IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S280 of 2018
B e t w e e n -
DSC17
Applicant
and
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
NETTLE J
GORDON J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON FRIDAY, 21 JUNE 2019, AT 11.00 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR N.J. OWENS, SC: If the Court pleases, I appear with my learned friend, MS C. TRAHANAS, for the applicant. (instructed by Nicholas Owens SC)
MS R.S. FRANCOIS: If the Court pleases, I appear for the respondent Minister. (instructed by Sparke Helmore Lawyers)
NETTLE J: Thank you. Yes, please.
MR OWENS: Thank you, your Honours. Your Honours, we require an extension of time. There is an affidavit in the book at page 66 which explains, for the most part, the delay was an inability to commence in the High Court Registry until a sealed copy of the judgment had been obtained, and then there is a short period of two weeks which is ‑ ‑ ‑
NETTLE J: Is the extension as such in issue, Ms Francois?
MS FRANCOIS: No, your Honour.
NETTLE J: Thank you. Perhaps we might go to the substance of the matter, then.
MR OWENS: Yes, thank you, your Honour. May I identify at the outset the issues upon which we see the fate of this application as resting? Analytically, it seems to us that the critical issue is whether there was jurisdictional error in the Authority’s finding that there were no exceptional circumstances within the meaning of section 473DD of the Migration Act.
I say that is analytically the critical step, because if I cannot persuade your Honours that there is a problem with that finding, then there is an independent sufficient basis to sustain the decision not to consider the new information.
NETTLE J: Well, there is no dispute, is there, that there was a mistake made in treating the two conditions as conjunctive rather than alternative?
MR OWENS: We apprehend that the Minister does contend that, properly construed, the Authority did not make that mistake.
NETTLE J: I see.
MS FRANCOIS: I think the appeal judge made that mistake, but not the Authority.
NETTLE J: I see, thank you. Yes, Mr Owens.
MR OWENS: In any event, I will come to that issue at the end. I have identified what I have described as the analytical central issue, which is exceptional circumstances. But practically or substantively, it seems to us that the critical issue is whether the Authority’s finding that the new information was not credible is really the point.
GORDON J: You mean a legally unreasonableness type argument?
MR OWENS: Yes, because if there was a valid decision that this information was so implausible that it could not, no matter what the other circumstances be accepted, then I accept that exceptional circumstances will not be able…
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- Case
- [2019] HCATrans 134
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Court included whether the Authority erred in its interpretation and application of section 473DD of the *Migration Act 1958* (Cth). Specifically, the applicant contended that the Authority impermissibly confined the considerations relevant to exceptional circumstances and made an unreasonable finding regarding the credibility or plausibility of the new information. A further issue was whether the Authority treated the conditions under section 473DD(b)(i) and (b)(ii) as cumulative rather than alternative, which the applicant argued was a misconstruction of the provision.
The applicant argued that the Authority's finding that the new information was not credible was a legally unreasonable conclusion, particularly in light of country information detailing arbitrary detention and human rights violations by Sri Lankan security forces, and the consistency of the new information with the applicant's prior claims. The applicant submitted that the question under section 473DD(b)(ii) was whether the information was *capable* of being accepted, not whether it was true, and that no reasonable decision-maker could have found the information incapable of acceptance given the context. The applicant further argued that the Authority failed to properly consider the existence of exceptional circumstances under section 473DD(a), conflating it with the credibility of the information. The Minister, conversely, argued that while principles regarding the interpretation of section 473DD were agreed, the application of those principles to the facts did not disclose any error, asserting that the Authority engaged in a proper process and that its conclusion regarding the lack of exceptional circumstances was reasonable.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi