Duz16 v Minister for Immigration

[2019] FCCA 2587

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DUZ16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2019] FCCA 2587

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for review of Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) decision – whether the IAA fell into jurisdictional error in their consideration of certain evidence – whether the IAA failed to consider the applicant’s claim due to certain facts – whether the IAA failed to consider a claim expressly made about certain information – no jurisdictional error revealed – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s.476

Cases cited:

Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999)197 CLR 510; (1999) 73 ALJR 584; (1999) 162 ALR 1; (1999) 55 ALD 1
Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184; (2003) 236 FCR 593; (2003) 75 ALR 630; (2003) 75 ALD 630

Applicant: DUZ16

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

File Number: SYG 3516 of 2016

Judgment of: Judge Nicholls

Hearing date: 3 September 2019

Date of Last Submission: 3 September 2019

Delivered at: Sydney

Delivered on: 16 September 2019

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr A. Kumar (direct access)

Solicitors for the Respondents: Minter Ellison

Legal Representative for the Respondents: Mr L. Dennis

ORDERS

1. The name of the first respondent is amended to read “Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs”.

2. The application made on 12 December 2016 and as amended is dismissed.

3. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs set in the amount of $6000.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT SYDNEY

SYG 3516 of 2016

DUZ16

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. This is an application made pursuant to s.476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 12 December 2016 and amended on 21 August 2017, seeking review of the decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (“the IAA”) made on 23 November 2016 which affirmed the decision of the Minister’s delegate (“the delegate”) to refuse to grant the applicant a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (“SHEV”) (a protection visa).

2. The evidence before the Court is contained in a bundle of relevant documents filed, and tendered, by the Minister (the Court Book – “CB” – “RE1”)

Background

1. The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka (item 18 at CB 35). He arrived in Australia on 14 November 2012 (item 46 at CB 42). The applicant applied for a SHEV, which was received by the Minister’s Department on 6 April 2016 (CB 22-CB 58). The delegate refused the grant of the visa on 30 September 2016 (CB 125-CB 136. The delegate’s decision was a “fast track reviewable decision”, as that term is understood for the purposes of the Act. The Minister referred the decision to the IAA for review. The IAA affirmed the decision on 23 November 2016.

2. The Minister’s written submissions provide a fair summary of the applicant’s claims to protection, as they are relevant to the grounds of the amended application before the Court:

   “5. The applicant claimed to fear harm on account of his Tamil ethnicity, his brother's links to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), his involvement in the 2012 elections, and as a failed asylum seeker who departed Sri Lanka illegally. In support of those claims, the applicant recounted the following events:

   (a)   from 2000–2006, his brother was a prominent LTTE member who went to Saudi Arabia from 2007–2009 to avoid harm;

(b)   after his brother's departure, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) began to harass other family members, including the applicant, causing one of his sisters to also flee to Saudi Arabia;

(c)    when his brother returned in 2009, the brother was detained and beaten and the applicant's family continued to be harassed and his father was also beaten;

(d)   his brother witnessed war crimes committed by the Sri Lankan authorities; and

(e)   during the 2012 elections, he refused to assist the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) and instead campaigned for the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) resulting in threats and retribution.”

1. The applicant claimed to fear harm on three bases. One, because of his brother’s activities as a prominent LTTE member the applicant and his family came to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities and were harassed by them.

2. Two, because of his own political activities in the 2012 elections on behalf of the Tamil National Alliance (“TNA”), he came to the adverse attention of their rivals, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (“TMPV”).  He was variously threatened and harassed.

3. Three, as a Tamil he would face harm for that reason, on return, from the Sri Lankan authorities.

4. Four, as a failed returning asylum seeker who departed Sri Lanka illegally he would, on return, come to the adverse attention of the Sri Lankan authorities, and be harmed by them.

5. In relation to each of these the IAA found:

   1    Given internal inconsistencies and implausibilities in his account, and in light of country information before it, the IAA found that his brother did not have any connection to the LTTE, and the applicant and his family were therefore not targeted, as claimed.

   2    The applicant was a low level TNA supporter.  The IAA found that the election in 2012 was “conducted in a tense and volatile environment”, and there was significant harassment by all sides of their opponents.  However, given country information before it, there had been an easing of political tensions, which the IAA found meant that the applicant would not face harm on return because of his political activities.

   3    The IAA accepted that as part of a Tamil family the applicant would have been subject to monitoring and harassment in the past.  However, having regard to country information about conditions in Sri Lanka since 2009, he would not likely face harm as a Tamil in the future.

   4    In relation to returning as a failed asylum seeker who departed illegally, the IAA found that any penalty, or any questioning, investigation, prosecution, or punishment of him, would not rise to serious or significant harm.  In essence, the applicant would be faced with the application of a law of general application.  The IAA also found there was no evidence before it that the applicant’s status as a failed asylum seeker would bring him to the adverse attention of the authorities on return.

The Grounds of the Application

1. The grounds of the amended application are in the following terms:

   “Ground 1
   The Authority fell into error when in consideration of the letters from local MP Mr Yogeswaran and the St Peter's Church from Sri Lanka stating that these documents were "hearsay information" (IAA at [19]) when these documents do not state that it is relying on any hearsay information and thereby committed jurisdictional error. Alternatively, the Authority misunderstood its task and the assessment of the evidence and erred in exercise of its discretion whether the .

   Particulars

   (a) The Applicant submitted the documents from MP Mr Yogeswaran and the St Peter's Church from Sri Lanka in support of the Application.

   (b) The letters do not state that the writers rely on hearsay information.

   (c) The Authority fell into error in carrying out proper review of the evidence and thereby committed jurisdictional error.

   Ground 2
   The Authority fell into error when it failed to consider a clearly articulated claims that the Applicant was at risk owing to his role with sports club and erred in failing to assess the applicant's claim and / or giving meaningful consideration of the Applicant's claims.

   Particulars

   (a) The Applicant had claimed fear owing to his association with the sports club.

   (b) The position clearly established the ability to influence elections results (as claimed in the Applicant's statement of claims).

   (c) The Authority fell into error in carrying out proper review and thereby committed jurisdictional error.

   Ground 3
   The Authority fell into error when it failed to consider a clearly articulated claims that the Applicant's brother was a witness to war crimes (IAA at [14]) and thus at whatever level of membership, the authorities had interest in the Applicant's brother. The Authority failed to deal with the risk to the Applicant owing to his brother's witnessing of war crimes. The Authority fell into error in failing to give meaningful consideration of the Applicant's claims.

   Particulars

   (a) The Applicant had claimed fear owing to his brother being witness to war crimes.

   (b) The Authority has failed to assess the claim.

   (c) The Authority fell into error in carrying out proper review and thereby committed jurisdictional error.

   Ground 4
   The Authority committed jurisdictional error when it failed to take into account that the Applicant's detention in poor prison conditions (IAA at [57]) would constitute persecution complementary protection provisions and thereby applied the wrong test in relation to s 5 and s 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958 and / or failed to address an integer / claim regarding the detention claim.

   Particulars

   4.1 The Authority found that the Applicant would suffer detention but would not constitute serious or significant harm.

   4.2 The Applicant would be detained for leaving country illegally.

   4.3 This was a relevant consideration in assessment of whether the Applicant's fear was well founded upon return to Sri Lanka.

   4.4 The Authority addressed and made findings regarding the claims on prison conditions harsh / poor) (IAA at [47] and not address this integer / claim and whether the conditions breached the relevant statutes and domestic law.

   4.5 Erred in not addressing that there was intention or not asking the correct question regarding detention by the Sri Lankan government to inflict cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment on the applicant.

   4.6 The Authority in consideration of the intentional aspects of the detention and impliedly / expressly referred intentions of the players carrying out detention (and has misconstrued the provisions) and erred in construction of the expression "intentionally inflicted' in the definitions of "torture and "cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment" in s 5(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Migration Act).

   4.7 The Tribunal erred considering the issue of intention and whether in carrying out the duties there intention to inflict serious or significant harm on the question of the Applicant's detention.

   [The reference to “Tribunal” is in error.]

   4.8 The Authority erroneously limited it consideration / erred [91] in the construction that the detention for illegal departure:

   (i) the expression "intended to cause" in the definition of "degrading treatment or punishment" in s 5(1) of the Migration Act;

   (j) require an actor to have "an actual, subjective, intention" to inflict pain or suffering, or to cause extreme humiliation, by the actor's acts or omissions, being an intention that cannot be proved by the actor's knowledge of the consequences of the actor's acts or omissions, no matter how certain that knowledge may be (at (68]).

   4.9 (Erred in not addressing that there was intention or not asking the correct question regarding detention by the Sri Lankan government to inflict cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment on the applicant.

   4.10 Applied wrong test or asked itself wrong questions when it found that the Applicant would not suffer significant harm.

   4.11 The Authority applied the wrong test.

   Ground 5
   The Authority fell into error when in consideration of the information regarding the Applicant's family.

   Particulars

   (a) The information concerning the Applicant's brother was credible personal information.

   (b) The Authority misconstrued and misapplied s 473DD of the Act.

   (c) The lack of understanding as unrepresented Applicant together with lack of appreciation of the legal system could constitute exceptional circumstances

   (d) The Authority erred in its exercise of discretion.

   (e) The Authority fell into error in carrying out proper review of the evidence and thereby committed jurisdictional error.

   Ground 6
   The Authority committed jurisdictional error when taking into account that the Applicant's credibility particularly concerning the claims relating to his brother and does not have logical / rational connection to the findings (IAA at [19] - [23]; [29]).

   Particulars

   a. The Authority found that the Applicant's brother was able to get out of the country.

   b. The Authority relied on this basis as finding that the Applicant lacked credibility.

   c. In the circumstances the finding of credibility lacks sufficient logical connection to the material on which it is based.

   d. The Authority's finding is affected by jurisdictional error.”

[Errors in the Original.]

1. At the hearing the applicant’s counsel confirmed that the applicant did not press grounds 4, 5 and 6.

Consideration.

1. Ground 1 asserts that the IAA erred by finding that supporting letters provided by the applicant contained “hearsay information”.

2. The letters are:

   1    Two letters from S. Yogaswaran MP dated 9 September 2013 (and translated on 23 March 2016) and 4 November 2016 (translated on 6 November 2016) (see English translations at CB 80 – CB 81 and CB 156 – CB 157).

   2    A letter from Rev. Fr. Hendrick of St Peter’s Church, dated 13 October 2016 (see English translation at CB 165).

3. The applicant’s written submissions sought to explain the ground as follows. One, the IAA found that the letters contained “hearsay information”.  The letters did not state that the authors were relying on hearsay information.  Therefore the IAA committed jurisdictional error. Two, in the alternative, the IAA misunderstood its task in relation to the assessment of this evidence. 

4. It must be said that the applicant did not satisfactorily explain this before the Court.  The references to the IAA: “…applying balance of probabilities test”, rather than “considering the letters and giving appropriate weight”, was, in the circumstances before the Court, meaningless.

5. At one point in submissions the applicant’s counsel appeared to argue that the absence of any specific statement in the letters that the authors relied on “hearsay evidence” meant that the IAA fell into legal error in finding that the contents of the letters were based on hearsay. This appeared to be consistent with the written submissions.

6. When pressed to explain this, the applicant’s position became even more opaque.

7. The applicant’s ground, as stated, directs attention to the IAA’s relevant consideration at [19] (at CB 197):

   “19. The letter from Mr Yogeswaran refers to the applicant’s brother being conscripted by the LTTE and ongoing harassment of the family from army intelligence. The letter from St Peter’s Church also refers to the applicant’s brother being an LTTE cadre. Neither of the writers has indicated that their understanding of the circumstances is other than from hearsay information, nor that it is has been verified by any objective and independent evidence. I give these letters no weight.”

1. Plainly at this part of its analysis (noting that ground 1 and the submissions in support only seek to impugn [19]), the IAA considered the letters in context of the applicant’s claim that his brother was “conscripted” by the LTTE, and the claimed subsequent ongoing harassment of the family from the Sri Lankan authorities as a result.

2. The letters from the MP contain various assertions about the applicant’s brother, and the applicant’s family circumstances.  It is clear in relation to both letters the MP relied on what the applicant’s mother told him: “… His mother has brought to my notice…” (at CB 80.5).

3. This letter also contains the following: “…When I investigated into this matter…” (at CB 80.6).  However, there is nothing in the letter to indicate whether the investigation was simply to ask the applicant’s mother as to what occurred, or whether the MP conducted any investigation involving first-hand observation.

4. The second letter from the MP, again, has no indication that the MP had any first-hand knowledge of what is asserted.  Here again the reference to: “…The mother who realised that there is danger to his [sic: her] son…” (at CB 156.4) can only have come from the applicant’s mother.

5. The letter from  Rev Fr Hendrick makes clear: “…As I heard from the people…” (at CB 165.4).

6. As the Minister submits the weighing of evidence is a matter for the IAA (Abebe v Commonwealth [1999] HCA 14; (1999) 197 CLR 510 at [197]). The IAA’s assessment as set out at [19] was reasonably open to it on what was plainly stated in the letters. None of the letters, as set out above, provide any basis to say that what was said was based on first-hand knowledge, or observation.

7. It was reasonably open to the IAA to assign no weight to the letters, for reason that the authors of the letters simply reported what had been told to them, in context, by the applicant’s mother, or “the people”. This characterisation of the information, or evidence, was reasonably available to the IAA.

8. The contention that information or evidence can only be found to be hearsay if there is some explicit statement to that effect in the information or evidence must be rejected.

9. The IAA is not a Court, and therefore the rules of evidence do not apply.  What the IAA plainly reasoned was that it could give no weight to the contents of the letters, because neither author related his own knowledge, as opposed to what had been told to them.

10. I pause to note that even where the rules of evidence apply before a Court, the applicant’s counsel did not explain how those parts of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) dealing with hearsay evidence require an explicit statement to that effect from a witness, or a deponent to an affidavit, before such evidence can be found to be hearsay.

11. In all, ground 1 is not made out.

12. Ground 2 asserts that the IAA failed to consider the applicant’s claim to fear harm because of his membership of a local sports club.

13. The applicant’s written submissions directed attention to the applicant’s statement provided with his application for the visa.  In particular at [18] – [19] (at CB 61):

    “18. I worked at a sports club. A government candidate was contesting as the chief minister for the eastern province. He wanted the sports club to support his campaign and I was expected to support this. The government candidate expected me to make speeches for him because many people in my village were illiterate. The club was very famous and the candidate thought if the club supported him he could get more votes. The candidate was working against the Tamil people. The candidate used to be a member of the LTTE with my brother so he knows everything about us.

    19. The sports club and myself refused to support the government candidate and supported the opposition candidate. The CID came to my home and were threatening and harassing me. The CID knew everything about us and where we lived because the government candidate had told them. They came to my home when my mother was there and they threatened my mother that they would do something to me. They used my brother's membership with the LTTE to intimidate my mother. Because of this problem, I had to study in three different schools. My mother made me change three different schools because of the intimidation and to protect me.”

1. At best, and relevantly, what is asserted here is that the applicant worked at a sports club from which the government candidate in the election sought support for his campaign. The candidate and his party wanted the applicant to make speeches on his behalf because of his connection with the sports club, which was said to be “very famous”.

2. It is important to note that the applicant made no claim to fear harm simply because of his membership of the sports club.  Rather, what is put in the applicant’s statement is that the government candidate wanted to use the applicant’s connection to this famous club to “win votes” for him. 

1. The claim, therefore, is that the applicant feared harm from the government candidate because of his refusal to support him in using his club affiliation to make speeches to win votes for the candidate.

2. The applicant now says that the IAA “listed” the “claim” at [14] (at CB 196.4):

   “● During the 2012 elections the applicant was approached by Pillayan who was the leader of the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) to campaign for their candidate. The applicant was a member of an influential sports club and the TMVP wanted to take advantage of the club’s connection with the local community. The applicant refused and was threatened by the TMVP and the CID/army.”

1. However, the applicant asserts that the IAA gave no further consideration to this claim, and has therefore failed to deal with the claim.

2. That must be rejected.  At [37] of its decision record the IAA plainly considered the claim that the TMVP (the party of the government candidate) wanted to use members of the sports club to support their candidature. Given the applicant’s written statement, it plainly understood the claim.

3. In fact, the IAA accepted the basis for this claim ([37] at CB 201):

   “37. The objective evidence shows that the 2012 Provincial Council elections were fiercely contested and characterised by disruption by all parties¹⁵. It is plausible that the opposition TMVP party sought to use members of the local sports group to canvass for them and that the applicant, who was a member of the group, was pressured to support the TMVP. I do not accept that Pillayan himself spoke to the applicant about this role, even if it could be said that the applicant was in some position of influence. At this time Pillayan was the Chief Minister and I consider it implausible that he was involved in managing minor administrative aspects of the election campaign. It is plausible that when the applicant refused to assist the TMVP he was then harassed by the TMVP and elements supporting them, which may have included members of the CID and army. I note that the applicant was amongst a group of nine to ten people campaigning for the TNA at the time and that he kept close to the TNA candidate and therefore had the benefit of the candidate’s bodyguards to ensure his safety. I accept that after the election Pillayan may have been disappointed with the election results and his TMVP party took retribution against the opposition TNA supporters and it is plausible that the applicant and his family experienced some harassment post-election. However, the applicant was a low-level TNA supporter, not a candidate, and I do not accept as plausible that Pillayan himself, accompanied by CID officers, visited the family home and harassed the applicant’s mother and issued threats against the applicant.”

[Emphasis Added.]
[Footnote Omitted.]

1. However, the IAA found that “…the applicant was a low-level TNA supporter, not a candidate…”, ([37] at CB 201), and as there had been an easing in political tensions since 2012 (the year of the election), the applicant would not face serious or significant harm as a result of not supporting the government candidate.  (See at [18] (CB 196 – CB 197) and [38] (CB 201)).

2. The IAA’s findings in this regard were all reasonably open to it, and logically probative, of what was before it. The ground, as pleaded and explained in submissions, seeks impermissible merits review, as it rises no higher than an attempt to disagree with the IAA’s analysis and findings.

3. Before the Court, the applicant’s counsel sought to argue that the IAA fell into error because it confined its understanding of the applicant’s “sports club” claim to the events of 2012.

4. However, counsel was unable to satisfactorily explain this when asked to do so before the Court.

5. As set out above (at [31]) the applicant first raised the “sports cub” claim in his written statement submitted with his application for the visa. It is the case that there is no specific temporal reference in this part of the statement.

6. However, what emerges is that the applicant did not claim that the government candidate wanted his support in multiple elections.

7. The applicant’s representative subsequently made written submissions on the applicant’s behalf (CB 159 – CB 164). The submissions, for the most part, address the delegate’s decision. The representative stated (at CB 160.4):

   “…The applicant instructs us that he strongly disagrees with the finding of the delegate in this matter for the reasons mentioned below.”

1. In relation to the “sports club” claim, the representative referred to the applicant’s written statement including at [18] – [19] (CB 162.3). The reference here was to: “…in the election…”. Again, only one election is nominated.

2. The delegate’s decision was the subject of the representative’s criticism. In relation to the sports club matter, the representative plainly relates this to the 2012 election: “Political involvement during the 2012 Eastern Provincial Election” (CB 130.1 to CB 131.4).

3. The delegate drew on the applicant’s written claims, and as these were explained by him at the interview: “The applicant also claims…” (at CB 130.2).

4. In these circumstances there was no error in the IAA’s understanding and consideration of the “sports club” claim in the context of the 2012 election. The applicant’s counsel was unable to point to anything in the evidence before the Court to argue against this. Ground 2 is not made out.

5. Ground 3 asserts that the IAA failed to consider a claim expressly made that the applicant’s brother was a witness to war crimes, and he was of interest to the authorities for that reason, and that the IAA failed to deal with the consequence of this for the applicant.

6. Before the Court, the applicant’s counsel submitted that while the IAA “listed” this claim, it did not deal with it. That is, there was no “direct consideration” of what might happen to the applicant as a result of the “war crimes” issue.

7. The applicant’s counsel further submitted that the IAA should have specifically considered the claim that the applicant’s brother witnessed “war crimes”.

8. The applicant’s submissions directed attention to [14] of the IAA’s reasons (CB 196.2 (2^nd dot point)):

   “● The applicant’s brother was a witness to war crimes committed by the Sri Lanka authorities and would be able to give evidence against the authorities and this is why they are pursuing him.”’

[Emphasis Added.]

1. At [14] the IAA sought to summarise the applicant’s claims in the information before it.  (See CB 195.7). The reference to the applicant’s brother witnessing war crimes is to be found in the applicant’s statement that accompanied his visa application (at CB 60): 

   “13. My brother was a volunteer member of the LTTE as he thought we needed to fight for our rights. My brother left LTTE in 2006 and then they came searching for him all the time. LTTE found him and interviewed him and then told him he could leave. However, the CID then started harassing him because he had been a member of LTTE. The United Nations are now trying to get information from people who participated in the war. The authorities are scared that people will find out what happened in the war and that is why the government is looking for my brother. He is a witness and knows what happened. My mother sent my brother away to Qatar. Because the government came searching for my brother, they came looking for me as well because they could not find him. The government thought if they harassed us and treated us badly that my brother would come back. My mother was scared for my life.”

[Emphasis Added.]

1. As is clear from the applicant’s statement, the claim that his brother witnessed war crimes was predicated on the claim that he: “…was a volunteer member of the LTTE”. This was the context within which he is said to have witnessed “what happened”.

2. The IAA plainly acknowledged the applicant’s claim to fear harm because of his brother’s LTTE activities, including the integer of that claim that he witnessed “war crimes”.

3. However, as set out above, the IAA found, for reasons given, that the applicant’s brother had no connection whatsoever with the LTTE. As the IAA found (at [31], CB 199):

   “31. I do not accept that the applicant’s brother was involved with the LTTE, nor that the authorities imputed him with an LTTE connection and I do not accept that they were looking for him after his return to Sri Lanka in 2009…”.

1. Specifically in relation to the applicant’s claimed fear said to arise from his brother’s LTTE involvement, the IAA found (at [32], CB 199 – CB 200):

   “32. I do not accept that the CID targeted the applicant, his parents or his siblings on the basis of a real or imputed LTTE involvement for the brother. I accept that the applicant and his family may have come to the attention of the CID and army during regular security exercises conducted during the civil war and in the months immediately prior.”

1. Given that the IAA rejected the claim that the applicant’s brother had any connection with the LTTE, and that the applicant’s family were targeted for this reason, then, in the circumstances, this was dispositive of the claim in its entirety.

2. If the applicant’s brother was not connected to the LTTE, then he could not have witnessed the war crimes which the applicant said he witnessed because he was a member of the LTTE.

3. This is plainly a case where the “war crimes” aspect of the claim was acknowledged, but subsumed in a finding of not only greater generality (Applicant WAEE v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCAFC 184 (“WAEE”) at [47]), but where the war crimes aspect of the claim, reliant on a precondition (the brother’s LTTE membership) could not be made out. Ground 3 is not made out.

Conclusion

1. None of the remaining grounds of the amended application are made out. It is appropriate to dismiss the application. I will make the appropriate order.

I certify that the preceding sixty-two (62) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Nicholls

Associate: 

Date:  16 September 2019