ECI20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

ECI20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FedCFamC2G 449

File number(s): MLG 3321 of 2020
Judgment of: JUDGE J YOUNG
Date of judgment: 31 May 2023
Catchwords: MIGRATION – extension of time application – applicant filed 1214 days out of time – applicant did not attend hearing before Tribunal – applicant did not apply for reinstatement before Tribunal – found no reasonable explanation for delay – found grounds of substantive argument are not reasonably arguable – application dismissed.
Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 412, 414, 425, 425A, 426(1A)(b), (1B) to (1F), 426B(5), 441A, 441C(5), 476A(3)(a), 477(1) and (2).

Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 4.35D(3).

Cases cited:

BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v SZVFW (2018) 264 CLR 541; [2018] HCA 30

Plaintiff M90/2009 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2019] HCA Trans 279

Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; 177 ALR 491

SZIGQ v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2007] FCA 328

SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86

Tran v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2014] FCA 533

Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 96 ALJR 819

WQRJ v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 736

WZANW v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2009] FMCA 1075

WZASQ v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2013] FCCA 1726

Division: Division 2 General Federal Law
Number of paragraphs: 73
Date of hearing: 11 May 2023
Place: Melbourne
Counsel for the Applicant: Self-represented litigant
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Daly of Mills Oakley
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Mills Oakley

ORDERS

MLG 3321 of 2020

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

BETWEEN:

ECI20

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

order made by:

JUDGE J YOUNG

DATE OF ORDER:

31 May 2023

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The Application filed 4 September 2020 be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the costs of the first respondent fixed in the sum of $4,189.38.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE J YOUNG:

INTRODUCTION

  1. Before the Court is an Application filed on 4 September 2020 for an extension of time under s 477(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Act) in which to seek judicial review of the decision of the second respondent (Tribunal) dated 4 April 2017…

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Details
Case
[2023] FedCFamC2G 449
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In ECI20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Malaysian citizen, sought judicial review of a decision by the Migration Review Tribunal (the Tribunal) to dismiss their application for a Protection (Class XA) visa. The application was filed 1214 days after the statutory 35-day filing period had expired. The primary issue before the court was whether it was necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of the 35-day filing period.

The court considered several factors in determining whether to grant an extension of time. Firstly, the Tribunal had provided the applicant with information regarding their right of review and the timeframes applicable, as well as information about where assistance could be sought. Secondly, the applicant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in filing the application. Although the applicant asserted financial hardship, there was no evidence to support this claim. The applicant had also not made any inquiries about a fee waiver.

The court found that the very lengthy delay and the lack of any satisfactory explanation for it weighed strongly against the grant of an extension of time. The court also noted that there was no prejudice to the Minister if an extension were granted, and that the public interest in the finality of administrative decisions weighed against an extension. The merits of the substantive application were also considered, but the court found that the applicant's failure to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay was a sufficient basis upon which to refuse to extend time.

Accordingly, the court dismissed the application for an extension of time and the applicant's application for judicial review. The Tribunal's decision to dismiss the application for a Protection (Class XA) visa stands.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

The Application was filed 1214 days after the expiry of the statutory timeframe. Not being satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of the 35-day filing period, the Application is dismissed. The reasons for this decision follow.BACKGROUND The applicant is a citizen of Malaysia who arrived in Australia on 8 February 2016 on a Visitor visa. On 16 March 2016 the applicant applied for a Protection (Class XA) (subclass 866) visa (Visa). On 5 May 2016 a delegate of the Minister (delegate) refused to grant the Visa. On 10 May 2017 the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate’s decision (review application). In the review application, the applicant nominated the email address xxxx@xxxx.com (applicant’s email address) for correspondence and provided the mobile number “xxxxx xxx65” (applicant’s mobile). On 27 May 2016 the applicant emailed the Tribunal from the applicant’s email address and updated his postal address. On 20 February 2017 the Tribunal emailed the applicant enclosing an invitation for him to attend a hearing on 16 March 2016 and attaching an information sheet. The hearing invitation stated that the Tribunal was unable to make a favourable decision on the information provided, and that if the applicant did not attend the hearing, the Tribunal may dismiss the application without any further consideration of the application or information before it. The applicant did not respond to the hearing invitation. On 8 March 2017 and 15 March 2017 the Tribunal sent an SMS hearing reminder to the applicant’s mobile. Delivery of the 15 March 2017 hearing reminder failed. The applicant did not attend the hearing on 16 March 2017. Pursuant to s 426(1A)(b) of the Act the Tribunal dismissed the application for non-appearance (dismissal decision). On 16 March 2017 the Tribunal sent a letter to the applicant’s email address. The letter informed the applicant that, as the applicant had failed to attend the hearing, the Tribunal had decided to dismiss the application for review and informed the applicant that reinstatement of the application could be sought within 14 days. The dismissal decision was omitted from the 16 March 2017 email. On 20 March 2017 the Tribunal sent another email to the applicant’s email address, instructing the applicant to disregard the email received on 16 March 2017, and attached a copy of the dismissal decision. The notification letter sent with the dismissal decision informed the applicant that reinstatement of the application could be sought by 3 April 2017. The applicant was also provided with an information sheet entitled “information about dismissal of applications” which informed the applicant that if reinstatement was not sought within 14 days the Tribunal must confirm the decision to dismiss the application. The applicant did not apply for reinstatement of the application. On 4 April 2017 the Tribunal confirmed its original decision to dismiss the application (confirmation decision).The Tribunal’s decisionDismissal decision

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGE J
The Tribunal found that the applicant was invited pursuant to s 425 of the Act to appear before it on 16 March 2017 at 9.30am but did not appear at the scheduled time and place. The Tribunal found that no reason for the non-appearance was given. The Tribunal dismissed the application without further consideration of the application or the information before it.Confirmation decision The Tribunal recorded that on 16 March 2017 the application was dismissed pursuant to s 426(1A)(b) of the Act; the applicant had been notified of the dismissal decision; and had been given a copy of the written statement in accordance with s 426B(5) of the Act. The applicant had been advised that reinstatement of the application could be sought within 14 days of receiving the dismissal decision and that a failure to apply for reinstatement within the 14 day period would result in confirmation of the dismissal decision. The Tribunal found that as the applicant did not apply for reinstatement within the 14 day period it must confirm the decision to dismiss the application.APPLICATION FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIMEWas the Application filed late? Section 477(1) of the Act requires that an Application to this Court be made within 35 days of the date of the migration decision. The Tribunal’s decision was made on 4 April 2017. An Application for judicial review of that decision in this Court was required to be filed by 9 May 2017. The Application for judicial review was not filed until 4 September 2020. Accordingly, the Application was made 1214 days after the expiry of the statutory timeframe. Should the Court be satisfied to make an order extending time? Section 477(2) of the Act allows the Court to grant an extension of the 35-day period within which an Application must be made if the Court is satisfied that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to make such an order. In Tu’uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 96 ALJR 819 (Katoa) at [12] the High Court observed that the Court’s power to extend time is not focused on the interests of the applicant “but on the broader interests of the administration of justice.” The Act does not specify any criteria which must be satisfied to establish that it is in “the interests of the administration of justice” to grant an extension. The principles regarding an Application under s 477(2) were considered in BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49. In that decision, Jagot and Halley JJ found that the Court has an obligation “to evaluate all of the relevant circumstances and to decide if the Court is satisfied that the extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice”.[1] Further, they identified that whilst the matters to which regard may be had are not expressly confined by the Act, the following are usually relevant when considering an extension of time – although it is noted that this list is not exhaustive:(1)the extent of the delay and explanation for it; (2)any prejudice to the respondent if an extension were granted; (3)the impact on the applicant if the time was not extended; (4)the interests of the public at large; and(5)the merits of the substantive application. [1]BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49 [40]

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: JUDGE J

Secondly, attached to the Tribunal’s decision was an information sheet headed “Information about decisions – MR Division”. That information sheet informs the applicant that judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision may be sought within 35 days of the date of the decision. It also provides the following information:Immigration assistanceOur website ( and [sic] provides a list of organisations that may be able to provide immigration assistance or referrals to other services. Accordingly, the applicant was provided with information regarding his right of review, the time frames that applied to it and where assistance may be sought. Thirdly, there is no evidence before the Court as to the applicant’s asserted financial hardship. In the absence of any such evidence there is an insufficient basis upon which to assess the explanation: Plaintiff M90/2009 v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2019] HCA Trans 279. Whilst the Court is prepared to accept that the applicant may have had difficulty paying the filing fee, the explanation provided still does not adequately explain the 1214 day delay. Further, the applicant has not provided any evidence of enquires made with the Court in relation to fee waiver. Fourthly, it is appropriate to take into account that impecunious litigants often commence applications in this Court for review of decisions of the Tribunal within the statutory limitation period: WQRJ at [37]. The very lengthy delay and the absence of a satisfactory and acceptable explanation for it weighs strongly against the grant of an extension of time. Indeed, given the length of the delay and the lack of any satisfactory explanation for it, this would be sufficient basis upon which to refuse to extend time. Prejudice The first respondent did not contend it would suffer any particular prejudice (except as to costs) if the applicant was granted an order allowing an extension of time. However, the mere absence of prejudice is not sufficient to justify a finding in favour of an extension of the time for filing: SZTRY v Minister for Immigration & Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 86 at [6]. I assess this as a neutral consideration.Public interest and impact on the applicant There is a public interest in ensuring that decisions of the executive are made lawfully. The merits of the substantive grounds relied upon by the applicant will of course be relevant to this, which are considered below. It has also been recognised that there is a public interest in the finality of administrative decisions: Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67; 177 ALR 491 at [15]-[17]. As to the impact upon the Applicant, if the extension of time is refused then the Tribunal’s decision will stand. Although an alternative route of review might be available, under s 476A(3)(a) of the Act the refusal of an explanation for an extension of time forecloses any right of appeal. I accept that a refusal to grant an extension of time would result in the Applicant returning to their country of nationality which is a circumstance they say they fear and that this is a matter weighing in favour of the grant of an extension of time. Merits of the substantive application