DRG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DRG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 304

Appeal from: Application for extension of time: DRG16 v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2017] FCCA 2063
File number: NSD 1662 of 2017
Judge: LEE J
Date of judgment: 19 February 2018
Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court – where consideration of merits determinative – proposed grounds of appeal devoid of merit – application dismissed with costs
Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth), r 36.05
Cases cited:

Cross v Harbour City Ferries Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1577

Zaburoni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 205

Date of hearing: 19 February 2018
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 21
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person, assisted by an interpreter
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr M Hughes
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent entered a submitting appearance, save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 1662 of 2017
BETWEEN:

DRG16

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

LEE J

DATE OF ORDER:

19 FEBRUARY 2018

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application for an extension of time to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs on a lump sum basis assessed in the amount of $4,000.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
(Revised from the transcript)

LEE J:

A        BACKGROUND

  1. On 28 September 2017, the applicant filed an application pursuant to FCR 36.05 for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court.  The application named as respondents the first respondent (Minister) and the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA).  The application was accompanied by an affidavit sworn by the applicant on 25 September 2017. 

  2. The evidence of the applicant, which was relevantly unchallenged and which I accept, was that he was represented by both solicitors and Counsel before the Federal Circuit Court and that his solicitor informed him that his application to that Court was dismissed on 4 September 2017.  In fact, the order dismissing the application was made on 31 August 2017 and, accordingly, the applicant was labouring under a misapprehension as to the time limit for the filing of a notice of appeal.  Annexed to the applicant’s affidavit is a draft notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court which sets out four proposed grounds of appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court (primary judgment). 

  3. The principles relevant to the exercise of discretion to grant an extension of the time within which to file a notice of appeal are well established.…

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Details
Case
[2018] FCA 304
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In DRG16 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which had dismissed his application. The Federal Circuit Court had determined that the delegate's decision was not affected by procedural unfairness and affirmed the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The applicant proposed four grounds for appeal: that the Immigration and Asylum Division (IAA) failed to consider relevant facts, that there was an excess of power, that the IAA's reasons misconstrued the applicant’s claims, and that the respondents made fact-finding errors. The primary judge found that the proposed grounds of appeal were devoid of merit.

The primary judge considered whether the applicant had provided an acceptable explanation for the delay and whether there was any prejudice to the Minister. The judge noted that the applicant had a misapprehension regarding the time limit for filing a notice of appeal, but the length of the delay was inconsequential. The primary judge also noted that the Minister pointed to prejudice because the proposed grounds of appeal differed from the arguments presented in the Federal Circuit Court. The primary judge concluded that the consideration of the merits of the substantive appeal was determinative in deciding whether to grant an extension of time. The proposed grounds of appeal were considered to be devoid of merit, and the applicant had failed to demonstrate an arguable case on appeal.

The primary judge dismissed the application for an extension of time and ordered the applicant to pay the Minister's costs on a lump sum basis assessed in the amount of $4,000. The primary judge reasoned that the proposed grounds of appeal did not disclose any error and that the applicant had failed to demonstrate an arguable case on appeal. The primary judge also noted that the Court's appellate jurisdiction is exercised for the correction of error and that it is necessary to demonstrate error on the part of the primary judge before this Court will intervene. The primary judge concluded that the proposed appeal grounds did not meet this threshold.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application for an extension of time to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs on a lump sum basis assessed in the amount of $4,000.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

The evidence of the applicant, which was relevantly unchallenged and which I accept, was that he was represented by both solicitors and Counsel before the Federal Circuit Court and that his solicitor informed him that his application to that Court was dismissed on 4 September 2017. In fact, the order dismissing the application was made on 31 August 2017 and, accordingly, the applicant was labouring under a misapprehension as to the time limit for the filing of a notice of appeal. Annexed to the applicant’s affidavit is a draft notice of appeal from the Federal Circuit Court which sets out four proposed grounds of appeal from the judgment of the Federal Circuit Court (primary judgment). The principles relevant to the exercise of discretion to grant an extension of the time within which to file a notice of appeal are well established. Mr Hughes, who appeared on behalf of the Minister, accepted, correctly in my view, that an acceptable explanation for delay had been provided and that the length of delay was inconsequential. The only matter of prejudice to which the Minister pointed was the fact that the proposed notice of appeal identifies grounds which differ from the way in which the case was conducted below. Accordingly, in the event that leave were granted to advance an appeal on this basis and such an appeal was upheld, there would be prejudice occasioned to the Minister by reason of the loss of any appeal as of right from my determination (the only avenue, of course, being an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court). As I explained to the applicant at the commencement of his submissions-in-chief, it seemed to me that the underlying merits of the substantive appeal, if leave were granted, was the consideration that was determinative in relation to whether or not an extension of time should be granted. As I recently explained in Cross v Harbour City Ferries Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 1577 at [23], when considering proposed grounds of appeal, they should be considered at a “reasonably impressionistic level” and the Court should guard against transmogrification of the hearing of the application for an extension of time into a full-blown hearing of the substantive appeal. Having said that, there is a certain degree of artificiality in doing justice to an unrepresented litigant (in seeking to understand inexpertly drafted proposed grounds of appeal) and determining the application for leave to appeal at a level of generality which does not involve descent into the underlying merits. Despite the issue of prejudice pointed to by the Minister, if I formed the view that the proposed appeal grounds disclosed some arguable case, in my opinion, the appropriate exercise of discretion in this case would be to grant an extension of time. This is not to ignore the Minister’s argument that the Court’s appellate jurisdiction is exercised for the correction of error and that it is necessary to demonstrate error on the part of the primary judge before this Court will intervene. Indeed, these principles are also well established: see Zaburoni v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] FCAFC 205 at [52] per Griffiths, Moshinsky and Bromwich JJ. The difficulty for the applicant is, of course, that the argument advanced before the primary judge when he was legally represented was materially different from the argument now proposed to be advanced on appeal.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In a comprehensive judgment, the primary judge determined that there was no denial of procedural fairness involved in the delegate’s decision and, in any event, even if there had been, that would not have affected the IAA’s authority to affirm the decision. There is no need to detail the primary judge’s reasons, as this argument is not pressed in the proposed appeal the subject of the application before me. B CONSIDERATION As would by now be evident, in the Court below the applicant did not seek to invite a wholesale review of the IAA’s decision, but advanced the contention that the alleged failures by the delegate had the effect that the IAA’s decision was a nullity. Although this contention is apparently not pressed in this Court, it is difficult to understand why the primary judge’s resolution of what he described as the “[f]irst issue” at [38]-[61] of the primary judgment (that is, that the delegate’s decision was affected by a procedural unfairness) discloses any error and, in particular, how it is suggested that the applicant was denied a reasonable opportunity to present his case. In any event, as indicated at [2] above, there are now four grounds proposed to be advanced on appeal, which may be summarised as follows:(a)The IAA failed to consider relevant facts (Ground 1).(b)There was an excess of power (Ground 2).(c)The IAA’s reasons misconstrued the applicant’s claims, and also gave reasons that were unreasonable, unacceptable and misleading (Ground 3).(d)The respondents fell into jurisdictional error by making fact finding errors in coming to the decision to reject the applicant’s claims (Ground 4). It is convenient to deal with each of these four grounds.B.1 Ground 1 The IAA was not satisfied that the applicant faced a real risk of persecution now, or in the reasonably foreseeable future. As the Minister submitted:(a)the IAA did not accept that the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP) continued to have any interest in the applicant or that he faced any risk from them. While the IAA accepted that the applicant had once been detained by members of the TMVP, he had not had any problems with them in the period between 2008 and his departure in 2012: at [13];(b)the IAA did not believe the applicant's evidence about alleged attacks or his role in subsequent protests. While the IAA accepted that the applicant may have protested, it was not satisfied that this would have caused the authorities to target the applicant as he claimed: at [15]-[25];(c)the IAA found that there was no reason why the Criminal Investigation Division (CID) (presumably of the Sri Lankan police) would be interested in the applicant. It found that the applicant had fabricated his claim that the CID had come looking for him in 2015. It found that the applicant would not face harm in Sri Lanka because of his Tamil ethnicity or imputed political opinion in favour of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE): at [29]-[34];(d)the IAA found that the applicant would not face persecution having left Sri Lanka illegally: at [45]-[51]; nor would he face significant harm for this reason (or indeed any other reason): at [57]-[58].