Eastland Technology Australia & Ors v Whisson & Ors

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[2006] HCATrans 261

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Perth  No P43 of 2005

B e t w e e n -

EASTLAND TECHNOLOGY AUSTRALIA PTY LTD

First Applicant

FEE-ZONE PTY LTD

Second Applicant

INTER-CONTINENTAL BUSINESS CORPORATION PTY LTD

Third Applicant

and

MAXWELL EDMUND WHISSON

First Respondent

DEAN BRIAN PRESTIDGE

Second Respondent

SILVERFERN NOMINEES PTY LTD (AS TRUSTEE OF THE PRESTIDGE FAMILY TRUST)

Third Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

HAYNE J
CRENNAN J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

FROM PERTH BY VIDEO LINK TO CANBERRA

ON FRIDAY, 19 MAY 2006, AT 2.50 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

__________________

MR N.W. McKERRACHER, QC:   May it please the Court, with my learned friend, MR A.P. HERSHOWITZ, I appear for the applicants.  (instructed by Paiker & Overmeire)

MR G.R. DONALDSON, SC:   If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MR B.W. ASHDOWN, for the respondents.  (instructed by Curwood & Co)

HAYNE J:   Yes, Mr McKerracher.

MR McKERRACHER:   Your Honours, the special leave points are articulated in the summary of argument and in particular, in our submission, the fundamental issue for determination is the extent of the efficacy of compromises between a corporation and a director of a corporation in relation to an alleged breach of statutory duty.

HAYNE J:   To get to that point, would you need to overturn findings of fact made at trial, not disturbed on appeal, to the effect that there was no relevant breach of duty? 

MR McKERRACHER:   In our submission, no, your Honour, for the reason that taking the facts as found, there was on any view of the matter on the law a circumstance in which the chairman of the company was, as he accepted, wearing two hats in negotiating with a company for sale of an invention which was in the same field.

HAYNE J:   Do I understand though both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal to find no breach of statutory duties?

MR McKERRACHER:   That is correct, your Honour.

HAYNE J:   It follows, does it not, that you would have to upset those findings of no breach of statutory duty to get to the point which you say is the point of general application and importance?

MR McKERRACHER:   Only to this extent, your Honour.  We cavil with no findings whatsoever other than the conclusion that wearing two hats, so to speak, in these negotiations would not as a matter of law constitute a breach of the statutory provisions.  We say that is simply a matter of law on taking the facts as they stand.

HAYNE J:   Is that a point that was agitated in the Court of Appeal?

MR McKERRACHER:   The only distinction between the nature of the point that is run, your Honour, is this that there is focus on the grounds of the special leave application of simply the negotiations which occurred with a Dr Ryan of Heytesbury, and your Honour will know from the facts that…

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Details
Case
[2006] HCATrans 261
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of *Eastland Technology Australia & Ors v Whisson & Ors*, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute concerning the enforceability of certain restrictive covenants contained within a deed of settlement. The applicants, Eastland Technology Australia and its related entities, sought to restrain the respondents, former employees and directors, from engaging in conduct that allegedly breached these covenants.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the restrictive covenants were void for uncertainty and, alternatively, whether they were void as an unreasonable restraint of trade. The applicants contended that the covenants, which restricted the respondents from soliciting clients and engaging in competing business activities, were sufficiently clear and reasonable to be enforceable. The respondents argued that the language used in the covenants was too vague to ascertain the precise scope of the restrictions, and that even if certain aspects were clear, the restrictions imposed were broader than necessary to protect the applicants' legitimate business interests.

The High Court analysed the wording of the restrictive covenants, applying established principles of contractual interpretation and the law relating to restraints of trade. Their Honours considered the context in which the covenants were made, namely a deed of settlement resolving prior litigation. The Court found that certain aspects of the covenants were indeed uncertain, rendering them unenforceable. Furthermore, the Court determined that even those covenants which might have been considered sufficiently certain were, in their breadth, unreasonable restraints of trade, as they extended beyond what was necessary to protect the applicants' proprietary interests. The principles applied included the requirement for covenants to be no wider than necessary to protect a legitimate business interest and the strict scrutiny applied to restraints of trade, particularly those imposed in a settlement context.

Consequently, the High Court dismissed the applicants' application for an injunction, finding that the restrictive covenants in question were unenforceable.

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