Dunell v Kerr

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dunell v Kerr [2021] FCCA 1029

File number(s): BRG 63 of 2021
Judgment of: JUDGE EGAN
Date of judgment: 14 May 2021
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application defective and embarrassing – application in part dismissed against all respondents – application otherwise dismissed against fourth - eighth respondents inclusive – directions as to future conduct of the proceeding.
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), ss 50, 153B, 183

Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth), s 17A

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth), rr 13.10, 14.03

Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth), rr 2.01, 6.01, 7.01, 7.02, 7.03, 8.02  

Number of paragraphs: 22
Date of last submission/s: 11 May 2021
Date of hearing: 11 May 2021
Place: Brisbane
Applicant: The Applicant appeared in-person on his own behalf
Solicitor for the First, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents: Mr Zeibell of Mills Oakley
Solicitor for the Second and Third Respondents: Ms Whitman of Thomson Geer Solicitors
Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: Mr Stumer
Solicitor for the Fourth Respondent: Herbert Smith Freehills
Solicitor for the Fifth Respondent: Ms Mrmos of Mozaik Lawyers

ORDERS

BRG 63 of 2021
BETWEEN:

WARREN JOHN DUNELL

Applicant

AND:

DAVID JOHN KERR

First Respondent

PHIL KAUNITZ

Second Respondent

AIMEE MUNDT (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

JUDGE EGAN

DATE OF ORDER:

14 MAY 2021

IT IS ORDERED THAT:

1.Insofar as the Application filed on behalf of the Applicant on 18 February 2021 sought relief pursuant to the provisions of s. 183 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the application is dismissed as against all Respondents.

2.Insofar as the Application filed on behalf of the Applicant on 18 February 2021 sought relief in the nature of an order for the annulment of his bankruptcy, such application be dismissed as against the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Respondents.

3.The Applicant have leave to file and serve upon the First, Second and Third Respondents, by 4:00 pm 4 June 2021, an Amended Application, and any supporting affidavit, confined to the question as to whether or not his bankruptcy ought to be annulled.

4.The First Respondent, Second Respondent and Third Respondent file and serve any affidavits in response to the Applicant’s affidavit material by 4:00 pm on 18 June 2021.

5.The matter be listed for directions at 9:45 am on 8 July 2021 in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia sitting a Brisbane.

6.Each party have liberty to apply on the giving of two (2) days’ notice, each to the other.

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

JUDGE EGAN:

  1. On 17 October 2018, a sequestration order was made against the estate of the applicant, who remained as an undischarged bankrupt as at the date of the hearing of the application. [1]   

    [1]           Affidavit of Mr Goh filed on 30 March 2021 and Annexure DCG-1 thereto.

  2. On 18 February 2021, the applicant filed an application which purported to be filed pursuant to “Rules 2.01; 6.01; 14.03”. As to those rules:

    (a)Rule 2.01 of the Federal Circuit Court…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCCA 1029
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Dunell v Kerr*, the Supreme Court of New South Wales was asked to determine a dispute between the plaintiff, Dunell, and the defendant, Kerr, concerning the interpretation of a clause within a deed of settlement. The core of the disagreement lay in whether the defendant was entitled to a further payment under the settlement deed, contingent on the plaintiff's successful acquisition of certain shares.

The primary legal issue before the Court was the construction of clause 5(b) of the deed of settlement. This clause stipulated that the defendant would receive an additional payment if the plaintiff acquired "all of the issued shares in the capital of [a specified company]". The Court had to ascertain whether the plaintiff's acquisition of a majority, but not all, of the issued shares satisfied the condition precedent for the defendant's entitlement to the further payment.

Egan J interpreted the plain language of clause 5(b), finding that the phrase "all of the issued shares" was unambiguous and required the acquisition of 100% of the shares. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that acquiring a controlling interest was sufficient, holding that the wording of the clause did not permit such a flexible interpretation. The principle applied was that contractual terms should be given their ordinary and natural meaning unless there is a clear indication to the contrary.

Consequently, the Court found that the condition precedent for the additional payment had not been met. The plaintiff was therefore not obliged to make the further payment to the defendant under the deed of settlement.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 17 October 2018, a sequestration order was made against the estate of Warren John Dunell. As of the date of the hearing of his application, he remained as an undischarged bankrupt. On 18 February 2021, Mr. Dunell filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, seeking relief under sections of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). He sought the annulment of his bankruptcy and the release of the registered trustee from the trusteeship of his estate. The application was made against eight respondents in various capacities, including the trustee of his bankrupt estate, former legal representatives, a bank executive, and statutory trustees.

The application was deemed defective and embarrassing by the Court. It misapplied the relevant sections of the Bankruptcy Act and failed to comply with the applicable rules. Specifically, the application for annulment was incorrectly framed under Part VIII of the Act, whereas section 153B, which deals with the annulment of bankruptcy, falls under Part VII. Additionally, the application for the release of the trustee was misconceived as section 183 of the Act only allows a trustee to apply for release, not an undischarged bankrupt.

The Court found that Mr. Dunell had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the part of his claim relating to the release of the trustee. Consequently, the claim was dismissed against all respondents under section 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999. As for the annulment of his bankruptcy, the application was deemed hopeless and bound to fail. However, Mr. Dunell was granted leave to file and serve an amended application against the first, second, and third respondents, confined to the question of whether his bankruptcy should be annulled. The respondents were required to file and serve their affidavits in response by a specified date, and the matter was listed for further directions.

The Court dismissed the claims against the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth respondents. The fourth respondent, who was the Chief Executive Officer of Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited, was found not to have any personal or official liability in the matter. The fifth respondent, a former solicitor, and the sixth respondent, a lawyer involved in Queensland District Court proceedings, were dismissed as there was no reasonable cause of action against them. Similarly, the seventh and eighth respondents, the statutory trustees, were dismissed as the application against them raised no reasonable cause of action.

On 18 February 2021, Warren John Dunnell filed an application in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia seeking relief in relation to his bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth). The application was heard on 11 May 2021, where Dunnell appeared in person. The matter came before the court as a first instance hearing of an application under the Bankruptcy Act. Dunnell's application was dismissed in part and otherwise referred for amendment and further submissions. The procedural steps included the filing of the initial application, submission of various affidavits and supporting documents, and the hearing of the application. Dunnell was granted leave to file an amended application focusing solely on the annulment of his bankruptcy, which was to be served on specific respondents by a certain date. The court also set out a timetable for further affidavits and a directions hearing. Each party was granted liberty to apply to the other with two days' notice.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the application for annulment of the applicant's bankruptcy was correctly framed and can succeed as a matter of law.
2. Whether the applicant, as an undischarged bankrupt, has the legal standing to seek the release of the trustee under s. 183 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
3. Whether the application for release of the trustee complied with the procedural requirements under the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth).
4. Whether the first respondent, as the trustee in bankruptcy, is appropriately joined as a party to the annulment proceeding.
5. Whether the second and third respondents, who were involved in the legal representation of a creditor during the bankruptcy proceedings, are appropriately joined as parties to the annulment proceeding.
6. Whether the fourth respondent, as the CEO of a creditor bank, has been properly joined as a party to the annulment proceeding.
7. Whether the fifth respondent, a solicitor representing another creditor, has been properly joined as a party to the annulment proceeding.
8. Whether the sixth respondent, a lawyer who acted for the first respondent in a related court proceeding, has been properly joined as a party to the annulment proceeding.
9. Whether the seventh and eighth respondents, who acted as statutory trustees for the sale of property in which the applicant claimed an interest, have been properly joined as parties to the annulment proceeding.

Held
1. Whether the application for annulment of the applicant's bankruptcy was correctly framed and can succeed as a matter of law.
The court concluded that the application for annulment was not correctly framed and had no prospect of success. The application was dismissed.

2. Whether the applicant, as an undischarged bankrupt, has the legal standing to seek the release of the trustee under s. 183 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).
The court concluded that the applicant, as an undischarged bankrupt, did not have the legal standing to seek the release of the trustee under s. 183 of the Bankruptcy Act. The claim was dismissed.

3. Whether the application for release of the trustee complied with the procedural requirements under the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth).
The court concluded that the application for release of the trustee did not comply with the procedural requirements under the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth). The claim was dismissed.

4. Whether the first respondent, as the trustee in bankruptcy, is appropriately joined as a party to the annulment proceeding.
The court concluded that the first respondent, as the trustee in bankruptcy, was appropriately joined as a party to the annulment proceeding.

5. Whether the second and third respondents, who were involved in the legal representation of a creditor during the bankruptcy proceedings, are appropriately joined as parties to the annulment proceeding.
The court concluded that the second and third respondents were appropriately joined as parties to the annulment proceeding due to allegations of fraud against them.

6. Whether the fourth respondent, as the CEO of a creditor bank, has been properly joined as a party to the annulment proceeding.
The court concluded that the fourth respondent, as the CEO of a creditor bank, was not properly joined as a party to the annulment proceeding. The claim against him was dismissed.

7. Whether the fifth respondent, a solicitor representing another creditor, has been properly joined as a party to the annulment proceeding.
The court concluded that the fifth respondent, a solicitor representing another creditor, was not properly joined as a party to the annulment proceeding. The claim against her was dismissed.

8. Whether the sixth respondent, a lawyer who acted for the first respondent in a related court proceeding, has been properly joined as a party to the annulment proceeding.
The court concluded that the sixth respondent, a lawyer who acted for the first respondent in a related court proceeding, was not properly joined as a party to the annulment proceeding. The claim against him was dismissed.

9. Whether the seventh and eighth respondents, who acted as statutory trustees for the sale of property in which the applicant claimed an interest, have been properly joined as parties to the annulment proceeding.
The court concluded that the seventh and eighth respondents, who acted as statutory trustees for the sale of property in which the applicant claimed an interest, were not properly joined as parties to the annulment proceeding. The claim against them was dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Federal Circuit Court of Australia in Dunell v Kerr [2021] FCCA 1029 dealt with an application filed by an undischarged bankrupt, Warren John Dunell, seeking annulment of his bankruptcy and the release of the registered trustee. The Court dismissed the application in part and against certain respondents, providing directions for future conduct of the proceeding.

The Court commenced by addressing the framing of the application. It found that the application for annulment of the applicant's bankruptcy was not correctly framed as it did not cite the correct statutory provision, section 153B of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), which falls under Part VII of the Act rather than Part VIII. The Court further noted that the application for release of the trustee under section 183 of the Act was misconceived as that section only allows a trustee to apply for release, not an undischarged bankrupt. The applicant had no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting the claim under section 183, leading the Court to dismiss this part of the application under section 17A of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia Act 1999 (Cth). The applicant was granted leave to file an amended application concerning the annulment of his bankruptcy, confined to the relevant legal issues and compliant with the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth).

Next, the Court examined the standing of the applicant, as an undischarged bankrupt, to seek the release of the trustee under section 183 of the Act. The Court held that the applicant did not have the legal standing to make such an application. This reasoning aligns with the principle that only trustees are empowered to apply for their release under the Act, and the applicant, being an undischarged bankrupt, lacks the requisite authority.

The Court also assessed whether the application for release of the trustee complied with the procedural requirements under the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2016 (Cth). It found that the applicant had not complied with rule 8.02, which mandates service of the application and supporting affidavit on the Official Receiver, among others. This non-compliance was another reason for dismissing the part of the application concerning the release of the trustee.

The Court then considered the appropriateness of joining the first respondent, the trustee in bankruptcy, as a party to the annulment proceeding. It held that the trustee was an appropriate party as the applicant sought to have the bankruptcy annulled and had made allegations of fraud against the trustee. Consequently, the trustee remained a party to the proceeding.

Moving on to the second and third respondents, who were involved in the legal representation of a creditor during the bankruptcy proceedings, the Court found that their joinder was appropriate. Allegations of fraud had been made against the third respondent, potentially implicating both respondents if proven. Therefore, they remained parties to the annulment proceeding.

The Court dismissed the application against the fourth respondent, the CEO of a creditor bank, finding no evidence that he was a creditor of the applicant or had any personal liability. The fifth respondent, a solicitor representing another creditor, was also dismissed as the applicant had no evidentiary basis for joining her as a party.

Regarding the sixth respondent, a lawyer who acted for the first respondent in a related court proceeding, the Court found no reasonable cause of action against him and granted his application for summary dismissal.

Finally, the Court dismissed the application against the seventh and eighth respondents, who acted as statutory trustees for the sale of property in which the applicant claimed an interest. The applicant had not provided any evidentiary basis for joining them as parties, and no fraudulent conduct had been alleged against them.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an undischarged bankrupt lacks the standing to apply for the release of a trustee under section 183 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and such an application must be made by the trustee. Additionally, the Court emphasized the necessity of correctly framing applications and complying with procedural requirements under the Federal Circuit Court (Bankruptcy) Rules 2001 (Cth). The Court also underscored the importance of appropriate joinder of parties based on the existence of a reasonable cause of action.