Drew Hancock v The Queen

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCR 2017 0030

DREW HANCOCK	Applicant
v
THE QUEEN	Respondent

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JUDGES:	BEACH, FERGUSON and COGHLAN JJA
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	25 August 2017
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	6 September 2017
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2017] VSCA 239
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM:	Director of Public Prosecutions v Caycee Johnson and Drew Hancock (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Coish J, 1 February 2017)

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CRIMINAL LAW – Sentence – Whether sentence manifestly excessive – Applicant pleaded guilty to 29 charges which mostly involved dishonesty offences – Applicant was 21 years old at the time of offending and heavy ice user – Applicant had good record – Judge considered principles related to young offenders tempered by ‘serious nature and grand scale’ of offending – Sentence not manifestly excessive – Judge considered all relevant factors – Azzopardi v R (2011) 35 VR 43 – Sentencing Act 1991

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Applicant	Mr S Johns with Mr L Carter	Adrian Paull Solicitors
For the Respondent	Mr MD Phillips	Solicitor for Public Prosecutions

THE COURT:

On 25 January 2017, the applicant pleaded guilty to 29 charges, most of which involved dishonesty offences. He also pleaded guilty to a number of summary offences, most of which related to his commission of indictable offences whilst on bail. He was sentenced[1] on 1 February 2017 to a total effective sentence of four years and six months’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and six months being set. The details of the sentence on the individual charges are set out in the annexure to these reasons.
[1]Director of Public Prosecutions v Caycee Johnson and Drew Hancock (Unreported, County Court of Victoria, Coish J, 1 February 2017) (‘Sentence Reasons’).

The applicant was refused leave to appeal[2] but renewed the application for leave pursuant to s 315(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009. His principal ground of appeal is that the individual sentences, the total effective sentence and the non-parole period are manifestly excessive.
[2]Drew Hancock v The Queen (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, Ashley JA, 26 April 2017) (‘Appeal Reasons’)

For the reasons which follow, we would refuse leave to appeal.

The commission of the offences[3]

[3]The below is drawn from Exhibit 1 on the plea, Summary of Prosecution Opening. See also Sentence Reasons [1]-[44], Appeal Reasons [3]-[6].

Between 28 March and 3 May 2016, the applicant committed the crimes for which he was sentenced. He was 21 years of age at the time he committed the offences. He was 22 years of age at the time of sentencing. The applicant and his co-offender were in a relationship at the relevant time, they were both unemployed and were described by the sentencing judge as ‘heavy ice users’.[4] The applicant and his co-offender burgled multiple properties, which had an impact on multiple victims. The applicant was on bail at the time some of the offences were committed.
[4]Sentence Reasons [11].

On 9 April 2016, Ms Elizabeth Moss realised that her 2009 Mazda Sedan (valued at about $15,000) had been stolen, and that her handbag containing credit cards and other personal items was missing. The cards were used by the applicant and his co-offender hours after the theft (Charges 7 and 8, obtaining property by deception).

On 10 April 2016, the applicant stole petrol valued at $63 (Charge 2, theft). He was arrested later that day driving a Honda CRV motor vehicle (valued at approximately $20,000) which had been stolen from the home of Ian and Rhonda Gibbs on 28 March 2016 (Charge 1, theft of a motor vehicle). A number of items of stolen property were found in the vehicle when the applicant was arrested (Charges 3, 4 and 5, handling stolen goods; summary charge - dealing with property suspected of being proceeds of crime). The applicant also pleaded guilty to driving the vehicle to a service station on 28 March 2016 and stealing petrol valued at $64.95 (Charge 6, theft).

Following his arrest, the applicant was granted bail on 11 April 2016.

On 15 April 2016, there was a burglary at the Shay family home. A 2011 Toyota Corolla Sedan (valued at approximately $10,000) was stolen by the applicant and his co-offender (Charge 9, theft of a motor vehicle).

On 21 April 2016, a 2015 Mercedes Benz valued at approximately $50,000 was stolen from the Wyndham family home, as well as a handbag containing credit cards and personal items. On that day, the applicant used the credit cards (Charge 10, obtaining property by deception). On 25 April 2016, the applicant was seen driving the stolen Mercedes Benz (Charge 11, theft of a motor vehicle; summary charge - committing an indictable offence whilst on bail). The applicant also attempted to buy goods with the stolen credit cards (Charge 12, attempting to commit an indictable offence).

On 24 April 2016, Ms Gabrielle Millar’s home was burgled. On 3 May 2016, the applicant was found in possession of assorted jewellery belonging to Ms Millar (Charge 13, handling stolen goods; summary charge - committing an indictable offence whilst on bail).

The applicant and his co-offender committed a number of offences on or related to the events of 27 April 2016. On 3 May 2016, the applicant was found in possession of a jewellery box containing jewellery that had been stolen from Ms Melissa Donaldson’s home on 27 April 2016 (Charge 14, handling stolen goods; summary charge - committing an indictable offence whilst on bail). The applicant was also in possession of a wallet and cards which were stolen on 27 April 2016 from the home of Mr Terrence Kennedy (Charge 15, handling stolen goods; summary charge - committing an indictable offence whilst on bail). Also on 27 April, the premises of Mr Christopher Steen were burgled by the applicant (Charge 16, burglary) and watches and other items were stolen by him (Charge 17, theft; summary charge - committing an indictable offence whilst on bail). The applicant and his co-offender were also found in possession of property belonging to Mr Keith Jones, which was stolen from his car on 27 April 2016 (Charge 20, handling stolen goods; summary charge - committing an indictable offence whilst on bail).

At approximately 4.00 am on 27 April 2016, the applicant attempted to break into the Phipps’ household, where Mr and Ms Phipps and their two year old child were asleep. Mr Phipps heard the laundry door close and heard footsteps, then called Triple 0. Police arrived shortly afterwards and determined that a set of keys containing a Suprabeam torch worth approximately $100 was stolen. The set of keys included keys to the Phipps’ home and to Mr Phipps’ workplace (Charge 18, Aggravated Burglary; Charge 19, theft; summary charge - committing an indictable offence whilst on bail).

On 29 April 2016, the applicant burgled the Trainor and Frost home. Car keys, personal property, jewellery and a 2013 Mercedes Benz (valued at approximately $300,000) were stolen (Charge 21, burglary; Charge 22, theft; Charge 23, theft of a motor vehicle). The sentencing judge described the house as ‘ransacked’ and noted that items worth more than $100,000 were stolen.[5]
[5]Ibid [37].

When the applicant and his co-offender were arrested on 3 May 2016, various drugs were found in their possession (Charge 24, possession of a drug of dependence - methylamphetamine; Charge 25, possession of drug of dependence -cannabis; Charge 26, possession of drug of dependence - ecstasy; summary charge - committing an indictable offence whilst on bail).

The applicant was also charged with offences relating to handling stolen goods and dealing with property suspected of being proceeds of crime (Charges 27 and 28; summary charge).

Between 27 April 2016 and 2 May 2016 the applicant and his co-offender were both seen in CCTV footage driving a stolen white Ford Falcon sedan (Charge 29, theft of a motor vehicle).

As noted above, the applicant was granted bail on 11 April 2016 with conditions, including that he reside at a particular address. The applicant failed to reside at his bail address (summary charge - breaching bail condition).

Judge’s Reasons

After describing the offending, the sentencing judge identified a number of mitigating factors he had taken into account. He noted that the applicant had pleaded guilty at an early stage and had cooperated with the authorities.[6] He believed that the applicant was genuinely remorseful and noted that he had no prior convictions, sentencing him as a person of previously good character.[7]
[6]Ibid [45].
[7]Ibid.

The sentencing judge observed that the applicant had a ‘disruptive’ childhood, as both his parents were drug users.[8] His parents had a tumultuous relationship and separated in 2013.[9] The sentencing judge noted that the applicant’s parents and siblings had been engaged in criminal activity, but that the applicant had distanced himself from that behaviour until 2016.[10] The applicant was educated until the age of 15, then began a plastering apprenticeship. He had a good work record and had been continuously employed until late 2015.[11] The applicant became estranged from his family in late 2015, and he began to use ice more frequently (having used it spasmodically before this time).[12]
[8]Ibid [46].
[9]Ibid.
[10]Ibid.
[11]Ibid.
[12]Ibid [48].

The sentencing judge described the applicant’s life as having ‘spiralled out of control’ at the time of the offending.[13] He noted that the applicant was homeless and using ice heavily at the time of the offending, and that he had little memory of the offending.[14] The sentencing judge stated that the applicant had used his time in custody constructively, and that he believed the applicant had good prospects of rehabilitation.[15] He observed that the applicant was a young offender, and that he had applied the principles relevant to sentencing a young person, but stated that the application of the principles was tempered by the ‘serious nature and grand scale’ of the offending.[16]
[13]Ibid [49].
[14]Ibid.
[15]Ibid.
[16]Ibid [53].

The sentencing judge described the offending as ‘very serious indeed’, comprising a large number of offences over a relatively short period of time.[17] He noted that the offending was motivated by a desire to feed an ice habit, and that the applicant’s offending was aggravated by the fact that he was on bail.[18] The sentencing judge considered a number of victim impact statements, which demonstrated that the victims felt disturbed and vulnerable as a result of the offending.[19] The sentencing judge stated that he had regard to the victim impact statements, but that they had not overwhelmed the other relevant sentencing considerations.[20] He noted that he had taken into account the applicant’s guilty plea when considering the victim impact statements.[21]
[17]Ibid [54].
[18]Ibid.
[19]Ibid [55]-[58].
[20]Ibid [59].
[21]Ibid.

The sentencing judge stated that he had regard to the principle of parity when sentencing the offenders, and that where they had committed the same offence in similar circumstances he had imposed the same penalty.[22] He stated that the applicant had greater involvement in the theft of a Mercedes Benz (Charge 23), and that he had taken this into account.[23] The sentencing judge also had regard to the principle of totality, noting that the individual sentences must be within the appropriate range, but that the aggregate sentence must also be a just and appropriate measure of the total criminality involved.[24] The sentencing judge also had regard to s 16(3C) of the Sentencing Act 1991, concerning the commission of offences whilst on bail.[25]
[22]Ibid [62].
[23]Ibid.
[24]Ibid [63].
[25]Ibid.

The sentencing judge then sentenced the applicant as set out above at [1] and in the annexure to these reasons.

Grounds of Appeal

The applicant relies on two grounds of appeal:[26]
[26]On the hearing of the renewal of the application for leave to appeal, the applicant abandoned two other grounds which were as follows:
Ground 3: The sentencing judge erred in receiving and taking into account the victim impact statements.
Ground 4: The sentencing judge erred in cumulating one month of the sentence imposed in Charge 27 as this amounted to double punishment contrary to Pearce v The Queen (1998) 194 CLR 610.

Ground 1: The total effective sentence, the non-parole period and the individual sentences imposed on charges 1-5, 6-8, 9, 11, 16, 18 were manifestly excessive in light of the following matters:

(a) the circumstances of the offences;

(b) the early plea of guilty;

(c) the limited period of offending;

(d) the applicant’s youth, deprived upbringing, excellent work history, previous good character, remorse and good prospects for rehabilitation.[27]

Ground 2: The judge erred in reducing the mitigating weight given to the applicant’s youth because of ‘the serious nature and grand scale of this offending’.

[27]On the hearing of the renewal of the application for leave to appeal, the applicant abandoned a fifth particular that in relation to Charge 27, the applicant had been sentenced to a partially cumulative sentence of 12 months on Charge 22 for the theft of the same items.

On the hearing of the renewal of the application for leave to appeal, the applicant accepted that Ground 2 was little more than a particular of Ground 1 and that although he did not abandon particulars (a)-(c), particular (d) of Ground 1 was the focus for the application for leave.

Grounds 1 and 2 – Manifest excess and the role of the applicant’s youth in sentencing him

The applicant submits that a number of the sentences imposed were manifestly excessive, and that as a result the non-parole period and total effective sentence are also manifestly excessive.

The applicant objects to the sentencing judge’s characterisation of his offending as being of a ‘serious nature and grand scale’.[28] He submits that the offending was neither notably serious nor grand in scale, and that the weight given to his youth should not have been reduced. The applicant submits that there was no reason for other considerations to be given greater prominence in sentencing. He further submits that his offending was not of the sort requiring youth to be mitigated. While he accepted that a term of imprisonment was warranted he rhetorically asks: how much was the sentence tempered given his youth?
[28]Sentence Reasons [14].

He particularly notes the following offences:

(a) In relation to Charges 1-5 (theft of a motor vehicle, theft of petrol, handling stolen items) and 6-8 (theft of petrol, handling stolen goods (credit cards)), the applicant submits that the charges are low-end offences of dishonesty, committed by a youthful offender with no prior convictions over a two day period. The applicant emphasises that he had lapsed into drug dependence following a personal crisis, and had shown considerable strength of character before that time.

(b) The applicant also highlights his early guilty plea, his remorse, and his good prospects of rehabilitation. He submits that in those circumstances, the imposition of custodial sentences was disproportionate to the offending.

(c) In relation to Charges 9 and 11 (theft of motor vehicle), the applicant submits that given the charges involve the use of a previously stolen car on the same occasion, and that the vehicles were subsequently recovered, the sentences imposed were outside the range of sentences that may be imposed.

(d) In relation to Charge 16 (burglary), the applicant submits that the offence was a ‘straightforward’ burglary of an empty house, and the sentence of 18 months imposed was outside the range in all the circumstances.

(e) In relation to Charge 18 (aggravated burglary), the applicant submits that the offence was at the lowest end of the range, and that the sentence imposed was therefore manifestly excessive. The applicant submits that as a result of this sentence being the base sentence, the total effective sentence and non-parole period are also manifestly excessive.

The respondent notes that the Court has repeatedly emphasised the difficulty of making good an argument of manifest excess, requiring the applicant to demonstrate that ‘something has gone obviously, plainly and badly wrong in the exercise of the sentencing discretion’.[29] For an argument of manifest excess to succeed, the sentence must be ‘wholly outside the range’.[30]
[29]Relying on Ayol v The Queen [2014] VSCA 151, [30] (Maxwell P) quoting Clarkson v The Queen (2011) 32 VR 361, 384 [89] (Maxwell ACJ, Nettle, Neave, Redlich and Harper JJA); Morgan v The Queen [2014] VSCA 303 [20] (Priest JA, Neave and Kyrou JJA agreeing); Hanks v The Queen [2011] VSCA 7 [22] (Bongiorno JA, Redlich JA agreeing).
[30]DPP v Karazisis (2010) 31 VR 634, 662-3.

The respondent submits that it is not appropriate to analyse the sentencing process in a ‘piecemeal’ fashion, as the applicant has sought to do, and that the sentences in this case are ‘entirely unexceptional’.

The respondent notes that the sentencing judge expressly stated that he had applied the principles relating to the sentencing of youthful offenders,[31] and contends that the characterisation of the offending as serious was open to the judge. The respondent submits that the judge’s language does not demonstrate that he gave other factors more prominence than the mitigating effect of the applicant’s youth, rather that the factors were balanced.
[31]Sentence Reasons [53].

If he is to succeed, the applicant must establish that the sentence that was imposed was wholly outside the range of sentencing options available to the judge. In our view, the applicant has failed to demonstrate this. The judge considered all of the matters relevant to his sentencing task, giving each the weight that he thought it warranted. The judge’s process and reasoning do not disclose any error on his part in arriving at the sentence. Rather, the judge dealt appropriately with all of the mitigating factors raised by the applicant and weighed them with the gravity of the offences and other sentencing considerations. In particular, when regard is had not only to the applicant’s youth (about which we will say more a little later in these reasons) but also to the seriousness of the offences, his persistence in offending (albeit over only a few weeks) and that some offences were committed while he was on bail, it is apparent that the sentence that was imposed was a sentence that was open.

In sentencing, the judge had regard to the particular matters raised by the applicant in respect of Ground 1.

For a start, the judge described the circumstances of each offence.[32] As described above, the judge then took into account the applicant’s early plea of guilty,[33] his co-operation with the authorities,[34] his remorse,[35] that he had no prior convictions,[36] his personal circumstances,[37] that at the time of the offending the applicant’s life ‘had spiralled out of control,’[38] the applicant’s good behaviour in custody and good prospects of rehabilitation,[39] his youth,[40] that the offences were committed over a relatively short period of time,[41] that the principal of totality was important in respect of the sentence to be imposed on the applicant[42] and that given there were so many individual offences ‘moderate and appropriate individual sentences with a degree of cumulation to take into account various incidents or episodes of offending’ were to be imposed.[43]
[32]Ibid [10]-[44].
[33]Ibid [45].
[34]Ibid.
[35]Ibid.
[36]Ibid.
[37]Ibid [46]-[48].
[38]Ibid [49].
[39]Ibid.
[40]Ibid [53].
[41]Ibid [54].
[42]Ibid [63].
[43]Ibid [70].

So far as youth is concerned, clearly an offender’s youth is a powerful mitigating factor. In Azzopardi v R,[44] Redlich JA summarised the underlying reasons for this as follows:

First, young offenders being immature are therefore ‘more prone to ill-considered or rash decisions’. They ‘may lack the degree of insight, judgment and self-control that is possessed by an adult’. They may not fully appreciate the nature, seriousness and consequences of their criminal conduct….
Secondly, courts ‘recognise the potential for young offenders to be redeemed and rehabilitated’. This potential exists because young offenders are typically still in a stage of mental and emotional development and may be more open to influences designed to positively change their behaviour than adults who have established patterns of anti-social behaviour. No doubt because of this potential, it has been stated that the rehabilitation of young offenders, ‘is one of the great objectives of the criminal law’. The added emphasis for the purposes of sentencing on realisation of a young offender’s potential to be rehabilitated is further justified because of the community’s interest in such rehabilitation, not only at a theoretical level, but because the effective rehabilitation of a young offender protects the community from further offending….
Thirdly, courts sentencing young offenders are cognisant that the effect of incarceration in an adult prison on a young offender will more likely impair, rather than improve, the offender’s prospects of successful rehabilitation. While in prison a youthful offender is likely to be exposed to corrupting influences which may entrench in that young person criminal behaviour, thereby defeating the very purpose for which punishment is imposed. Imprisonment for any substantial period carries with it the recognised risk that anti-social tendencies may be exacerbated. The likely detrimental effect of adult prison on a youthful offender has adverse flow-on consequences for the community….[45]

[44](2011) 35 VR 43 (‘Azzopardi’).

[45]Ibid 53–54 [34]–[36] (footnotes omitted).

Redlich JA went on to consider the effect that crimes which are particularly serious or persistent have on these matters.[46] In short, the serious nature of an offence or persistence in offending are matters that may lessen the impact of the offender’s youth in determining the sentence that may be imposed. Youthfulness is not disregarded. Indeed, it is often an important factor. Nevertheless, other sentencing considerations may weigh more heavily in the particular circumstances of the case.
[46]Ibid 55-56 [37]–[40].

Here, the judge specifically referred to and took into account the applicant’s youth. He said:

As you are a relatively young man the principles relevant to the sentence of a person of a young age are relevant and I have applied them, however they are tempered by the serious nature and grand scale of this offending. [47]

[47]Sentence Reasons [53].

We detect no error in the judge’s approach to and treatment of the applicant’s youth as a sentencing consideration in the circumstances of this case. It was open to the judge to describe the offending as of ‘a serious nature and grand scale.’ The applicant persisted in his offending, even when he was on bail.

The base sentence was set in respect of Charge 18 which is described in brief terms above at [12]. As outlined, the offence was one of aggravated burglary committed in the early morning hours when Mr and Ms Phipps and their two year old child were sleeping. The gravity of that offence should not be underestimated. The judge noted the seriousness of the offence and observed that Mr Phipps was woken by the sound of a thud when the applicant entered their home which ‘was no doubt a very distressing experience for the victim and his family.’[48] Contrary to the applicant’s submission, his offending in respect of that charge is not properly described as at ‘the lowest end of the range.’ Rather, it is certainly open to the description the judge used as being of a ‘serious nature and grand scale.’[49] The repetitive nature of the offences is disturbing.
[48]Ibid [71].
[49]Ibid [53].

As Ashley JA observed when refusing leave to appeal, ‘the individual sentences imposed for the group of offences comprehended by charges 1 to 5 were individually modest; whilst the total cumulation ordered in respect of that group of offences was two months only.’[50]
[50]Appeal Reasons [12].

Charges 6 to 8 each attracted a sentence of one month only. We would not interfere with those sentences as they are not wholly outside the range of sentence that might properly be imposed. In any event, we note that those individual sentences do not impact upon the total effective sentence as no cumulation was ordered in respect of any of them.

Similarly, the individual sentences on Charges 9, 11 and 16 are not wholly outside the range. The cumulation of two months on each of Charges 9 and 11 and four months on Charge 16 do not suggest that the exercise of the sentencing discretion has gone awry.

In addition to the matters raised by the applicant in respect of his first ground, the judge properly took into account other sentencing considerations including the need for specific and general deterrence, denunciation of the applicant’s conduct and the effect of his crimes on his victims.[51] Having weighed up the various factors the judge arrived at a sentence which was not manifestly excessive.
[51]Sentence Reasons [65]-[67].

The applicant’s grounds of appeal must fail.

Conclusion

The application for leave to appeal will be refused.

ANNEXURE - SENTENCE

Charge on Indictment	Offence	Maximum	Sentence	Cumulation
1.	Theft [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	9 months	2 months
2.	Theft [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	1 month	-
3.	Handling Stolen Goods [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	15 years [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	6 months	-
4.	Handling Stolen Goods [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	15 years [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	6 months	-
5.	Handling Stolen Goods [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	15 years [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	3 months	-
6.	Theft [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	1 month	-
7.	Obtain Property by Deception [s 81 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 81 Crimes Act 1958]	1 month	-
8.	Obtain Property by Deception [s 81 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 81 Crimes Act 1958]	1 month	-
9.	Theft [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	9 months	2 months
10.	Obtain Property by Deception [s 81 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 81 Crimes Act 1958]	2 months	-
11.	Theft [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 months	2 months
12.	Attempt to Obtain Property by Deception [s 81 & 321M Crimes Act 1958]	5 years [s 321P Crimes Act 1958]	1 month	-
13.	Handling Stolen Goods [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	15 years [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	6 months	1 month
14.	Handling Stolen Goods [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	15 years [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	6 months	1 month
15.	Handling Stolen Goods [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	15 years [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	6 months	1 month
16.	Burglary [s 76 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 76 Crimes Act 1958]	18 months	4 months
17.	Theft [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	12 months	1 month
18.	Aggravated Burglary [s 77 Crimes Act 1958]	25 years [s 77 Crimes Act 1958]	30 months	Base
19.	Theft [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	6 months	-
20.	Handling Stolen Goods [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	15 years [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	6 months	-
21.	Burglary [s 76 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 76 Crimes Act 1958]	18 months	4 months
22.	Theft [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	12 months	1 month
23.	Theft [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	14 months	2 months
24.	Possession of a Drug of Dependence (Methylamphetamine) [s 73 Drugs, Poisons & Controlled Substances Act 1981]	1 year or fine of not more than 30 penalty units or both [s 73(1)(b) Drugs, Poisons & Controlled Substances Act 1981]	1 month	-
25.	Possession of a Drug of Dependence (Cannabis L) [s 73 Drugs, Poisons & Controlled Substances Act 1981]	5 penalty units [s 73(1) Drugs, Poisons & Controlled Substances Act 1981]	Fine $250	-
26.	Possession of a Drug of Dependence (MDMA) [s 73 Drugs, Poisons & Controlled Substances Act 1981]	1 year or fine of not more than 30 penalty units or both [s 73(1)(b) Drugs, Poisons & Controlled Substances Act 1981]	1 month	-
27.	Handling Stolen Goods [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	15 years [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	9 months	1 month
28.	Handling Stolen Goods [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	15 years [s 88 Crimes Act 1958]	4 months	-
29.	Theft [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	10 years [s 74 Crimes Act 1958]	9 months	2 months
Uplifted Summary offences
Informant HILL
15.	Commit an indictable offence whilst on bail [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	1 month	-
17.	Commit an indictable offence whilst on bail [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	1 month	-
20.	Commit an indictable offence whilst on bail [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	1 month	-
28.	Commit an indictable offence whilst on bail [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	1 month	-
30.	Commit an indictable offence whilst on bail [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	1 month	-
33.	Commit an indictable offence whilst on bail [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	2 months	-
36.	Commit an indictable offence whilst on bail [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	2 months	-
40.	Commit an indictable offence whilst on bail [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	1 month	-
53.	Commit an indictable offence whilst on bail [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	1 month	-
54.	Breach bail condition [s 30A(1) Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30A(1) Bail Act 1977]	1 month	-
55.	Commit an indictable offence whilst on bail [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	3 months or 30 penalty units [s 30B Bail Act 1977]	1 month	-
58.	Deal with property suspected of being proceeds of crime [s 195 Crimes Act 1958]	2 years [s 195 Crimes Act 1958]	3 months	-
Total Effective Sentence		4 years 6 months
Non-Parole Period:		2 years 6 months
(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991Pre-Sentence detention declaration pursuant to s 18:		275 days
6AAA Statement: 7 years with a non-parole period of 5 years
Other relevant orders: Disposal Order; Forfeiture Order.

[2017] VSCA 239

6 September 2017