Eaton v Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Limited

[2004] NSWDDT 18

Reported Decision (2004) 1 DDCR 716

Dust Diseases Tribunal

of New South Wales

CITATION:	Eaton v Carrier Air Conditioning and Ors [2004] NSWDDT 18
PARTIES:	Isabella Margaret Eaton Administrator Ad Litem Representing the Estate of the Late George Eaton Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd (first defendant) Amaca Pty Ltd (second defendant) McPhersons Ltd (third defendant) Wallaby Grip Ltd (fourth defendant) Wallaby Grip (Bae) Pty Limited (fifth defendant)
MATTER NUMBER(S):	84 of 2003
JUDGMENT OF:	O'Meally P at 1
CATCHWORDS:	:- Dust Diseases - mesothelioma - indivisible injury - all asbestos exposure causative of disease - breach of duty by manufacturers - duty of care of retailer of goods containing asbestos - actual or contructive knowledge of dangers of exposure - duty to protect end user - duty to warn or withdraw products from sale - breach of duty.
LEGISLATION CITED:
CASES CITED:
DATES OF HEARING:	24 April, 26 November 2003; 12 & 13 May; 31 August; 1,2,3,9 & 10 September 2004
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE :	09/09/2004
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES:	PLAINTIFF: Mr M J Joseph, SC with R A O'Keefe instructed by Slater & Gordon SECOND DEFENDANT: Miss W S Strathdee instructed by Phillips Fox THIRD DEFENDANT: Mr G Watson, SC with Mr J C Sheller instructed by Cowley Hearne FOURTH & FIFTH DEFENDANTS: Mr D Russell, SC instructed by Acuiti Legal

JUDGMENT:

1. This is an action for damages brought by Isabella Margaret Eaton on behalf of the estate of her late husband George Eaton. I have decided to deliver reasons for judgment immediately. If I fail to deal with any matter I invite counsel to draw that matter to my attention at the conclusion of these reasons so it may then be dealt with.

2. By statement of claim issued on 12 March 2003 the late George Eaton commenced proceedings against Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd, Amaca Pty Ltd (Amaca), McPhersons Pty Ltd (McPhersons), Wallaby Grip Ltd (WGL) and Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd (WGBAE) (in Liquidation).

3. The case was brought on urgently and upon an undertaking given by the plaintiff that no Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 point would be taken the evidence of the late Mr Eaton was taken at his home outside Perth in Western Australia on 24 April 2003. On 25 June 2003 Mr Eaton died from the effects of malignant mesothelioma. The fact of his death from mesothelioma and that it was caused by exposure to asbestos dust and fibre are not in issue in the case. During the course of the proceedings his claim against the first defendant, Carrier Air Conditioning Pty Ltd was settled. Mrs Eaton maintains proceedings on behalf of the estate against Amaca, McPhersons, WGL and WGBAE.

The Nature of The Case

4. The plaintiff's case is that the fourth and fifth defendants (BAE and WGBAE) stand in the shoes of the Bells companies, which supplied millboard for heater boxes used in air conditioning ducting, and the late Mr Eaton was exposed to asbestos from that millboard whilst employed by Chatterton and Stevens Pty Ltd (Chatterton & Stevens), manufacturers and installers of air conditioning systems, between 1955 and 1963 and whilst employed by Hillman and Howell Pty Ltd (Hillmans), also and air conditioning installation company, between 1963 and 1978. The allegation against Amaca is that whilst working on insulation sites for Chatterton & Stevens and for Hillmans the late Mr Eaton was exposed to asbestos dust and fibre which emanated from insulation material used on those sites and manufactured, supplied and produced by James Hardie & Coy Pty Ltd (JHC) in whose shoes it stands. It is alleged, additionally, that in the factories of both Chatterton and Stevens and Hillmans he was exposed to asbestos released from millboard supplied and, or, manufactured by JHC.

5. His case against the third defendant, McPhersons, is that it supplied millboard to both Chatterton and Stevens and Hillmans, that it knew or ought to have known of the dangers of exposure to asbestos products, that its failure to warn of those dangers or to withdraw material containing asbestos from sale was, in the circumstances of the case, a breach of duty owed by it to him as an end user of the retail products, and that breach of duty was a cause of his mesothelioma.

Damages Agreed

6. During the course of submissions, which have been heard over a number of days, much has been conceded, and for the concessions made by counsel for all parties I am grateful. It is agreed that the plaintiff's damages should be assessed in the sum of $227,979.91. The progress of the case was interrupted after Mr Eaton’s death and later by reason of the necessity to deal with urgent cases and because of my own absence overseas at various stages.

Concessions and Issues

7. The fourth and fifth defendants concede that they are liable to pay damages to the plaintiff. The second defendant concedes a liability to pay damages if I am satisfied that the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos from any of its products. The third defendant denies liability saying that it owed no duty of care to the late Mr Eaton, that if it did there was no breach of duty and if there were a breach of duty such breach was not causative of the plaintiff's loss and damage.

All Asbestos Exposure Causative of Mesothelioma

8. McPhersons did not concede, at least did not concede consistently, that all asbestos exposure during the accepted latency period for mesothelioma is causative of or makes a material contribution to that disease. Nevertheless, the evidence that all asbestos exposure makes a material contribution to mesothelioma is evidence which I would have thought is now beyond controversy. Not only has such a conclusion been reached in many cases before this, but the uncontradicted evidence in this case supports that view. The failure to maintain that concession was unjustified and unmeritorious.

9. Professor Musk, a respiratory physician practising in Perth, is an expert of national and international standing. He prepared at least two reports for this case. In the first of those, which bears date 7 February 2003, he said of Mr Eaton:

It is my opinion that his mesothelioma is a result of asbestos exposure as a sheet metal worker as outlined. It is my opinion that each period in which the plaintiff was exposed to asbestos made a material contribution to his mesothelioma.

10. Dr James Leigh is not only a consultant occupational physician but an epidemiologist, whose evidence and reports are frequently before the Tribunal. He, also, prepared a number of reports for this case. His report of 21 April 2003 contained his opinion that:

Each period of exposure, including all millboard work, contributed materially to causation of mesothelioma.
And in a later report of 19 November 2003 said:
…all cumulative exposure must be considered to have contributed to causation.

11. It is beyond controversy that all asbestos exposure during the course of the latency period, which generally is accepted to be anything between 10 and 60 years, is causative of mesothelioma and makes a material contribution to it.

Difficulties of Recollection

12. This case, perhaps more so than any other I have heard, demonstrates how recollection and memory are affected by the passage of time. Witnesses have expressed beliefs and made assumptions and upon these I have been invited to make findings of fact or to reject as utterly unreliable evidence given. It is true that in respect of some witnesses I have difficulty in accepting the entirety of their evidence, but that is not to say that any of them was being deceitful or seeking to mislead the court. Because there are outstanding cross-claims, and cross-claims yet to be issued, I intend to decide only such facts as are necessary to determine the plaintiff's claim against the remaining defendants.

The Liability of Amaca Pty Ltd

13. I have come to the view that the late Mr Eaton was exposed to asbestos dust and fibre from material manufactured and supplied by JHC.

14. Patrick Lennon was called by counsel for the fourth and fifth defendants. In 1957 he formed a company, under the name of P & M Insulation Pty Ltd, in which seemingly he and his wife were the principal shareholders. The late Mr Eaton and he were well known to one another. In the 1950s and 1960s his company was engaged as a subcontractor on what was described as a very large job at the University of New South Wales. This “large job” involved the installation and insulation of pipes and ducts throughout the university. He subcontracted to Chatterton and Stevens and Hillmans and it was in the performance of subcontracting to Chatterton and Stevens that he first met the late Mr Eaton. He did give evidence that he and Mr Eaton used and were exposed to asbestos from Hardies millboard. That evidence was made upon an assumption, which he ultimately conceded to be an assumption. I find it unnecessary now to determine whether such a conclusion should be drawn. Nevertheless, he gave evidence that not only at the University of New South Wales, but in the construction of the Law Courts building in Queens Square in Sydney and at construction sites for Remington and Smith Kline and French, Hardies insulation material was used. It is not doubted that Hardies was JHC. Mr Lennon gave evidence that insulation sectional material was cut and shaped by both himself and other laggers and that dust was released in the process, that Mr Eaton and he were both exposed to such dust, that it was visible in the air and it settled upon their work clothes. Upon this evidence, which I accept, I am satisfied that Mr Eaton was exposed to some quantity of asbestos dust and fibre from sectional products manufactured by JHC. Accordingly, Amaca is liable to the plaintiff.

The Liability of McPhersons

15. McPhersons supplied millboard to both Chatterton and Stevens and Hillmans.

16. At all relevant times McPhersons Ltd was the largest retail outlet of hardware in the Commonwealth of Australia. Its answers to interrogatories reveal that at all relevant periods it had thousands of employees and its sales were millions of pounds and presumably millions of dollars. I say presumably millions of dollars because in respect of years post 1966 its answers are given to questions concerning its sales in pounds and not in dollars as might have been expected.

17. Mr L B Clucas was called by Amaca. He was employed by McPhersons as manager of its General Division. He said that until 1976 he was unaware that asbestos was dangerous. McPhersons did stock and retail millboard though the sale of asbestos products was but a small part of McPhersons business. He asserted, though with some concession that this may not have been the case, that McPhersons did not stock material produced by JHC and perhaps, other than millboard, McPhersons did not purchase from JHC "in my day." McPhersons had a number of premises in Sydney from which stock was sold. Mr Clucas said that in 1969 McPhersons opened premises in Alexandria and such millboard as was sold, was sold from its Bathurst Street premises only. The selling of asbestos, he said, was but a small part of McPhersons business, something in the order of .05 per cent of total sales.

18. Mr J C Kelso was called by the third defendant. He was employed by McPhersons between 1951 and 1982. From 1968 he was Marketing Manager for New South Wales and upon appointment to that position moved from Melbourne to Sydney. His evidence was that the Bathurst Street outlet closed in 1972 and that millboard was sold until then. In an affidavit he swore that such sales continued until 1973 or 1974. Mr Kelso had no recollection of millboard being sold from Alexandria. It was in 1975 or 1976 that he became aware of the dangers of asbestos, but at that stage McPhersons was not selling it, he said.

19. It is relevant for considerations which will later be made to note that under the McPhersons umbrella a research laboratory had been established. It was set up in 1938. The company had a reference library in which periodicals also were kept. Mr Kelso gave evidence that heat treatment was part of the business of McPhersons and products concerned with containing heat or with heat treatment were tested by McPhersons, though asbestos was not tested.

20. McPhersons produced and distributed catalogues which reveal that it had available for supply, not only asbestos materials, but also equipment which restricted the release of dust. The catalogues also disclosed that McPhersons sold respirators which contained cartridges to prevent or limit the inhalation of dust.

21. Mr Kelso's evidence was that none of the staff of McPhersons was trained to advise customers on safety issues because they relied, or because it relied, for such information on manufacturers. Nevertheless, it is relevant to observe that in respect of some products it sold safety advice was given; but one example is the suggestion that goggles be used with certain types of abrasion devices. McPhersons employed a doctor in a medical centre, though I infer his task was probably to treat injured employees of McPhersons. Even if that be so there is no reason why he could not have been consulted by McPhersons’ management. Mr Kelso agreed that McPhersons employed chemists and undertook research into new products. He conceded a familiarity with the Protector brand of masks and cartridges. Significantly, he assumed that there was always a likelihood that anyone who used saws on asbestos products would inhale released dust. His evidence disclosed that McPhersons sent its senior executives overseas to study and to acquire the latest scientific knowledge. McPhersons had a chief chemist who went to America and Europe every five or six years to develop scientific knowledge. No technical or scientific employee, past or present, was called to give evidence.

22. Mr Kelso was recalled after the catalogues, to which reference has been made, were produced to the Court and they are now in evidence. On the occasion of his recall Mr Kelso said that he supposed he knew there were dangers to the health of persons inhaling dust. He knew that dust was created by the use of saws, particularly electric saws and that dust from that source would be inhaled by those who operated them. He knew it was beneficial to minimise the amount of dust inhaled.

23. He was cross-examined about a booklet described as the "Handyman Book" which McPhersons issued to its customers. In it there was a section dealing with "Safety Rules" but these related to the use of power driven tools. Mr Kelso said when asked, that the only explanation he could give why there was no reference in the safety rules to the need to minimise the inhalation of dust was that the book may have been written by an advertising executive.

24. It is put that I ought to draw some adverse conclusion against McPhersons because of the failure to call evidence, other than from the two employees to whom I have referred, on the basis that Mr Kelso was not approached to assist in the answers to interrogatories. I do not find it necessary to approach the case in that way. The principal question to be considered is whether McPhersons as a retailer owed a duty of care to an end user, that is in this case the employee of employers to which it sold asbestos material.

25. There is no argument that by the mid 1960s it was known to the medical, scientific and industrial communities that asbestos inhalation constituted a risk of injury, neither could there be. That question has been considered over and over and over again. A remaining question is whether a retailer in the position of McPhersons ought reasonably to have known that such exposure constituted a risk of injury. It should be observed immediately, however, that McPhersons does not accept that that, in the circumstances of this case, is a proper test and in that regard I was referred to a decision of Young CJ in Eq sitting in the Common Law Division of the Supreme Court.

26. In Elliott v Bali Bungy Co [2002] NSWSC 906 His Honour at [23] said that one of the defendants had submitted that:

A vendor of goods does not owe a duty of care to undertake inspections to determine latent defects in the goods he sells and is not liable to third parties for defective goods unless he was aware of the defect or alternatively the defect was of a type that a qualified retailer would have taken steps to preclude.

He went on to say:

[24] Counsel cite, inter alia, as authority for that proposition the decision of Curtis J in Burns Philp & Co Ltd v J Blackwood & Son Ltd (2000) 21 NSWCR 96 at 100. However, it seems to me that that is no authority for the proposition. Indeed, Curtis J fixed on the last words of a sentence used in Fleming on Torts (now in the 9th Edition (LBC, Sydney, 1998) page 547):

'Retail dealers ... duty, in the first place, is to warn of dangers of which they know or should know'

Curtis J emphasised the words 'should know' and did seem to find liability of the distributor of a dangerous product, namely, asbestos, even though he held that the breach of the retailer's duty did not cause or materially contribute to the plaintiff's disease.

[25] With respect, the words 'should know' go beyond what is in the authorities unless, as Fleming suggests in the footnote to p 547, they are read as 'have reason to know'.

27. For my own part I see little difference between the phrases "have reason to know" and "ought to know", but on this question there is a contrary expression of view in the decision of the Chief Judge at Common Law, Wood CJ at CL in Lanza v Codemo Management Pty Ltd(T/A Yoogali Engineering Co & Ors) [2001] NSWSC 845 delivered on 28 September 2001. Though that was a manufacturers case it is nevertheless relevant to observe that at [171] Wood CJ at CL said:

The existence of the duty depends upon the nature of the goods sold, the risk involved and the extent to which that risk was known to, or should have reasonably been known to the supplier.

28. Those cases seem neither to reinforce or detract from the existence of the duty of a retailer in selling goods, for here it could not be said there was a latent defect in the goods sold. The danger associated with asbestos use was and is a patent one. Nor were the asbestos products sold by McPhersons manufactured by it.

29. Counsel for McPhersons argues that it had no duty to an end user unless it is proved that it had actual knowledge of the dangers of a particular product. I have been taken to a number of decisions in support of the argument that to hold McPhersons liable is not permitted by authority. Indeed, it is submitted that the contrary is the case.

30. In particular, reference was made to the decision of the High Court of Australia in Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CGD Pty Ltd (2004) 205 ALR 522 at [87] and that of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Amaca Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2004) ATR 65,788. In the later case at [137] Ipp JA considered the importance of actual knowledge of a risk. He quoted at [138] from the decision of McHugh J in Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee [1999] HCA 59 and referred, as I have also been referred, to Woolcock Street. I was also taken to the decisions of the High Court of Australia in Graham Barkley Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540 and Devore Pty Ltd v Wilkins (2003) 77 ALJR 1706. It is said that a consideration of those cases demonstrates that a duty of care does not arise in this case. It is said that McPhersons had no control over the way millboard was to be used and no control over the employers of Mr Eaton, nor whether they obeyed or complied with their obligations in law. It is put that the intervention of an employer as a third party in the relationship displaces any duty and in support of this submission McPhersons relies upon the decision of the High Court of Australia in Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254.

31. I am unable to accept the submission that as a general proposition a retailer owes no duty of care to those who use products which it sells. Nevertheless, that of itself is not the answer in this case. I am required to determine whether there was a duty of care, what was the nature of that duty and what was its content.

32. In considering these questions it is relevant to remark once again that McPhersons at all relevant times was the largest hardware retailer in the Commonwealth of Australia. It sold a myriad of products, as is established by an examination of the catalogues which are in evidence. In respect of many of the products it sold, it undertook research and issued safety warnings. It sold machinery designed for cutting asbestos material and it also sold devices to minimise the release of dust in the cutting process. It retailed breathing apparatus to restrict the inhalation of dust, in particular asbestos dust. Its own employees handled asbestos material and the evidence is that frequently dust settled upon them and their clothing. Because it was a national corporation it had an obligation to acquaint itself with legislative and regulatory requirements concerning occupational health and safety. There were regulations relating to the use and handling of asbestos made in Victoria in 1945 and 1956 and in Queensland in 1970. As remarked earlier, there was in the medical, scientific and industrial communities and in their literature an awareness that the inhalation of asbestos constituted a risk of injury, and this awareness certainly existed before the mid 1960s in each group. Not only were there articles appearing in the medical, scientific and industrial literature concerning the dangers of asbestos, but also in newspaper articles published nationally.

33. If McPhersons did not know of the dangers of asbestos, at least by the mid 1960s, there is, in my view, no excuse for its ignorance. As the largest retailer of hardware in Australia with a research department and a practice of sending executives and chemists overseas to acquire and increase knowledge on scientific and industrial matters it ought to have known. It ought to have consulted the literature. It ought to have known of the nature of the risks of exposure to asbestos. It ought to have known that such exposure was capable of causing serious disease, including cancers, the inevitable consequence of which was death. It ought to have known, if it did not, that not only end users of asbestos products it sold, but also its own employees, were at risk of contracting such disease. By at least the mid 1960s it ought to have known, if it did not, that exposure even to small quantities of asbestos was capable of causing serious disease. It ought to have known that asbestos products of all types, that is whether amphibole or serpentine, were capable of causing disease. It had reason to know these things. It ought to have directed its chemists, those doctors it employed, its senior staff, and its research department, to make inquiries, if it be the case that they did not make such inquiries. Those inquiries, if made, would have confirmed the risks associated with use of asbestos. When it continued to retail asbestos material it should have given warnings which would obviate or minimise those risks. It sent its employees to factory premises of those who purchased products from it, including Chatterton and Stevens. It did know that certain asbestos products were difficult to handle and caused the liberation of dust.

34. It is submitted for the plaintiff that this is not such a case as Barclay Oysters in that McPhersons was able to detect the defect in the products it sold, unlike the detection of a virus in contaminated oysters. But it is not the plaintiff's case that, as a general rule, a retailer is expected to test or inspect products which leave the manufacturers premises if they arrived and are sold in sealed containers, which would not normally be opened until they reached the ultimate user. The plaintiff submits that McPhersons did have a duty to warn of dangers to health arising from the expected use of the asbestos products which it sold. Alternatively, it had a duty to withdraw such products from sale if a warning was impracticable. I was referred to the decision of Kirby J in Hoyts Pty Ltd v Burns (2003) 201 ALR 470 at 486 [71] where he set forth criteria relevant to the obligation to provide warnings. A consideration of those criteria confirms that McPhersons did have a duty to warn and its failure to warn constituted a breach of that duty.

35. With all respect to those senior executives of McPhersons who gave evidence it seems to me that McPhersons was indifferent to the dangers and risks of selling asbestos products. In this connection it is relevant to note that Mr Clucas said in evidence that it would not have crossed his mind to ask suppliers of asbestos material whether there were dangers associated with the products. Had McPhersons consulted the literature which was freely available it might have been moved to make inquiries, to give warnings or to direct that asbestos products be removed from sale. Further evidence justifying a conclusion of indifference appears in the transcript of Mr Clucas' evidence and also that of Mr Kelso who, as previously noted, had an appreciation of the fact that dusts could be injurious to health.

36. Mr Kelso's evidence was that McPhersons was content to rely upon information provided to it by manufacturers. Nevertheless it did, without suggestion from manufacturers of certain electric tools, advise purchasers to wear goggles to protect their eyes in some circumstances. The plaintiff submits that if a manufacturer of asbestos products provided advice to McPhersons it should have called such evidence. It called none.

37. The evidence of the late Mr Eaton is that had he known of the risks of injury and had he been warned to take precautions he would have taken such precautions as would, in effect, have minimised or obviated the inhalation of asbestos. This is credible evidence. One should look cautiously at assertions of what might be done before an event which are made after an event, but I accept Mr Eaton's evidence. He was a competent and conscientious tradesman and I see no reason to doubt his evidence that had he been warned of the dangers of using asbestos material he would have heeded them. He was a person who, at the time of his exposure, could not have been aware of its dangers. In that respect he was vulnerable, not only because of his lack of knowledge but also because of the lack of warnings, either on the products or from his employer.

38. In the light of these considerations I come to the conclusion that the third defendant from at least the mid 1960s and before, acting reasonably, ought to have foreseen there was a risk of injury, and by continuing to sell asbestos products without warning of their danger it failed to discharge the duty it owed to those who purchased those products and to those in the employ of those to whom it sold; indeed, to anyone in whose contemplation it may have been that they would come into contact with dust released.

39. The duty of McPhersons was to warn of the dangers of which it ought to have known or had reason to know. It had reason to know of the dangers. It ought to have known of the dangers. Its failure to warn or to withdraw materials containing asbestos from sale constituted a breach of that duty.

40. In Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 Mason J at 47 said:

In deciding whether there has been a breach of the duty of care the tribunal of fact must first ask itself whether a reasonable man in the defendant's position would have foreseen that his conduct involved a risk of injury to the plaintiff or to a class of persons including the plaintiff. If the answer be in the affirmative, it is then for the Tribunal of fact to determine what a reasonable man would do by way of response to the risk.

41. I think I have made it clear that my view is McPhersons ought to have warned or withdrawn asbestos products from sale. Nevertheless, it is appropriate, I think, also to have regard to what Giles JA said in Julia Farr Services Incorporated v Hayes (2003) 25 NSWCCR 138 at 181 [125].

Foreseeability can turn on knowledge of the dangers of any exposure to asbestos, including in the calculus for breach of duty, and is not confined to knowledge of the dangers of exposure to high levels of asbestos or levels of asbestos above any particular standard... Of course, the existence of an accepted standard may in the inquiry into breach of duty be material to the response of the reasonable man, but that is a different matter...

42. I do not see it necessary to consider any more than thus far I have considered the position of McPhersons as a hardware retailer, in the same way that Giles JA considered in Julia Farr the fact that the defendant there was an occupier of a building or that a defendant was a supplier of brake pads in Bendix Mintex Pty Ltd and Ors v Barnes and Ors (1997) 42 NSWLR 307.

43. At all times there was a grave and serious risk of injury to those in the class of which the late Mr Eaton was a member. The likelihood of that risk coming home was high. The avoidance of that risk required minimal action. Taking alleviating action would have generated no inconvenience, nor would it have caused any conflict in responsibility. The evidence satisfies me that the failure to warn of the dangers of the products as well as its failure to withdraw then from sale caused, in the relevant sense, Mr Eaton's mesothelioma. Accordingly, I am of the view that each remaining defendant is liable to the plaintiff.

44. There will be verdict for the plaintiff jointly and severally against the second, third, fourth and fifth defendants and judgment in the sum of $227,979.91.

45. I will reserve the application for indemnity costs for further argument.

46. Is there any further matter you wish dealt with?

Mr JOSEPH: No

Miss STRATHDEE: No, your Honour

Mr WATSON: No

Mr RUSSELL: No

Mr M J Joseph, SC with R A O’Keefe instructed by Slater & Gordon Appeared for the Plaintiff

Miss W Strathdee instructed by Phillips Fox Appeared for the 2nd Defendant

Mr G Watson, SC with J C Sheller instructed by Cowley Hearne Appeared for the 3rd Defendant

Mr D Russell, SC instructed by Acuiti Legal Appeared for 4th & 5th Defendants