FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
INDUSTRIAL LAW - Award - Interpretation - Provision concerning meal breaks - Claim for wages in lieu of meal breaks - Entitlement to an “unpaid lunch break” dependent on whether relevant employees were employed in “non-continuous shift work” - Respondents were employed as boiler attendants on 12 hour shifts that operated continuously for 120 hours each week - Possible application of definition of “continuous work” to bring them within concept of “non-continuous shift work”.
Workplace Relations Act 1996 (formerly Industrial Relations Act 1988) ss 179 and 412.
Timber Industry Consolidated Award 1990, cl 30.
DUNCANS HOLDINGS LIMITED v DESMOND KEITH CROSS, KEVIN CHARLES TYLER and MICHAEL ANTHONY McLEOD
NI1113 OF 1997
JUDGE: WILCOX J
PLACE: SYDNEY
DATE: 22 OCTOBER 1997
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NI1113 of 1997
BETWEEN:
DUNCANS HOLDINGS LIMITED
AppellantAND:
DESMOND KEITH CROSS
First RespondentKEVIN CHARLES TYLER
Second RespondentMICHAEL ANTHONY MCLEOD
Third RespondentJUDGE:
WILCOX J
DATE OF ORDER:
22 OCTOBER 1997
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
The appeal be allowed.
The orders made by the Local Court at Murwillumbah in favour of each of the respondents, Desmond Keith Cross, Kevin Charles Tyler and Michael Anthony McLeod, be set aside and, in lieu thereof, it be ordered that the Complaint and Summons of each of the said respondents be dismissed.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
NI1113 of 1997
BETWEEN:
DUNCANS HOLDINGS LIMITED
ApplicantAND:
DESMOND KEITH CROSS
First RespondentKEVIN CHARLES TYLER
Second RespondentMICHAEL ANTHONY MCLEOD
Third Respondent
JUDGE:
WILCOX J
DATE:
22 OCTOBER 1997
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
WILCOX J: This appeal raises issues of construction of an award, the Timber Industry Consolidated Award 1990, made by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission under the Industrial Relations Act 1988 (“the Act”). The appellant, Duncans Holdings Limited (“Duncans”) is a party to that award and the operator of a timber mill at which it employed the three respondents, Desmond Keith Cross, Kevin Charles Tyler and Michael Anthony McLeod. The three men worked at various times as boiler attendants, tending a boiler operated continuously over five days per week. Their working weeks comprised five twelve hour shifts. They were paid the wages prescribed by the award but not allowed a one hour “lunch break”, as provided by cl 30(h)(i) of the award, or paid wages in lieu of that break.
Each of the respondents laid a complaint in the Local Court at Murwillumbah against Duncans, pursuant to s 179 of the Act. They alleged the company’s failure to provide a lunch break constituted a breach of the award and sought payment for the time not granted.
At the magistrate’s hearing there was no dispute about the facts. The only question was whether or not cl 30(h)(i) applied to the case. If the paragraph did apply, it was agreed the…
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- Case
- [1997] FCA 1090
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the argument of the respondents was not correct. A legislative definition should be applied directly to a substantive provision only where the substantive provision uses the very words that are the subject of the definition. The definition of “continuous work” was designed to address the situation where work is planned to extend over the whole of, at least, six days; that is, at least 144 hours. As the evidence in the present case did not contain the whole of the award, the court was unable to determine exhaustively the use of the defined term “continuous work”. However, the court noted that extra benefits were given to employees “on continuous work”. The court also held that policy reasons supported the view that the work done by the present respondents fell within clause 30(h)(ii) rather than clause 30(h)(i). Where clause 30(h)(i) applied, the employee was entitled to a one-hour, unpaid “lunch break”. Where clause 30(h)(ii) applied, a one-hour meal break was not provided, merely a twenty-minute crib break. It would be incongruous to allow a one-hour unpaid lunch break to an attendant who was required constantly to monitor a boiler.
The court held that the appeal should be allowed, the orders made by the Local Court in relation to each of the respondents should be set aside, and in lieu thereof, it be ordered that each Complaint and Summons be dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case began when the respondents filed complaints against Duncans Holdings in the Local Court at Murwillumbah, claiming breach of the Timber Industry Consolidated Award 1990 and seeking compensation for the unpaid lunch breaks. The Local Court magistrate ruled in favor of the respondents, ordering Duncans Holdings to pay compensation. Dissatisfied with the ruling, Duncans Holdings filed an appeal to the Industrial Relations Court of Australia under section 412 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996. Following the transfer of jurisdiction from the Industrial Relations Court to the Federal Court of Australia on 25 May 1997, the appeal was heard by the Federal Court.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether clause 30(h)(i) of the Timber Industry Consolidated Award 1990 applies to the respondents' employment as boiler attendants.
2. If clause 30(h)(i) applies, whether the respondents are entitled to an unpaid lunch break or wages in lieu of such a break.
3. Whether the definition of "continuous work" in clause 30(b)(iv) of the award affects the applicability of clause 30(h)(i).
Held
1. Clause 30(h)(i) of the Timber Industry Consolidated Award 1990 does not apply to the respondents' employment as boiler attendants.
2. As clause 30(h)(i) does not apply, the respondents are not entitled to an unpaid lunch break or wages in lieu of such a break.
3. The definition of "continuous work" in clause 30(b)(iv) of the award does not affect the applicability of clause 30(h)(i).
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the award's provisions to determine whether the respondents' work constituted "non-continuous shift work" under clause 30(h)(i). The court found that the respondents' work involved continuous shifts over 120 hours per week, which did not fit the ordinary use of language for "non-continuous shift work." The definition of "continuous work" in clause 30(b)(iv) was considered irrelevant to the applicability of clause 30(h)(i). The court reasoned that the term "continuous work" in the award was intended to cover situations where work extends over at least six consecutive days, which was not the case here. The court also noted policy reasons supporting the view that the respondents' work fell within clause 30(h)(ii), which provides for a paid crib break rather than an unpaid lunch break. Therefore, the court concluded that the respondents were not entitled to an unpaid lunch break or wages in lieu of such a break, and dismissed their complaints. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that the definition of "continuous work" in an award should not be applied automatically to other provisions without careful consideration of the substantive provisions and their intended purpose.