on him, a copy of all records and accounts kept by them in connection with the EPA in terms of their dealings and transactions and requiring that such records and accounts be audited by an auditor appointed by the Tribunal. In the application, the applicant also sought orders that were clearly misconceived and outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, for compensation and damages and for the return of personal items of the donor allegedly removed from a safety deposit box.
8 In a statement of issues, facts and contentions filed by the applicant on 11 May 2015, he alleged that the donees 'transferred all [the donor's] property into their possession and control and used the property for their own benefit'. In particular, the applicant alleged that, on 16 August 2004, the donees transferred the donor's residential property at [address] into the name of [DH] Pty Ltd. However, the statement of issues, facts and contentions itself also said that while Ms LDG is a director of [DH] Pty Ltd, it is a trustee company for the [D] family trust which is a trust for the benefit of the donor's grandchildren, not for the benefit of the donees or for any other of the children of the donor. In his statement of issues, facts and contentions, the applicant also alleged that the donees 'transferred all other assets held by the Donor into their names'. However, the applicant did not present any cogent evidence to the single member or to the Full Tribunal which supports that allegation.
9 At the hearing on 11 June 2015, the applicant referred also to a safety deposit box and jewellery of the donor and expressed concern about the acquisition of that property of the donor by the donees. Further evidence about that was given today and we will refer to that in these reasons subsequently.
Legislative framework
10 Section 109(1) of the GA Act states in part as follows:
A person who has, in the opinion of the State Administrative Tribunal, a proper interest in the matter may apply to the Tribunal for an order
(a) requiring the donee of an enduring power of attorney to file with the Tribunal and serve on the applicant a copy of all records and accounts kept by the donee of dealings and transactions made by him in connection with the power;
(b) requiring such records and accounts to be audited by an auditor appointed by the Tribunal and requiring a copy of the report of the auditor to be furnished to the Tribunal and the applicant for the order[.]
11 As the inaugural President of the Tribunal, Justice Barker, held in KS [2008] WASAT 29 at [26] and following, s 109(1) of the GA Act confers a supervisory jurisdiction upon the Tribunal in respect of the conduct of donees of EPA's and indeed, as his Honour held, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal continues even if the donor of the EPA is deceased (at [29] [36]). That is because the donee or donees remain accountable for their dealings and transactions undertaken in connection with the power.
12 Section 17A of the GA Act states as follows:
(1) Where the State Administrative Tribunal consisting of one member makes any determination, a party who is aggrieved by the determination may request the President to arrange for a Full Tribunal to review the determination, and the President shall comply with any such request.
(2) A request under subsection (1) is to be made within 28 days of the date of the determination or, if the Full Tribunal considers there is good reason for making the request outside that time, such further time as the Full Tribunal allows.
13 The term 'determination's is defined in s 3(1) of the GA Act to include 'the making of, or refusal to make, an order under section … 109 …'.
14 Finally, s 27 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act) concerns the nature of review proceedings including review proceedings under s 17A of the GA Act. Section 27 of the SAT Act states as follows:
(1) The review of a reviewable decision is to be by way of a hearing de novo, and it is not confined to matters that were before the decisionmaker but may involve the consideration of new material whether or not it existed at the time the decision was made.
(2) The purpose of the review is to produce the correct and preferable decision at the time of the decision upon the review.
(3) The reasons for decision provided by the decisionmaker, or any grounds for review set out in the application, do not limit the Tribunal in conducting a proceeding for the review of a decision.
Issues for determination
15 The following four issues arise for determination or, more correctly depending on the determination of certain of those issues, potentially arise for determination in this matter:
1) Whether there is 'good reason' for making the request for a review of the determination made on 11 June 2015 out of time under s 17A(2) of the GA Act.
2) If the answer to issue 1 is 'yes', whether the applicant has a 'proper interest' in the matter for the purposes of s 109(1) of the GA Act.
3) If the answer to issue 2 is 'yes', whether there is, in the circumstances of the case, some reason requiring or justifying an order under s 109(1)(a) of the GA Act requiring the donees of the EPA to file with the Tribunal and serve on the applicant, a copy of all records and accounts kept by the donees of dealings and transactions made by them in connection with the EPA.
4) If the answer to issue 3 is 'yes', whether an order should be made under s 109(1)(b) of the GA Act requiring the records and accounts kept by the donees of dealings and transactions made by them in connection with the EPA to be audited by an auditor appointed by the Tribunal and requiring a copy of the report of the auditor to be furnished to the Tribunal and to the applicant.
16 We will address each of these issues in turn.
Is there 'good reason' for making the request out of time?
17 The expression 'good reason' in s 17A(2) of the GA Act is not defined in the GA Act. Some guidance in relation to the power of the Full Tribunal to grant an extension of time is provided in the decision of Justice Hall in Di Virgilio v McCleary [2012] WASC 437 at [38] [39] as follows:
The power to grant an extension of time to commence proceedings is generally discretionary in nature. The use of the word 'may' in r [10] [of the State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA)] confirms the existence of a discretion here. Whether the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant in any case depends on an assessment of the particular facts and circumstances.
The discretion exists for the sole purpose of enabling a court or tribunal to do justice between the parties. It can only be exercised in favour of an applicant upon proof that strict compliance with the rules will work an injustice upon the applicant. In order to determine whether there would be an injustice it is necessary to have regard to the history of the proceedings, the conduct of the parties, the nature of the litigation and the consequences for the parties of the grant or refusal of the application for an extension of time: Gallo v Dawson [1990] HCA 30; (1990) 93 ALR 479, 459 (McHugh J).
18 In the circumstances of this case, the application for review was made 33 days out of time. However, on 19 June 2015, that is about a week after the determination was made, the applicant wrote to the Tribunal indicating that he wished to 'appeal' the decision of the single member once he had accessed the transcript or the recording of the hearing on 11 June 2015. Although the Tribunal provided a copy of the recording, or at least provided a copy of part of the recording of the hearing, it for some reason did not include the full hearing. The applicant requested the full recording and in late July 2015 the Tribunal provided it. The application was then filed on 12 August 2015.
19 In those circumstances, we find that there is good reason for making the request out of time, in particular the applicant clearly indicated within the 28 day period for an application that he intended to seek review and provided a reasonable explanation of why he did not commence the application for review within time. He then proceeded to seek review within a reasonable period of time after being given the full recording. In the circumstances, we consider that strict compliance with the 28 day period for the commencement of an application for review will work an injustice upon the applicant and we therefore as a Full Tribunal extend time.
Does the applicant have a 'proper interest' in the matter?
20 In the decision of EW [2010] WASAT 91; (2010) 72 SR (WA) 49 (EW), the Tribunal at [27] [28] considered the meaning and purpose of the expression 'proper interest'. The Tribunal said the following at [27] [28]:
Although ultimately to be decided on a case by case basis, the above authorities provide some guidance on how the words 'proper interest' may be interpreted for the purposes of s 109 of the GA Act. Given the Tribunal's general supervisory role in the conduct of enduring powers of attorney, it is our view that the qualification intended by 'proper interest' should not be restrictively applied.
The applicant is the son of the late donor and a beneficiary under her will. He alleges that a significant amount of money was misappropriated during the period the enduring power of attorney was in force from its execution on 22 July 2004 to the death of EW on 29 March 2008. We are satisfied that the application is not 'frivolous or vexatious or merely prurient' and that the applicant's interest is established as a 'proper interest' by virtue of his relationship to the donor, his interest in her estate and, because of the allegations made, a public interest in ensuring that attorneys under enduring powers of attorney fulfil their obligations.
21 The applicant in this case conceded in his evidence that during the final 15 years of his mother's life, from 1998 until her passing in September 2013, he had no contact at all with his mother. He did not see her; he did not speak to her. He said that he left the family home in 1998 as a result of the request of his mother as expressed to him by two of his siblings. He said that he was hurt. He lived for the next 15 years in the same suburb as the donor, as he said, within about a two minute drive; however throughout that whole period he did not see or talk to his mother. He said that he did visit the family home or at least go to the family home on occasion in order to speak to his brother, Mr AD, and did so on occasion, but never entered the house. Mr AD confirmed that aspect of the applicant's evidence.
22 During the period that the applicant had no contact with his mother, she executed the EPA and the EPA operated.
23 Furthermore, during that same period the donor unfortunately as we have said, was diagnosed with Alzheimer's type dementia and as the medical evidence before the Tribunal demonstrates, her condition deteriorated during the period particularly after October 2004. Whereas the donor had a Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) score of 22/30 in 2002, April 2003 and October 2004, by April 2007 her MMSE score had reduced to 11/30 and by November 2008 sadly to 7/30, demonstrating a significant decline in her cognitive function, particularly during the period after October 2004.
24 As we noted earlier, on 3 August 2001, the donor made a will. Under that will she appointed her sons, Mr AD and Mr ID, as the executors and left her deceased estate to those sons subject to a trust in favour of her daughter, Ms PD, to enable Ms PD to reside in the house during her life. The will shows that the donor did not place trust and confidence in the applicant and that the applicant did not benefit under the will.
25 Finally in relation to whether there is a proper interest, we note that although the applicant has made, in his statement of issues facts and contentions, serious allegations in relation to the operation of the EPA, the statement of issues, facts and contentions itself concedes that the principal impugned transaction was to a trustee company for the benefit, not of the donees but for the donor's grandchildren. Furthermore, the evidence that we will refer to subsequently in these reasons shows that that transaction was entered into directly by the donor and not by the donees. Although the applicant has made other serious allegations against the donees, he has not presented any cogent evidence in support of those allegations.
26 In those circumstances, given that the applicant had no relationship with his mother during her final 15 years, when she executed the EPA and it operated and when she was diagnosed with Alzheimer's dementia and deteriorated significantly, given further that he has no interest in her deceased estate and given that he has not presented any cogent evidence in support of his allegations, we find that the applicant does not have a proper interest in the matter.
Is there a reason requiring or justifying intervention in the EPA?
27 Strictly speaking it is unnecessary to determine this issue given our finding that the applicant does not have a proper interest in the matter. Having a proper interest in the matter is a condition precedent to consideration of this issue. However, given that we have conducted a hearing in relation to all issues and given that the parties have made submissions in relation to all issues, we will determine this issue.
28 In relation to the question of whether there is a reason requiring or justifying intervention, the Tribunal in EW said at [94]:
The Tribunal should exercise its supervisory authority (the discretion to require records and accounts to be filed and audited), '… if circumstances require it' (KS at [47]). When would that be? It is clearly not sufficient that an order be made simply upon the making of an application by a person with a proper interest. To do so would obviate the discretion available to the Tribunal. An enduring power of attorney is an essentially private agreement between the donor and donee, and the transactions undertaken pursuant to that agreement should not be scrutinised unless there is reason to do so. That said, the threshold for making an order under s 109 of the GA Act should not be set so high as to compromise the general supervisory role given to the Tribunal in the conduct of attorneys. This is particularly so as attorneys are required to keep and preserve accurate records and accounts of the dealings and transactions made by them (s 107(1)(b) of the GA Act).
29 The Tribunal then referred to several court decisions in relation to circumstances in which courts will supervise or enquire into the conduct of trustees in bankruptcy or liquidators and the Tribunal then said the following at [101]:
Using the language of the authorities as a guide and with reference to the general supervisory role of the Tribunal in respect of the conduct of donees of enduring powers of attorney, is there in the case before us something which requires an inquiry, and is there a sufficient basis for making an order for an audit of the records and accounts kept by the granddaughter of dealings and transactions made by her as attorney for EW?
30 We respectfully adopt the analysis of the Tribunal in EW.
31 The question for the Full Tribunal in this matter is whether there is in the case before us something which requires an inquiry. As noted earlier, the applicant, in his statement of issues, facts and contentions, raised as his primary concern the transfer of the property at [address] on 16 August 2004. However, that transaction and that transfer was undertaken directly by the donor and not by the donees under the EPA. Furthermore, the transferor was not the donees as alleged, but rather a trustee company operating a trust which benefits the donor's grandchildren, not the donees or the other children of the donor.
32 Although the donor was diagnosed with Alzheimer's dementia about 28 months before the transfer of the property to the trust company and although a medical report of a geriatric psychiatrist, Dr NL, dated 13 October 2004 records that one of the donor's daughters advised that 'the family is observing a steady progression of [the donor's] cognitive impairment … especially [relating] to [the donor's] shortterm memory', the MMSE conducted on 10 October 2004 as we have said earlier, had the same score of 22/30 as such examinations conducted by the same doctor in July 2002 and again on 10 April 2003, indicating that during the period July 2002 to October 2004 there was no significant deterioration. As we have said, there was unfortunately significant deterioration subsequently. Those further medical reports in April 2007 and November 2008 indicate a significant decline as evidenced by MMSE scores of 11/30 in April 2007 and 7/30 in November 2008.
33 In our view, the transfer of the property in August 2004 was not a transaction or dealing in connection with the EPA, and in any case does not provide a reason requiring or justifying intervention into the EPA.
34 As noted earlier, the applicant has also alleged that the donees 'transferred all other assets held by the Donor into their names'. However, the applicant has not presented any cogent evidence or indeed any evidence at all to support that broad allegation.
35 At the hearing before the Full Tribunal, the applicant also tendered and referred to three months of bank statements from January to April 2011 from a Commonwealth Bank account which he says was his mother's. He said that he obtained those directly from the Commonwealth Bank after his mother's death and upon presenting the bank with a death certificate. The applicant submitted that these bank records show that there was a significant decline in the donor's balance during that period. In fact, the balance did vary from approximately $7000 to approximately $2000. However, the only significant withdrawal during that period was a withdrawal of $5000 which Ms LDG explained to the Tribunal was a withdrawal by her in order to pay for her mother's funeral. Although the donor thankfully did not pass away at that time, Ms LDG gave evidence that she was in a bad way and she was concerned that her mother would pass away shortly. The money was kept by Ms LDG and ultimately used for the donor's funeral expenses. We accept the evidence of Ms LDG in relation to those matters and on that basis, the withdrawal of $5000 during that period does not give rise to any concern on the part of the Tribunal in relation to the operation of the EPA and does not justify or warrant an order for intervention in it.
36 The applicant also raised concerns about two periodic payments during the period, one monthly payment and one fortnightly payment. However, Ms LDG explained that they related to insurance and mortgage payments. We accept Ms LDG's evidence in that respect. The donor was not at the time, in 2011, liable to pay a mortgage given that she had transferred the property to the trust or to the trust company on behalf of the trust in 2004. Nevertheless, during the whole period of 2004 to September 2013, the donor lived, it appears, rent free, in her former residential property. In those circumstances, the regular payments of mortgage and indeed the regular payments of insurance do not give rise to any concern on the part of the Tribunal such as to warrant or require an order for the provision or filing of accounts and records in relation to transactions and dealings made by the donees under the EPA. The operation of the bank account, although it appears in 2011 under the authority of the EPA, does not give rise to any concern on the part of the Tribunal as to the operation of the EPA by the donees and does not warrant or require an order for the provision by them of accounts or records.
37 The applicant also contended that his mother's safety deposit box at the Commonwealth Bank 'had been cleared out'. Ms LDG gave evidence that there was a safety deposit box that her mother had at the Commonwealth Bank and it was accessed by Ms LDG from time to time under an authority that predated the EPA and was a specific authority of the bank to operate that box and that she did access it from time to time to borrow jewellery for special occasions which she returned. Ms LDG also gave evidence that shortly before her mother's death she removed all the contents of the safety deposit box and placed them into the safe at her home. She said that the contents are available to the executor or executors of her mother's deceased estate. We accept the evidence of Ms LDG in this respect. Her conduct in relation to the safety deposit box, firstly, was under a separate authority not acting under the EPA but in any case, does not give rise to any concern on the part of the Tribunal such as would warrant or justify or require an order for the provision of or the filing of accounts and records by her or by her fellow donee.
38 Finally, the applicant submitted that the amount the donor had left in her bank account at the date of her death was only about $700 and that the decline in the balance to $700 gave rise to a concern on his part about the conduct of the donees. He noted that he had not seen the bank statements of his mother other than during the period January to April 2011 and that he would like to see her statements before and after that period.
39 There is in fact no direct evidence before the Tribunal that the account had a balance of $700 on the date of death of the donor. However, and in any case, even if the balance had reduced to $700, that does not, in the circumstances of this case, justify or require an order for intervention in the EPA by means of an order for the filing and service of accounts and records held by the donees in connection with the operation of the EPA. There is absolutely no cogent evidence before the Tribunal to support the allegation of impropriety against the donees. The fact that the applicant does not have access to his mother's bank records other than in some curious way of having obtained those records after her death, but without the authority or without the apparent authority of the executors of the estate, does not either create any concern on the part of the Tribunal, nor does it justify or warrant any order. The fact is that the applicant had no relationship with his mother for the past 15 years of her life and by her will the donor placed trust and confidence in other members of her family as is also demonstrated by the identities of the donees under the EPA.
40 In all of those circumstances, we conclude that there is no reason requiring or justifying an order under s 109(1)(a) of the GA Act requiring the donees to file with the Tribunal and serve on the applicant a copy of all records and accounts kept by them of their dealings and transactions in connection with the EPA. There is no warrant therefore to consider issue 4.
Conclusion
41 As the applicant does not have a proper interest in the matter for the purposes of s 109(1) of the GA Act and as there is no reason requiring or justifying an order under s 109(1)(a) of the GA Act requiring the donees to file with the Tribunal and to serve on the applicant a copy of all records and accounts kept by them of their dealings and transactions in connection with the EPA, the correct and preferable decision is to dismiss the applicant's applications under s 109(1)(a) and s 109(1)(b) of the GA Act.
Orders
42 For these reasons we make the following orders:
1. The application for an extension of time in which to seek review of the determination made on 11 June 2015 to dismiss the applicant's applications under s 109(1)(a) and s 109(1)(b) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) is allowed.
2. The application for review under s 17A of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) is dismissed.
3. The determination made by the Tribunal on 11 June 2015 to dismiss the applicant's applications under s 109(1)(a) and s 109(1)(b) of the Guardianship and Administration Act 1990 (WA) is affirmed.
I certify that this and the preceding [42] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
JUDGE D R PARRY, DEPUTY PRESIDENT
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