QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION
CITATION: PARTIES: | Duck v State of Queensland (Department Duck, Toni v State of Queensland (Department of |
CASE NO: | PSA/2022/688 |
| PROCEEDING: | Public Service Appeal – Appeal against a suspension without pay decision |
DELIVERED ON: | 7 September 2022 |
MEMBER: | Pidgeon IC |
| HEARD AT: | On the papers |
ORDERS: | The Appellant's application to allow their appeal to be started within a longer period is dismissed. |
CATCHWORDS: | PUBLIC SERVICE – EMPLOYEES AND SERVANTS OF THE CROWN GENERALLY – Public Service Appeal – appeal against a suspension without pay decision – where the appellant was suspended without pay for not complying with Direction 1/21 - COVID-19 Vaccinations – where appellant submits that decision is unfair and unreasonable - appeal lodged out of time – whether extension of time should be granted – extension of time refused. |
LEGISLATION: | Department of Education Employment Direction 1/21 Industrial Relations Act 2016 s 564 Public Service Act 2008 ss 137, 194 Public Service Commission Suspension Directive 16/20 cls 5, 6 |
| CASES: | Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541 Brodie-Hanns v MTV Publishing Limited (1995) 67 IR 298 Chapman v State of Queensland [2003] QCA 172 Cullen v State of Queensland (Queensland Health) [2021] QIRC 258 Erhardt v Goodman Fielder Food Services Limited (1999) 163 QGIG Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (1994) 3 FCR 344 Schimke v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 136 Thorley v State of Queensland (Department of Education) [2022] QIRC 133 |
Reasons for Decision
Appeal Details
Ms Duck is employed by the State of Queensland (Department of Education) as an Early Childhood Officer (AO5).
On 11 February 2022, Ms Duck was suspended from duty without pay. The suspension without pay decision was made on the basis that Ms Duck: did not have a diagnosed medical contraindication or other qualifying exceptional circumstance serving to exempt her from Department of Education Employment Direction 1/21; and had not complied with Direction 1/21.
On 24 June 2022, Ms Duck received a letter informing her that the suspension from duty without pay would cease at 1:00 am on 30 June 2022. The letter said that regular payments would start in the next available pay cycle and directed Ms Duck to resume duty at her workplace on the first workday of Term 3, 2022.
The letter confirmed that in accordance with cl 6.10 of the Public Service Commission Suspension Directive 16/20, on the basis that she was not available to work during the period of suspension as she was not compliant with the Direction, Ms Duck would not be repaid for the period she was suspended without pay.
The letter also informed Ms Duck that if she believed the decision was unfair and unreasonable, she may lodge an appeal under the appeal provisions of the Public Service Act 2008.
On 1 August 2022, Ms Duck lodged an appeal against the decision of 11 February 2022 to suspend her without pay. The…
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- Case
- [2022] QIRC 347
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issues the court had to address were whether the appeal could be initiated beyond the statutory deadline and, if the deadline had passed, whether exceptional circumstances justified granting an extension of time for the appeal. The court examined the statutory provisions governing the time limits for appeals and the criteria for extending these deadlines. The court also considered the appellant's submissions regarding the fairness and reasonableness of the suspension decision and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their ability to meet the appeal deadline.
The court concluded that the statutory time limit for lodging the appeal had indeed expired and that the appellant had not demonstrated exceptional circumstances warranting an extension of time. The court found that the appellant's reasons for the delay were not sufficiently compelling to warrant an exception to the statutory deadline. The court emphasised the importance of adhering to statutory timelines for appeals and noted that the appellant had not provided a satisfactory explanation for the delay in lodging the appeal. Consequently, the court dismissed the appellant's application to allow their appeal to be started within a longer period.
The final orders of the court were that the appellant's application to permit their appeal to be initiated beyond the statutory time limit was dismissed. The appeal was therefore not allowed to proceed, and the suspension without pay remained in effect. This decision underscored the necessity for strict compliance with statutory deadlines for appeals and highlighted the limited circumstances in which extensions of time may be granted.
Orders
Orders of the court
The Appellant's application to allow their appeal to be started within a longer period is dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi