Eastern Express Pty Limited v General Newspapers Pty Limited
[1992] HCATrans 368
•
.
~
| IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA | • |
| Office of the Registry |
Sydney No S58 of 1992 B e t w e e n -
EASTERN EXPRESS PTY LIMITED
Applicant
and
GENERAL NEWSPAPERS PTY LIMITED,
DOUBLE BAY NEWSPAPERS PTY
LIMITED, BREHMER FAIRFAX PTY
LIMITED, JOHN B. FAIRFAX,
JOHN HANNAN. FRANK HANNAN andNICKELBY PTY LIMITED
Respondents
Application for special leave
to appeal
BRENNAN J
DAWSON J
McHUGH J
| Eastern | 1 | 11/12/92 |
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 11 DECEMBER 1992, AT 10.06 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
| MR D.F. JACKSON, QC: | May it please the Court, I appear with |
my learned friend, MR J.S. HILTON for the
applicant. (instructed by Solomon Partners)
| MR R.J. ELLICOTT, QC: | Your Honour, I appear with |
MR D.M. YATES for the respondents. (instructed by Phillips Fox)
| BRENNAN J: | Mr Jackson. |
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honours, may I hand to the Court a copy of |
an outline of submissions. The relevant issues,
Your Honours, appear in the last two paragraphs.
BRENNAN J: Yes, Mr Jackson?
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honours, as is apparent from the outline |
of submissions, two issues arise in relation to the
application for special leave. The first concerns
the test to be applied under section 46(1), and the
second concerns the approach taken by the
Full Court in the present case in relation to that
issue, and the consequences of the court's view.
Your Honours, section 46 is set out at page 33
of the application book, and may I take
Your Honours to it for just a moment.
Your Honours, as is apparent from the opening
words of section 46(1), the terms of the provision
require a consideration of the question whether thecorporation has, to use the words in the section,
"a substantial degree of power" in a market. If it
does, it may not take advantage of that power for
one of the three purposes listed in paragraphs (a),
(b) and (c). Now, Your Honours will see that paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) deal with different
aspects of competition, and may I ask Your Honours
to note particularly, that whereas paragraph (b) is
concerned with preventing entry into markets, paragraph (a) is concerned with the use of market
power for eliminating or substantially damagingcompetitors within markets, and it was (a), rather
than (b) with which the case was concerned.
Your Honours, that that is so may be seen from
the reasons for judgment of the primary judge at
page 43, line 19 through to page 44, line 1. I wonder if I might take Your Honours to that for a
moment.
At page 43 in the last paragraph on the page,
Your Honours will see that he says the real issue:
| Eastern | 2 | 11/12/92 |
is whether ESN has taken advantage of its
market power for one of the purposes -
And then at line 21:
And that issue comes down to para (a);
whatever its hopes may have been, ESN did not
succeed in preventing the entry of "EasternExpress" into the market (para (b) and the
applicant does not suggest -
et cetera. Your Honours will see what the case is
about in the last three lines on that page and at
the top line on the next page. So it was a case
relating to paragraph (a) in circumstances where
the applicant and the respondent were in the
market, the applicant having entered the market.
| BRENNAN J: | So you are talking about the period after |
February 1990?
| MR JACKSON: | Yes. | That is what His Honour is talking about, |
and he was correct in saying that is the real issue
in the case whatever might have been the other
issues.
Your Honour, may I just add one, not
qualification, but observation if I may, in
relation to that. That does not mean, of course,
that evidence relating to conduct before that date
might not be germane to a resolution of a question
of matters happening after that date, but it is
evidence rather than the issue.
BRENNAN J: But it does mean this, does it not, that you
must accept the burden of showing that as from
February 1990, the respondent enjoyed substantial market power?
| MR JACKSON: | Indeed, Your Honour, and that is what the |
primary judge found, and that is what I am about to
come to next.
Now, Your Honours, in that context, the first
question which arose was whether, in the market in
which they had become competitors, the respondents
had a substantial degree of power. And,
Your Honours, the primary judge held that in that
market the respondents had had earlier a
substantial degree of power and retained it.
Your Honours, may I take Your Honours to the
findings in that regard? They commence relevantly
at page 38, and at lines 19 to 20 where - and
Your Honours, this a prefatory matter leading to
the relevant conclusion - His Honours says:
| Eastern | 11/12/92 There is no doubt that before the advent |
of "Eastern Express", ESN had a high degree of
market power.
And then he discusses his reasons for that. He then goes on to say on the next page, commencing at
line 10, in a passage which goes through to the
next page, line 7 - he describes the nature of the
power before February 1990, and Your Honours will
note, if I might invite Your Honours to, that
between lines 15 to 20 he says that the factors,
which he specifies, and Your Honours will see the
references to vertical-integration:
constituted formidable barriers to entry, the
presence of which are a key component of
market power:
He then discusses in the second half of that
paragraph on page 39, that is from about lines 17
onwards, discusses the extent to which the agents
had their presence and their ability to start up
another paper, was an aspect of the power in the
market, and Your Honours will then see at the
bottom of page 39, line 25 and then going to the
top of the next page, he says that:
Even today ..... given the advantages of -
the matters he specifies:
ESN has a degree of market power, however the
relevant market be defined.
And then he poses the question, "Is it
substantial?" and he answers that question,
Your Honours, at page 43 lines 7 to 17 where he makes a finding - and Your Honours, there was a lot
of evidence about this topic - that "ESN retained
substantial market power" and, Your Honours, that
was the finding which he made in our favour.
Now, His Honour then proceeded to hold that we
had failed on the question whether that power had
been used in the market for the purpose specified
in section 46(l)(a) and, Your Honours, may I
indicate where His Honour's findings in that regardmay be found? They are page 61 lines 9 to 11
where, speaking of predatory pricing, he says:
If they make one thing clear -
that is American principles
it is that a charge of predatory pricing must
be related to the costs incurred by the price
cutter.
| Eastern | 11/12/92 |
Then on the same page, Your Honours, lines 18 to
the bottom of the page, Your Honours will see the
allegations that were made, and Your Honours will
see - I only want to take a moment on this -
that he refers to the allegations as being (a)"to prices less than the cost", paragraph (b) "prices
equivalent to the cost", paragraph (c) "price which
returns to them less profits" in effect.
Then His Honour says on the next page,
page 62, lines 8 to 11, that:
reading the paragraph as a reference to
display advertisements only, the evidence
clearly establishes ..... sub-para (c) -
which is the paragraph on the bottom of the
preceding page.
And finally, Your Honours, at page 69,
lines 16 to 21, he expresses the view that, if I
could paraphrase it, although it had been
established that they were selling at a price
which, of course, resulted in diminution of profit,
because it had not been established that there was
a sale at a price below or at cost, that we failed,
in effect.
Now, Your Honours, that was an issue. The
matters to which I have just been referring were
matters which were, of course, in issue in the Full
Court. But, Your Honours, in the Full Court, the
basis on which the matter was decided was not by a
final determination of the issues on which we
failed before the primary judge. What happened wasthat the members of that court treated the primary
judge as having omitted consideration of one aspect
which was regarded by them as critical to the
question of the degree of market power, so that we
failed on an issue anterior to the issue on which
we failed before the primary judge.
Now, Your Honours, the aspect which the
members of the Full Court treated as being critical
was the ability of the real estate agents in the
eastern suburbs to combine to form a rival
newspaper to the Wentworth Courier. And, Your Honours, if I could just say one thing about
that. It is apparent, of course, that it is a
matter to which the primary judge had given some
attention, because Your Honours will recall in a
passage to which I referred earlier at page 39, the second half of page 39 and the top of page 40, that His Honour had taken into account in determining
the market power of Wentworth Courier the fact
that, as Your Honours will see at line 18, for
example, on page 39:
| Eastern | 11/12/92 |
It is significant that ..... Mr Solomon and
Mr Spira -
et cetera. So, it was not a matter His Honour had
not taken into account. I think, Your Honours, if
I could come to the Full Court.
The Full Court appears to have held that the
ability of the agents to enter into the market of a
competing vehicle for advertisements was a feature
which demonstrated a lack of relevant market power
on the part of the respondent in circumstances once
the applicant had entered the market.
Your Honours, I suspect I am not putting it
entirely clearly. What I am endeavouring to say is
this: what the Full Court treated as being
significant was the power of the agents to combine,
in effect, to enter the market.
DAWSON J; What is the point of time at which you look at
market power? After the new newspaper has entered
the market or before, or both as the trial judge seems to think?
MR JACKSON: | Your Honour, the situation, we would say, is that the issue which had to be decided was what the | |
| ||
| the relevant time means, one has to look to see | ||
| what the conduct is, and if the conduct relied on | ||
| is conduct which is being engaged in at a time when | ||
| the market, or the participants in the market, | ||
| consist of not one but two, one has to look at it | ||
| as at that time. That is the point I am seeking to | ||
| make. |
Now, Your Honours, undoubtedly, evidence
relating to the nature of the market, to the power
of a single participant, the power prior to the
entry of another person into it is a matter which
is germane to the resolution of the ultimate
question, but it is not decisive of the matter.
The point that I was seeking to make about it,
Your Honours, is this, that in dealing with the approach to the question of power, what the
Full Court seemed to have done is really two
things: one is to have treated, not merely as
irrelevant, but rather as a dominant consideration,
the question whether there were any barriers to
entry. Having treated that as the dominant
consideration, what the Full Court then did was to
say, "Well, there was no relevant barrier to entry
and therefore no substantial degree of market
power, because, look at the agents, the agents
could and did enter into the market."
Well, Your Honours, what we would say is in relation to the second of those aspects, even if
| Eastern | 6 | 11/12/92 |
one assumes the first, that is really looking at it
at the wrong time. One is looking at a market -
one should have been looking at it in terms of a
market in which there had been the entry and one
had to look at the degree of market power, as the
primary judge did, in those circumstances.
DAWSON J: In other words, the rival newspaper had not
finished the process of entering the market, as it
were, it was an ongoing process, and you look at
the whole picture because the retaliatory actionwas part of the process of entering the market, as
it were?
MR JACKSON: | Yes, Your Honour, and the situation one had, of course, was that we could not establish - our side | |
| I should say, did not and I suppose, in the event, | ||
| could not establish that there was conduct of the | ||
| kind referred to in 46(l)(b) because it has not, in | ||
| fact, prevented, and the judge was not satisfied of the matters necessary to establish that. But, | ||
| what he was then looking at was a situation where | ||
| there was a market which we had entered and, no | ||
| doubt, there were participants. There were two | ||
| ||
| whether they had the requisite degree of power? If they did, were they exercising it for a proscribed purpose. Your Honours, in relation to the first of those matters, we would submit that the court went | ||
| wrong. |
DAWSON J: Entry into the market is one thing; sustaining
that entry is another.
| MR JACKSON: | Indeed, Your Honour. Yes, and section 46 is |
directed to allowing there to be competition, of
course, but competition in a market which has
standards imposed upon it by the legislature.
Now, Your Honours, the discussion by the Full Court commences at page 143 at about line 18,
and Your Honours will see that what Their Honours
said was that: Market power is concerned with power which enables a corporation to behave
independently of competition and of the
competitive forces in a relevant market.
Now, Your Honours, as a very broad statement,
perhaps with some qualifications, one would not
cavil with that, with respect. But Their Honours
then go on to regard the primary criteria as being: whether there are barriers to entry into the
relevant market.
| Eastern | 11/12/92 |
Your Honours, that that is so appears first at
page 143 commencing at line 21 where they say:
The primary consideration in determining market power must be taken to be whether there
are barriers to entry into the relevant
market.
This is the fundamental point made in
Queensland Wire. Then they say: To what extent is it rational or possible for
new entrants to enter the market in this case?
Now, Your Honours, if I could just say two things
about that. The first is - and I will come to the relevant parts of Queensland Wire in just a
moment - the case to which Their Honours refer is a
case where the issue was one whether there was or
was not conduct related to section 46(l)(b),
prevention of entry to into a market. And it is
apparent enough, we would submit with respect, that
if one looks at the passages in decisions of
members of the Court in that case, the Court was
dealing with that issue and was not attempting to
say that all cases falling within section 46(1),the question of absence of market power is to be
determined by the application of a primary
criterion of the question whether there were
barriers to entry.
Your Honours, that is the first thing we would
say about it. But one then goes on to see that on
the next page, page 144, Their Honours quote, inthe parts that have got the dots on the side of the
page, some criteria which presumably Their Honours
regard as being relevant and one of them,
Your Honours will see, for example, is at line 7:
- "the ability of a firm to raise prices above
the supply cost -
Your Honours, this is really to obverse of a case like this where one was talking about the ability to lower prices to prevent competitive conduct. Your Honours, as it apparent, we would submit,
from the observations of members of the Court in
the Queensland Wire case, (1989) 167 CLR 177, one
has to look at the issue in relation to the
particular circumstances, and may I take
Your Honours to that case for just a moment. Can I give Your Honours copies of it. What Your Honours
will see is that, if I can go first to what was
said by Your Honour Justice Dawson at page 200, and
Your Honour said at about point 4 on the page:
| Eastern | 11/12/92 |
The term "market power" is ordinarily taken to
be a reference to the power to raise price by
restricting output in a sustainable manner.
Your Honour said about point 6 on the page:
But market power has aspects other than
influence upon the market price. It may be manifested by practices directed at excluding
competition such as exclusive dealing, tying
arrangements, predatory pricing or refusal to
deal ..... The ability to engage persistently -
et cetera. Your Honours, if one goes to the other part of the case which deals with the concept of
market power, that appears in the joint judgment of
Chief Justice Mason and Justice Wilson at pages 188
to 200, and the relevant passage commences in the
last paragraph on page 188 and goes over to
page 190, about three quarters of the way down the
page.
Now, Your Honours, true it is that if one
looks at some parts of the observations in that
passage and, in particular, at the bottom of
page 189 that one might say Their Honours placedimportance on the question of barriers to entry,
but what has to be borne in mind, of course, is
that that was the case with which the Court was
dealing.
Your Honours, if I could go back then to the
approach taken by the Full Court in this case.
What Your Honours will see is that the importance
of the question of barriers to entry was then
raised specifically by the court at p~ge 146 about
line 19, and they said:
There is one element highly relevant to
the consideration of any market power of the
respondents which His Honour did not consider
and which we regard as critical.
That is at line 21. And then what Your Honours will see is that at line 26 they speak of:
The capacity of those agents or some of them
to combine ..... is an inherent element in the
market forces at all relevant times.
Your Honours, that is the aspect which they
treat His Honour as not having considered and, as
Your Honours have seen at page 39 and page 40,
His Honour, in fact, did take that into account.
Now, Your Honours, the Full Court then went on
to discuss that issue. May I take Your Honours to
| Eastern | 9 | 11/12/92 |
what appear to be the central parts of it. First,
at page 147 commencing at about line 30, where they
speak of the potentiality of the agents becoming a
reality in June 1988, and that is a passage which
goes through to page 148 about line 16, and
Your Honours will see, at page 148 about line 22,
that Their Honours particularly refer to events
before our entry into the market, and then at
page 149 about line 22 they say:
From at least November 1988 onwards the
respondents did not have a substantial degree
of market power in the relevant market.
Now, Your Honours, they reached their conclusion at
page 150 line 18 through to page 151 line 10
and, may I say, Your Honours, that if one goes
particularly to the start of that passage they say
about line 22 on page 150:
To what extent is it rational or possible for
new entrants to enter the relevant market?
This is the primary consideration in determining market power.
Your Honours will see at the top of··the next page
in the second line, they say:
This is precisely what they did. It is
therefore not rational to say that new
entrants were unable to enter the market andparticipate in it.
Your Honours, that seems to be the essential
passage of Their Honours' reasoning on the
question and, Your Honours, we would submit that to
adopt the approach of saying that at the relevanttimes the question was whether new persons could or
could not enter the market, and that was the only
question, and to say that was the dominantquestion, as it were, is it rational or possible to
enter the market and then to say it always was because they did, does not touch on, we would
submit with respect, what was the correct question
for the court to answer.
BRENNAN J: What was your case, Mr Jackson? That they
exercise such market power as they had by lowering
prices, not below cost, so as to diminish their
profits?
| MR JACKSON: | Yes. |
BRENNAN J: Where does that cross the line between
legitimate competition and a breach of section 46?
| Eastern | 10 | 11/12/92 |
MR JACKSON: Well, Your Honour, what Your Honour said is not
quite our case. It is the essence of it, but there is just a little more to it. What we would say is
this: one had a situation where they were not just
a publisher of a newspaper, they were a printer and
had a degree of, as was said, vertical-integration
and also a number of other quite disparate
activities, so they had, as we would say, a
considerable degree of market power and, in effect,
a fair bit of, if I can use the expression, fact
that could be used to sustain any battle in which
they chose to engage.What we are saying is this, Your Honour, that section 46(l)(a) says that if you have a
substantial degree of market power, you cannot use
it for the proscribed purpose. Because of the
matters to which I have referred, they did have
substantial degree of market power which they were
able to use to price the advertisements in their
paper at a level such that would inevitably attract
a considerable amount of custom and make it more
difficult for us to compete by having prices at
higher levels, for example, or at the same level.
BRENNAN J: | Does section 46(l)(a) prohibit the exercise of competitive strength to diminish an opponent's |
| profitability? |
| MR JACKSON: | Well it does, Your Honour. | If one looks at the |
terms of section 33, what it says is that one shall
not take advantage of the power for a particular
purpose, and what the purpose that is referred to
in the section is, is this:
·eliminating or substantially damaging a
competitor.
Could I just say, Your Honours, that the things
that section 46(1)(a) looks to are, existence of
substantial power, it looks to the purpose of the
taking advantage of that power, and the purpose
which is proscribed by the sub-section is the particular one of eliminating or substantially
damaging a competitor.
Now, Your Honour, if one has circumstances
where there are, as the section requires, people in
competition, relevantly, then one of the most
normal ways in which a purpose of the proscribed
kind might be demonstrated would be by what is
sometimes described shortly as being predatory
pricing. Now, predatory pricing, Your Honour, is something that involves pricing at a level which
has, often speaking, a relationship to cost, which
may be below cost, at cost or it may be somewhat
above cost, but it is the purpose with which it is
| Eastern | 11 | 11/12/92 |
engaged in that is the relevant one. Your Honour, that is what the legislature - - -
McHUGH J: But there is this vital but subtle distinction
between purpose and effect in this section, is
there not?
MR JACKSON: Yes, Your Honour.
McHUGH J: And the effect of what was done here was to
damage a competitor, but the trial judge found, and
the Full Court appears to have been prepared to
uphold, that the purpose of the conduct of therespondent was to protect its commercial interest
against the competition offered by your client.
MR JACKSON: | Your Honour, could I just say this in relation to that. The first thing is this: Your Honour is | |
| right in saying that what was found by the primary | ||
| judge, that is the issue which we were seeking to have found in our favour in the Full Court. Now, the Full Court was - I am conscious in what I am about to say, that the Full Court expressed some | ||
| views on the question, but may I come to that in | ||
| ||
| in effect, a "proper" - I use the expression in | ||
| inverted commas of course - determination of that issue by the Full Court, because the Full Court was diverted from the issue by the view which it took on the question of market power, the degree of | ||
| market power. And, because of the view which the | ||
| court took on that, we did not, to put it shortly, obtain a proper hearing of the other issues and | ||
| that is why, if we were to obtain special leave and | ||
| ultimately to succeed in an appeal in setting aside | ||
| the Full Court's view, the appropriate thing might well be for the matter to go back to a Full Court | ||
| to be determined. | ||
| But, Your Honour, the view taken by the Full Court on the particular questions - and | ||
| perhaps I can come to that immediately - appears to | ||
| ||
| that the primary judge's approach to the whole matter had been one which was incorrect because of | ||
| his view of market power. Then, they proceeded to | ||
| deal with the remainder of the appeal, and the way | ||
| in which they dealt with it, Your Honours, can be | ||
| seen in an effect, two passages. | ||
| The first is at page 152, and at the bottom of the page Your Honours will see that they expressed |
| Eastern | 12 | 11/12/92 |
engaged in the activity thus did not properly
arise before the primary judge.
They say they heard full argument on that question and they say:
Nevertheless, there is a conceptual difficulty
in our expressing any concluded views upon
this branch of the case because both the
findings of the primary judge upon the
question of misuse of market power and the
criticism by the appellant of those findings
are posited upon the existence of a
substantial degree of power in the relevant
market, contrary, as we have held, to the
fact.
Now, Your Honours, they then, however, as page 153, say that they will briefly state what
their position would have been if they concluded
there did exist the relevant power.
Your Honours will see that they deal with that
issue over some pages, and then at page 159
lines 10 to 20, having referred to the various
passages in the evidence, they say that they would
characterize statements that were made whether
considered individually or collectively, "as
relevant rather than compelling evidence upon the
issue of proscribed purpose" and, Your Honours,
even if one accepts that as being a definitive view
against us, one comes to the next part of it which
is the question of the evidence relied upon by us
of the price cuts themselves, to put it shortly,
and Their Honours do not reach a view on that
question.
The discussion commences at page 159 line 22. They set out the question, then, Your Honours, they
come at page 161 line 20 to say that:
it is unnecessary to rule upon these rival contentions.
Then, Your Honours, there is a discussion of
American cases which does not really resolve the matter.
So, Your Honours, the final thing I would say
is this, that some observations I made at page 167
concerning the form of relief that was sought but,
of course, the case was one which, in any event,
involved damages as well.
Your Honours, could I just say on the question of purpose, if one were to look at the evidence to
| Eastern | 13 | 11/12/92 |
seek to deal with the question whether there was an
arguable case form our side on it, could I just
refer to page 129 and to the statement at the
bottom of page 128 to the top of page 129 by
Mr Fairfax who was one of the principals of one of the respondents, and -
BRENNAN J: Whereabouts in 129, Mr Jackson?
| MR JACKSON: | I am sorry, Your Honour, it is between lines 5 |
and 10 first of all. You will see that he is saying: The Wentworth Courier is produced on
newsprint ..... charging advertising rates which
we really can't afford ..... we will charge
those rates simply because it's a bigger
company ..... Therefore we can afford to take it
on the nose.
And he agreed with the proposition there was
a discount war going and they could last longer.
Your Honour, all I am seeking to say about
that is that if one were arguing the question of
purpose, there is certainly material upon
which -
BRENNAN J: But, Mr Jackson, are not the questions of the
degree of market power and the purpose for which
market power is exercised related issues?
| MR JACKSON: | I am sorry, did Your Honour say, "are" or "are |
not"?
BRENNAN J: Are related issues.
| MR JACKSON: | Yes, Your Honour, yes. Could I say two things |
about it, Your Honour. The first is that there is a substratum of fact on which various aspects are
germane to both.
| BRENNAN J: Yes. | |
| MR JACKSON: | The second thing is that the various paragraphs |
of 46(1) relate to aspects of market power.
| BRENNAN J: | I was not thinking so much in terms of the facts of the particular case, but as a general |
| section 46 relates. It may be that whatever market | |
| power is possessed by one competitor in the market, | |
| it is exercised to protect its interests, even | |
| though that the exercise of such power as it | |
| possesses does adversely affect the other competitors. That is in the nature of competition. |
| Eastern | 14 | 11/12/92 |
| MR JACKSON: | Yes. |
BRENNAN J: There comes a point, one would think, where, if
the market power is so large, or the conduct of the
possessor of market power of any degree is so
predatory that one can characterize it as being in
breach of section 46, but the two things arenecessarily related, that is the degree of the
market power possessed and the manner of its
exercise.
| MR JACKSON: | Your Honour, could I just say in relation to |
what Your Honour put to me, one has to be careful,
of course, to bear in mind that section 46 is
looking, of course - if I could go to the terms of
it, looking to the use of power or the taking of
advantage of power for particular purposes. Now, it may be that the purpose which motivates the
taking advantage is a proscribed purpose, but it
may be the taking advantage is not, in fact,
affected for perhaps a variety of reasons: even
misconceptions.
So that, Your Honour, what section 46 is
doing is to say in the sense that it does not
proscribe conduct which is competitive, conduct of
its nature being competitive is likely to haveadverse affects upon the profitability, for
example, and profits of competitors. But the thing that it does say is that if you have power in
the market, then you may take advantage of it, butyou may not take advantage of it if your purpose of
doing so is one of the proscribed things.
BRENNAN J: Say section 46 was, in this case, applied as
against you? The question being, you would have
some market power, having entered the market with
the support of 23 real estate agents and a
purchasing power of some $4 million a year. The result of your entry into the market and your
following of the practices that were followed was
to diminish substantially the profitability of the
Wentworth Courier, and that was an object of those who supported the Eastern Express because they could see that the profits were to be made through their avenue rather than by paying for it to the
Wentworth Courier. Does section 46 apply?
MR JACKSON: Well, Your Honour, it would be possible it
would, but may I say that if one were to examine,
for example, our conduct, it would be necessary to
look at a number of matters because what
Your Honour will have seen from the material is
that at the time when the publication was mooted and the end came into being, the reasons for its
coming into being were not reasons which, in a
sense, were simply economic but some degree of
| Eastern | 15 | 11/12/92 |
dissatisfaction with service and so on, and if, at
the end, one came down to having to look at our
conduct, no doubt one would take into account
various factors. It may be that a finding would be
one which fell within section 46, but if it were to
appear, for example, that better facilities weresought, and a lot of other things, Your Honour,
could be taken into account.
| BRENNAN J: | I was only using it in order to highlight the |
problem that seems to me to arise here, and that is that where it is not really possible to isolate the
two issues which you seek to isolate, as I
understand the argument, you have sought to
challenge the question of the finding of the trial
judge as to the purpose before the Full Court and
then in the Full Court, as you say, they
concentrated on the question of whether there was a
substantial degree of market power and suggest, as
I understand the argument, that that diverted the
Full Court from the consideration of the issue you
wished to raise.
I wonder whether the case really raises
anything more than a consideration of the facts
looked at from different viewpoints?
MR JACKSON: Well, we would submit it does, Your Honour, and
could I just say that we really put our application
in two ways: first, we submit, of course, there is
an issue about the meaning of section 46 in terms
of what is contemplated or what is the test for
taking advantage of the power. Having said that -
we would say that is an important issue, but if we
are right on that, Your Honours, one then comes to
the second aspect of the case and that is the way
in which it was treated by the Full Court is one
that has resulted in our, on that assumption, not being accorded a proper hearing in the Full Court
and the nature of the case being such that it would
be appropriate for this Court to entertain it. So we put it on the two bases, and I accept there is a
degree of connection between the two, but the second aspect, of course, goes to the interest of
justice approach; the first to the question of law.
Your Honour, those are our submissions.
| BRENNAN J: | We need not trouble you, Mr Ellicott. |
The Court is of the view that the result of
this case is not attended with sufficient doubt to
justify the grant of special leave. Accordingly,
special leave will be refused.
| Eastern | 16 | 11/12/92 |
| MR ELLICOTT: | I ask for an order for cost, Your Honour. |
MR JACKSON: There is nothing I can say about that,
Your Honour.
BRENNAN J: It will be refused with costs.
AT 10.50 AM THE MATTER WAS ADJOURNED SINE DIE
| Eastern | 17 | 11/12/92 |
Key Legal Topics
Areas of Law
-
Commercial Law
-
Statutory Interpretation
Legal Concepts
-
Appeal
-
Jurisdiction
-
Statutory Construction
-
Standing
1
0