Eagle v Civil Aviation Safety Authority

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Eagle v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCA 1016

Citation: Eagle v Civil Aviation Safety Authority [2014] FCA 1016
Parties: ANGUS EAGLE v CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
File number(s): NSD 131 of 2014
Judge(s): BENNETT J
Date of judgment: 18 September 2014
Catchwords:

NEGLIGENCE – proceedings against Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) – whether an applicant for certification is owed a duty of care by CASA – whether statutory or common law duty to provide certification includes a duty to act without unreasonable delay – whether the common law duty of care as pleaded is inconsistent with CASA’s powers and functions

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for dismissal of proceedings under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – alternatively for the statement of claim to be struck out – whether reasonable cause of action disclosed

Legislation: Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth) ss 9A, 31
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A
Cases cited: Avenhouse v Hornsby Shire Council (1988) 44 NSWLR 1
Fernando v Commonwealth (2010) 188 FCR 188
Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 4) (2012) 203 FCR 293
Polar Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2012) 203 FCR 325
Repacholi Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (2009) 263 ALR 93
Repacholi Aviation Pty Ltd v Civil Aviation Safety Authority (No 2) [2012] FCA 1297
Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923
Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215
Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562
Sutherland Shire Council and Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424
W v Home Office [1997] Imm AR 302
Date of hearing: 13 June 2014
Date of last submissions: 23 June 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 65
Counsel for the Applicant: A Crossland
Counsel for the Applicant: K Jones
Solicitor for the Applicant: S McMillan
Counsel for the Respondent: I Harvey
Solicitor for the Respondent: Minter Ellison Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 131 of 2014

BETWEEN:

ANGUS EAGLE
Applicant

AND:

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
Respondent

JUDGE:

BENNETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 SEPTEMBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The amended statement of claim filed on 15 April 2014 be struck pursuant to rule 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
  2. The proceedings be dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).
  3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings.           

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 131 of 2014

BETWEEN:

ANGUS EAGLE
Applicant

AND:

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
Respondent

JUDGE:

BENNETT J

DATE:

18 SEPTEMBER 2014

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. Mr Eagle is and was employed by Qantas Airways Limited (Qantas) as a commercial airline pilot and held the position of Captain on a…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1016
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Eagle v Civil Aviation Safety Authority, the plaintiff, Mr Eagle, sought to establish a duty of care on the part of CASA, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, in relation to the processing of his medical certification application. The central issue was whether CASA owed a duty of care to Mr Eagle to act without unreasonable delay in granting him a medical certificate, which he claimed led to economic loss due to lost income and depleted sick leave. The court was tasked with determining whether such a duty existed under either statutory or common law and whether it conflicted with CASA’s primary function of ensuring air navigation safety.

The court examined the statutory duties of CASA under the Civil Aviation Act 1988 (Cth), which emphasized safety as the paramount concern. It found no express statutory requirement regarding the timing of the issuance of medical certificates. Instead, CASA's duty was to determine whether Mr Eagle met the regulatory requirements and consider safety implications. The court also considered the common law duty of care, acknowledging that while such a duty could exist, it must be compatible with CASA’s statutory obligations. The recognition of a duty to act without unreasonable delay, as alleged by Mr Eagle, would conflict with CASA’s mandate to prioritize safety, potentially diverting the authority from its primary function.

The court concluded that the alleged cause of action was not available to Mr Eagle because the duty of care claimed was inconsistent with CASA’s statutory duties. The pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and therefore, the amended statement of claim was struck out under rule 16.21(1)(e) of the Federal Court Rules 2011. Additionally, the court dismissed the proceedings under section 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) and ordered that Mr Eagle pay CASA's costs.

The court's decision underscored the paramount importance of safety in CASA's regulatory framework, reaffirming that any duty of care CASA owes must align with its statutory objectives. This ruling highlights the limitations on imposing additional duties that could interfere with the primary safety-focused mandate of regulatory bodies like CASA.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The amended statement of claim filed on 15 April 2014 be struck pursuant to rule 16.21 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

2. The proceedings be dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth).

3. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Further, the recognition of such a cause of action, entailing an assessment of what may constitute unreasonable delay would be likely to divert the decision maker from his or her duties, contrary to the interest of the general public’s interest (Fernando). This state of affairs would not be conducive to an exercise of power in which air safety navigation was the most important consideration (W v Home Office per Lord Woolf). The distinction that Mr Eagle seeks to draw between a duty to act quickly, which he does not allege, and a duty to act without unreasonable delay, does not avoid this difficulty. Indeed, it exemplifies it. In the present case, Mr Eagle does not allege that CASA should have acted in any particular way. He seems to imply that CASA should have acted immediately on his changed medical opinion without further consideration or factual material. If such a duty were found, in light of the history of the matter, it would have been inconsistent with the governing mandate.CONCLUSION The parties do not dispute that the question, whether a duty of care of the scope or content for which the applicant contends exists, is a proper question to be determined on a summary dismissal application. There is no real dispute between the parties as to the principles relevant to applications for striking out a pleading or for summary disposition, subject to Mr Eagle’s submission, which I accept, that care must be taken where the allegation is that, as a proposition of law based upon existing authority, no cause of action is available. The cause of action alleged, that CASA owed to Mr Eagle a general duty of care to take reasonable steps in the exercise of its statutory powers to ensure that he did not suffer economic loss, is not available. The specific duty alleged is incompatible with CASA’s statutory duties. I agree with CASA’s submissions, for the reasons expressed above. Rule 16.21(1)(e) of the Rules provides that a party may apply to the Court for an order that all or part of a pleading be struck out on the ground that the pleading fails to disclose a reasonable cause of action. I consider that the pleading does not disclose a reasonable cause of action and should be struck out in accordance with rule 16.21(1)(e) of the Rules. Further, I consider that as there is no reasonable cause of action available to Mr Eagle, there would be no utility in granting leave to replead. In light of my conclusion that no reasonable cause of action is available to Mr Eagle, it then follows that the proceedings should be dismissed pursuant to s 31A of the Federal Court Act and rule 26.01(1)(c) of the Rules and that Mr Eagle should pay CASA’s costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Justice McKerracher turned to Polar No 4 and noted Kenny J’s observation that CASA was subject to a statutory régime which had as its main aim “maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation”, which makes air navigation safety the paramount concern (at [65]). Justice McKerracher noted that neither he nor Kenny J had said that a duty of care could never exist but that the duty as pleaded before him did not exist and that there was no requisite duty of care to make inquiries as alleged in that case. In particular, his Honour accepted the submission that the exercise of the power in Repacholi and Repacholi No 2 was one within CASA’s judgment. It was not a power to be exercised for the benefit of either the regulator or the person to be affected by it, but for the safety of the public generally (at [63]).ConsiderationStatutory duty It is not in dispute that the statutory scheme established by the CA Act has as its primary purpose, and that CASA has as its primary function, the establishment of a regulatory framework for maintaining, enhancing and promoting the safety of civil aviation. One of the means of bringing about this result is the issue of certificates, licences, registrations and permits. Section 9A(1) states that “in exercising its powers and performing its functions, CASA must regard the safety of air navigation as the most important consideration”. This does not directly concern the timing of the exercise of CASA’s powers and functions. There is no express statutory requirement as to the timing of the issue of certifications. The statutory duty was to determine whether Mr Eagle complied with the requirements in either subregulation (e)(i) or (e)(ii) of reg 67.180(2). This involved CASA coming to a state of satisfaction that those requirements were met and that the considerations of s 9A of the CA Act were taken into consideration in that determination. Mr Eagle maintains that the statutory duty was to issue a Medical Certificate without unreasonable delay. It is not alleged that CASA had formed a state of satisfaction that Mr Eagle met the statutory requirements at a particular time and then delayed. Rather, it is alleged that from one of three alternative dates, CASA took an unreasonable time to make the decision, being the administrative decision to issue the Medical Certificate. That breach is said to have caused Mr Eagle loss and damage being, essentially, a loss of income from his employment and depletion of paid sick leave. At the relevant times prior to November 2011, it was accepted that Mr Eagle suffered from a medical condition that required CASA to consider the application of s 9A and reg 67.180(2)(e)(ii). By a combination of reg 67.180(2)(e) and reg 11.055, if a person has applied for an authorisation, including a Medical Certificate, CASA may grant the authorisation ‘only if’ the person meets the prescribed requirements under that provision, including the requirement that the authorisation would not be likely to have an adverse effect on the safety of air navigation. This applies to subreg 67.180(2)(e)(i) and endorses the specific requirement in subreg 67.180(2)(e)(ii). In accordance with reg 67.015, a condition is “safety-relevant” if it is likely to reduce the ability of the person to exercise the possible actions conferred by the licence. It is not in dispute that IH is such a condition. At the relevant times prior to November 2011, it was accepted that Mr Eagle suffered from a medical condition that required CASA to consider the application of s 9A of subreg 67.180(2)(e)(ii). The statutory duty was to determine whether Mr Eagle complied with the requirements in either subregulation (e)(i) or (e)(ii) of reg 67.180(2). This involved CASA coming to a state of satisfaction that those requirements were met and that the considerations of s 9A of the CA Act and of reg 11.055 were taken into consideration in that determination.