DZAER v Minister for Immigration

[2015] FCCA 673

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DZAER & ANOR v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2015] FCCA 673

Catchwords:

MIGRATION – Administrative review – Refugee Review Tribunal – false or misleading representations – whether the applicants were afforded natural justice – no error of law established – application dismissed – costs.

Legislation: 

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.36, 422B, 424AA, 425

First Applicant: DZAER

Second Applicant: DZAES

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

File Number: DNG 35 of 2014

Judgment of: Judge Vasta

Hearing date: 6 March 2015

Date of Last Submission: 6 March 2015

Delivered at: Brisbane

Delivered on: 6 March 2015

REPRESENTATION

Solicitors for the Applicants: Parish Patience Immigration Lawyers

Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Livieris

Solicitors for the First Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

1. That the Application filed 18 August 2014 be dismissed.

2. That the First and Second Applicant pay the costs of the First Respondent fixed in the amount of $6,646 in accordance with Schedule 1, Part 3, Division 1 of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA

AT BRISBANE

DNG 35 of 2014

DZAER

First Applicant

DZAES

Second Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Ex tempore)

1. By amended application filed in this Court on 25 November 2014, the First Applicant and the Second Applicant have asked this Court to grant the following:

   a)a writ of certiorari removing into this Court to be quashed the purported decision of the Second Respondent, the Refugee Review Tribunal, made on 25 July 2014. 

   b)a declaration that the decision is void and of no affect;

   c)an order by way of mandamus that the Second Respondent reconsider the application for review in accordance with law; and

   d)any directions of the Court and an order that the Minister pay the Applicants’ costs.

2. The grounds of the application are that:-

   ·Firstly, the Tribunal failed to comply with the exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by not providing each of the Applicants or either of them with a genuine opportunity to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.

   ·Secondly, the Tribunal further or in the alternative failed to comply with the exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act by not complying with the requirements of s.424A or otherwise s.424AA of the Act.

   ·Thirdly, the Tribunal denied procedural fairness to the Applicants in the conduct of its review by failing to take appropriate steps to obtain documentary evidence which was corroborative of the Applicants’ claims, but which had not been provided to it by the Minister’s department and about which the Department had concerns. 

   ·Fourthly, in the alternative to ground 3, the Tribunal failed to comply with the exhaustive statement of the natural justice hearing rule in Division 4 of Part 7 of the Act by not providing each of the Applicants or either of them with a genuine opportunity to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to an issue arising in relation to the decision under review.

3. From my reading of the material, it would appear that the First and Second Applicants are of Malaysian origin.  They have been in this country since 3 February 2010, having arrived on a three‑month tourist visa.  Upon the expiration of that visa on 3 May 2010, they continued to live in this Country and are, as the Act defines them, unlawful non‑citizens.  On 9 March 2014, they were detained by officers of the First Respondent and 10 days after they were detained, the Applicants made the present application for Protection Visas. 

4. On 20 May 2014, it seems the Applicants were interviewed by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection.  The First Applicant submitted a written claim to the department to back up his application for the Protection Visa.  Both the First and Second Applicant were interviewed the next day and on 12 June 2014, the delegate found that Australia did not owe the Applicants protection obligations and, therefore, the Protection Visas were not issued.  A week later, on 19 June 2014, the Applicants applied to the Refugee Review Tribunal for a review of the decision of the delegate.

5. The Applicants gave evidence before that Tribunal at the hearing of 23 July 2014 and a transcript has been prepared.  A decision and written reasons were given two days later on 25 July 2014 by the Tribunal, affirming the delegate’s decision.  The Applicants then came to this Court on the grounds I have previously mentioned.  In short, the First and Second Applicants claim that they had to flee Malaysia because gangsters were after them.  Why the gangsters were after them is not truly settled because, by my reckoning, there have been quite a number of different explanations as to how the situation came to be and why the gangsters were looking at the Applicants for reprisals.

6. The Refugee Review Tribunal, not surprisingly, found that the claims of the First and Second Applicants lack credibility. Having found that such claims lacked credibility, there could be no justification for the Refugee Review Tribunal considering that the Applicants met the criteria set out in s.36(2)(a) or (aa). There is no complaint about the findings made by the Refugee Review Tribunal. There seems to be an acceptance that such findings were open on the evidence. Instead, the Applicants have concentrated on whether the Applicants were afforded natural justice in the conduct of the hearing of the Refugee Review Tribunal.

7. It is trite to say that if the Refugee Review Tribunal did not exercise natural justice to the Applicants, then that would be a jurisdictional error that would justify the relief sought in the application.  The natural justice provisions as I will call them are found in the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) from s.422B and onwards. Section 425 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) says that:

   “Tribunal must invite applicant to appear

   (1) The Tribunal must invite the applicant to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.

   (2)Subsection (1) does not apply if:

   (a)  the Tribunal considers that it should decide the review in the applicant’s favour on the basis of the material before it; or

   (b)  the applicant consents to the Tribunal deciding the review without the applicant appearing before it; or

   (c)  subsection 424C(1) or (2) applies to the applicant.

   (3)If any of the paragraphs in subsection (2) of this section apply, the applicant is not entitled to appear before the Tribunal”

8. The first ground of this application is a claim that the Second Applicant was not afforded that right.  This comes from a look at the transcript where at the beginning of the hearing at page 3, line 24, there is this exchange where the Tribunal says to both the First and Second Applicant:

   “TRIBUNAL: Okay. Now, the way I’m going to conduct the hearing is I’m going to start by talking to you first, (first applicant) and that’s because you’re the primary applicant.  And then I will speak to (second applicant).  I’m going to ask (second applicant) to wait outside while you give your evidence and when it’s her turn, she can come in and give her evidence.  Do you have any questions about what I’ve just explained?

   APPLICANT 1:   No.

   APPLICANT 2:   No.”

9. It was then that the Second Applicant went outside.  When the First Applicant was finished, the Tribunal said at page 21, line 9:

   TRIBUNAL:I want to talk to your wife now. You can remain in the room if you wish.  However, it’s very important that you do not interrupt her or prompt her while she’s giving evidence.”

10. The First applicant said that:

    “APPLICANT 1: I choose to stay outside. The reason why I come here is I hope the RRT can give me a just hearing.”

    And the Tribunal said

    “TRIBUNAL:   I would prefer if you wait in the room, but please don’t interrupt her when she is giving her evidence…”

11. She then started to give her evidence and that follows until we get to page 23 where at line 7, the First Applicant interrupts the proceedings and says:

    “APPLICANT 1:   Excuse me… Can I go outside?”

12. The Tribunal allows him to go outside and obviously, he comes back at some stage, though when that happened is not recorded in the transcript. 

13. What is curious is the manner in which the Tribunal decided to conduct the hearing.  One could see the propriety in allowing the First Applicant to give his evidence in the absence of the Second Applicant.  Such a practice is really beyond reproach.  Notwithstanding that, it is the contention of the Applicants that this was not for the reasons of ensuring that the evidence eventually given by the Second Applicant would not be contaminated and have its proper value. 

14. The Applicants here say that this is because there was a misconception as to the status of both the First and Second applicant.  This comes from the line at page 3, line 24, where the Tribunal says:

    “TRIBUNAL:   Now, the way I’m going to conduct the hearing is I’m going to start by talking to you first (first applicant) and that’s because you’re the primary applicant…”

15. The submission is that by referring to the First Applicant as the primary Applicant, there has been that misapprehension and it, in effect, consigns the Second Applicant as being a secondary applicant. The fact is, and it has been recognised, that the Tribunal rightly categorised both Applicants as being Applicants in their own rights. The Tribunal considered both their applications separately and on the merits, in effect, treating both of them as if they were Applicants under s.36(2)(a) and s.36(2)(aa), and that is the way that it should have been done.

16. By the Tribunal conducting the matter in this way, the Applicants here say that the Second Applicant was treated as if she were merely a witness in the case of the First Applicant. Also pointed to is the fact that the husband wasn’t asked to leave and what was done meant that the husband was treated differently to the wife. It was said here today that there was no choice given to either Applicant. They were told that “this is what is happening and she has to go, he has to stay”. In my view, the concept of primary and secondary applicants is not applicable to either s.36 of the Act or the regulations.

17. If one looked upon this transcript almost in a vacuum, it would be easy to conclude that the husband had been the one to write the application, to be interviewed first, to be interviewed for longer and also to have given more extensive evidence before the Refugee Review Tribunal than did the wife. However, it is incorrect nomenclature to describe either of them as a primary applicant.  The fact is, that whilst the Tribunal Member talked about the First Applicant as being the primary applicant, the Member did not ever talk about there being a secondary applicant. 

18. Whilst the use of the word “primary” may be unfortunate because it may give someone who was poring over the transcript the belief that there has been that misconception, it is in my view in looking at that whole exchange that the Member was merely using the word “primary” to connote the various contributions to the case for the applicants as between the First Applicant and the Second Applicant.  It was the First Applicant who was, in effect, saying that it was his dealings in trying to get a business loan or having people use the account to launder money in Malaysia that had led to the predicament in which both applicants found themselves.

19. In that context, I take the word “primary” simply to be a word used by the Refugee Review Tribunal to differentiate the position of the first applicant as against that of the second applicant.  It is also obvious this is why the Tribunal wanted the First Applicant to give evidence in the absence of the Second Applicant.  When the Second Applicant returned, there was no more evidence for the First Applicant to give, so there was nothing that the First Applicant could do to taint his own evidence, and the appropriate warnings as to not interfering with the Second Applicant while she was giving evidence were given.

20. So the submission is made that the Second Applicant should have been allowed to stay and listen to the whole of the evidence because that was her right under s.425. But again, in looking at s.425, the legislation says that she must appear before the Tribunal to give evidence and to present arguments relating to the issues. How that is done is really a matter for each individual Tribunal. What has to be looked at is whether this was fair. The exclusion of her from the room whilst the First Applicant gave evidence was in my view a proper procedure undertaken by the Refugee Review Tribunal and it was not unfair.

21. When the Second Applicant returned, there were a number of things put to her and she was able to speak to those matters that were in the mind of the Tribunal as matters that affected the credibility and the overall disposition of the matter. As I say, as the credibility of both Applicants was paramount in such a hearing, this procedure adopted by the Tribunal was not an incorrect one.

22. Notwithstanding the manner in which the hearing was conducted and that the reasons for the manner were not clearly explained, I cannot see that this ground is made out. I do not find any jurisdictional error.

23. With regard to the second ground, this has given me some consternation.

24. The Migration Act states at s.424AA:

    “424AA  Information and invitation given orally by Tribunal while applicant appearing

    If an applicant is appearing before the Tribunal because of an invitation under section 425:

    (a)the Tribunal may orally give to the applicant clear particulars of any information that the Tribunal considers would be the reason, or a part of the reason, for affirming the decision that is under review; and

    (b) if the Tribunal does so—the Tribunal must:

    (i)ensure, as far as is reasonably practicable, that the applicant understands why the information is relevant to the review, and the consequences of the information being relied on in affirming the decision that is under review; and

    (ii)orally invite the applicant to comment on or respond to the information; and

    (iii) advise the applicant that he or she may seek additional time to comment on or respond to the information; and

    (iv) if the applicant seeks additional time to comment on or respond to the information—adjourn the review, if the Tribunal considers that the applicant reasonably needs additional time to comment on or respond to the information.”

25. What is complained of in this application is contained on page 29 of the transcript. The Tribunal starts off and gives or tells the two Applicants what it must tell them pursuant to the s.424AA. At line 16, the Tribunal says this:

    “TRIBUNAL:   I will now tell you what the information is and give you an opportunity to comment on or respond to that information.  You are not obliged to do so immediately.  You can seek additional time to do so.  If you seek additional time, I will consider whether or not I should adjourn this review to give you that additional time.  So, that’s the reasons why this is important.  Now I’m going to tell you what the information is.”

26. The Tribunal continued to outline what the information was.  However, this information related only to the First Applicant and I will read exactly what was said:

    ‘TRIBUNAL: I have information before me from the Department of Immigration that you, (first applicant) were detained by the department on 8 March 2014.  I have information that departmental officers conducted an interview with you, (first applicant) on 8 March 2014.  During the course of that interview, you were asked if there was any reason why you could not return to Malaysia and you are recorded to have stated no.  You are recorded to have stated that you would like to stay in Australia and work.  You were asked if you were willing to depart Australia and you answered yes.  You are recorded to have stated that you would like to remain in Australia.  You did not make any mention of your fears of returning to Malaysia at that time.  This raises doubts about the credibility of your claims for protection.  Would you like to make any comment on or response to that information?…”

27. Now, it’s obvious that such information was directed wholly and solely to the First Applicant because it talked of his interview and his responses.  However, the comment, “Would you like to make any comment or response to that information?” would seem to have been directed to both the First and the Second Applicants because the next words are:

    “I will start with you first (First Applicant).

    The First Applicant answered through the interpreter:

    “INTERPRETER: At that time, I did tell the immigration people that in Malaysia I had this debt or a loan problem and I also told them that they were trying to use me.” 

    Then, without the interpreter, he said:

    “APPLICANT 1:   Can I ask my wife to talk to you?”

    The Tribunal said:

    “TRIBUNAL:   I will give her an opportunity.  This is your opportunity.  Is there anything else you want to say?”

28. Then he answered.  The complaint is made that, firstly, in asking, “Would you like to make any comment on or response to that information?” the Tribunal should have instead asked, “Would you like to make any comment on, response to that information or would you like additional time to comment on or respond to that information?”  It was submitted that whilst sub-subsection (ii) was repeated to the applicants, sub-subsection (iii) should also have been repeated on each and every occasion in which such comment was sought. 

29. In my judgment, I do not see that such a re-iteration is necessary to give effect to a fair hearing.  What does need to be told to the Applicants is that there is that ability to seek additional time to comment on or respond to the information.  That was made abundantly clear to the Applicants by what had already been said a matter of less than a minute before this comment had been made.  There was no need to do repeat the direction. 

30. Whilst it may be that the Applicants do come from a different culture, have a different language, they are not unintelligent people.  One can see that quite clearly through their answers and how they have conducted themselves in the hearing, and they do have the assistance of the interpreter.  It is difficult to see that the Applicants did not know that they could ask for more time if they had wanted.  In fact, there was no evidence that they complain of that.  However the question is not whether or not the Applicants would have taken advantage of extra time or not, it is whether sub-subsection (iii) should have been repeated to ensure procedural fairness.

31. In my view, having mentioned it once, it was not needed to be repeated. 

32. Of more concern, however, is that in saying to the Applicants, “Would you like to make any comment or response to that?” and then saying, “I will start with you first (first applicant),” it may have raised an expectation that the Second Applicant would at some stage be asked to comment on that.  This seems to be so when the First Applicant does say, “Can I ask my wife to talk to you?” and the Tribunal says, “I will give her an opportunity.  This is your opportunity.  Is there anything else you wish to say?”

    And the Tribunal later on at page 30 does say this at line 44:

    “TRIBUNAL:   (Second applicant), were you with your husband when he was interviewed on 8 March?”

    And through the interpreter, she said:

    “INTERPRETER:   No.”

    The Tribunal then said:

    “TRIBUNAL:   So you wouldn’t know what he said to the officer then?”

    Then the Second Applicant said:

    “APPLICANT 2:   No.”

1. The Respondents submit that any disquiet there is about the unusual way in which the Refugee Review Tribunal has started the process of commenting is smoothed over when one looks at that later exchange between the Tribunal and the Second Applicant. In the question that was asked or the information that was put and asked for the First Applicant’s response, there could not have been a response from the Second Applicant that would have had any value whatsoever.

2. The Second Applicant was not there and, quite frankly, the Second Applicant cannot reach into the mind of the First Applicant and be able to interpret or explain certain answers.  However, notwithstanding that, even though that may be the case, later on at page 35 at line 19, when the questioning of the Second Applicant had occurred, the First Applicant interrupted at one stage and the Tribunal, in admonishing the First Applicant, said:

   “TRIBUNAL:   (First Applicant) please, this is now your wife’s opportunity.  Give her an opportunity to speak.  Go ahead.  No, it’s your wife’s opportunity to speak, please let her speak.  Go ahead.”

3. She spoke and kept answering as she did. The question really is whether s.424AA has been complied with. Was there a chance for the Second Applicant to comment on or respond to the initial information that was given to the First Applicant? The answer for that must be that there was not that opportunity to comment or respond to the information. The question is if that has not been done, was it, in all the circumstances, still fair?

4. The Applicants say it does not matter what value it would have had. It is submitted that the Second Applicant was entitled to comment or respond to that information, even though she was not there.  As I say, this is the matter that has concerned me the most.  Does fairness dictate that she should have been allowed to answer it there and then when the First Applicant said, “Can I ask my wife to talk to you?”?   In my view, there was no unfairness in her not being allowed to do so. Whatever was said could only be conjecture and could not have had any value for the Tribunal.  She was not present at the time of the interview.

5. Notwithstanding the fact that the Tribunal said, “I will start with you first (first applicant),” the fact is it was clearly a question or information that could only have been directed to the First Applicant and could only have been answered by the First Applicant. 

6. So, not without some hesitation, I cannot find that there has been jurisdictional error.

7. The final two grounds relate to the purported police report and the translations that have been done of those reports.  Those reports purport to corroborate the accounts of the First and Second Applicants.

8. It would seem that the original Malay reports were before the Tribunal, but it does not seem as though the translations were before the Tribunal.  The first report relevantly says this: it is a statement by a person called Mee Yoke Tee, a female said to be born on 5 May 1975 and she says:

   “On 29 June 2009 at approximately 5.10 pm, I received an SMS text message from my friend (second applicant) from (a particular phone number) to my mobile phone number, informing me that she and her husband named (first applicant) were abducted by four men of Chinese descent believed to be loan sharks while they were near the OCBC Bank, Georgetown, Penang.  I also received an SMS text message that my friend was being taken in a blue Honda Civic car (registration number) and my friend stated she was already in the Semanggol area of Perak. 

   At 1932 hours, I received an SMS text message telling me she had arrived in Rawang.  I then came to the police station to make this report.” 

9. The second police report relevantly says, and it’s from the second applicant:

   “In relation to Lebuh Pantai report, number 1256 of 2009, I voluntarily withdraw the report as I do not wish to prolong the case.  This is because in this matter, my husband and I willingly went back to Johor with them to settle our debt problem.”

10. Whilst on the face of these documents it may seem that they could corroborate a version of the Applicants, it is when one has a look at the versions given by the Applicants that one is not so sure that this is actually the case.  In the visa application that the First Applicant made, he said this:

    “After we discovered our friend using our bank account for a large amount of illegal moneys laundering, we made it clearly (sic) to my friend not to use our bank accounts.  However, the gangsters refused to do so.  To avoid the conflict with the gangsters, we fled to Penang City.  The gangster found us after we withdraw money from the bank at Penang City Central.  Thereafter, we were abducted.  We found a way to report the organised crimes to the police. 

    The police interviewed us and recorded our oral evidences, but we were asked by the police to amend our evidences in favour of the gangsters.  If not do so, we would be beaten by the police.  Although we have done what the police told us, the gangsters still have intimidating, threatening and stalking my family.  We had not (sic) choice but went hiding in Taiwan.  The gangsters had strong connection to the Taiwanese criminals and they quickly located us. 

    We had to return to Malaysia and then managed to come to Australia.  I left Malaysia to escape from the harm by criminal gangsters and the persecution by the Malay police.  I’ve been kidnapped by the gangsters, forced to fabricate my evidence by the police.  We have no place to live in Malaysia, but have gone hiding in Taiwan.  I’m in fear of being harmed by criminal gangsters and the police and in fear of the safety of my family’s life. 

    The corrupt police and authorities accept the briberies offered by gangsters.  The perverted collusion would prevent me from being protection by the authorities if we were removed to Malaysia.”

11. In the interview that was made:

    “The first applicant explained that he and his wife operated a painting and advertising business in Johor, Malaysia.  He was unable to get a loan from the bank to expand his business.  He initially claimed that it was difficult for ethnic Chinese to get money from the government.  He subsequently stated that he and his wife were unable to get a loan from the bank because they had been operating their business for two years and were unable to satisfy the lending criteria. 

    He borrowed 50,000 ringgit from a friend who operated the lending business.  He was initially only required to pay interest on the loan.  In May 2009, they were unable to make the necessary repayments on the loan and their problems began.  He and his wife were warned by a criminal gang that they would be kidnapped if they did not make payments on their loan.  He and his wife decided to go to Kuala Lumpur, but were kidnapped on their way.

    The kidnappers took all their possessions from them, but his wife managed to hide her mobile phone.  His wife went to the toilet and called the police.  He and his wife were rescued by the police and taken to Penang the following day.  They made a statement to the police.  The gang members contacted the police and they were then forced to change their statement to the police before they could be released.” 

12. During the interview with the delegate on 20 May 2014 at paragraph 20 the Tribunal outlined:

    “…the first named applicant initially stated that he and the second named applicant provided the police with statements in relation to being kidnapped, that the gangsters then contacted the police and the police forced them to change their statements before they were released by the police. However, he subsequently stated that they were arrested by the police at a later date, that he was beaten by the police and they were threatened and forced to change their statements.  At the hearing, he gave evidence that he was threatened by the police to change his statement, but he did not claim that he was beaten by the police…” 

13. Now, having regard to the incredible inconsistencies in these accounts, those translated police documents would just give a fourth version to what has happened and would not be corroborative. But notwithstanding that, the Refugee Review Tribunal at paragraph 32 wrote:

    “The applicants provided the department with two documents from Malaysia.  The first document is in relation to a statement made to the Malaysian police and the other is a withdrawal of the complaint.  The applicants did not provide copies of their bank statements to verify the use of their bank account for money laundering.  The country information on Malaysia indicates that document fraud is widespread in Malaysia.  In view of this country information and the Tribunal’s concerns referred to above, the Tribunal places no weight on these documents.”

14. The complaint is made by the Applicants that the Tribunal should have had made sure that they had the translated documents. The translated documents, it is said, were part of the evidence that should have been before the Tribunal and for them not to be before the Tribunal was unfair. The fact is that the way in which the Tribunal looked at those documents, it was as if those documents were as favourable for the Applicants as they could be. If the true nature of the documents were before the Tribunal, the result would have inevitably have been more unfavourable.

15. So having taken that view that the documents would be favourable, it still can be clear from what the Refugee Review Tribunal has said that it had no faith in the veracity of these documents. This was a finding of fact.  It does not matter that there was a failure to acquire the translated documents. The ground of appeal is that the Tribunal should have done what it could to acquire the translated documents and that failure is the unfairness. There cannot be any complaint that the ultimate conclusion made by the Tribunal about the documents could be in any way impugned.

16. In my view, there has not been a jurisdictional error simply because it may be said that the Tribunal has wrongly ascribed to those documents a lack of authenticity.  In my view, having made the finding of fact that it had, there was no jurisdictional error made by the Refugee Review Tribunal in not attempting to acquire the translated documents.  Notwithstanding that these were the four grounds of appeal, I have had a look through the transcript of the Tribunal hearing and the reasons.  In my view, the Tribunal was extremely fair in its dealings with the Applicants.

17. The tale told by the Applicants seems somewhat preposterous and that, coupled with the many inconsistencies in the story as well as other matters highlighted by the Refugee Review Tribunal at paragraphs 23 through to 31, does, in my view, justify the Tribunal in its findings from paragraphs 32 to 39.  In my view, the Applicants were given all procedural fairness in putting forward their case before the Refugee Review Tribunal.  The Refugee Review Tribunal listened to everything and assessed the evidence in a proper way. 

18. It made findings which were well and truly open to make.  Accordingly, I can find no jurisdictional error and I dismiss the applications. 

I certify that the preceding fifty (50) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Vasta

Date:  23 March 2015