Durani v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Durani v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 129

Citation: Durani v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 129
Parties: SUHAIL AHMAD KHAN DURANI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
File number: WAD 361 of 2013
Judge: GILMOUR J
Date of judgment: 24 February 2014
Catchwords:  MIGRATION – judicial review of Minister’s decision to cancel visa under s 501A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether or not Minister’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error – whether or not there was a denial of procedural fairness by failure to inform the applicant of relevant considerations – legitimate expectation that Minister will treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration - whether or not the Minister failed to give primary consideration to the best interests of the applicant’s son – whether or not the separation of a child from its parent can be in the national interest - whether or not Minister failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to critical matters – whether or not the Minister fettered the exercise of the discretion.
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A(1)(c), 501(2), 501A(2), 501(6), (7)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1), (1A)(c)
Cases cited: Durani v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 172
Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 417
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Leiataua v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 208 FCR 448
Lesianawai v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 131 ALD 27
Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326
Maurangi v Bowen (2012) 200 FCR 191
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
Nweke v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 126 ALD 501
Re Durani and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] AATA 273
Ruatita v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 364
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Tewao v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 126 ALD 185
Date of hearing: 16 December 2014
Place: Perth
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 68
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Hooker
Solicitor for the Applicant: Shahid Shakur
Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Macliver
Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 361 of 2013

BETWEEN:

SUHAIL AHMAD KHAN DURANI
applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent

JUDGE:

GILMOUR J

DATE OF ORDER:

24 FEBRUARY 2014

WHERE MADE:

PERTH

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs to be taxed if not agreed.  

Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

WAD 361 of 2013

BETWEEN:

SUHAIL AHMAD KHAN DURANI

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 129
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Durani v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection involves an Indian national, the applicant, who has been residing in Australia on a permanent visa. The Minister for Immigration and Border Protection cancelled the applicant's visa under s 501A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), and the applicant sought judicial review of this decision. The applicant raised multiple grounds for review, including whether the Minister's decision was affected by jurisdictional error, a denial of procedural fairness, and a failure to consider critical matters. The applicant also argued that the Minister fettered his discretion by applying an inflexible policy that prioritized the avoidance of any risk of reoffending over other considerations.

The legal issues in this case centred on the exercise of the Minister's discretion in cancelling the applicant's visa. The applicant argued that the Minister failed to give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to critical matters, such as the minimal risk of reoffending and the best interests of the applicant's son. Additionally, the applicant contended that the Minister fettered his discretion by applying a rigid policy that deemed any risk of reoffending unacceptable, thereby overriding countervailing considerations. The court had to determine whether these arguments established a basis for judicial review.

The Federal Court rejected the applicant's grounds of review. The court found that the Minister had indeed considered the risk of reoffending and the best interests of the applicant's son, concluding that any risk of reoffending was unacceptable. The court held that the Minister's reasoning did not indicate a fettered discretion or a failure to give proper consideration to the critical matters. The court determined that the Minister's decision was lawful and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs, to be taxed if not agreed. The dismissal of the application meant that the Minister's decision to cancel the applicant's visa was upheld. The requirement for the applicant to pay the respondent's costs underscored the court's view that the applicant's challenge to the Minister's decision was without merit.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs to be taxed if not agreed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The other grounds of review relate to the exercise of the Minister’s discretion in deciding to cancel the applicant’s visa. The first is that the Minister failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to two critical contentions put in the applicant’s response to the notice of possible cancellation of his visa, namely, the finding of the AAT that the applicant’s risk of reoffending was minimal and the “content sourcing the AAT’s conclusion that it had no doubt that cancellation of the applicant’s visa is not in the best interests of the applicant’s child”. The second is that the Minister fettered his discretion, in that he inflexibly applied a policy or rule, in proceeding on the basis that that any risk of reoffending is unacceptable and therefore necessarily prevails over countervailing considerations.Relevant background The applicant relies upon two affidavits sworn by him on 19 October and 26 October 2013. The applicant is a 38-year-old Indian national. He first came to Australia on 6 December 2006 as the holder of a Class UE, Subclass 422 (Medical Practitioner) visa, being a visa that allowed him to remain in Australia on a temporary basis. On 13 July 2009 he was granted a permanent visa in the form of a Class VE, Subclass 175 (Skilled – Independent) visa. It is that visa that is the subject of the cancellation decision of 3 September 2013. The applicant has a wife and a child in Australia, both of whom are Australian citizens. In February 2010, the applicant was employed as a Resident Medical Officer at the Royal Perth Hospital (RPH). On 20 February 2010 he committed the offences of unlawful and indecent assault (three counts) and sexual penetration without consent (two counts) against a 19 year old female patient of the RPH. He was convicted of those offences by the District Court of Western Australia on 10 June 2011 and sentenced to a total effective period of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 months. The applicant’s appeal against the convictions to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Western Australia was dismissed on 30 August 2012: Durani v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 172. The applicant was imprisoned from 13 July 2011 until his release on parole on 6 February 2013, at which time he was taken into immigration detention. The applicant’s visa was first cancelled on 5 February 2013. That cancellation was made under s 501(2) of the Act by a delegate of the Minister. Subsection 501(2) permits the Minister, or a delegate of the Minister, to cancel a visa in circumstances where a person is suspected of not passing the “character test”, and does not satisfy the decision-maker that they do pass the test. The applicant fails to pass the character test because of a “substantial criminal record” arising from the sentences of imprisonment for the two counts of sexual penetration without consent: s 501(6) and (7). That “substantial criminal record” is also relevant to the exercise of the cancellation power under s 501A(2): the failure of the applicant to satisfy the Minister that he passes the character test being one of the preconditions to the exercise of the power (s 501A(2)(d)).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

This ground fails. Ground B3 – Proper, genuine and realistic consideration I reject Ground B3 for the reasons which include those set out above under Ground A2 concerning the Minister’s finding that the best interests of the applicant’s son were that the applicant’s visa not be cancelled. The particulars under Ground B3(a) are contrary to the facts. The Minister did take into account, as a fact, as I have explained above, that the risk of the applicant re-offending was low. If the point of this particular is to distinguish “minimal risk” from “low risk” then it avails the applicant nothing. Whatever the difference, if there be one in this case, the Minister concluded, as he was entitled to, that any risk of re-offending was unacceptable. The particulars under Ground B3(b) add nothing. If it matters, the conclusion of the AAT as to what was in the best interests of the applicant’s son was exactly that found by the Minister. It is not to the point to complain that the Minister arrived at this important conclusion by different means or on lesser evidence than was relied upon by the AAT. Such a proposition, even were it established, does not disclose jurisdictional error. I reject this ground. The submission that the applicant failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant’s contentions in this regard, is wholly unmeritorious. It is unnecessary to consider what may have been the consequences of such a failure, such as, for example, a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, had I determined otherwise. This ground fails. Ground B4 – Fettering of discretion The applicant’s submission is that although the SOR did not in terms refer to the application of any "policy", the effect of the Minister’s reasoning to his conclusion at SOR [36]-[38] was to the effect that he was adopting a fixed and immutable presumption by reason of the very fact of the applicant's criminal convictions which caused the applicant's position to be beyond redemption and that strong countervailing considerations in his favour were incapable of overcoming that presumption, as was his minimal risk of reoffending. Thus, as the applicant contends, the nature of the facts detailing those considerations, and that minimal risk, were at least in terms considered, but not properly, genuinely or realistically so. It follows, the applicant submits, that the effect of the Minister's limited reasoning from which his conclusion was derived was to strip his residual discretion of any operative content and that consequently the Minister did not exercise his statutory power under s 501A(2) of the Act according to law. This ground is in substance that the Minister applied a test that where such an applicant was to be permitted to remain in Australia there must be no risk of recidivism: a test which could almost never be met. This is, in effect, a repetition of the failed argument advanced in an earlier appeal to the Full Court in Tewao. The position here, as in Tewao, was that no such “test” was applied by the Minister. Rather, on the facts before him, the Minister concluded that, although the risk of this applicant re-offending was low, it was not in the national interest to accommodate that, or indeed any, such risk.