DUBOW v Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DUBOW v ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER LEGAL SERVICE [2013] FCCA 1357
Catchwords:
INDUSTRIAL LAW – Termination of employment – general protections – workplace right – complaint or inquiry in relation to employment – objectionable term – whether there was a right to complain to the Fair Work Ombudsman – appropriateness of reinstatement – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Fair Work Act2009 (Cth), ss.340, 341, 356, 371, 391

Cases Cited:
Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O’Neill (2006) 227 CLR 57
Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd (1968) 118 CLR 618
Harrison v In Control Pty Ltd [2013] FMCA 149
Printing and Kindred Industries Union v Vista Paper Products Pty Ltd (1991) 12 CAR 167
Wild v Queensland Rail Limited [2012] FWAFB 9827

Tim Donaghey, Termination of Employment (LexisNexis Australia , 2nd ed, 2013)

Applicant: YOLANDE DUBOW
Respondent: ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER LEGAL SERVICE
File Number: BRG 242 of 2013
Judgment of: Judge Burnett
Hearing date: 24 April 2013
Date of Last Submission: 24 April 2013
Delivered at: Brisbane
Delivered on: 24 April 2013

REPRESENTATION

The applicant appeared on her own behalf
Solicitors for the Respondent: Ashurst Australia

ORDERS

  1. That the applications filed on 22 March 2013 are dismissed.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

AT BRISBANE

BRG 242 of 2013

YOLANDE DUBOW

Applicant

And

ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER LEGAL SERVICE

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Ex Tempore)

  1. The applicant is a lawyer employed by the respondent, the Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Legal Service (“the Service”) at its Bundaberg Office. I will refer to the Service only in relation to its Bundaberg office. By letter dated 15 April 2013, the Service wrote to the applicant informing her of its requirement for her to show cause as to why her employment should not be terminated. It advised her that she had two days within which to show cause. The applicant’s response was to apply to this Court for interim relief to restrain the Service from acting upon its notice.

  2. The basis of the applicant’s claim is founded in her allegations of breaches of a general protections made by her against the service in respect of her employment. These are presently the subject of conciliation before Fair Work Australia. No certificate has yet been issued by the Commission pursuant to s.371 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (“the Act”) in respect of those complaints. However, s.371(1) provides a jurisdictional basis for relief by this Court, insofar as it provides:

    “General protections court applications

    FWC conference to be held before application

    (1) A person who is entitled to apply under section 365 to the FWC for the FWC to deal with a dispute must not make a general protections court application in relation to the dispute unless:

    (a) the FWC has issued a certificate under section 369 in relation to the dispute; or

    (b) the general protections court application includes an application for an interim injunction.

    …”

  3. The application today is one for an interim…

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Details
Case
[2013] FCCA 1357
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, Ms. Dubow, appealed a determination by the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service regarding disciplinary action. The dispute concerned Ms. Dubow's conduct and communications, which the CEO viewed as impertinent and insubordinate. The CEO had issued formal warnings, which Ms. Dubow contested through a series of letters. The matter came before Judge Burnett.

The central legal issue was whether Ms. Dubow's conduct and communications constituted insubordination, thereby justifying the disciplinary action taken by the CEO. This involved assessing the nature of her correspondence, particularly her defiance of the CEO's authority and her assertions regarding her professional role and obligations. The court was required to determine if her actions were indeed resistant to and in defiance of the CEO's authority, as found by a disciplinary investigator.

Judge Burnett concurred with the CEO's observations regarding Ms. Dubow's communications, finding her submissions to be gratuitous and inflammatory. The court accepted the finding of a disciplinary investigator that Ms. Dubow's words were resistant to and in defiance of the CEO's authority, a conclusion further supported by her subsequent letter. The court viewed her assertion of not being subordinate to the CEO, and her references to her cat and deceased mother in that context, as indicative of insubordinate behaviour. The court ultimately found that Ms. Dubow had failed to demonstrate why formal disciplinary action was unwarranted.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The applicant appealed the CEO’s determination by her letter of 18 March 2013 which I need not restate, except to note that, in some respects, it could be interpreted that her submissions were, in part, impertinent. In response to her appeal, the CEO responded on 19 March 2013. He concluded in these terms:“In conclusion, having considered the matters raised by you – I see no basis upon which to change my original decision as to the appropriate penalties – hence the two formal warnings stand. I close by once again cautioning you to be more discerning in your communications and conduct. Various inflammatory comments made by you in your most recent email might suggest to some that you are doing your best to encourage me to terminate your employment contract. I have shown considerable restraint thus far and I believe, have dealt with you very leniently.” I certainly concur with his observations. Not content with matters as they then stood, the applicant then wrote again on a date which is not noted but which follows the CEO’s letter of 19/20 March 2013. Again, without necessarily restating all the matters contained in the letter, certain parts warrant observation. She stated, in part:“In any event, I do not agree and cavil with any suggestion that I am subordinate to you! My role as a Legal Practitioner is completely different to yours as a Chief Executive Officer of a publicly funded social justice agency ... I am subordinate to my dead mother and my Chocolate Boy Burmese cat: As you are neither of these, I remain sufficiently defiant to engage in lawful and requisite disclosure: The Fair Work Act allows and permits it, the Public Service legislation requires it as does my ethical standards of responsibility.” [Original emphasis] She concluded her letter with this observation:“As a Social Justice Agency the failure in Natural Justice and due process is outrageous:As this has become farcical I take the Pirates of Penzance position on your Show cause request!” The observations by the applicant were in my view entirely gratuitous and, no doubt, led to what subsequently followed. The CEO’s response was to appoint the Director of Criminal Law to conduct a disciplinary investigation. He conducted that investigation and concluded, having regard particularly to the words in the show cause letter, in these terms:“In short the words particularised in the ‘show cause letter’ are resistant to and in defiance of the authority of the Chief Executive Officer of this organisation and I so find. This finding is strongly supported by Ms Dubow’s subsequent letter to you dated 28 March 2013.” In his finding as to show cause he noted that the applicant had failed to demonstrate why a formal disciplinary action was unwarranted and proceeded then to recommend that the applicant have two days from the date of the letter to show cause in writing as to why the penalty was unwarranted, in which time, depending on the course that she took, she might have the opportunity to resign. Following that letter by the director, some of the correspondence that I have earlier referred to emerged that ultimately led to the letter of 15 April 2013, the genus of these proceedings. In that letter, the CEO stated:“I refer to my earlier correspondences relating to a show cause situation regarding an allegation of insubordinate conduct on your part. I also refer to your communications in response.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established