Duffy v Minister for Planning

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[2004] HCATrans 414

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Perth  No P10 of 2004

B e t w e e n -

PATRICK JAMES DUFFY

Applicant

and

THE MINISTER FOR PLANNING

Respondent

Application for special leave to appeal

GLEESON CJ
GUMMOW J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT PERTH ON WEDNESDAY, 27 OCTOBER 2004, AT 2.00 PM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR R.I. VINER QC:   If it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MS L.E. ROWLEY, for the applicant.  (instructed by McLeods)

MR G.T.W. TANNIN, SC:   May it please the Court, with MR B.P. KING, I appear for the respondent.  (instructed by Crown Solicitor’s Office Western Australia)

GLEESON CJ:   Yes, Mr Viner.

MR VINER:   If your Honours please, there are two questions which, in our submission, make this a special leave matter.  They are at page 149 of the application book.  The first, in what circumstances should an appellate court upon a rehearing, having found the trial judge to be in error, order a retrial rather than deciding contentious questions of fact and opinion – and I emphasise opinion – for itself in a case which is dependent for its outcome upon competing opinion evidence. 

Formulated in that way, it is relevant to distinguish Duffy from Fox v Percy where the conflict in evidence was dependent upon the credibility of the witnesses and, to some extent, the demeanour of some of the witnesses compared to the written evidence of the police constable as to what was in his notebook.  This case concerns conflicting opinion evidence as to the value of the land resumed. 

The second special leave question is the correct legal principles which courts at first instance should apply to contemporary factors affecting valuation evidence when applying the broad principle in Spencer v The Commonwealth as to fair market value.  Spencer v The Commonwealth, heard and decided some hundred years ago before sophisticated regulation of town planning considerations, today where those considerations impact fundamentally on the use to which land can be put and hence the market value of that land has a distinct bearing upon valuation and hence any restrictions, regulation and so on by those town planning considerations must be taken into account. 

The question then is, when it comes to the application of those considerations to the comparable sales method of valuing the land, do such considerations go to questions of law, namely, the relevance of those considerations to determining which sales are and which sales are not comparable, rather than to matters of fact, as has been put in cases and indeed in the appellate court in this case, to weight or adjustment. 

It is our contention that town planning considerations go to questions of law when the comparable sales method is being applied to valuation because the court is required to determine whether certain sales of land being subject to different town planning considerations renders them irrelevant as distinct from acceptable…

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Details
Case
[2004] HCATrans 414
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Duffy (the applicant) sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister for Planning (the respondent) to grant development consent for a residential subdivision. The applicant, who owned land adjacent to the proposed subdivision, argued that the Minister's decision was invalid due to a failure to comply with procedural fairness requirements. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the Minister, in granting development consent, was under a duty to afford procedural fairness to the applicant, and if so, whether that duty had been breached. This involved considering the nature of the decision-making process under the relevant planning legislation and whether the applicant had a legitimate expectation of being heard or consulted before the consent was granted.

The High Court held that the Minister's decision to grant development consent was not of a character that attracted a duty to afford procedural fairness to the applicant. Gleeson CJ and Gummow J reasoned that the statutory scheme for granting development consent did not confer on objectors, such as the applicant, a right to be heard or to participate in the decision-making process. The legislation provided for public notification and submissions, but these were considered part of the information-gathering process for the Minister, not a guarantee of individual procedural rights. The Court distinguished this from situations where a decision directly affects an individual's existing rights or interests.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

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