Dugan v Pitcher [No 2]
[2023] WADC 6
•1 FEBRUARY 2023
JURISDICTION : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CHAMBERS
LOCATION: PERTH
CITATION: DUGAN -v- PITCHER [No 2] [2023] WADC 6
CORAM: STAVRIANOU DCJ
HEARD: 25 JANUARY 2023
DELIVERED : 1 FEBRUARY 2023
FILE NO/S: CIV 2394 of 2019
BETWEEN: BRIANNA ANN DUGAN
Plaintiff
AND
JAMIE-LEE CHARLOTTE PITCHER
Defendant
Catchwords:
Review of Taxation - Order 66 r 53, O 66 r 54, O 66 r 55 Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) - Review of taxation by judge - Whether error in principle by taxing officer
Legislation:
Legal Profession (Supreme and District Courts) (Contentious Business) Determination 2020
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 66 r 42, O 66 r 53, O 66 r 54, O 66 r 55
Result:
Application allowed in part
Representation:
Counsel:
| Plaintiff | : | Ms A L Pascoe |
| Defendant | : | Mr D P Coster |
Solicitors:
| Plaintiff | : | Vertannes Georgiou Lawyers (Perth) |
| Defendant | : | Moray & Agnew Lawyers |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223
Australian Coal & Shale Employees' Federation v The Commonwealth [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621
Bray v Ryan [1999] WADC 66
Dugan v Pitcher [2021] WADC 106 (S)
Larussa v Carr [2019] WASCA 34
Mossensons (a firm) v Coast Line Associates (Unreported, WASC, Library No 970661, 2 December 1997)
Parramatta City Council v Pestell [1972] HCA 59; (1972) 128 CLR 305
Schweppes' Ltd v Archer [1934] NSWStRp 17; (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178
W J Green & Co (1984) Pty Ltd v Tace Pty Ltd [No 4] [2010] WASC 363
STAVRIANOU DCJ:
Introduction
In this action the plaintiff claimed damages for personal injury arising out of a motor vehicle crash. The defendant admitted liability and the only issue at trial was the assessment of damages.
On 4 November 2021, the plaintiff obtained judgment after trial together with an order for costs to be taxed.
The taxation took place before a deputy registrar acting as a taxing officer. Prior to the signing of the certificate of taxation the defendant filed objections, which were ultimately disallowed: Dugan v Pitcher [2021] WADC 106 (S).
The defendant has now applied for a review of certain items in the taxed bill of costs pursuant to Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) (RSC) O 66 r 55.
Overview of proceedings
On 12 January 2022, the plaintiff filed a bill of costs for taxation claiming $114,940.92.
On 18 February 2022 and 16 March 2022, the defendant delivered written submissions outlining her response to the items claimed in the bill.
On 30 March 2022, the bill was taxed in the sum of $107,016.84. An order was made that any objections be filed by 7 April 2022.
On 4 April 2022, the defendant filed objections to the allowance of several items in the bill namely:
• Copying;
• Preparation of case;
• Counsel preparation for and attendance at pre-trial conference;
• Counsel preparation for and attendance at listing conference;
• Counsel preparation and attendance at trial (Day 1); and
• Counsel Fee (Day 2 and Day 3).
On 11 April 2022, the plaintiff filed a response to the objections.
On 19 September 2022, the taxing officer delivered written reasons (the reasons) in which he determined that he had made no error in principle and that the objections were not sufficient to establish jurisdiction to review the taxation.
On 10 October 2022, the certificate of taxation was signed.
Taxation, objection and review of costs - statutory framework and principles
Order 66 r 42 RSC requires a bill of costs for taxation to be prepared to clearly show the various items for which costs are claimed, together with a reference to the item in the scale to which the item in the bill relates, the dates of the items and, where necessary, particulars of the services charged for, disbursements, and professional charges.
The process of taxation essentially involves the consideration of three matters. First, the identification of what services were necessary in the particular case. Secondly, an objective assessment being made as to what a reasonable allowance for such services would be by application of the Rules, the appropriate determination and the underlying principles. Thirdly, a measurement of the amount actually claimed in the bill for the services against the objective assessment in order to determine whether or not the amount claimed is reasonable and what adjustment, if any, should be made: Bray v Ryan [1999] WADC 66 [35] - [37].
The taxation of the bill was conducted by reference to the costs allowed under the Legal Profession (Supreme and District Courts) (Contentious Business) Determination 2020 (WA) (determination).
Order 66 r 53, r 54 and r 55 RSC permit a party dissatisfied with the taxation of a bill of costs to object and apply for a review, and then to seek a review of the taxation by the taxing officer, and thereafter to seek a review of the taxation by a judge.
Order 66 r 53 RSC reads:
Party dissatisfied with taxation may object and apply for review
(1)A party who contends that the taxing officer has made an error in principle in allowing or disallowing any item or part of an item in a bill of costs taxed by him may, at any time before a certificate of taxation dealing finally with that item is signed, or at such earlier time as may, in any case, be fixed by the taxing officer -
(a)deliver to the other party interested in the allowance or disallowance and carry in before the taxing officer, an objection in writing to the allowance or disallowance specifying in the objection by a list, in a short and concise form, the items or parts of items objected to, and the grounds and reasons for the objections; and
(b)thereupon apply to the taxing officer to review the taxation in respect of those items or parts.
Order 66 r 54 RSC reads:
Review of taxation by taxing officer
(1)Upon an application under r 53 to review the taxation, the taxing officer shall reconsider and review his taxation in relation to the objections, and he may, if he thinks fit, receive further evidence in respect of the objections.
(2)If so required by a party, the taxing officer shall state in his certificate of taxation or by reference to the objection, the ground and reason of his decision on the objection, and any special facts or circumstances relating to his decision.
Order 66 r 55 RSC reads:
Review of taxation by judge
(1)If a party is dissatisfied with the certificate of the taxing officer as to any item or part of an item objected to under r 53 of this Order, he may, within 14 days from the date of the certificate, or such other time as the Court, or the taxing officer at the time he signs his certificate, allows, apply to a judge in chambers for an order to review the taxation as to that item or part of an item.
(2)The judge, if of opinion that the taxing officer has made an error in principle, may thereupon make such order to rectify the error as the judge thinks just.
Order 66 r 55 RSC requires the demonstration of an error in principle. The review is not a hearing de novo and is directed at ascertaining whether or not the already reconsidered decision of the taxing officer contained an error of principle. The review is no occasion for new points of challenge to emerge, or for issues not raised to the taxing officer, or for points inadequately argued before the taxing officer to be re‑ventilated afresh: W J Green & Co (1984) Pty Ltd v Tace Pty Ltd[No 4] [2010] WASC 363 [23].
An error in principle will only occur where the taxing officer acts upon a wrong principle, gives weight to extraneous or irrelevant matters, fails to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations, or makes a mistake as to facts: Australian Coal & Shale Employees' Federation v The Commonwealth [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621, 627.
Errors in principle may be made both in determining whether an item should be allowed and in determining how much should be allowed: Schweppes' Ltd v Archer [1934] NSWStRp 17; (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178, 183; Australian Coal & Shale Employees' Federation v Commonwealth (628).
Although it is possible for an error in principle to be made regarding the quantum allowed in respect of a particular item, that is generally regarded as unusual. An error in principle on that basis could only be established if it is shown that no taxing officer acting reasonably could ever have taxed the particular item in the amount in question: Mossensons (a firm) v Coast Line Associates (Unreported, WASC, Library No 970661, 2 December 1997) 9 - 10; Larussa v Carr [2019] WASCA 34 [39]; Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1947] EWCA Civ 1; [1948] 1 KB 223, 229; Parramatta City Council v Pestell [1972] HCA 59; (1972) 128 CLR 305.
The taxation
Prior to the taxation, the defendant filed an outline of submissions dated 18 February 2022. In par 4 of those submissions it was observed, in relation to the claim made for preparation of case, that 'no breakdown has been provided identifying the work that was performed and who it was performed by'. On 21 February 2022, the plaintiff delivered a six‑page document entitled 'Getting Up Schedule' (plaintiff's schedule).
The claim for each item and the allowance made was:
Bill Item No
Date
Description
Scale Item
Amount
Taxed Off
21
Various
Copying 2,973 pages at $0.165 per page
[See Annexure 'A']33
$490.54
$0
22
Various
Copying of documents for experts (Dr Hee 45, Dr Overmeire 48, - total 93 pages @ $0.165
33
$15.34
$0
23
Various
Copying documents for Counsel's brief for a pre-trial conference (1 volume), 324 pages at $0.165
33
$53.46
$0
24
Various
Copies of documents for Counsel's Trial Brief and copy for instructing solicitor at trial (3 Volumes x 2), 997 x 2 = 1,994 pages at $0.165 per page
33
$320.01
$0
25
Various
Copies of transcript for Counsel's Brief and instructing solicitor at trial (179 x 2) - total 358 pages at $0.165 per page
33
$59.07
$0
26
Various
Preparation of case for trial including work reasonably and necessary undertaken prior to commencement of proceeding
19
$49,500.00
$0
29
21.09.20
Preparation and attendance at a pre-trial conference
27(c) and (d)
$4,510
$0
30
12.10.20
Preparation and attendance at listing conference
27(c) and (d)
$1,353
$0
32
27.07.21
Counsel fee on brief, first day of trial and preparation including opening submissions
22(a)
$20,295.00
$2,295
33
28.07.21
Counsel fee, second day of trial
22(c)
E$2,255.00
$0
34
29.07.21
Counsel fee, third day of trial
22(c)
E$2,225.00
$0
The reasons
The reasons contain the following uncontroversial statements:
1.The plaintiff obtained an order for costs by which she is entitled to recover the reasonable cost of services necessarily provided to her for the purposes of the action.
…
35.Recovery under an order for costs is had in accordance with the entitlement established by common law. In the case of the usual order for costs, for the purpose of considering what is reasonable for the cost of provision of a service or any particular part of a service, the relevant standard is established by reference to it being efficiently provided by a competent practitioner. In applying that standard, the focus is properly upon an objective evaluation of value of the task undertaken. It would be established by more than the passage of time taken by a practitioner to deliver a service or part of a service in the manner adopted by that practitioner.
These paragraphs are identified as it is accepted that they represent orthodox statements of principle to be applied upon a taxation of costs.
The items and consideration of alleged errors in principle
Items 21 25 - copies-
The plaintiff's claim for copying of $938.42 was allowed without deduction. A schedule of the copies made was provided to the taxing officer by the plaintiff.
The defendant makes two primary submissions. First, that there has been a reversal of the onus of proof and, secondly, that the taxing officer erred in failing to take account of and assess the existence of multiple copies.
There is no basis for the submission as to the reversal of the burden. The plaintiff presented a schedule which was extremely detailed. Explanations were provided by the plaintiff as to the multiple copies and the taxing officer then assessed the reasonableness of the claim.
The taxing officer applied the appropriate rate ($0.165 per page) to the number of copies he found to be reasonable and necessary. There has been no demonstrated error in principle.
I am far from satisfied that no taxing officer, acting reasonably, could ever have taxed the particular item in the amount in question.
No error of principle has been established.
Items 26 - Preparation of case
The plaintiff's schedule identified 112.5 hours worked and a total sum for the work done of $55,687.50 (calculated at the rate of $495 per hour). Notwithstanding the schedule the plaintiff claimed $49,500 which was allowed by the taxing officer. The plaintiff's position upon the taxation and the review hearing was that all work particularised in the plaintiff's schedule was done by a senior practitioner.
The defendant submitted in relation to the plaintiff's schedule that:
•It included a not insignificant amount of work not captured under Item 19 and/or, more appropriately, administrative (non‑billable) work, and/or work that ought to have been allowed at a lower rate.
•The plaintiff claimed at the senior practitioner rate, and was evidently allowed:
Costs for travelling to the District Court to copy subpoenaed documents, collating medical evidence, and collating and delivering a brief to Counsel.
Attendance at the Court to copy subpoenaed documents.
Collating and delivering briefs to Counsel.
Filing documents with the Court.
Organising a video-link and booking witnesses to give evidence at trial.
The defendant submits that the taxing officer has erred in principle in his assessment of this item by:
•misstating the test of recovery; and
•making an error as to quantum.
Item 19 of the determination provides:
Item Time Fee Earner $ 19
Preparation for Trial
120 hours
SP
59,400
The reference in the determination to 'SP' is a reference to a Senior Practitioner who, pursuant to the determination, is able to charge at the rate of $495 per hour.
The taxing officer noted that the plaintiff's schedule provided specified parts of the service constituted by the item and that it recorded in relation to each item the time taken. The taxing officer noted that the item in the determination is not expressed to be available on the basis of time costing.
The defendant's objection notes in relation to the plaintiff's schedule:
17.1A claim for perusing documents discovered by the Defendant, which more properly ought to be claimed under Scale Item 8 (and it is noted the Plaintiff has made a separate claim for this).
17.2A claim for perusing a list of documents, again more properly claimed under Scale Item 8.
17.3A claim for collating medical evidence, more properly a task for an administrative assistant, or at the very least Clerk/Paralegal.
17.4A claim for travelling to the District Court to copy subpoenaed documents. Again more properly a task for an administrative assistant, or at the very least a Clerk/Paralegal.
17.5A claim for collating and delivering a brief to Counsel for the pre‑trial conference. Again more properly a task for an administrative assistant, or at the very least a Clerk/Paralegal.
17.6A claim for collating and delivering a brief to Counsel for the trial. Again more properly a task for an administrative assistant, or at the very least a Clerk/Paralegal.
17.7A claim of $2,029.50 for a Senior Practitioner organising a video‑link and booking witnesses to give evidence at trial. It is submitted that a Clerk/Paralegal or a Junior Practitioner rate ought reasonably be allowed for such work.
17.8A claim for a Senior Practitioner e-lodging documents with the Court. It is submitted that this is a task for an administrative assistant.
The defendant's principal contention is that, whilst work may have been done by a senior practitioner, it was not work which would justify a senior practitioner's charge rate. In his reasons the taxing officer notes:
51.I accept that the defendant may have a view or opinion as to how provision of a service or part of a service by the plaintiff's solicitor would properly be undertaken. Holding such a view or opinion does not establish that a different view held by the plaintiff's solicitor would render provision of a service or part of a service in accordance with the practitioner's view as other than proper. The test of recovery for the value of a service found to have been necessarily provided is what is reasonable. The reason that reference to the proper provision of a service does not appear to be misplaced in the context of taxation is that whether a service had properly been provided is the alternative test of recovery for an item that applies in the context of taxation under a retainer. The test applies to recovery for the provision of a service or part of a service, not to the manner of its provision. The test does not apply in the context presented under an order for costs.
52.By her claim the plaintiff sought to recover the cost of provision of the relevant service. Where a service or part of a service has been provided by a solicitor there is no reason to consider that a beneficial party would justify such provision.
53.It may be that by subpars 17.3 to 17.8 the defendant raises what she considers to be valid points by which she would project efficiency in the provision of a service or part of a service by the generation of comparatively less cost.
54.Provision of a service or part of a service by delegation would engage not only a process of instruction but also some level of supervision and review of the task performed in accordance with the standard of care and degree of responsibility that the practitioner considered appropriate. Each of those features of the process and the impact they may have on a relevant claim would provide scope for development of submissions by each party in the course of taxation. The fundamental consideration is that the context in which the standard was generated and that to which it applies is professional practice.
55.Unlike the issues raised by subpars 14.3 to 14.7 and subpars 17.1 and 17.2, the contentions of the defendant put by subpars 17.3 to 17.8 would not bear upon the allowance of the parts of the item to which they relate. They could only have a bearing upon the process of assessing quantum and thereby engage the test of reasonableness in assessing quantum.
56.Read within the context provided by r 42 and the scale, r 53(1) does not provide jurisdiction to review a quantum determination. In Mossensons (a firm) v Coastline Associates (Unreported, WASC Library No 970661, 2 December 1997), the majority considered that an error sufficient to establish review of a quantum determination would be expressed along the lines that no taxing officer acting reasonably could ever have so determined. By subpars 17.3 to 17.8 the defendant does not so contend.
57.I would add that in that case the interpretation of r 53(1) had not been before the court.
58.The content of each of subpars 17.3 to 17.8 is at best submission. Paragraphs 17.3 to 17.8 are insufficient to found jurisdiction to review.
The taxing officer goes on to note that the matter proceeded to trial. In the reasons it is further noted that the test for recovery for the value of the service found to be necessarily provided is what is reasonable.
Paragraph 4 of the defendant's objections identify specifically an error in principle being constituted by showing 'that no taxing officer, acting reasonably, could ever have taxed the particular item for the amount in question.' The objection to the preparation for case allowance refers to errors in principle being made by the taxing officer. In the circumstances the issue as to quantum was raised by the objection. Accordingly the taxing officer erred in the finding (pars 56 ‑ 58 of reasons, see [40] above) that the defendant's objection did not raise the issue.
The taxing officer erred in his assessment of quantum. The reasons do not disclose that the taxing officer considered the nature of the work done and the reasonableness of the rate charged for the work done. It was necessary to determine not only that it was reasonably necessary for the work to be done but also that the amount charged for the particular work was reasonable. This necessarily would involve a consideration as to whether the work should reasonably and properly have been carried out by a senior practitioner. The taxing officer failed to approach the taxation of this particular item on that basis. In my view in failing to do so the taxing officer erred in principle in his approach to the assessment of the allowance for preparation for trial.
Item 29 - counsel preparation for and attendance at pre-trial conference
The taxing officer allowed the claimed sum of $4,510 (10 hours at $451 per hour) for counsel preparing for and attending the pre-trial conference on 21 August 2020.
It was accepted at the taxation that the duration of the pre-trial conference took approximately one hour, leaving nine hours for preparation.
The defendant now submits that:
44.The Taxing Officer erred in failing to have regard to (and to apply) the authorities presented to him, or alternatively erred in failing to afford the Defendant adequate opportunity to be heard by peremptorily dismissing the objection.
45.The Taxing Officer further erred in failing to apply the 'necessary and reasonable' test to the claim for Counsel's fees.
46.The Taxing Officer erred in allowing the entirety of the claims for Counsel's fees in the circumstances.
In his reasons for decision, the taxing officer has correctly identified that the relevant Items (27(c) and 27(d)) provide for calculation of an allowance to be based on time spent. It was not the defendant's case that counsel had not been engaged for 10 hours. That is the proper context in which the observation made in the reasons that the 'defendant does not contend that any part of the period of 10 hours for which the claim is made should be disallowed' is to be understood.
What the defendant did submit was that no taxing officer, acting reasonably, would have allowed the claim in the sum of $4,510. Accordingly, there was an error of principle. In the defendant's submissions, reference was made to the level of complexity of the matter, in that it was straightforward and relatively simple.
I do not accept the defendant's submission. The defence raised issues of causation, loss of earning capacity, failure to mitigate loss and pre‑existing conditions. The brief delivered to counsel for the pre‑trial conference comprised 324 pages.
In relation to this item, I am not satisfied that there has been any error of principle made by the taxing officer. The reasons identify the work done and the applicable determination.
The taxing officer has not erred. He has identified and valued the service provided. He has determined the fee charged was reasonable and that the service provided was necessary. I am not satisfied that no taxing officer, acting reasonably, could ever have taxed the particular item in the amount in question in each case. No error of principle has been established.
Item 30 - counsel preparation for and attendance at listing conference
The review in relation to the allowance for this item was not pursued.
Item 32 - counsel preparing and attending trial
The review in relation to the allowance for this item was not pursued.
Items 33 and 34 - counsel fee for second and third day of trial
The bill claimed $2,255 for each of the second and third day of trial pursuant to Item 22(c) of the determination.
The defendant submits that the taxing officer erred in principle in his interpretation and application of the determination and erred in having regard to a specified daily hearing fee rather than applying an hourly rate to the work reasonably required. It is observed that the trial transcript indicates time in court for day two of just over 45 minutes and just over two hours for the third day.
In her response to the defendant's objection, the plaintiff outlines:
41.1.Counsel did not charge the maximum of 10 hours for the second and third day of trial each;
41.2.Whilst the second day of trial ran for around 45 minutes, and the third day for 2 hours and 8 minutes, Counsel also worked on preparation for the hearing days 2 and 3. Work the Counsel did includes but is not limited to:
41.2.1.Perusing and considering a 102 page printout entitled 'Articles published by Briana Dugan' provided by the Defendant at the first date of trial (new evidence, Exhibit 2, tendered by the Defendant's Counsel);
41.2.2.Taking instructions from the Plaintiff and Plaintiff's solicitors with respect to the Exhibit 2;
41.2.3.Reviewing Plaintiff's evidence in preparation for re‑examination on day two of the trial;
41.2.4.Perusing and considering 119 pages of transcript;
41.2.5.Taking instructions with respect to special damages (agreed on the last day of trial);
41.2.6.Taking instructions and considering particulars of damages for trial (filed on the last day of trial);
41.2.7.Preparing for and drafting summary of closing submissions for oral submissions on day 3 of the trial.
Item 22(c) of the determination relevantly reads:
Item
Time
Fee Earner
$
22
Trial
Counsel fee for the second and each successive day of hearingC
$4,510
The reference in the determination to 'C' is a reference to counsel.
Clause 7(d) of the determination reads:
Recovery of daily fees for Counsel on the taxation or assessment of a Bill of Costs is intended to apply only where a full day has been worked, either in court or in court and in preparation for a subsequent hearing date.
The taxing officer in his reasons has reproduced cl 7(d) of the determination and noted that the plaintiff did not seek to recover based on the daily fee for either the second or third day of trial.
The reasons continue:
89.In the plaintiff's response to the objection, she provides detail relating to the services provided by counsel on the second and third days.
90.The basis upon which the claims were sought to be recovered was transparent. In each instance the preparation undertaken was for the balance of the trial. Although on a reading of cl 7(d) it may be taken that there could be no recovery of a daily fee for preparation undertaken for the final day of hearing unless undertaken prior to midnight on the penultimate hearing day, I doubt that the defendant would seriously so contend; there being no logical reason to exclude recovery for preparation undertaken on the day.
91.The defendant does not actually contend either that by the determination there had been recovery for a full day on the second and third day of trial or that the plaintiff could not recover for preparation undertaken for the third day of trial unless undertaken prior to midnight on the second day of trial.
92.In drawing the bill the plaintiff had been required by r 42(1) to specify the claim for the days of hearing other than the first day by reference to item 22(c) of the scale. The claim was advanced upon that basis at taxation. As I have stated, the plaintiff's approach to recovery for preparation and trial on the second and third days was transparent. It is no more than implicit in the defendant's contention of error that in coming to the determination an assessment had been made that is consistent with there having been a full day on the second and third days.
93.The plaintiff did not seek to recover on the basis of a daily fee for either the second or third day of trial but on the basis of the value of the service provided on those days to the extent that it had been provided regardless whether it was constituted by preparation or trial. There is no justification for the proposition that recovery was had for a full day on each of the second and third days of trial.
94.Neither of the objections of the defendant is sufficient to establish jurisdiction to review.
No authority was identified for the proposition in relation to Item 22(c) that where counsel was not engaged for a full day that an hourly fee was applicable. The determination itself identifies particular items where an hourly rate is to be applied. There is no such specification in Item 22(c). The proposition that the allowance should be determined by the application of an hourly rate is not established.
The reasons identify the work done and the applicable determination. The reasons state that the 'claims were transparent'. The taxing officer opined that the claim was made by reference to Item 22(c) and found there was no justification for the proposition that recovery was had for a full day on each of the second and third days of trial.
The taxing officer has not made a full day allowance for counsel for either the second or third day of trial. It is reasonable to assume that as well as attendance upon the hearing, there necessarily would have been time spent on preparation. The taxing officer has not erred. He has identified and valued the service provided in each case. He has determined the fee charged in each case was reasonable and that the service provided was necessary. I am not satisfied that no taxing officer acting reasonably, could ever have taxed the particular item in the amount in question in each case. No error of principle has been established.
Conclusion
I am satisfied that there has been an error in principle on the part of the taxing officer in relation to the allowance for preparation for trial.
The application is otherwise dismissed.
ANNEXURE 'A'
Copying court documents including Writ 34x4), Memorandum of Appearance (1x2), Statement of Claim (2x6), Defence (1x2), Plaintiff's List of Documents (1x5), Defendant's List of Documents (1x3), O24A Offers (4x1); Amended Defence (1x3); Defendant's Interrogatories (1x4), Plaintiff's Answers to Interrogatories (1x10), Plaintiff's Particulars of Damages (2x3), Subpoena to produce to Department of Defence (1x6), Consent Orders 02.03.18 (1x2), Undertaking Subpoena Department of Defence (1x2), Entry for trial (2x2), Particulars of special damages 18.08.20 (2x21), Defendant's consolidated list of documents (1x6); Plaintiff's Index of Expert Reports (2x2), Further and Better Particulars of Further Amended Statement of Claim (2x3), Defendant's Counsel's Certificate (1x2), Form 2 application (2x6), Subpoena to Curtin University (1x5), Subpoena to give evidence to Dr Michael Light (4x2), Subpoena to give evidence to Dr Geoffrey 33 Cont. 4 No Date Description Scale Item Amount Various Hee (4x2), Subpoena to give evidence to Dr Shiong Tan (4x2), Subpoena to produce to Fulham GP (3x6), Subpoena to give evidence to Dr Robert Delcanho (4x2), Subpoena to produce to Burton Street Family Practice (1x5), Subpoena to produce to Belmont City Physiotherapy Clinic (1x5), Subpoena to produce to Archer Street Physiotherapy (1x5), Subpoena to produce to Belmont Chiropractic Centre (1x5), undertakings to inspect and copy various subpoena (8x2); Amended Subpoena to give evidence to Dr Shiong Tan (3x3), Plaintiff's List of Witnesses for Trial (2x2), (Papers for the Judge (2x12), Plaintiff's Outline of Submissions (2x6); Plaintiff's Amended List of Witnesses for Trial (2x2), Plaintiff's Amended Index of Expert Reports (2x2), Defendant's Opening submissions (1x2); Plaintiff's Updated Particulars of Damages 29.07.19 (3x5), Plaintiff's Schedule of special damages for trial (3x27); Plaintiff's Trial Bundle (7x350), Defendant's book of documents copy for Counsel and instructing solicitor (2x76), Reasons for Decision 04.11.21 (1x31), Judgment After Trial (1x1), various court notices, letters and orders (26), Bill of Costs (2x8).
I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the District Court of Western Australia.
FE
Associate
1 FEBRUARY 2023
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