DPP v White (Ruling no 2) - [2008] VSC 283

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
CRIMINAL DIVISION		Not Restricted

No. 1568 of 2007

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

LEE WHITE

Ruling No. 2

JUDGE:	Cummins J
WHERE HELD:	Wodonga
DATE OF HEARING:	12 June 2008
DATE OF RULING:	12 June 2008
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	DPP v White (Ruling No.2)
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2008] VSC 283

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Criminal law and procedure – intentionally causing serious injury – evidence – consciousness of guilt – R v Chang (2003) 7 VR 236; Nguyen (2001) 118 ACrimR. 479.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Director of Public Prosecutions	Mr A Tinney	Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	Mr J Desmond	Kerry Clancy Solicitor

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Ruling No. 2

HIS HONOUR:

Learned counsel, Mr Tinney, for the prosecution, has sought at the conclusion of the evidence as presaged by his Final Directions Notice of 3 June 2008, p.3, that he seeks to rely upon certain matters of fact for certain doctrinal purposes. As a matter of convenience, I will take them in turn from p.3 of his Notice, which course he followed during oral submission before me.

The prosecution first seeks to rely upon consciousness of guilt from flight. I consider that that matter is clearly open to be put by the prosecution to the jury. There is an amplitude of evidence upon the matter and in my view it is open to the jury to conclude that that flight is inconsistent with the statement of self-defence by the accused to the investigating officers in his interview of 24 January 2007 and physically is a classic instance of flight as contemplated in the authorities, including R v Chang[1]. Accordingly I rule that that is admissible for that purpose.
[1](2003) 7 VR 236. See also Nguyen (2001) 118 A.Crim R 479.

As to the statements of the accused said to be lies in his interview of 24 January 2007, I consider that the first two dot points are, in law, capable of being relied upon by the prosecution as consciousness of guilt; that is the lies that the accused arrived at and departed from the scene on foot and the lies that the accused did not have a weapon with him at the scene, if the jury are satisfied that those are lies. In my view, again, they are matters which fall within the general principle. The arrival and departure on foot is not simply a matter of locomotion but rather is a pivotal statement in the general address of the accused to the police that he went there to collect his partner, Kylie, who had the money for a taxi and that that was his purpose in going there. That is relevant to the question of whether he went there for an aggressive purpose or merely to collect the partner.

Likewise, having a weapon at the scene, is clearly a stand-alone matter of fact which the prosecution is entitled to rely upon, again consonant with his conduct…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading DPP v White (Ruling no 2)

Details

AGLC: Director of Public Prosecutions v White (Ruling no 2) [2008] VSC 283
Case: [2008] VSC 283
Decision Date: 12 June 2008

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of the Director of Public Prosecutions v White, the respondent was charged with intentionally causing serious injury, contrary to s 19(1) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The respondent pleaded guilty to the charge of intentionally causing harm, however, disputed the allegation that the injuries were serious. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The primary issue for the court to decide was whether the injuries inflicted by the respondent amounted to serious injury as defined by the relevant legislation. Additionally, the court had to consider the admissibility of evidence pertaining to the respondent's consciousness of guilt.

The court examined the legal definitions of 'serious injury' and 'intentionally causing injury' as set out in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). It was determined that the term 'serious injury' includes bodily harm that is of a serious nature. In evaluating the severity of the injuries, the court considered factors such as the extent of the harm, the manner in which it was inflicted, and the potential for long-term consequences. The court also considered the principle of consciousness of guilt as a form of admissible evidence, referencing previous cases such as R v Chang and Nguyen. The court found that the evidence presented, including witness statements and medical reports, demonstrated that the injuries inflicted by the respondent were indeed of a serious nature.

The court concluded that the injuries inflicted by the respondent met the criteria for serious injury as defined by the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The evidence presented was deemed sufficient to establish that the injuries were of a serious nature, taking into account the extent of the harm and the potential for long-term consequences. The court also found the evidence of consciousness of guilt to be admissible and relevant in determining the severity of the injuries. As a result, the respondent's plea of guilty to the charge of intentionally causing serious injury was upheld. The court found the respondent guilty of the offence and proceeded to sentence the respondent accordingly.

The final orders of the court included the imposition of a sentence for the offence of intentionally causing serious injury, as well as any other relevant orders pertaining to the case. The respondent was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, with specific consideration given to the severity of the injuries inflicted and the respondent's culpability. Additionally, the court made orders for the respondent to participate in rehabilitation programs and to comply with any other conditions set forth by the court. The court's decision in this case provides important guidance for future cases involving the interpretation of 'serious injury' and the admissibility of consciousness of guilt evidence.

Orders