FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Durani v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 129
Citation: Durani v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 129 Parties: SUHAIL AHMAD KHAN DURANI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION File number: WAD 361 of 2013 Judge: GILMOUR J Date of judgment: 24 February 2014 Catchwords: MIGRATION – judicial review of Minister’s decision to cancel visa under s 501A(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether or not Minister’s decision is affected by jurisdictional error – whether or not there was a denial of procedural fairness by failure to inform the applicant of relevant considerations – legitimate expectation that Minister will treat the best interests of the child as a primary consideration - whether or not the Minister failed to give primary consideration to the best interests of the applicant’s son – whether or not the separation of a child from its parent can be in the national interest - whether or not Minister failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to critical matters – whether or not the Minister fettered the exercise of the discretion. Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476A(1)(c), 501(2), 501A(2), 501(6), (7)
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) ss 39B(1), (1A)(c)Cases cited: Durani v The State of Western Australia [2012] WASCA 172
Gbojueh v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 202 FCR 417
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550
Leiataua v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 208 FCR 448
Lesianawai v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 131 ALD 27
Madafferi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2002) 118 FCR 326
Maurangi v Bowen (2012) 200 FCR 191
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273
Nweke v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 126 ALD 501
Re Durani and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2013] AATA 273
Ruatita v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2013) 212 FCR 364
SZBEL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 228 CLR 152
Tewao v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2012) 126 ALD 185Date of hearing: 16 December 2014 Place: Perth Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 68 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Hooker Solicitor for the Applicant: Shahid Shakur Counsel for the Respondent: Mr P Macliver Solicitor for the Respondent: Sparke Helmore Lawyers
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 361 of 2013
BETWEEN: SUHAIL AHMAD KHAN DURANI
applicantAND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
GILMOUR J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 FEBRUARY 2014
WHERE MADE:
PERTH
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs to be taxed if not agreed.
Note:Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
WAD 361 of 2013
BETWEEN: SUHAIL AHMAD KHAN DURANI
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 129
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues in this case centred on the exercise of the Minister's discretion in cancelling the applicant's visa. The applicant argued that the Minister failed to give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to critical matters, such as the minimal risk of reoffending and the best interests of the applicant's son. Additionally, the applicant contended that the Minister fettered his discretion by applying a rigid policy that deemed any risk of reoffending unacceptable, thereby overriding countervailing considerations. The court had to determine whether these arguments established a basis for judicial review.
The Federal Court rejected the applicant's grounds of review. The court found that the Minister had indeed considered the risk of reoffending and the best interests of the applicant's son, concluding that any risk of reoffending was unacceptable. The court held that the Minister's reasoning did not indicate a fettered discretion or a failure to give proper consideration to the critical matters. The court determined that the Minister's decision was lawful and dismissed the application for judicial review.
The final orders of the court were that the application be dismissed and that the applicant pay the respondent's costs, to be taxed if not agreed. The dismissal of the application meant that the Minister's decision to cancel the applicant's visa was upheld. The requirement for the applicant to pay the respondent's costs underscored the court's view that the applicant's challenge to the Minister's decision was without merit.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs to be taxed if not agreed.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
This ground fails. Ground B3 – Proper, genuine and realistic consideration I reject Ground B3 for the reasons which include those set out above under Ground A2 concerning the Minister’s finding that the best interests of the applicant’s son were that the applicant’s visa not be cancelled. The particulars under Ground B3(a) are contrary to the facts. The Minister did take into account, as a fact, as I have explained above, that the risk of the applicant re-offending was low. If the point of this particular is to distinguish “minimal risk” from “low risk” then it avails the applicant nothing. Whatever the difference, if there be one in this case, the Minister concluded, as he was entitled to, that any risk of re-offending was unacceptable. The particulars under Ground B3(b) add nothing. If it matters, the conclusion of the AAT as to what was in the best interests of the applicant’s son was exactly that found by the Minister. It is not to the point to complain that the Minister arrived at this important conclusion by different means or on lesser evidence than was relied upon by the AAT. Such a proposition, even were it established, does not disclose jurisdictional error. I reject this ground. The submission that the applicant failed to give proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the applicant’s contentions in this regard, is wholly unmeritorious. It is unnecessary to consider what may have been the consequences of such a failure, such as, for example, a constructive failure to exercise jurisdiction, had I determined otherwise. This ground fails. Ground B4 – Fettering of discretion The applicant’s submission is that although the SOR did not in terms refer to the application of any "policy", the effect of the Minister’s reasoning to his conclusion at SOR [36]-[38] was to the effect that he was adopting a fixed and immutable presumption by reason of the very fact of the applicant's criminal convictions which caused the applicant's position to be beyond redemption and that strong countervailing considerations in his favour were incapable of overcoming that presumption, as was his minimal risk of reoffending. Thus, as the applicant contends, the nature of the facts detailing those considerations, and that minimal risk, were at least in terms considered, but not properly, genuinely or realistically so. It follows, the applicant submits, that the effect of the Minister's limited reasoning from which his conclusion was derived was to strip his residual discretion of any operative content and that consequently the Minister did not exercise his statutory power under s 501A(2) of the Act according to law. This ground is in substance that the Minister applied a test that where such an applicant was to be permitted to remain in Australia there must be no risk of recidivism: a test which could almost never be met. This is, in effect, a repetition of the failed argument advanced in an earlier appeal to the Full Court in Tewao. The position here, as in Tewao, was that no such “test” was applied by the Minister. Rather, on the facts before him, the Minister concluded that, although the risk of this applicant re-offending was low, it was not in the national interest to accommodate that, or indeed any, such risk.