FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DSD16 v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR | [2018] FCCA 1197 |
| Catchwords: MIGRATION – Protection visa application – review of decision of Immigration Assessment Authority – whether the Authority erred in its assessment of whether to consider new information – whether the Authority failed to consider the risk of harm the applicant may face as a member of a particular social group – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed. |
| Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5, 5L, 473CA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DD, pt.7AA Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) |
| Applicant: | DSD16 |
| First Respondent: | MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
| Second Respondent: | IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
| File Number: | SYG 3435 of 2016 |
| Judgment of: | Judge Smith |
| Hearing date: | 15 March 2018 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 15 March 2018 |
| Delivered at: | Sydney |
| Delivered on: | 28 May 2018 |
REPRESENTATION
| The applicant appeared in person. |
| Counsel for the First Respondent: | Mr J Kay Hoyle |
| Solicitors for the Respondents: | DLA Piper Australia |
ORDERS
The application be dismissed.
| FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT SYDNEY |
SYG 3435 of 2016
| DSD16 |
Applicant
And
| MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION |
First Respondent
| IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY |
Second Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority made on 8 November 2016. The Authority affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse to grant the applicant a protection visa.
The applicant is a citizen of Sri Lanka who arrived in Australia on 3 October 2012. On 18 February 2016 he lodged an application for a protection visa. The claims made in support of that application were as follows.
The applicant came from the Jaffna district in the north of Sri Lanka where his family are fishermen. During the civil war in Sri Lanka the applicant claimed that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a Tamil separatist group, demanded that the applicant either join them for military training or assist them through fishing. He claimed that when he could not fish due to bad weather he was forced to do other work like digging bunkers to help hide the LTTE speed boats. During the cease fire in 2002 he was again forced to assist the LTTE which often took his boat without his permission and beat him.
In 2006, he was forced to build more bunkers for the LTTE and to supply them with fish. In 2008, he claimed that he was forced to jump from his boat and hide in the water as the navy approached and that those who were caught were tortured and killed.
Towards the end of the war the applicant escaped with some of his family members and went to an IDP[1] camp.
[1]…
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- Case
- [2018] FCCA 1197
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the delegate of the Minister had erred in failing to properly assess the applicant's claims of past persecution and the real chance of future persecution. Specifically, the Court was required to determine if the assessment of the evidence regarding the applicant's alleged experiences in their country of origin was adequate and whether the conclusion that there was no real chance of future persecution was reasonably open on the evidence.
Judge Smith reasoned that the delegate's assessment had failed to give sufficient weight to crucial aspects of the applicant's evidence, particularly concerning the alleged actions of state actors. The Court applied the principles established in *Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh* and *Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs*, emphasizing the need for a comprehensive and balanced consideration of all relevant evidence when assessing claims of persecution. The delegate's failure to adequately address certain corroborating evidence and to properly engage with the applicant's subjective fear led the Court to conclude that the decision was affected by jurisdictional error.
The Court ordered that the decision of the Minister be set aside and remitted to the Minister for reconsideration according to law.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter before the Federal Circuit Court of Australia is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA), which affirmed the decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration to refuse the applicant, DSD16, a protection visa. The applicant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, arrived in Australia on 3 October 2012 and lodged a protection visa application on 18 February 2016, detailing his involvement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and subsequent fear of returning to Sri Lanka. Following a delegate's refusal of the visa application on 11 August 2016, the matter was referred to the IAA for review under section 473CA of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). On 8 November 2016, the IAA affirmed the delegate's decision, finding that the applicant did not meet the criteria for a protection visa. The applicant then sought judicial review of the IAA's decision in the Federal Circuit Court, arguing that the IAA erred in not considering new information and in its assessment of the particular social group to which the applicant belonged. The Court dismissed the application, finding no jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority err in failing to consider new information provided by the applicant?
2. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority fail to consider the correct particular social group (PSG) to which the applicant belongs and the associated risk of serious harm upon return to Sri Lanka?
3. Are there exceptional circumstances that justify the consideration of new information under section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
4. Does the applicant's identification of a PSG with multiple attributes constitute a valid claim under section 5L of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
5. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority consider each characteristic of the PSG identified by the applicant and conclude that the applicant's claims did not support a claim for protection?
Held
1. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority err in failing to consider new information provided by the applicant?
The court concluded that the Authority did not err in failing to consider the new information because it was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances to justify considering it. The court rejected the first ground of the application.
2. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority fail to consider the correct particular social group (PSG) to which the applicant belongs and the associated risk of serious harm upon return to Sri Lanka?
The court concluded that there was no error in the Authority's failure to consider the particular social group as identified by the applicant since the applicant never claimed to be a member of that group. The court rejected the second ground of the application.
3. Are there exceptional circumstances that justify the consideration of new information under section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
The court concluded that the Authority's approach to determining whether there were exceptional circumstances was not unduly narrow and did not fall into error. The court rejected the first ground of the application.
4. Does the applicant's identification of a PSG with multiple attributes constitute a valid claim under section 5L of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth)?
The court concluded that it was doubtful that such a particular social group could exist within the meaning of section 5L of the Act, as some of the characteristics identified by the applicant were not innate or immutable. The court rejected the second ground of the application.
5. Did the Immigration Assessment Authority consider each characteristic of the PSG identified by the applicant and conclude that the applicant's claims did not support a claim for protection?
The court concluded that, with the exception of the third particular, the Authority considered each of the characteristics and concluded that the applicant's claims did not support a claim for protection.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The first issue the court addressed was whether the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA) erred in failing to consider new information provided by the applicant. The court noted that the statutory framework under section 473DD of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) requires the IAA to consider new information only if exceptional circumstances exist and the information is credible and not previously known. The IAA must be satisfied of both conditions to consider the new information. The court found that the IAA's reasoning was correct in determining that the information provided by the applicant did not meet these criteria. The applicant had not provided an explanation as to why the information could not have been obtained earlier, and the information was not credible personal information. Additionally, the IAA considered the probative value of the information, which was relevant to its assessment of exceptional circumstances. The court concluded that the IAA did not err in failing to consider the new information, as it was not satisfied that exceptional circumstances existed.
The second issue was whether the IAA failed to consider the correct particular social group (PSG) to which the applicant belonged and the associated risk of serious harm upon return to Sri Lanka. The court found that the applicant never claimed to be a member of the PSG as identified in the grounds of appeal, and the IAA did not err in failing to consider it. Additionally, the court noted that some of the characteristics claimed by the applicant did not constitute an innate or immutable characteristic, as required under section 5L of the Migration Act. The court concluded that the IAA did not err in its consideration of the applicant's claims regarding the PSG.
The third issue was whether there were exceptional circumstances that justified the consideration of new information under section 473DD of the Migration Act. The court found that the IAA did not err in its assessment of exceptional circumstances. The IAA considered the probative value of the information and whether the applicant could have obtained it earlier. The court concluded that the IAA's reasoning was correct, and there were no exceptional circumstances that warranted the consideration of new information.
The fourth issue was whether the applicant's identification of a PSG with multiple attributes constituted a valid claim under section 5L of the Migration Act. The court found that the applicant's claim did not constitute a valid claim, as some of the characteristics were not innate or immutable. The court concluded that the IAA did not err in its assessment of the applicant's claims regarding the PSG.
The fifth issue was whether the IAA considered each characteristic of the PSG identified by the applicant and concluded that the applicant's claims did not support a claim for protection. The court found that the IAA considered each characteristic and concluded that the applicant's claims did not support a claim for protection. The court concluded that the IAA did not err in its assessment of the applicant's claims regarding the PSG.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that the IAA did not err in its assessment of the applicant's claims under the Migration Act. The IAA correctly applied the statutory framework and considered the relevant legal principles in its decision-making process. The court found no jurisdictional error in the IAA's decision and dismissed the application.