FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DRG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 304
Appeal from: Application for extension of time: DRG16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2063 File number: NSD 1662 of 2017 Judge: LEE J Date of judgment: 19 February 2018 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court – where consideration of merits determinative – proposed grounds of appeal devoid of merit – application dismissed with costs Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 36.05 Cases cited: Cross v Harbour City Ferries Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1577
Zaburoni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 205
Date of hearing: 19 February 2018 Registry: New South Wales Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 21 Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person, assisted by an interpreter Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M Hughes Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs ORDERS
NSD 1662 of 2017 BETWEEN: DRG16
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
First Respondent
IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
LEE J
DATE OF ORDER:
19 FEBRUARY 2018
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application for an extension of time to appeal be dismissed.
2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs on a lump sum basis assessed in the amount of $4,000.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)LEE J:
A BACKGROUND
On 28 September 2017, the applicant filed an application pursuant to FCR 36.05 for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court. The application named as respondents the first respondent (Minister) and the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA). The application was accompanied by an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 25 September 2017.
The evidence of the applicant, which was relevantly unchallenged and which I accept, was that he was represented by both solicitors and Counsel before the Federal Circuit Court and that his solicitor informed him that his application to that Court was dismissed on 4 September 2017. In fact, the order dismissing the application was made on 31 August 2017 and, accordingly, the applicant was labouring under a misapprehension as to the time limit for the filing of a notice of appeal. Annexed to the applicant’s affidavit is a draft notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court which sets out four proposed grounds of appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court (primary judgment).
The principles relevant to the exercise of discretion to grant an extension of the time within which to file a notice of appeal are well established.…
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- Case
- [2018] FCA 304
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary judge considered whether the applicant had provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and whether there was any prejudice to the Minister. The judge noted that the applicant had a misapprehension regarding the time limit for filing a notice of appeal, but the length of the delay was inconsequential. The primary judge also noted that the Minister pointed to prejudice because the proposed grounds of appeal differed from the arguments presented in the Federal Circuit Court. The primary judge concluded that the consideration of the merits of the substantive appeal was determinative in deciding whether to grant an extension of time. The proposed grounds of appeal were considered to be devoid of merit, and the applicant had failed to demonstrate an arguable case on appeal.
The primary judge dismissed the application for an extension of time and ordered the applicant to pay the Minister's costs on a lump sum basis assessed in the amount of $4,000. The primary judge reasoned that the proposed grounds of appeal did not disclose any error and that the applicant had failed to demonstrate an arguable case on appeal. The primary judge also noted that the Court's appellate jurisdiction is exercised for the correction of error and that it is necessary to demonstrate error on the part of the primary judge before this Court will intervene. The primary judge concluded that the proposed appeal grounds did not meet this threshold.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application for an extension of time to appeal be dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs on a lump sum basis assessed in the amount of $4,000.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In a comprehensive judgment, the primary judge determined that there was no denial of procedural fairness involved in the delegate’s decision and, in any event, even if there had been, that would not have affected the IAA’s authority to affirm the decision. There is no need to detail the primary judge’s reasons, as this argument is not pressed in the proposed appeal the subject of the application before me. B CONSIDERATION As would by now be evident, in the Court below the applicant did not seek to invite a wholesale review of the IAA’s decision, but advanced the contention that the alleged failures by the delegate had the effect that the IAA’s decision was a nullity. Although this contention is apparently not pressed in this Court, it is difficult to understand why the primary judge’s resolution of what he described as the “[f]irst issue” at [38]-[61] of the primary judgment (that is, that the delegate’s decision was affected by a procedural unfairness) discloses any error and, in particular, how it is suggested that the applicant was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case. In any event, as indicated at [2] above, there are now four grounds proposed to be advanced on appeal, which may be summarised as follows:(a)The IAA failed to consider relevant facts (Ground 1).(b)There was an excess of power (Ground 2).(c)The IAA’s reasons misconstrued the applicant’s claims, and also gave reasons that were unreasonable, unacceptable and misleading (Ground 3).(d)The respondents fell into jurisdictional error by making fact finding errors in coming to the decision to reject the applicant’s claims (Ground 4). It is convenient to deal with each of these four grounds.B.1 Ground 1 The IAA was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real risk of persecution now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future. As the Minister submitted:(a)the IAA did not accept that the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) continued to have any interest in the applicant or that he faced any risk from them. While the IAA accepted that the applicant had once been detained by members of the TMVP, he had not had any problems with them in the period between 2008 and his departure in 2012: at [13];(b)the IAA did not believe the applicant's evidence about alleged attacks or his role in subsequent protests. While the IAA accepted that the applicant may have protested, it was not satisfied that this would have caused the authorities to target the applicant as he claimed: at [15]-[25];(c)the IAA found that there was no reason why the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) (presumably of the Sri Lankan police) would be interested in the applicant. It found that the applicant had fabricated his claim that the CID had come looking for him in 2015. It found that the applicant would not face harm in Sri Lanka because of his Tamil ethnicity or imputed political opinion in favour of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): at [29]-[34];(d)the IAA found that the applicant would not face persecution having left Sri Lanka illegally: at [45]-[51]; nor would he face significant harm for this reason (or indeed any other reason): at [57]-[58].