FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DuluxGroup (Australia) Pty Ltd v Hado (No 3) [2021] FCCA 59
File number(s): BRG 14 of 2020 Judgment of: JUDGE JARRETT Date of judgment: 19 January 2021 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – proceedings in connection with sequestration – petition and sequestration order – hearing of creditor's petition and form of sequestration order – going behind judgment – particular cases. Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 52(2) Cases cited: Number of paragraphs: 66 Date of last submission/s: 10 August 2020 Date of hearing: 10 August 2020 Place: Brisbane Solicitor for the Applicant: Rostron Carlyle Rojas Lawyers Counsel for the Respondent: Ms Carruthers Solicitor for the Respondent: Joseph Burke Law Pty Ltd ORDERS
BRG 14 of 2020 BETWEEN: DULUXGROUP (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD
Applicant
AND: GEORGE MATTE HADO
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE JARRETT
DATE OF ORDER:
19 JANUARY 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The orders made on 20 February, 2020 be set aside;
2.The creditor’s petition filed on 10 January, 2020 be dismissed.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE JARRETT
On 20 February, 2020 a Registrar of this Court made a sequestration order against the estate of Mr Hado. The order was entered on 20 February, 2020 but amended on 21 February, 2020 to record the correct date of the act of bankruptcy committed by Mr Hado.
On 24 March, 2020 Mr Hado applied to review the Registrar’s decision. The petitioning creditor opposes the application. The application initially came before me on 9 April, 2020. On 7 May, 2020 I delivered reasons granting Mr Hado an extension of time within which to apply for a review of the sequestration order against him. I made some directions for the parties to file further material in support of their respective cases in the event that they wished to do so: DuluxGroup (Australia) Pty Ltd v Hado [2020] FCCA 1077.
Both parties filed further material. Mr Hado filed three further affidavits, one on 18 May, 2020, another on 29 May, 2020 and a final affidavit on 1 June, 2020. The petitioning creditor filed the necessary statutory affidavits and an answering affidavit to Mr Hado’s claims. Mr Hado argued that there is in truth no debt sufficient to support the making of a sequestration order owing by him to the petitioning creditor. He invited the Court to go behind the judgment debt upon which the sequestration order is based (a default judgment given in the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Moorabbin) and reach that conclusion.
For the reasons I delivered on 10 July, 2020 (DuluxGroup (Australia) Pty Ltd v Hado [2020] FCCA 1887), I determined to exercise the Court’s discretion to go behind the judgment upon which the bankruptcy notice relied upon by the petitioning creditor was based. I considered it appropriate to go behind the judgment because the judgment was a default judgment given in the absence of an appearance and defence by…
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- Case
- [2021] FCCA 59
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether Mr. Hado had committed an act of bankruptcy by failing to comply with a bankruptcy notice, thereby justifying the making of a sequestration order. This required the Court to determine the validity of the underlying debt upon which the bankruptcy notice was founded, particularly in light of Mr. Hado's assertion that he never ordered or received the goods. The Court also considered whether Mr. Hado had presented sufficient evidence of solvency to resist the petition.
Judge Jarrett found that while a credit agreement and a guarantee and indemnity were executed by Mr. Hado, the evidence did not establish that he personally ordered or collected the goods for which DuluxGroup claimed payment. The Court accepted Mr. Hado's evidence that he had never attended the relevant store and found that the documentation produced by DuluxGroup did not demonstrate his liability for the goods. Crucially, the Court found no evidence of actual, ostensible, or implied authority for Mr. Lumani, who appeared to have collected the goods, to act as Mr. Hado's agent in ordering them. Consequently, the Court was not satisfied that the debt claimed by DuluxGroup was properly established against Mr. Hado.
Accordingly, the Court ordered that the sequestration order made on 20 February 2020 be set aside and that the creditor's petition filed on 10 January 2020 be dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The orders made on 20 February, 2020 be set aside;
2. The creditor’s petition filed on 10 January, 2020 be dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The petitioning creditor then submits that given that the only amount paid by Mr Hado is $825, he cannot establish solvency because the amount owed to the petitioning creditor and claimed by it (less $825) remains. The petitioning creditor points out that there is no proper evidence of value of Mr Hado’s assets so as to establish solvency. There is no evidence of the actual mortgage via a bank statement and so the evidence of solvency is insufficient. Nor is there an assertion that he is trying to realise the alleged equity in this house by an impending sale or refinance of that property, so the court cannot find that he could use this property to pay the debt owed. He does not give any evidence of any cash at bank that would be sufficient to pay any amount owed to the applicant.CONSIDERATION I am satisfied that there was a credit agreement entered into between the petitioning creditor and Mr Hado on Mr Hado’s application in August, 2018. He also entered into a guarantee and indemnity notwithstanding that Mr Hado was a sole trader. His signature on the guarantee and indemnity was witnessed by Mr Lumani. I have not accepted Mr Flannery’s evidence that he was familiar with Mr Hado or that he saw Mr Hado in the Keilor Park store at any time. I have accepted Mr Hado’s evidence that he has never attended the Keilor Park store. I accept Mr Hado’s evidence that he did not order the goods the subject of each of the invoices (save for the Exsulite training). None of the documents produced by the petitioning creditor demonstrate that Mr Hado ordered or collected those goods. Those documents tend to suggest that others, but particularly Mr Lumani may have done so. Mr Lumani was not an authorised person to operate the account having regard to the terms of it. There is no evidence before me that Mr Lumani was given any actual authority to operate that account. Indeed, that proposition was not put to Mr Hado in cross examination. It was never suggested to him that Mr Lumani was acting as his agent for the purposes of ordering products from the petitioning creditor. Moreover, the evidence is entirely insufficient to establish a case of ostensible or implied authority on the part of Mr Lumani. Even if he had been seen in the company of Mr Hado from time to time, there is no evidence to suggest that the person that served Mr Lumani on the occasions giving rise to the relevant invoices knew of any association between Mr Lumani and Mr Hado. There is no evidence from any person who was responsible for taking the orders from Mr Lumani at the time they were placed by him about what was said or observed at that time. Those matters would be critical to a proper determination about any liability on the part of Mr Hado for any goods ordered and taken by Mr Lumani. There is no evidence that at the relevant times Mr Hado associated himself in any way with Mr Lumani so as to clothe Mr Lumani with ostensible authority to transact on his account. There is no evidence for example that he was in fact wearing a shirt that was emblazoned with Mr Hado’s business logo. But even if there was, that of itself would be insufficient to establish ostensible authority in my view. The argument is like suggesting that a person ordering goods and wearing a T-shirt with the brand on was acting with the ostensible authority of the brand owner. There is no evidence to suggest that those serving Mr Lumani had ever seen him in the company of Mr Hado.