Eastman v The Queen

Case

[1995] FCA 1207

7 Jul 1995

No judgment structure available for this case.

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - ACT Supreme Court - applications for

leave to appeal - criminal proceedings - trial in progress -

interlocutory orders - refusal of permanent stay - refusal to disqualify for bias - revocation of bail - fragmentation of

criminal process - no exceptional circumstances.

CRIMINAL LAW - ACT Supreme Court - murder trial in· progress -

interlocutory orders of trial judge - refusal of permanent stay - refusal to disqualify for bias - revocation of bail -

application for leave to appeal to Federal Court.

Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR 378

Sergi v Director of Public Prosecutions, unreported, New South

Wales Court of Appeal, 10 September 1991

B v Iorlano (1983) 151 CLR 678

Jarrett v Seymour (1993) 46 FLR 557

Elliot v Seymour (1993) 119 ALR 1

Re Rozenes; Ex parte Burd (1994) 68 ALJR 372

Yates v Wilson (1989) 168 CLR 338

Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632

Greater Wollongong Corporation v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134

Barton v Walker (1979) '2 NSWLR 740 ·

Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund v Saunders ( 1994)

123 ALR 323

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s. 27

Supreme Court Act 1933 {ACT), s. 4A

Bail Act 1992 (ACT), s . 22

No . ACT G36 of 1995

No. ACT G37 of 1995 No. ACT G40 of 1995

DAVID HAROLD EASTMAN v THE QUEEN

Applicant

Respondent ~:

BLACK CJ, SHEPPARD AND BEAUMONT JJ

7 JULY 1995

MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

)

)

No. ACT G36 of 1995

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

)

No. ACT G37 of 1995

)

No. ACT G40 of 1995

DISTRICT REGISTRY

) )

GENERAL DIVISION

)

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

BETWEEN:

DAVID HAROLD EASTMAN

Applicant

AND:

THE QUEEN

Respondent

CORAM:

BLACK C.J., SHEPPARD AND BEAUMONT JJ.

DATE:

7 JULY 1995

PLACE :

MELBOURNE (APPLICATIONS HEARD IN CANBERRA)

MINUTES OF ORDER

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. Leave to appeal in each of matters ACT G 37, 38 and 40 of

1995 is refused.

2. The republication of these orders and the reasons for

judgment except to the parties and their legal advisers

is prohibited until further order of the Court or of a

judge.

Note :

Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in

Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

-:.:.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

)

)

No. ACT G36 of 1995

AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

)

No. ACT G37 of 1995

)

No. ACT G40 of 1995

DISTRICT REGISTRY

) )

GENERAL DIVISION

)

APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

BETWEEN:

DAVID HAROLD EASTMAN

Applicant

AND:

THE

QUEEN

Respondent

CORAM:

BLACK C.J., SHEPPARD AND BEAUMONT JJ.

DATE:

7 JULY 1995

PLACE:

MELBOURNE (APPLICATIONS HEARD IN CANBERRA)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

These three applications for leave to appeal arise

in the following circumstances.

The applicant, David Harold Eastman, is charged with the murder of Colin Stanley Winchester on 10 January 1989 . The

indictment, dated 29 March 1993, was filed in the Supreme

Court of the Australian Capital Territory at about that time,

the applicant having been committed for trial by the Coroner

on 24 December 1992 after a coronial inquest held from May

1989 to December 1991, and reopened in November 1992.

In May 1994, prior to the commencement of the trial, the applicant moved the Supreme Court for an order that the

2

proceedings be permanently stayed. On 11 July 1994, Jenkinson

J. , sitting as a Judge of the Supreme Court, refused the

motion.

The trial of the applicant was fixed to commence on ! · May

1995 before Carruthers A.J. On 1 May, the applicant's

solicitors filed a notice of motion, returnable before the

Supreme Court on 2 May, again seeking a . permanent stay.

On 2 May 1995, the trial commenced and is currently part

heard.

On 2 May, the applicant requested that the trial Judge

disqualify himself. His Honour declined the request.

On 16 May 1995, Carruthers A. J. refused the application

for a permanent stay filed on 1 May, and on 1 June his Honour

gave reasons for the refusal.

The applicant now seeks, in matter ACT G 36/95, leave to appeal from the order made on 16 May refusing the stay.

This

application is dated 19 June 1995.

In matter ACT G 37/95, the applicant seeks to appeal against what is said to be the judgment given on 16 May. The basis of this application, also rlated 19 June, is said to be

that the trial Judge exhibited bias.

The third application before this Court in matter ACT G 40/95, is an application for leave to appeal from the order

3

made by Carruthers A.J. on 29 June whereby the applicant's

bail was not renewed.

The applications were argued

at length over a period

extending throughout 3 and 4 July.

On 3 July the Court sat

until 6 p . m.

The matter was concluded at 5.40 p.m. on 4 July

when the Court reserved its decision. The applicant was

unrepresented but had a comprehensive grasp of the points

which he wished to make. He was very articulate and presented

his case clearly.

Ordinarily, the Court would publish more detailed reasons than these, dealing in detail with each of the arguments presented to it . There are reasons, however, why that is not

possible in this case. The first of these is time. The

applications have been made by the applicant during the course

of a criminal trial. The trial has proceeded, so we were

informed, for the past seven weeks.

The Crown has called some

60 of the 200 or so witnesses it proposes to call. On the

present rate of progress it is anticipated that the Crown case will occupy a further eight weeks. The due administration of

justice requires a decision from this Court on the matters that were argued as soon as it is reasonably possible for it

to be given.

There is a further reason why the reasons are necessarily brief. Many of the matters which are relied upon touch on

sensitive aspects of the trial and the possibility of any

4

misconception that we have a view about these matters must be minimised. We have no more than an outline of the Crown case.

We have heard no evidence, and, in any event, it would be

quite irrelevant and inappropriate for - us to express any view

of our own about any aspect of the evidence. Nevertheless,

misunderstandings occur and it is desirable that the chances

of that happening be reduced so far as that is possible.

Numerous points were relied upon by the applicant.

We do

not propose to address each one. The critical points may be

referred to as the flawed inquest point, the fresh evidence point, the bias point and the bail point. It was substantially upon the flawed inquest point that the applicant

relied in his application that the trial be permanently

stayed. The submission with which his Honour dealt was made for the applicant by senior counsel then appearing for him.

The submission is succinctly put in written submissions which

were given to his Honour and which have been made available to

us .

The applicant relied upon those submissions.

In his affidavit in support of the application for a stay filed on 1 May, the applicant's solicitor contended that the

continuation of the proceedings would be an abuse of process

for the following reasons:

"(i)

Because of the flawed Inquest proceedings and

the inadequate police investigations on which those proceedings were based the accused

cannot receive a fair trial. To require the accused to stand trial in these circumstances

would constitute an abuse of process;

5

(ii) The Crown case is a circumstantial one and it

is incumbent on the Crown to exclude beyond

r easonable doubt any reasonable hypotheses

cons is tent with the accused's innocence.

Evidence at the Inquest raised a number of

such hypotheses , yet the Crown case as

outlined , and its list of proposed witnesses,

indicate its intention not to lead evidence .

of such hypotheses in the trial. To deny the

accused the benefit of such hypotheses is

oppressive and an abuse of process ;

(iii)  The Crown case as outlined is so inherently

weak that if a guilty verdict were to be

returned at trial it would be quashed on the appeal as being unsafe and unsatisfactory and

no new trial would be ordered . Thus, to

require the accused to stand trial on this

prosecution case would be oppressive and an

abuse of process;

(iv)

The

proceedings

constitute

an

abuse

of

process because

of undue delay

which

has

prejudiced the

accused's right

to a

fair

trial .

(v) The accused has been subjecte d to a r egime of

harassment by Australian Federal Police

officers which has interfered with his

a bility to properly instruct his legal

representatives in his defence to the extent

that to require him to stand trial on the

indictment would constitute an abuse of

process ;

(vi) To allow the Crown to lead _what is termed the 'Webb Evidence' given to the Inquest on 18 November 1992 would be oppressive and an

abus e of process. The Crown case against the accused fails in the absence of the said

evidence ."

Having referred to the authorities in this area, in particular, the judgment 'of Jen).cinson J. and the "balancing

.-.

I '

;:

exercise" explained by the majority of the High Court (:M:ason

CJ., Deane and Dawson JJ.) in Walton v Gardiner (1993) 177 CLR

378 (at 396), the primary Judge proceeded to analyse the

circumstances of the case, and considered each of the grounds

6

(i) to (vi), above, contended for on behalf of the applicant,

and in the light of the authorities, concluded that no basis

for the grant of a permanent stay had been made out .

In our opinion, subject to the question of the tender of fresh evidence, to whi ch we will return, no case for leave has

been made out.

The principles to be applied in this area are well settled . In Walton, Mason CJ. , Deane and Dawson JJ. agreed

(at 392) with the approach taken by the New South Wales Court

of Appeal that it had power to make an order staying

proceedings if satisfied that their continuation would be so

unfairly and unjustifiably oppressive as to constitute an

abuse of process; and that it would only be so satisfied in an exceptional or extreme case. A similar approach has been

taken by that Court, in a criminal context, in Ser gi v

Director

of

Public

Prosecutions,

10

September

1991,

unreported.

Moreover, so far as intervention at the appellate level

by this Court is concerned, there are_ powerful discretionary

reasons why this Court should not interfere (see B v Iorlano

(1983) 151 CLR 678 at 680; Jar.rett v Seymour ( 1993) 46i FCR

I

557;

Elliott v Seymour (1993) 119 ALR 1).

As Dawson J. !said

in Re Rozenes; Ex parte Burd (1994) 68 ALJR 372 at 373:

7

"This Court has repeat~dly indicated that the fragmentation of a criminal trial by proceedings to

contest the rulings of a trial judge, by way of

either leave to appeal or prerogative relief, is

highly undesirable and will only be allowed in

exceptional c ircumstances ."

In Yates v Wilson ( 1989) 168 CLR 338, Mason CJ, Toohey and Gaudron JJ, i n refus ing an application for special leave

to appeal against a decision of this Court not to interfere

with a Magistrate's decision to commit a person for trial,

stressed the undesirablity of fragmenting the criminal

process . Their Honours said (at 339):

"The undesirability of fragmenting the criminal

process is so powerful a consideration that it requires no elaboration by us. It is a factor which

should inhibit the Federal Court from exercising

jurisdiction under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) as we ll as inhibit

this court from granting a special leave to appeal."

Where the fragmentation of a criminal trial is involved, the usual tests applied in civil cases to determine whether

leave to appeal should be granted from an interlocutory order

yield to the further and very powerful consideration that the

fragme ntation of a criminal tria l by appellate proceedings is

highly undesirable, so that leave will be granted only in exceptional circumstances. Other factors that point to this

conclusion include what Kirby P. described in Sergi v Director

of Public Prosecutions as: "the ·~ large provisions to chal~enge

::

a conviction on appeal if, at the end of a trial, the ac~used

is convicted and still compla ins about an interlocutory

ruling . " The circumstance, if it were present , that an

applicant might succeed upon appeal on grounds sought to be

8

raised by way of appeal during the course of a trial, and will

have suffered the e xpense and strain of a criminal trial in

the meantime, is not, for these purposes, an exceptional

circumstance: Re Rozenes; Ex parte Burd (1994) 68 ALJR 372 at

373-374, per Dawson J.

The principles to be applied by the trial Judge are also well established.

In Walton, Mason CJ . , Deane and Dawson JJ. said (at 395-

6 ) :

" the question whether criminal proceedings

should be permanently stayed on abuse of process grounds falls to be determined by a weighing process

involving a subjective balancing of a variety of

factors and considerations. Among those factors and

considerations are the requirements of fairness to the accused, the legitimate public interest in the

disposition of charges of serious offences and in

the conviction of those guilty of crime , and the need to maintain public confidence in the administration of j ustice. "

In our view, it has not been shown that the primary Judge failed to identify correctly these principles or that

exceptional circumstances exist such as would warrant the

grant of leave to appeal .

The fresh evidence point w~s based main ly on the r 1cent availability to the applicant of transcripts of conversaiions

overheard by police officers as a result of the installation

of listening devices in or close to the applicant's flat.

Some of these conversations were with his solicitors. The

applicant complained that the subsequent transcription of the

conversations, which were conversations between himself and his legal adviser, amounted to a gross breach of legal professional privilege which had been permitted by the

Australian Federal Police. We are prepared to assume that

this may have been the case. Furthermore, we are not prepared

to accept at face value the bland assurance of counsel for the

Crown that the installation of the listening devices without a

warrant in the vicinity of the accused's home was lawful . We

are unable to determine whether the installation was lawful or

unlawful because we have heard no evidence on the point . It

is unnecessary, for the purposes of reaching a conclusion on

the matters rel ied upon by the applicant, for us to do so.

The principles upon which fresh evidence may be received are well established. They have been propounded by the High

Court in Orr v Holmes (1948) 76 CLR 632, Greater Wollongong Corporation v Cowan (1955) 93 CLR 435 and Commonwealth Bank of

Australia v Quade (1991) 178 CLR 134. One of those principles

is that a person seeking to rely on fresh evide nce in an

appeal must establish, not only that the evidence carne into

his possession after the trial of the matter but that, if the

evidence had been available at the time of the trial, there

would have been at least a real possibility that it would have

led to a result opposite to that reached at the trial . :Here

'

'

the trial is not the present trial which is continuing b~fore

his Honour nor the inquest. It is the hearing before his

Honour.

The question we must ask ourselves is whether, if his

Honour had had the transcripts available to him at the time he

10.

made

his

decision,

there

would

have

been

a

distinct

possibility of his reaching a different conclusion.

In our opinion, having regard particularly to the lapse of time between the inquest and the trial, it is most unlikely

that h i s Honour's conclusion would have been any different

from what it was.

Apart from these matters, there is a question whether,

although the material upon which the applicant relies in fact

came into his possession very recently, it was not available

to him much earlier and indeed before the application made to

the trial judge for the permanent stay . The fact that the

conversations in question had been overheard by the police was

well-known. It was apparently their content which was not

known . It seems that if a reque~t for the transcript had been made by the applicant earlier, it would have been complied

with. That was all at a time when the applicant was represented by competent senior counsel . There is thus a question whether the applicant exercised due diligence to

obtain t he material requ i red for his application to his Honour

for a s tay.

In our opinion, this is not a case in which the discretion to receive further evidence under s.27 of the

Federal Court of Austral i a Act 1976 should be exercised.

11.

Accordingly, leave to appeal in matter number ACT G 36 of 1995 is refused .

We turn to the bias point.

An initial difficulty

confronting the applicant is that no formal order was made by the trial Judge on either occasion when his Honour declined to

disqualify himself, being 2 May and 29 June respectively, from

which an appeal could be brought.

Moreover, it is by no means obvious what order of any ·utility could now be made he r e by an appellate court, even if

it were persuaded to interve ne at this juncture (see Barton v

Walker (1979) 2 NSWLR 740; cf. Gas & Fuel Corporation

Superannuation Fund v Saunde r s {1994) 123 ALR 323).

But, in any event, we are not persuaded that any ground for disqualification has been made out. The applicant relied

upon a number of statements in the transcript by his Honour which he said gave him a reasonable apprehension that his Honour was biased against him . We have examined each of these

instances and have reached the conclusion that the submission

is not justified.

1:

;:

A few things need to be said about this matter.

Firs.tly,

a trial of the length of this one, particularly bearing in

mind its complexity, naturally imposes a substantial strain on

all those engaged in it. That particularly applies to an

12.

accused person who, for much of the trial, has chosen to

r epresent himself. One of the difficulties about taking this

course is that an accused person in such a position is

inclined to lose his own objectivity and balance which

counsel, removed as he or she is from personal involvement in

the case, is usually able to avoid. A trial such as this

imposes strains of a different kind on the Crown and those who

represent it , on police officers and others who give evidence

and upon jurors. A very substantial burden is cast upon the

trial judge whose duty it is to see that the trial remains

fair throughout . It is only natural that, at times, patience

will be tried, tempers may tend to become a little short and

misunderstandings may occur. From time to time remarks may be

made which may be regarded on reflection as incautious or

unwise .

It is plain on the face of the transcript that his Honour has had a concern on some occasions that the applicant has been deliberately endeavouring t o say things, or to ac t in a

manner, calculated to have an inf luence on the jury in his

favour . His Honour has rebuked him from time to time for

making what may be termed irrelevant and unhelpful comments.

Particularly in respect of one:, _ occasion which occurre<;:l on '

j!

29 June last, the applicant is prepared to concede

that;! his

own behaviour left something to be desired . He claims however

to have bee n provoked into this behaviour by a remark made by

his Honour. The remark was made in the context of a

13.

consideration of whether or not the applicant should be

allowed to remain on bail. In the submission of the applicant

the remark made by his Honour, which we shall not repeat, was

unsympathetic and sarcastic. We do not wish to say any more

about it other than that it may have · been better expressed.

It was the applicant's submission that his own behaviour was

brought about by resentment at what his Honour had said.

On another occasion, when the appellant was represented

by counsel, his counsel was cross-examining a key witness in

the trial. We do not go to the significance of this evidence

except to say that, upon the basis of the outline of the Crown case which we were given by counsel for the Crown, the witness

was certainly a very important one. His Honour apparently

thought the cross-examination had proceeded for too long and

made another remark which, in our view, was unfortunate.

Again we do not go to the particular discussion which ensued between his Honour and counsel but, understandable though it

may have been, it may have been better if his Honour had

endeavoured to bring the cross-examination to an end in a less

forthright way.

Although we have said what{ we have, it would be going much too far to take the view that these remarks made by!: his

L

Honour may be reasonably perceived to have reflected animosity

towards the applicant so as to justify a finding of

apprehended bias on his part .

14.

There was another aspect of the bias argument which was

unusual.

Our attention was drawn to the fact that his Honour

was appointed pursuant to s.4A of the Supreme Court Act 1933

(A.C.T.) as an additional judge of the Court. Appointments

may not be made for periods longer than 12 months although, as we understand the statute, it would be quite permissible for

the executive to reappoint a judge who has been appointed to act for an additional period. The point relied upon by the applicant is that his Honour's appointment concludes in

December next . He says, therefore, that the trial has to

finish before then. Otherwise his Honour cannot sit. Subject to his Honour's reappointment in that event, that would not be

so. The applicant has complained that from time to time, his

Honour has made remarks which suggest that he is anxious to

maintain the momentum of the trial . The applicant, so he says, has understood thi s to mean that his Honour is intent on

finishing the trial at all costs as soon as possible so as to

meet this deadline.

We have no hesitation in saying that the applicant is under a misapprehension about this matter. No judge presiding

over any trial, whether civil or criminal, these days does so

without being conscious of the ~need to keep proceedingf as

;

brief as possible so long as doing so is consistent wit~ the

due administration of justice. The applicant ought not,

simply because his Honour has indicated his wish that the

momentum of the trial be maintained, take from that some

15.

indication that his Honour does not propose to carry out his duty of ensuring that there is a fair trial. It would, of course, be a counter-productive exercise for his Honour to

engage in such a process. His Honour would be well aware of

this. If he were to do so , the trial would almost ' certainly

miscarry with the consequence that the time and expense incurred in the trial would have been wasted . No one would be

more consc ious of this than his Honour who has had a very

substantial experience in criminal trials. The likelihood is

that, if the trial were to run longer than December, the

Government of the Australian Capital Territory would reappoint

his Honour for such period as was necessary to enable him to

complete the trial.

The bias point is rejected.

In any case, no exceptional

circumstance s have been shown.

Leave to appeal in matter

number ACT G 37 of 1995 is refused .

We now turn to the application for leave to appeal

against the trial judge 's order by which the applicant's bail

was not renewed. Counsel for the Crown did not persist with

his argument that the Court had no appellate jurisdiction in

that matter .

The applicant argued that he should have leave to appeal against the bail decision because the trial judge had based it

upon the appl icant' s disruptive c~nduct which, he said, was a

16 .

matter to be dealt with in accordance with the principles

relating to contempt of court and was not within the exclusive

criteria regarding the grant of bail set out in s.22(1) of the

Bail Act 1992 (ACT) and, in particular, s.22(l)(c)(i).

In the course of giving his reasons the trial judge said:

"It is indeed a rare case where an accused person is

on bail while standing trial for murder. Had there been no course of disruptive conduct on the part of

the accused I would of course have allowed that

situation to continue, exceptional and unusual as it

is. However, I have no hesitation in saying that

the accused has now left me in a position where I feel I have no alternative but formally to revoke his bail."

His Honour did not indicate specifically the part that the disruptive conduct played in the process of his applying the criteria provided for by s.22(1) of the Bail Act, but in the overall context of his reasons we think it emerges that his Honour was basing his decision not upon the disruption as

such but upon the disruption as a factor which he considered

to be relevant to the criteria in s . 22 ( 1) (a). Accordingly,

even if s.22(1)(c)(i) is limited in the way contended for by

the applicant - a point upon which we need express no opinion

we do not think it has been shown that his Honour erroneously applied s.22(1).

'

1

Moreover, the refusal of the application for the re~ewal

of bail was very much a matter for the discretion and judgment of the judge presiding at the trial and in respect of such matters an appellate court is usually ill-equipped and

17.

reluctant to interfere. There is then , of course, the added

circumstance that the grant of leave to appeal would invol ve

interference with the course of the trial . In our view, no

exceptional situation of the kind required to warrant our

intervention in these circumstances has been made out and we

consider that leave to appeal should be refused.

During the course of the applicant's submissions to this Court, the applicant requested a declaration that the trial

Judge, Carruthers A. J. , was not validly appointed as a Judge

of the Supreme Court. His Honour was appointed an acting

Judge of the Supreme Court from 3 April 1995 to 22 December

1995 pursuant to s.4A of the Supreme Court Act . The applicant now seeks to argue that, by reason of the application to the

Territory of the doctrine of the separation of powers, the

purported appointment was invalid because s.4A itself and this

particular appointment "breaches the doctrine of separation of

powers" .

As we understood the submission, it was that there was invalidity because the executive was empowered to appoint

judges, including acting judges, in that way, was empowered to

interfere with the judicial arm of government . We reject this

submission.

All judicial appointments in Australia, a~ting

,.

and otherwise, are made upon the advice of the executive government of the day. It has never been suggested that this

in any way transgresses the separation of powers which is

provided for in the Commonwealth Constitution or in the

18 .

constitutions of States and Territories which have written

constitutions.

We make the following orders :

1. In each matter, leave to appeal is refused.

2 . The republication of these orders and the reasons

for judgment, except to the parties and their

legal advisers, is prohibited until further order

of the Court or a judge.

I hereby certify that this and the

preceding seventeen ( 17) pages are a

true copy of the Reasons for Judgment

herein of the Court.

Associate: ~kv~

Date:

7 July 1995

"•

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APPEARANCES

The applicant represented himself .

Counsel for the respondent :

M.F. Adams QC

J.E. Ibbotsen

J. Brewster

Date of hearing:

3 and 4 July 1995

Date of judgment:

7 July 1995

::

.I.

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Cases Citing This Decision

0

Cases Cited

14

Statutory Material Cited

0

Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34
Walton v Gardiner [1993] HCA 77
R v Elliott [1996] HCA 21