Durkin v Pioneer Permanent Building Society Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Durkin v Pioneer Permanent Building Society Limited (ACN 087 652 042)
[2003] FCA 419

PROCEDURE – whether proceedings be dismissed – whether statement of claim be struck out.

CONTRACT – where agent acting for party – where special conditions – where valuation condition – whether binding contract concluded – whether affirmed contract – whether waiver – whether terminated wrongfully – whether repudiated contract – whether implied term of acting reasonably and honestly – whether should consider property income in valuation – whether in breach of lending guidelines – whether claim in contract.

TORTS – whether negligent in giving instructions – whether negligent in not appreciating a party’s dissatisfaction with valuation – whether claim in negligence.

TRADE PRACTICES – whether misleading or deceptive conduct pursuant to s 52 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – where representations allegedly made orally and in writing – whether unconscionable conduct pursuant to s 51AA Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) – whether at special disadvantage – where in unequal bargaining position – where in financial need.

Spencer v The Commonwealth of Australia (1907) 5 CLR 418 discussed
Shepherd v Felt and Textilers of Australia Ltd (1931) 45 CLR 359 applied
Hurley v McDonald’s Australia Ltd (2000) ATPR 41,741 discussed
The Commercial Bank of Australia Limited v Amadio & Anor (1983) 151 CLR 447 applied
Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362 at 405 cited
Bridgewater & Ors v Leahy & Ors (1998) 194 CLR 457 cited
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CG Berbatis Holdings Pty Ltd & Ors [2003] HCA 18 applied

Trade Practices Act ss 51A, 51AA, 51AB, 51AC, 52
Federal Court Rules O 11 r 16, O 20 r 2,

THOMAS KIERAN DURKIN AND RHONDA JOAN DURKIN v PIONEER PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 087 652 042), JEFFREY DAVID DODDS AND DOUGLAS KNIGHT

Q 174 OF 2002

DOWSETT J
9 MAY 2003
BRISBANE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 174 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

THOMAS KIERAN DURKIN
FIRST APPLICANT

RHONDA JOAN DURKIN
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

PIONEER PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 087 652 042)
FIRST RESPONDENT

JEFFREY DAVID DODDS
SECOND RESPONDENT

DOUGLAS KNIGHT
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 MAY 2003

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The statement of claim as amended on 27 February 2003 be struck out as against the first respondent.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY

Q 174 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

THOMAS KIERAN DURKIN 
FIRST APPLICANT

RHONDA JOAN DURKIN
SECOND APPLICANT

AND:

PIONEER PERMANENT BUILDING SOCIETY LIMITED (ACN 087 652 042)
FIRST RESPONDENT

JEFFREY DAVID DODDS
SECOND RESPONDENT

DOUGLAS KNIGHT
THIRD RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

DOWSETT J

DATE:

9 MAY 2003

PLACE:

BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

THE MOTION

  1. The first respondent moves for dismissal of the proceedings against it pursuant to O 20 r 2 or alternatively, for an order pursuant to O 11 r 16 that the…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 419
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The matter of Durkin v Pioneer Permanent Building Society Ltd concerns the applicants’ attempt to hold the first respondent liable for a loan agreement. The applicants, who were indebted to the first respondent, sought additional accommodation to cover their debts and farming expenses. The first respondent agreed to provide the additional funds under certain conditions, including the need for independent valuations to support the applicants’ valuation. The first respondent subsequently moved for the dismissal of the proceedings or, alternatively, for the statement of claim to be struck out.

The central legal issues revolved around the interpretation of the conditions outlined in the letter of offer from the first respondent and whether these conditions constituted a binding agreement. Specifically, the court needed to determine if the first respondent's commitment was conditional upon the satisfaction of the valuation condition and other outstanding requirements, and if so, whether these conditions were met. Additionally, the court had to consider whether the applicants had any grounds to claim that the first respondent was liable for the loan despite the conditional nature of the offer.

The court found that the first respondent's commitment was indeed conditional, as clearly stated in the offer letter and the execution page of the enclosed document. The valuation condition and other outstanding requirements had not been satisfied, thereby preventing the offer from becoming a binding agreement. The applicants’ argument that the first respondent was estopped from relying on the conditional nature of the offer was also dismissed. Consequently, the court ruled that the statement of claim against the first respondent should be struck out.

The court ordered that the statement of claim, as amended on 27 February 2003, be struck out as against the first respondent. This decision effectively dismissed the applicants’ claims against the first respondent in the proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The statement of claim as amended on 27 February 2003 be struck out as against the first respondent.

Background

Background to the litigation

The first respondent moves for dismissal of the proceedings against it pursuant to O 20 r 2 or alternatively, for an order pursuant to O 11 r 16 that the statement of claim be struck out as against it. The latter application must be determined having regard to the case as pleaded. In determining the former application, I may have regard to uncontradicted evidence.BACKGROUND At all material times the first and second applicants carried on a farming business on property known as “Tori”, owned by the first applicant. Prior to 23 April 2001 they were indebted to the first respondent in an amount in excess of $600,000 and had numerous other debts. On that date a Mr D B Quinlan, trading as “Quinlans”, applied to the first respondent on their behalf for additional accommodation in the amount of $150,000. This accommodation was to meet replanting costs and to provide “carry on” finance. Mr Quinlan is a valuer. He submitted his valuation of “Tori”, dated 11 and 12 March 2001, in which he valued the property at $1.6 million. In the letter of application he indicated that the amount already secured on the property (including moneys owed to the first respondent) was $820,000. He opined that the “fire sale value” of the property was $1.12 million, that is 70 per cent of its fair market value. This showed a net excess of “fire sale value” over secured debts of $300,000. At some stage, the amount of additional accommodation being sought was increased to $240,500, of which $160,500 was to be applied to clear other debts and $71,500, to meet interest payments until winter harvest funds became available, together with fees and charges. Such an advance would have increased the applicants’ total indebtedness to the first respondent to $900,000. On 23 May 2001 the first respondent wrote to the applicants, offering to increase their accommodation to a total of $900,000 upon the terms contained in an enclosed document. The offer was open for acceptance until 4.00 pm on 6 June 2001. Repayment was to be secured by a first mortgage over “Tori” and an existing crop lien. The terms of the loan were specified. The offer was subject to certain special conditions, including the following:Appraisals from two (2) rural real estate agents confirming the value advised by consultant. Should this value not be supported an independent (sic) valuation by a registered valuer will be required. This condition is hereafter referred to as the “valuation condition”. The “value advised by consultant” was that of Mr Quinlan. After the special conditions, the following words appeared:Please note that this is not a binding commitment by the Society until all special conditions have been satisfied.There were also certain riders described as “Outstanding Requirements”. The first respondent’s “commitment” was also conditional upon such requirements being satisfied. The conditional nature of the first respondent’s commitment was stressed, both in the letter of 23 May and on the execution page of the enclosed document. It seems that the applicants signed the execution page on 25 May 2001. At some stage the first respondent indicated that the reason for requiring “arms length support” of Mr Quinlan’s valuation was that “… the last two applications have been from you as the consultant and as valuer.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

DOWSETT J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: DOWSETT J

Full text does not contain this section.