Eastman v Officer in Charge of the Cells Act Supreme Court

[1994] HCATrans 472

..

,

• r

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Registry	No Cl6 of 1994
In the matter of -

An application for a Writ of

Habeas Corpus directed to

the Officer in Charge of the

cells ACT Supreme Court,

Knowles Place, Canberra ACT

Ex parte -

DAVID HAROLD EASTMAN

DEANE J

(In Chambers)

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

Eastman 31/8/94

AT CANBERRA ON WEDNESDAY, 31 AUGUST 1994, AT 11. 31 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

HIS HONOUR:	You are Mr Eastman, are you?
MR D.H. EASTMAN:	Yes, Your Honour, I represent myself.

HIS HONOUR:  Good, thank you. Mr Rozenes I see you

there - - -

MR M. ROZENES, OC:  Yes, I am here really to assist the

Court, if that is necessary.	I do not appear
for - - -

HIS HONOUR:	Has the application been served?
MR ROZENES:	A copy of the application has been served, as I

understand it, both on my office and also that of

the police, but the police do not appear and I do

not appear for them.

HIS HONOUR:  I would anticipate dealing with the application

at this stage as an ex parte application which

means might I suggest if you would be good enough

to just sit and see whether any matter arises which

you feel makes it necessary for you to apply to

intervene.

Mr Eastman, the Latin in that comment which you may or may not understand was ex parte, by

which I mean by you, without any respondent being

here as a party.

MR EASTMAN:  Yes, I understand from a reading of the

High Court rules that Your Honour would have

discretion if you saw fit to make an order

absolute, and that is the form of order that I

would be seeking.

HIS HONOUR: Well, let me indicate to you at this stage I

see the process as a two-step process.	The one
which we are now engaged on is whether an order

should be made that a writ issue and be served on

the basis that it can then come back before the

Court to determine whether or not a final order

should be made. In other words, again to revert to

Latin unfortunately, this is equivalent to what we

call an order nisi application. That is, an order

which calls upon the respondent to show cause, but

if I can at this stage - - -

MR EASTMAN:  Your Honour, if I may say, I said in my - I

worded my application having regard to the

discretion under the Court rules, hoping that time
could be saved and the proceedings, instead of

being a two-stage one, could be telescoped and made

a single one, rather than applying for an order

nisi and then having to come back here again. I have cast my application in the form, as you can

see, of an application for an order absolute, but

Eastman 31/8/94

if Your Honour sees fit at this stage to take the

two-stage route, well of course I am in the hands

of the Court.

HIS HONOUR:  I propose at this stage to deal with it as I

indicated. I have read your affidavit which I will make a note of; it is the affidavit of David Harold

Eastman which was sworn on the 29 August 1994.

There is one matter - obviously I have to deal with

this on the material before me - there is one

matter in your affidavit - - -

MR EASTMAN: If I may, before Your Honour goes further - I

am slightly embarrassed in relation to my

preparation, and I would like to ask the Court for

an adjournment if at all possible until, say, 2 pm this afternoon, if that is possible for the Court.

The reason being this that, of course, being in

custody for the last month, I have not had access

to legal books and so forth, and I did partially

manage to prepare this application in terms of

researching precedents and so forth when I was at

the supreme court cells on Monday of this week, and

I was able to get legal books sent down from the

library and to read them in the cells. I

anticipated that what would happen this morning was

that I would go in from the remand centre to the

supreme court cells with their normal morning run

at about 8 am, and that consequently I could have

completed my preparation between about 8.30 am and

11 am, and I requested that that be done.

Unfortunately, my request was not met and I was

brought here direct. So I have, unfortunately, not

been able to complete the preparation and I would

not be able to present my case as strongly as I

could if I were able to complete it. So, I simply

make that request for that adjournment if it is

convenient for the Court.

HIS HONOUR:  Very well, we will adjourn until 2 pm. Having

read these documents, I would direct your attention

to two matter: one is, whether this Court has

jurisdiction - do you understand what that means?

MR EASTMAN:	Yes, I think I do.
HIS HONOUR:	To make an order of habeas corpus in the

circumstances of this case. Now, for this Court to

have jurisdiction, you need to point to something

in the Constitution or in some statute, in that

this is primarily an appellate court, which has not

got implied or inherent general jurisdiction.

The second matter I would direct your

attention to is whether, even if the Court has

jurisdiction, an order for habeas corpus or a writ

of habeas corpus will issue in circumstances where

Eastman 31/8/94

a person is held in custody pursuant to a court

order. Now, I realize your limitations in terms of

looking at things, but they are matters which, if

you do want to look at things, you should look at

if you are not in a position to make submissions in

relation to them. I will deal with the matter

according to my own knowledge of the law.

MR EASTMAN: If I can make, perhaps, a preliminary or

tentative submissions on both of those points at

this stage - - -

HIS HONOUR: Well, that is a matter for you.

:MR EASTMAN:  I will just do that, as I say, provisionally.

My understanding is that the Constitution vests

this Court with original jurisdiction in respect of

prerogative writs, including a writ of habeas

corpus, directed to a Commonwealth officer

and - - -

HIS HONOUR: Well, my job is to sit here and listen, but in

relation to that I will point out to you that

habeas corpus is not among the writs in

section 75(v) of the Constitution. They are

mandamus, prohibition and injunction.

MR EASTMAN:  I was told habeas was in there. All right.

HIS HONOUR: Well, somebody has misled you about that.

MR EASTMAN:  And the second point is that I understand that

I am at the moment in custody of Australian Federal

Police officers, and that a writ, if issued, is

directed to the persons who, for the time being,
have the legal custody of the person, as opposed to

whoever might at some previous stage in the

decision-making chain have been responsible for

placing the person in custody, and, therefore, that

that would not be a problem. But I will certainly

check those two points out.

HIS HONOUR:  We will adjourn until 2 o'clock.

AT 11.41 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED

UNTIL LATER THE SAME DAY

UPON RESUMING AT 2.01PM:

HIS HONOUR:	Yes, Mr Eastman.
Eastman	31/8/94

MR EASTMAN: Before addressing the points that Your Honour

made before the adjournment, there is a matter that

I would wish to put on the record simply to fix it

in time. Having been in custody now for a month

there have been some incidents in custody which
have not complied with the standards that I believe

people in custody are entitled to expect.

HIS HONOUR:  Mr Eastman, that is not relevant to this

application, I am sorry.

MR EASTMAN:  May I briefly fix them in time on the Court

record should be any further incidents?

HIS HONOUR:	No, it is not relevant to this application.
MR EASTMAN:	If it please Your Honour.  Corning to the two

points that Your Honour raised: one, the question

of the jurisdiction of this Court, my submission is

that there is clear jurisdiction to grant a writ of

may put a contrary view and I will come to those in

habeas corpus pursuant to section 33(1)(f) of the

a moment. However, should the Court hold that it

does not have jurisdiction to grant a writ of

habeas corpus, except when it is incidental to its

original jurisdiction in some other respect or

incidental to its appellate jurisdiction, then I

would seek leave to amend my application and to

ask, in the alternative, for a writ of prohibition

directed to the same respondent prohibiting him

from retaining me further in custody.

I come to the question of whether the explicit

power of this Court to grant a writ of habeas

corpus referred to in 33(l)(f) of the Judiciary Act

1903 should be construed as being limited to being

incidental to other purposes. This view - - -

HIS HONOUR:  Mr Eastman, can I just interrupt you for a

moment. Reading the affidavit a bit more carefully

since we were last here - have you a copy of it

there?

MR EASTMAN:  I do, indeed, Your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:  At the top of page 2 there is a reference to "prejudice of a fair trial". Do you see that?

MR EASTMAN:	I do, indeed.
HIS HONOUR:	Do I deduce from that that at the time you were on bail pending the trial of that alleged matter?
MR EASTMAN:	Yes, I was.
Eastman	31/8/94
HIS HONOUR:	I guessed that was so and I thought it was, but

it is just not stated clearly.	You go back to
where you were.

MR EASTMAN:  Certainly. As I was saying, the view that the

power to grant a writ of habeas corpus may be

limited goes back to a comment of the judge in a

case in 1920. But let me just say first that on a

simple common sense reading of section 33 it is

clear that there is no limitation on the power at

all there and no doubt the Parliament seriously

considered this one of the most fundamental pieces

of Commonwealth legislation and carefully
considered the wording of it and I find it strange to suggest that the Parliament would have intended the habeas corpus power to be exercised in a

constrained way if it did not say so in the

section.

The first suggestion that it should be

interpreted as being exercisable only in a

constrained way comes from a case, 28 CLR 590,

which was a case where a person was fighting a

deportation bid - it was heard before a single

Judge, Justice Starke - in due course he held that

the deportation order was valid anyway, so it was

not necessary for him to determine conclusively

whether he had power to grant the applicant a writ

of habeas corpus. But, in passing, he made a

comment that at page 590 - I will just check that

page reference - yes, at page 590, half-way down

the page His Honour said, without any elaboration:

It must not be taken for granted that this

Court has a general power to direct the issue of writs of habeas corpus under sec 33 of the Judiciary Act, but I apprehend that the Court

has jurisdiction to exercise this power in aid

of its appellate or original jurisdiction.

No justification for this view is put forward and

it is in the nature of a throw-away comment, the

issue at stake having already been decided. by him

on other grounds.

We then come to the next case, which is

51 CLR 548 and, again, it is the same judge,

His Honour Justice Starke. Again, it is not the basis of the decision. The decision is taken on

other grounds. It is a Full Court case and he is

the only judge to make this comment, and again it

is in the nature of, I would submit, a throw-away
line. It is half-way down page 548, and we get the

statement:

Eastman 6 31/8/94

The grant of the writ by this Court must

attach itself either to the appellate or to

the original jurisdiction.

Just that bald statement; no explanation or

justification for it. And then, it crops up again

in 66 CLR 452, but at 462, 465 and 480. If I can

just take Your Honour to the first of those.

Towards the bottom of the page, second-last

paragraph - - -

HIS HONOUR:	What page are we on?
MR EASTMAN:	462, Your Honour.
HIS HONOUR:	Thank you.
MR EASTMAN:	This is in the decision of Justice Rich. He

says:

So far as the respondents Cashman and Lester

are concerned the claim for prohibition and

habeas corpus fails because this Court has no

general jurisdiction in that regard as its

power is attached to and exercised in aid of

Federal jurisdiction, whether original or

appellate.

Well, that would seem, I submit, to be a clear

error because he says that "the claim for

prohibition and habeaus corpus fails" on those

grounds. Well, I would submit, that is a clear

error because prohibition is spelt out explicitly

in section 75(v) of the Constitution. Again, it
does not determine the issue which was then before
the Court, it is in the nature of a passing
observation. At 465, this is Justice Starke,

again, and it is approximately a third of the way

down, and he says:

sec 33 of the Judiciary Act 1903-1940 can only	I agree with Isaacs J that the powers given by
be exercised within the range of jurisdiction conferred upon the Court under the provisions of the Constitution.

There is some brief justification of that view

which I, frankly, do not quite understand. If I

get the drift of it, it seems to be being suggested

that this Court, being primarily a constitutional

court and an appeal court, there must be an

inference that use of habeas corpus could only be

somehow justified if it were incidental to other

things. It does not seem, to me, to be a

convincing argument at all. The third comment is

at 480, Justice Williams, and again just over

halfway down the page, he states:

Eastman 31/8/94

Sec 33 of the Judiciary Act 1913-1940

provides, inter alia, that this Court may

direct the issue of writs of habeas corpus, but it has been held that it can only do so where the writ is claimed in aid of a matter

in which the Court has original or appellate

jurisdiction.

He provides no justification for that point of view other than to quote the two cases involving

Justice Starke, to which I have already referred,

where again it was an assertion offered without any

justification.

We then come to a decision of Justice Brennan,

Re Superintendent of Training Centre at Goulburn

and Another; Ex parte Pelle, 48 ALR 225. Here, at

page 226, half-way down, Justice Brennan states,

again, just as an assertion, really:

Other difficulties apart, the jurisdiction of

this court to grant a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to s 33(l)(f) of the Judiciary Act

1903 (Cth) can be exercised only as an

incident to the exercise of the original or
appellate jurisdiction of this court and not
otherwise.

But the only cases that he quotes in support of that view are the three to which I have already

referred where it was not the decisive factor, in

any of them, and it was raised only in the manner

of passing observations, observations which, I

submit, were not substantiated or made out.

Lastly, there is a case, 69 ALR 286, and it

also involved a single Judge, Justice Brennan, at

288, the second paragraph, where His Honour says,

again a very brief comment:

But the jurisdiction of this court to grant

such a writ pursuant to s 33(1)(f) of the

Judiciary Act can be exercised only as an incident to the exercise of the original or appellate jurisdiction of this court -

and he quotes no cases in support of that view

other than the ones to which I have already

referred.

HIS HONOUR:	Mr Eastman, could you give me the reference to the last case, again?
MR EASTMAN:	Yes, that was 69 ALR 286, at page 288.
HIS HONOUR:	Thank you.
Eastman	31/8/94
MR EASTMAN:	So the sum total of the cases, when you look at

them, is that, as I read it, there have been three

cases where this ball was set rolling by way of

passing observation and two cases where it then was

picked up and became a determining factor in the

decision that was reached, but in both of those cases it was a single Judge only. I understand

that the rule of precedents are that the decision

of one single Judge is not binding on another

single Judge, although you may wish to take note of

them for the reasons -

HIS HONOUR:  It gets a bit hard when there are four single

Judges though, does it not?

MR EASTMAN:  There is, I would say, a conspicuous lack of

any real thought. It seems to be an idea that has

just been growing like topsy and people have been

repeating it without really looking at it. At any

rate, I would submit that one should discount the

comments that have been made in those cases, and

rely on the crystal clear wording of the

legislation itself. That is all I have to say on

that. If that argument were not accepted, I submit

in the alternative, an application that I have leave to amend my application so that it be an

application of the same effect, addressed to the

same people but an application for a writ of

prohibition, or alternatively, since the

Constitution permits that also, an injunction.

I come now to the second point that

Your Honour raised before lunch, which was, if this

Court did have jurisdiction, whether it would have

jurisdiction to issue a writ in circumstances where

a person was held in custody pursuant to a court

order. What I would say to that is that the writ

that I am seeking would not be directed to a court

and I am not quite sure that I fully understood the
question that Your Honour was raising there.	I

would be grateful for any clarification that you

could give as to the issue.

HIS HONOUR: 

What I was directing your attention to was the

question whether habeas corpus is an appropriate
means of attacking the order of a court authorizing
detention in custody.

MR EASTMAN: Right, I will address my comments to that then.

In the circumstances where a person has been taken

into custody legally, I would concede the total

validity of the point that Your Honour is making.

If, therefore, the objection is that there has been

an error of judgment in refusing bail, that one

would normally expect an appeal to the supreme

court against that decision, and if that failed

then an appe~l to the Federal Court and so forth

Eastman 9 31/8/94

and so on. If, however, a person has been taken

into custody illegally, then I would submit that

the appropriate remedy is an application for a writ

of habeas corpus. That would normally be heard in

the relevant supreme court. However, in this

instance, the relevant supreme court Chief Justice,

as I am led to believe, has directed the registry

to refuse to accept my application, and after being
in custody a month shows no signs of relenting in

this position. Therefore, I would submit that the

only course of action that I can take is the one

that I have taken.

It could not be contended, for example, that

this was in some way interfering with the orderly

or normal processes of the court, that is, of the

supreme court. The supreme court has already

subverted its own orderly and normal processes by

interfering with my normal right, I would submit,

to make this application to the ACT Supreme Court.

So it is not a situation, for example, similar to that which arose in the case I have already quoted involving Justice Brennan, 48 ALR 225, and the

comment begins at the bottom of 228 where

His Honour says:

Even if this court were vested with

powers to intervene in a case like the

present, it would be incongruous to exercise

those powers so as to interrupt the orderly

administration of justice in criminal appeals.

If that was the objection that Your Honour was

directing my attention to, I would say that there

is no interruption to the normal orderly process in

the circumstances where the Supreme Court of the

ACT, the Chief Justice thereof, has seen fit to

obstruct its own orderly processes.

Also in relation to that if it were held that

the person by virtue of whose action I am in

custody now, and therefore to whom the writ ought

to be directed, were rather than the police

officers of the Australian Federal Police in whose

immediate custody I am, rather the court that made

that order, if there is some question being raised
there as to whether the court being an ACT

Magistrates Court is a Commonwealth officer - if

that was the point that Your Honour had in mind, I

would argue that ACT magistrates are Commonwealth

officers and writs can lie to them. I quote in

support of that view 163 CLR 117, Cram and Others;

Ex parte NSW Colliery Proprietors' Association

Limited and Others. The essential point is well

summarized at the front of the report, a third of

distance from the bottom of the page:

Eastman 10 31/8/94

Held ..... (3) That the persons who constituted

the Tribunal and the Authorities were officers

of the Commonwealth within the meaning of

s 75(v) of the Constitution, and remained so

notwithstanding that they exercised or

purported to exercise powers conferred by the

State Act and even when a particular power was

identifiable as having been conferred by the

State Act.

I would submit that an ACT magistrate in fact

is in a clearer position than those officers were.

Their position was that they were members of a

tribunal, namely, the Joint Coal Tribunal, which was

jointly set up by the Commonwealth Government and

the New South Wales Government by complementary

legislation and that therefore when exercising their

powers as members of the tribunal they relied both

on a Commonwealth source and a State source.

HIS HONOUR:  Yes. The problem with that, if I can direct

your attention to it, is that if you were to seek a

writ directed to the magistrates, it would not be a

writ of habeas corpus. And if you were to seek,

for example, a writ of prohibition from this Court

directed to the magistrates, this Court, in its

discretion, would say, "No, that is another way of

appealing from the decisions of the magistrate

direct to this Court", and that is something we

just would not permit. Do you understand the point

I am directing your attention to?

MR EASTMAN:  Yes, I am not, in fact, seeking to amend my

application.

HIS HONOUR:  I follow that, but I was just saying that if

there are difficulties in your path by a reason of

the nature of the writ of habeas corpus, I do not

think this particular argument provides an answer

to them.

MR EASTMAN:  I am sorry, I do not understand what the

difficulty is and that I would like to address it

if I can but - - -

HIS HONOUR:	Your difficulty is that the writ of habeas corpus is not an appropriate method of attacking
the validity of the orders made by the Magistrates
Court.  And while those orders stand the police
officer to whom your writ is directed is fully
within the law in complying with those orders. I
do not think I can - I am really not supposed to
get involved in the argument.  I do not think I can
take it further than that.
MR EASTMAN:	What I would say is that the police officers

may believe they are complying the law but, in

Eastman 11 31/8/94

fact, they are not doing so because the orders are

a nullity and the orders of the court - the

successive orders which have kept me in custody

over the past month have, I submit, all been a

nullity because they start with the first decision

which was a decision in proceedings where, I would

submit, the court had no jurisdiction because the

person before it was not validly or legally brought

before the court.

I would submit that in any legal proceedings,

particularly where a court is making a decision

concerning a person's liberty, there must be a

presumption that the defendant is legally before

the court in order for the court to have

jurisdiction to make orders. If it is the case

that the person is not legally before the court

then I would submit the court has no jurisdiction to deal with him or her and any decisions that it

makes are a nullity. So I would say that the chain

of decision making has been flawed and rendered a

nullity by the illegal circumstances of my initial

arrest. Perhaps I should come now to deal with

that.

The affidavit recounts briefly the

circumstances, and I would say that the arrest was

illegal in two respects: it was illegal because it

was carried out without any valid arrest warrant; and, in the alternative, if it were held that the piece of paper, did amount to a valid warrant, that

the circumstances amounted to an abuse of process.

Dealing with the first of those points, having

looked at the ACT Magistrates Court Act, I find no
provision in that Act for any document known as a
certified true copy of a warrant, which was the
description of the document with which the police

officers purported to effect this arrest. The

sections of the ACT Magistrates Court Act, 1930,

which refer to warrants, are - if you will bear

with me I will just identify them - section 11,

which says:

Every summons, warrant, conviction, and order
(not being by law authorized to be made by

word of mouth only) shall be under the hand of

the Magistrate or Registrar issuing or making

it.

And there is no reference to a certified true copy,

or anything other than simply a "warrant". The

second section confirms that, section 46, which is

headed up, "Warrants to be signed and, where so

required, sealed":

Eastman 12 31/8/94

Every warrant shall be in writing and shall be

signed by the Magistrate issuing the same and,

where expressly provided by any Act or law of

the Territory, sealed with the seal of such

Magistrate.

Now, it is true that in the Commonwealth

Crimes Act - and the alleged offence here was a

Commonwealth offence, so the Commonwealth

Crimes Act would seem to be the relevant one -

there is a provision for an arrest without warrant
to be made, but that is normally only done, I would

submit, in very serious matters, and I would submit

that this was scarcely even an arrestable offence.

The charge was under section 85ZE of the

Crimes Act. It is, in fact, a summary offence.

HIS HONOUR:  85Z - capital E?

MR EASTMAN: Capital Z, capital E, Your Honour - and the

penalty prescribed is imprisonment for one year. of the Commonwealth Crimes Act states:

Offences against a law of the Commonwealth,

being offences which:

(a) are punishable by imprisonment for a

period not exceeding 12 months .... are summary
offences, unless the contrary intention

appears.

I must admit I do not know sufficient about

the law as to whether, in fact, a summary offence

is even an arrestable offence at all, but if it is

it, I would submit, is at the very much the lower

end of the scale of arrestable offences and nobody

could contemplate effecting an arrest for a summary

offence without a valid warrant and the police

themselves, by their conduct have, I would submit,

implicitly admitted that in that they got some sort

of a document with them when they came along

clearly implying that they considered that it was

not a circumstance where they would be entitled to

Magistrates anything other than the signed original of the warrant to be used, I would contend that the arrest

arrest without warrant. Given that the

is plainly illegal.

I would direct Your Honour's attention to

paragraph 5 of my affidavit where I state that the

signed original warrant was not delivered to the

watchhouse until about an hour after my arrest, and

it was only at that time that the watchhouse

sergeant charged me, and I was unable to get from

the police an admission as to where the warrant had

Eastman 13 31/8/94

been except that it had not been with them at the

time of arrest, and I suspect that since the

arresting officers were from Tuggeranong the

warrant was probably in the Tuggeranong police

station when they were coming through my front door

in Reid with a sledgehammer. Now, I would submit

that that is clearly an illegal arrest.

Apart from the issue of the warrant I would

also argue, even if it were held that the certified

true copy were a valid warrant for the purposes of

the arrest, that the circumstances amounted to an

abuse of process in that, as I state in my

affidavit, the police had obtained, apparently,

the - I do not actually state this in my affidavit

because I left it out, but if I may state it from

the bar table - the police informed me that they

had obtained the warrant on Tuesday. The fact that

they had obtained it first came to my notice on

Wednesday night, and as I do state in my affidavit,

throughout Thursday and Friday I went about my

normal business around Canberra, made no attempt in

any way to conceal myself from anyone, and then at

8 o'clock on Friday night the police come round

and, as I say in paragraph 3 of my affidavit, on

several occasions during the Thursday and the

Friday I observed police officers, both on foot and

in police vehicles who clearly recognized me in
that they made eye contact and looked in my

direction and gave every indication of having

recognized me, but who made no attempt to arrest me

and, I submit, the arrest was deliberately delayed

until 8 pm on a Friday night with the purpose of

keeping me in custody over a weekend at least and,

I submit also, the amount of violence used amounted

to an abuse of process.

We have here an offence which may not even be an arrestable one in that it is a summary offence.	If it is arrestable it is at the very lower end of
the scale, and we find a sledgehammer being used to gain entry to a person's premises; a degree of force that one normally associates with apprehensions of kilos of heroin and things like
that. As I state in my affidavit, I live in a
block of flats where there are elderly people whose
health is not good. So, on the grounds of invalidity of the the warrant and/or abuse of process, I would contend that the original arrest
was illegal and that the successive decisions to
hold me in custody since then have consequently been a nullity. That is the conclusion of the submission, Your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:  Thank you, Mr Eastman. I propose to take a

short adjournment for - it could be about

Eastman 14 31/8/94

20 m nutes, when	w::: qi~e ~y ~ec:s::n
appl cati:in.

AT 2.~3 PM S½ORT ADJOURNMENT

UPON RESUMING AT 3.16 PM:

(Reasons for judgment were delivered)

HIS HONOUR: Accordingly, and quite apart from the ques:ion

of the jurisdiction of the Court, the applica:ion

for a writ of habeas corpus must be dismissed, and

I so order.

Mr Eastman, as you probably observed, I was

reading from something I dictated during the

adjournment. A copy of this will be available :o both you and to Mr Rozenes, I would think, within

about five minutes if you can be allowed to wai:

here for that period, but that is on the basis :~a:

it has not been proofed which means some for:c:al

amendments might subsequently have to be made ::i

it. For example, I notice as I read there was one

error in a page reference but, as I say, if you can

be allowed to stay here for five minutes I will

arrange to have a copy of this delivered to you.

MR EASTMAN: If it please Your Honour.

HIS HONOUR:  Mr Rozenes, a copy will be available to you at

once.

MR ROZENES:	Thank you, Your Honour.
HIS HONOUR:	And there will be some other copies available

if they are required.

AT 3.26 PM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE

Eastman