SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Eaton v Rare Nominees Pty Limited [2019] QCA 190
PARTIES:
CHRISTOPHER JOHN EATON
(appellant)
v
RARE NOMINEES PTY LIMITED ACN 094 976 833 as trustee for the MACKELLAR FAMILY SUPERANNUATION FUND
(respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 11105 of 2017
DC No 4799 of 2015DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
General Civil Appeal
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane – [2017] QDC 238 (Dorney QC DCJ)DELIVERED ON:
13 September 2019
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
9 October 2018
JUDGES:
Philippides and McMurdo JJA and Davis J
ORDERS:
1. Allow the appeal.
2. Set aside the judgment against the appellant in favour of the respondent.
3. Give judgment for the appellant against the respondent.
4. Set aside the order for costs made by the trial judge against the appellant.
5. Order the respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceeding against him and the costs of the appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
EQUITY – GENERAL PRINCIPLES – FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS – FIDUCIARY DUTY – SCOPE GENERALLY – where a company, of which the appellant was the sole director and controlling mind, and the respondent, entered into a joint venture agreement for the development of an “Asset”, being a piece of land, and the sale of serviced residential lots – where the appellant’s company was the proprietor of the “Project” and the respondent was one of a number of contributors to it – where, under the joint venture agreement, the respondent advanced money to the Project – where the joint venture agreement provided that the proprietor of the Project shall pay “Contributors’ Entitlements” to the respondent at least annually – where the joint venture agreement further provided that the relationship between the parties to the joint venture agreement shall be “contractual only”, that to the extent permitted by law, duties of a fiduciary nature were excluded, and that the appellant company, as proprietor, held all legal and beneficial interest in the Asset and did not hold it on trust for the contributors – where the respondent contended that the appellant’s company owed fiduciary duties to the respondent, which it breached by prioritising non-development payments of the Project over paying entitlements to the respondent as a contributor – whether a fiduciary duty proscribing that conduct arose in the circumstances
Assad v Eliana Construction & Developing Group Pty Ltd [2015] VSCA 53, considered
Australian Oil & Gas Corporation Ltd v Bridge Oil Ltd [1989] NSWCA 239, applied
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty Ltd [No 4] (2007) 160 FCR 35; [2007] FCA 963, considered
Caple v Wilson [2016] VSC 704, considered
Farah Constructions Ltd & Anor v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89; [2007] HCA 22, considered
Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corporation (1984) 156 CLR 41; [1984] HCA 64, applied
John Alexander’s Clubs Pty Ltd v White City Tennis Club Ltd (2010) 241 CLR 1; [2010] HCA 19, applied
News Ltd v…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Eaton v Rare Nominees Pty Limited and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2019] QCA 190
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the nature of the relationship between the parties and whether it could be characterized as fiduciary. The JVA explicitly excluded fiduciary duties and stated that the relationship was "contractual only." The court noted that while contractual labels are not determinative of whether a relationship is fiduciary, express contractual exclusions of fiduciary duties have generally been effective. The court also highlighted that the company held all legal and beneficial interest in the Asset and did not hold it on trust for the contributors. The court concluded that the trial judge erred in finding that a fiduciary relationship, albeit of a confined nature, arose in the present case. The fiduciary obligation imposed by the trial judge altered the operation of the contract in a way that was inconsistent with its true construction.
The appeal was allowed, and the judgment against Mr. Eaton was set aside. Judgment was given in favor of Mr. Eaton against Rare Nominees, and the order for costs made by the trial judge against Mr. Eaton was also set aside. Rare Nominees was ordered to pay Mr. Eaton's costs of the proceeding against him and the costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Allow the appeal.
2. Set aside the judgment against the appellant in favour of the respondent.
3. Give judgment for the appellant against the respondent.
4. Set aside the order for costs made by the trial judge against the appellant.
5. Order the respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the proceeding against him and the costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In the context of contractual relationships, it has been observed that, while contractual labels have been held not to be determinative as to whether a relationship is fiduciary, express contractual exclusions of fiduciary duties have generally been effective.[84] Such was the case in Citigroup, where the letter of retainer which specified that Citigroup was engaged by Toll “as an independent contractor and not in other capacity including as a fiduciary” was held to amount to an effective exclusion of a fiduciary relationship. The decision has attracted criticism from Professor Finn (a matter to which the trial judge alluded in his reasons). The criticism is that the question was approached by Jacobson J as a matter of construction rather than characterisation. Gageler J has observed in the extra-judicial writing to which I have referred that proceeding on the premise that:[85]“… whether a relationship is fiduciary is a question of attributing a legal character to the relationship which has been formed in fact… a contractual description can sometimes be used as a shorthand description of the incidents of the relationship or transaction into which contracting parties have in fact entered. The contractual description of Citigroup as ‘not a fiduciary’ could have been interpreted as expressing an agreement that Citigroup remained free to benefit from the relationship without seeking the further consent of Toll and that Citigroup was at liberty to place itself in a position where its contractual duty to advise Toll conflicted with its own commercial interests.[86] On this approach, in the absence of some basis in law or in equity for holding that the agreement was not binding or that it was capable of avoidance by Citigroup, it is strongly arguable that the contractual description could have binding effect. This would reflect a contractual tailoring of the incidents of the relationship with the effect of removing the basis for fiduciary obligations.The issue joined between the parties in Citigroup and tendered for the determination of Jacobson J was whether, in the context in which Toll and Citigroup dealt with each other, the contractual description could and should be so read. There was no suggestion that a fiduciary relationship arose independently of the letter of retainer.”[84]See Gageler J at 180 referring to M Leeming, ‘The Scope of Fiduciary Obligations: How Contract Informs, But Does Not Determine, the Scope of Fiduciary Obligations’ (2009) 3 Journal of Equity 181 at 192-193.[85]Gageler J at 180-181.[86]Cf New Zealand Netherlands Society ‘Oranje’ Inc v Kuys [1973] 1 WLR 1126 (PC); Kelly v Cooper [1993] AC 205 (PC).Consideration I agree with the arguments advanced on behalf of Mr Eaton that the trial judge erred in finding that a fiduciary relationship, albeit of a confined nature,[87] arose in the present case. In particular, the trial judge failed to give proper weight to the critical consideration that any fiduciary relationship in the present case had to accommodate the terms of the JVA so as not to be inconsistent with them. Fiduciary and contractual relationships may co-exist. However, superimposing the fiduciary obligation as the trial judge did, in the circumstances of the present case, had the effect of altering the operation which the contract was intended to have according to its true construction. The relationship between the parties, on a proper construction of the JVA, did not allow for the imposition of the fiduciary obligation found by the trial judge.[87]Reasons at [106].