EBD & Anor v Director of Child Protection Litigation

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DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

EBD & Anor v Director of Child Protection Litigation [2022] QDC 253

PARTIES:

EBD

(first appellant)

and
ACS
(second appellant)

and

v

DIRECTOR OF CHILD PROTECTION LITIGATION

(respondent)

FILE NO:

BD1480/22

DIVISION:

Criminal

PROCEEDING:

Appeal

ORIGINATING COURT:

Magistrates Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

22 November 2022

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

28 October 2022

JUDGE:

Burnett AM, DCJ

ORDER:

1.   Appeal dismissed.

2.   A protection order issue granting long term guardianship of the child to the Chief Executive until the day before he turns eighteen years of age.

CATCHWORDS:

FAMILY LAW AND CHILD WELFARE – CHILD WELFARE UNDER STATE OR TERRITORY LAWS – Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld) – child protection orders – appeal against child protection order – where the child’s mother had previously been convicted of grievous bodily harm inflicted upon another of her children – where the child’s father had been previously convicted of possessing child exploitation material and had paraphilia and was otherwise unfit because of inability to adequately supervise the mother – where the appellant contends the learned magistrate had failed to take into account all relevant information put before the court

APPEALS – Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – Section 222 appeal – appeal by way of rehearing on the evidence

LEGISLATION:

Child Protection Act 1999

Child Protection Reform Amendment Act 2017

Justices Act 1886

CASES:

Forrest v Commissioner of Police [2017] QCA 132

COUNSEL:

First Appellant self-represented
Second Appellant self-represented
G Murray (assistant Director) for the Office of the Director of Child Litigation 
H Mustafa (solicitor) as 3rd party representative for the child’s interests

SOLICITORS:

HM Lawyers for the 3rd party representative for the child’s interests

Introduction

  1. The appellants are the parents of HS, a child (DOB 20 August 2020) (the child) who was made the subject of a child protection order pursuant to s 117(2) Child Protection Act 1999 (the Act) by a decision made by Magistrate Bucknall at the Redcliffe Childrens Court on 7 June 2022.

  2. Following a trial which proceeded substantially over two days his Honour granted an application made by the respondent/applicant Director of Child Protection Litigation (the Director) for a child protection order granting long-term guardianship of the child, HS, to the Chief Executive, Department of Child Safety, Youth and Women (the Chief Executive) until the day before he turns 18 years of age.  At that hearing the appellant mother appeared self-represented and the child’s father was represented by counsel.  There was also an appearance for the child who was provided separate representation.

  3. The child’s mother (the mother) is nominated as the appellant on the notice of appeal.  Her appeal is supported by the child’s father (the father) who was nominated as the first respondent.  The Director is nominated as the second respondent. The child’s separate representative also appeared on the appeal. In substance the parents’ appeal the Magistrate’s order in favour of the orders sought by the Director.

    Principles

  4. The Act provides for appeals against the decision of a Childrens Court…

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Details
Case
[2022] QDC 253
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appellants, EBD and another, appealed against a decision of the Magistrates Court of Queensland concerning a child protection order. The child, who was approaching two years of age, had been identified as suffering cerebral palsy and was in need of special attention. The father had been convicted of possessing child exploitation material and had paraphilia, while the mother had previously been convicted of grievous bodily harm inflicted upon another of her children. The primary concern was whether the father was also unfit to provide adequate supervision over the mother. The mother argued that the magistrate had failed to take into account all relevant information put before the court, including that the child was Aboriginal. The father supported this argument and further contended that the magistrate did not know what orders he was able to make according to section 62(2C)(a)-(b) of the Child Protection Act 1999 (Qld). The court found that the magistrate had read and understood all the evidence and affidavit material before him. The magistrate engaged with witnesses during cross-examination to clarify issues in their evidence and made reference to the evidence of Dr Varghese, Dr Walker and Mr Pershouse as well as the other material which was incorporated in the various affidavits filed in the proceedings. The court concluded that the child was at risk of significant harm and the appellants' appeal was dismissed. A protection order was issued granting long term guardianship of the child to the Chief Executive until the day before he turns eighteen years of age.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. A protection order issue granting long term guardianship of the child to the Chief Executive until the day before he turns eighteen years of age.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

As earlier noted the appellant mother listed 21 grounds in the Notice of Appeal. The father adopted her grounds. There was significant overlap and duplication in a number of the grounds. In my view those submissions have appropriately collected common grounds and accordingly I address the grounds as articulated by the Director’s submissions.Ground 1 - Having regards to the evidence, the learned Magistrate erred in making an order for long-term guardianship. In her submission the mother contended that the Magistrate erred in making an order for long-term guardianship because on her view he did not thoroughly read all the evidence and affidavit material before him “which may have been sufficient for the Magistrate to make an alternative order”. The father supported the mother’s submission and further contended that the Magistrate did not know what orders he was able to make according to s 62(2C)(a)-(b) [3] of the Act. In particular he submitted that the Magistrate did not retain all the evidence (that is after having read it) as he did not know that the child was Aboriginal as was mentioned in the father’s affidavits and in some of the affidavit material. [3]The current reprint provides s 62(5). It is expressed in the same terms as s 62(2C) introduced into the Act by s 34 Child Protection Reform Amendment Act 2017. The amendment act renumbers the section as s 62(5) by operation of s 34(4). For the Director and the separate representative it was submitted that the transcript reveals the Magistrate did read the material prior to the commencement of the hearing he having noted that he had done so and he having indicated he took time to read late material. Furthermore, it was submitted by reason of the Magistrates engagement with witnesses in the course of cross-examination to clarify issues in their evidence he did so on the basis that he understood the affidavit evidence and must clearly have read it in order to formulate and articulate the questions posed. This was particularly so, it was submitted, in respect of the cross‑examination of Dr Varghese by the father’s counsel when the Magistrate was able to correct a question on the basis of material which was in evidence although not earlier referred to. It was submitted that “his Honour must have read the brief in its entirety to conclude that there were, so far as the filed material was concerned, no such independent or corroborative evidence (as was put).” Further it was submitted that at the conclusion of the evidence written submissions were tendered and the Court adjourned in order to review that material, that being further evidence of his Honour’s consideration of all written material as well as the oral evidence and submissions. It was further submitted that the judgment evidenced the careful consideration of the views of Dr Varghese and Mr Shepherd, particularly in respect of each of the parents and that the evidence particularly of those professional witnesses supported the conclusion.

Decision

Reasons for decision

It is the father’s situation that should be the focus of the proceeding. For reasons that follow the mother is unlikely ever to be trusted with the unsupervised care of the child because of her mental health issues and the risk they pose to the child. The substantive issue is whether the father also lacks the capacity to be someone ‘able’ to protect the child.[2] The child is approaching 2 years of age and was recently identified as suffering cerebral palsy so is in need of special attention, which is now the subject of a NDIS plan. The fact the child has a medical condition is an additional risk factor in light of the mother’s condition and the father’s inability to capably deal with the mother. [2]Child Protection Act 1999 s 59(6)(a). The decision The trial proceeded substantially over two days. At the conclusion of the second day and after hearing submissions the Magistrate delivered his judgment. In his judgment he particularly made reference to the evidence of Dr Varghese, Dr Walker and Mr Pershouse as well as the other material which was incorporated in the various affidavits filed in the proceedings. In addition, he noted he heard evidence from various child safety officers as well as from each of the father and mother. Additionally, he noted the assessment reports done by a Mr Shepherd, a social worker who specialises in family dispute resolution. He noted that in particular, concerning the making of a child protection order, the Court could only make an order if it was satisfied that the relevant matters required by s 59 of the Act which included inter alia:·A child protection order “is appropriate and desirable for the child’s protection”.·There is a case plan for the child.·A conference has been held.·The child’s wishes or views if able to be ascertained are known to the Court.·That the protection sought is unlikely to be achieved by an order under the Act on less intrusive terms.·There is no person able and willing to protect the child within the foreseeable future.·The child’s need for emotional security would be best met in the long-term by making the order and in particular the informing principles required by s 5 of the Act including the paramount principle. He concluded that he was satisfied from the evidence the child was at risk of significant harm noting that there were various issues confronting both parents. Concerning the mother, the Magistrate made observations that the evidence of Dr Varghese concerning her was quite troubling. He noted the doctor’s observation that she had an apparent lack of empathy for others including her damaged child whom she poisoned in order to fulfill her own emotional needs. He noted that she continued to do so even when it ought to have been obvious that the injured child was suffering deeply and at risk of death. Her presentation during the course of her consultation with Dr Varghese occasioned him particular concern. The Magistrate made express observations concerning Dr Varghese’s remarks at the page of his report that the mother represented a risk of physical harm to the child by way of causing him to be ill in the same manner as that which had occurred to his elder sister. Thus in his view it was doubtful that the mother “…had the capacity to provide for emotional nutrients to a child involving empathetic relatedness required for the healthy development of a child”. He opined that it can be predicted that her own needs will take precedence over any emotional or indeed other needs of the child.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established