Dudzinski v Kellow

[2003] FCA 798

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dudzinski v Kellow [2003] FCA 798

WALDEMAR DUDZINSKI v AYNSLEY KELLOW, ROY RICKSON, ERROL STOCK, BILL HOGARTH, CORDIA CHU, KEES HULSMAN, LYN HOLMAN, COLIN McANDREW, JOHN SCOTT AND GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY
Q 31 OF 2003

KIEFEL J
BRISBANE
25 JULY 2003

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY	Q 31 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

WALDEMAR DUDZINSKI
APPELLANT

AND:

AYNSLEY KELLOW
FIRST RESPONDENT

ROY RICKSON
SECOND RESPONDENT

ERROL STOCK
THIRD RESPONDENT

BILL HOGARTH
FOURTH RESPONDENT

CORDIA CHU
FIFTH RESPONDENT

KEES HULSMAN
SIXTH RESPONDENT

LYN HOLMAN
SEVENTH RESPONDENT

COLIN McANDREW
EIGHTH RESPONDENT

JOHN SCOTT
NINTH RESPONDENT

GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY
TENTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

KIEFEL J

DATE OF ORDER:

25 JULY 2003

WHERE MADE:

BRISBANE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The applications filed on 21 July 2003 be dismissed with costs.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY	Q 31 OF 2003

ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

WALDEMAR DUDZINSKI
APPELLANT

AND:

AYNSLEY KELLOW
FIRST RESPONDENT

ROY RICKSON
SECOND RESPONDENT

ERROL STOCK
THIRD RESPONDENT

BILL HOGARTH
FOURTH RESPONDENT

CORDIA CHU
FIFTH RESPONDENT

KEES HULSMAN
SIXTH RESPONDENT

LYN HOLMAN
SEVENTH RESPONDENT

COLIN McANDREW
EIGHTH RESPONDENT

JOHN SCOTT
NINTH RESPONDENT

GRIFFITH UNIVERSITY
TENTH RESPONDENT

JUDGE:	KIEFEL J
DATE:	25 JULY 2003
PLACE:	BRISBANE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. Mr Dudzinski has asked me to disqualify myself.  I have said that I would not disqualify myself, and that the reasons would appear largely from the transcript, but I shall state them very shortly. 

2. Mr Dudzinski’s brand of bias is that any judge who holds a view contrary to those that he holds, or requires him to undertake litigation in an efficient and proper manner, one different from the way that he wishes to conduct it, is biased against him.  He has shown a readiness to accuse judges of this Court of all kinds of impropriety.  Even accepting that some litigants in person can truly hold such beliefs, I am coming very close to the view that these applications, that judges disqualify themselves in Mr Dudzinski’s case, are now brought cynically and without such a belief, but it is not necessary for me to determine that.  The application is without foundation.

3. The application for leave to appeal is from a decision of Dowsett J refusing an adjournment of the appeal, which is due to be heard by a Full Court on 14 August 2003, about three weeks away.  At the time Dowsett J heard it, an even longer period was available.  It is brought from a judgment given by Spender J on 20 February 2003.  The appeal was filed by Mr Dudzinski in March 2003.  The appeal is from a sequestration order made by his Honour, which was based upon a judgment for costs, which had been taxed by the Court.  A review of his Honour’s judgment, which helpfully shows the extent of the history of Mr Dudzinksi’s litigation, shows that some technical points were taken in relation to the bankruptcy notice and the authority of those bringing the proceedings.  Mr Dudzinski has some further grounds in relation to going behind the judgment.  He has had some months to prepare his appeal prior to him recently moving house, which really forms the only basis for the application.  That was a matter considered by Dowsett J, and I can detect no error in Dowsett J’s approach.  I also agree with his Honour that there is an interest in having bankruptcy matters heard and determined.

4. However, if I had truly felt that Mr Dudzinksi was in a position not to be able to put his case forward, I would be inclined to consider the order he seeks, but I am not so satisfied.  I have no doubt his Honour considered the same question.  Mr Dudzinski explains that he has not had time to prepare because he has had to move house.  The balance of his assertions are allegations of collusion which have prevented him from preparing or alternatively from obtaining an adjournment.  There is no substance to the latter allegations.   As to the former, I can discern no real basis for accepting why, in the period since he has filed his notice of appeal, he should not be substantially prepared for his appeal. If Mr Dudzinski had spent as much time on the appeal as he has on the last two applications, he would have gone even further towards its preparation.  I take it that he has been advised by the Court or its Registrars not to assume that the Full Court will not proceed with his appeal.  If his time is now shorter, it is as a result of his decisions.  It is not necessary for me to draw any conclusion about whether he is deliberately delaying the matter.

5. His further application to set aside the judgment is based upon fraud, he says.  The application is procedurally misconceived, and it is based upon unfounded allegations of impropriety on the part of his Honour.  Both  applications will be dismissed with costs.

I certify that the preceding five (5) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Kiefel.

Associate:

Dated:            6 August 2003

For the Applicant:	In Person
Solicitor for the Respondents:	Minter Ellison
Date of Hearing:	25 July 2003
Date of Judgment:	25 July 2003