Dye v Commonwealth Bank of Australia

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Dye v Commonwealth Bank of Australia & Anor [2012] NSWCA 220
Hearing dates:2 July 2012
Decision date: 26 July 2012
Before: Campbell JA at 1;
Sackville AJA at 8;
Preston CJ of LEC at 67.
Decision:

1. Extend the time for the applicant to seek leave to appeal to 25 January 2011.

2. The application for leave to appeal against the orders made on 21 October 2010 that the applicant pay:

(a) the Bank's costs of the defamation proceedings which have been wasted in the sum of $250,000; and

(b) the Bank's costs of the stay application in the sum of $15,000,

be dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the Bank's costs of the application for leave to appeal.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - whether Court has jurisdiction to entertain an application for leave to appeal from a wasted costs order made on an application under the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 - availability of judicial review of costs order under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970.
Legislation Cited: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth)
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth)
Civil Procedure Act 2005
Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987
Supreme Court Act 1970
Cases Cited: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Maritime Union of Australia (2001) 114 FCR 472
Dye v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2010] NSWSC 1236
Dye v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2010] NSWSC 1237
Dye v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [2010] NSWSC 1238
Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118
Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No 2) [2012] FCA 407
Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd [2012] FCA 242
Federated Fire Engine-Drivers and Fireman's Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd (1911) 12 CLR 398
Fencott v Muller [1983] HCA 12; 152 CLR 570
Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36; 235 CLR 125
Micallef v ICI Australia Operations Pty Ltd [2001] NSWCA 274
Neumann Contractors Pty Ltd v Traspunt No 5 Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 119; [2011] 2 Qd R 114
Philip Morris Inc v Adam P Brown Male Fashions Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 7; 148 CLR 457
Re Wilcox; Ex parte Venture Industries Pty Ltd [1996] FCA 1497
Tangalooma Island Resort Pty Ltd v Miles (1989) 96 FLR 47
Thomas v State of New South Wales [2008] NSWCA 316; 74 NSWLR 34
Travelex Ltd v FCT [2010] HCA 33; 241 CLR 510
Wang and Liu v State of New South Wales [2011] NSWCA…
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Details
Case
[2012] NSWCA 220
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Ms Dye, sought leave to appeal from wasted costs orders made by a judge of the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The Commonwealth Bank of Australia was the respondent. The dispute concerned the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal to entertain an appeal from a wasted costs order made in the context of proceedings transferred under the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (Cth).

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the wasted costs orders were decisions "in relation to the transfer" of a proceeding under the Cross-Vesting Act, which would render them unappealable under section 13(a) of that Act. A secondary issue arose regarding the availability of judicial review of the costs orders under section 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW).

The Court noted that while the primary judge's reasoning for the wasted costs order was linked to the transfer of proceedings, the critical question was whether the order itself was "in relation to the transfer." The Court considered it arguable that section 13(a) of the Cross-Vesting Act might only prohibit appeals from costs orders directly related to the costs of the transfer application itself, and not other costs orders made in the context of such a transfer. Given the applicant was unrepresented and the potential jurisdictional complexity, the Court indicated a preference for addressing the substance of the applicant's arguments. The Court also acknowledged that the applicant could have sought prerogative relief by way of certiorari in the Court's original jurisdiction under section 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970, which would allow for review of errors of law on the face of the record.

The Court ultimately decided to address the substance of the applicant's arguments regarding the merits of the wasted costs orders, rather than definitively determining the jurisdictional issue of the appeal's competence. This approach was taken to avoid deferring the applicant's substantive arguments and to allow the Court to deal with them without a jurisdictional impediment. The Court found that the primary judge was correct in holding that the applicant could have brought the defamation proceedings in the Federal Court, as she had pleaded causes of action arising under Commonwealth legislation, such as the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), which fell within the Federal Court's original jurisdiction.

Orders

Orders of the court

41.

appealed from (in this case the wasted costs order) is in relation to the transfer of a proceeding under the Cross-Vesting Act, not whether the reasoning supporting the decision is in relation to the transfer.

42.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

PRESTON CJ
I appreciate that in the present case the reasoning of the primary Judge indicates that the wasted costs order was made in one sense as the "price" for transferring the proceedings to the Federal Court. However, s 13(a) limits the right of appeal from a "decision ... in relation to the transfer ... of a proceeding under this Act". The question is whether the decision appealed from (in this case the wasted costs order) is in relation to the transfer of a proceeding under the Cross-Vesting Act, not whether the reasoning supporting the decision is in relation to the transfer. For these reasons, in my view, despite the force of Mr Gray's submissions, it is arguable that s 13(a) of the Cross-Vesting Act should be read as prohibiting appeals from costs orders only insofar as the orders relate to the costs of the transfer application itself. If the argument is correct, s 13(a) would not render incompetent the application for leave to appeal from the costs orders. Neither of the costs orders concerns the costs of the transfer application itself. Because the applicant is unrepresented this Court has not had the benefit of full argument on the construction of s 13(a). For this reason, if it is clear that the Court otherwise has jurisdiction to entertain the applicant's challenge to the costs orders, it is in my view preferable not to decide finally whether the application for leave to appeal is competent. Mr Gray accepted that it would have been open to the applicant, had she been so advised, to seek an order in the nature of certiorari quashing the costs orders made by the primary Judge. Such an order could have been sought by her in this Court's original jurisdiction pursuant to s 69(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1970. One ground available to her would be an error of law appearing on the face of the record. The "record" for this purpose includes the reasons of the Court: s 69(3), (4). Given that the applicant is unrepresented in these proceedings, I would be prepared to allow her to file a summons seeking prerogative relief on the grounds she has identified in her application for leave to appeal. This would enable the Court to deal with the substance of her arguments without any jurisdictional issue arising. Mr Gray did not suggest that any prejudice would be caused to the Bank if that course had to be followed. In these circumstances, I propose to address the substance of the applicant's arguments. To do so has the advantage of not simply deferring consideration of those arguments until a summons in an appropriate form is filed. The primary Judge was clearly correct to hold that the applicant could have brought the defamation proceedings in the Federal Court even before the inclusion of the malicious falsehood causes of action (which arose under State law and thus were themselves within the accrued jurisdiction of the Federal Court). The Federal Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the applicant's claim because she alleged, among other things, that the respondents had contravened provisions of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) and the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) and that she was entitled to relief under those Acts. These pleaded causes of action constituted a matter "arising under any law made by the Parliament" in respect of which the Federal Court has original jurisdiction: Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B(1A)(c).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: PRESTON CJ