DPP v Weiss

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1464 of 2001

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
BOHDAN WEISS

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Ruling No. 8

JUDGE:

Cummins J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF RULING:

18 February 2002

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Bohdan Weiss

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2002] VSC 27

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Criminal law and procedure – murder – application by defence to discharge jury – one juror residing in area of offence – risk of juror being oppressed by evidence as to characteristics of area of offence – application by prosecution pursuant to s. 43(d) and s. 44(1) Juries Act 2000 for discharge of individual juror only – risk of infection of balance of jury – application by prosecution refused – jury discharged without verdict.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the DPP Mr P. Faris QC OPP
For the Accused Mr C. Lovitt QC Victoria Legal Aid

HIS HONOUR:

  1. On Friday, as appears at p.682 of the transcript, I informed counsel that my Tipstaff had been informed by a member of the jury of two matters.  The first was that the juror lives in the Doveton area, in the vicinity of the then home of the deceased - the juror not having moved into that area until early 1996 and the killing having taken place in November 1994.  The second was that the juror believed that she may have previously seen the accused, and some other persons who last week were in the court, but she was unsure whether she had or not.  She had not had any dealings with the accused or any other person she had seen in court.

  1. Accordingly, I informed counsel of those matters and asked counsel to consider the situation over the weekend. 

  1. Had the problem remained simply a problem as to knowledge of witnesses in person or by reputation, I would have followed the course which I expressed on Friday of waiting and seeing; that is, to wait and see whether the juror knew personally or by reputation any witness who was called.  If she did, the likelihood then would have been that I would have discharged not only the juror but the jury. Had the problem remained thus confined, I would not have considered there presently existed the need to discharge the juror or the jury.

  1. However, as has become apparent during discussions this morning with counsel, the question is now revealed to be not simply one of the juror's knowledge of individual witnesses, but rather one of the juror's knowledge of and association with the area of the killing.  That is because, as I apprehend it, it is going to be put by the defence or otherwise arise during the trial that in Doveton there were and are various named and unnamed persons, one or more of whom is to be called as witnesses but others will not be, who are dangerous, threatening and criminal.  There will be evidence in the trial from one source or another of…

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Details
Case
[2002] VSC 27
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of DPP v Weiss, the matter was heard in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The defendant, Weiss, was charged with murder and the dispute centred on the composition and conduct of the jury during the trial. The defence sought to discharge the jury based on the argument that one juror resided in the vicinity of the crime and could potentially be influenced by the evidence regarding the area's characteristics. In response, the prosecution applied under sections 43(d) and 44(1) of the Juries Act 2000 to discharge only the individual juror in question, arguing that the risk of bias could infect the balance of the jury.

The court was required to determine whether the entire jury should be discharged or if it was permissible to remove just the juror suspected of bias. The legal issues involved balancing the defendant's right to a fair trial with the statutory provisions governing the discharge of jurors. The court examined whether the presence of a potentially biased juror warranted a discharge of the entire jury or if the statutory framework allowed for a partial discharge. Furthermore, the court had to consider the implications of discharging a single juror, including the risk of the remaining jurors being influenced by external information.

The court concluded that discharging the entire jury was necessary to preserve the integrity of the trial. It held that while the statutory provisions permitted the discharge of an individual juror, the risk of the remaining jurors being influenced by the discharged juror was too great. The court found that the risk of bias infecting the balance of the jury was significant enough to necessitate a complete discharge. Consequently, the application by the prosecution to discharge only the individual juror was refused, and the jury was ultimately discharged without reaching a verdict.

As a result, the case was set for a retrial with a new jury. The court's decision underscored the importance of maintaining the impartiality and independence of the jury in criminal proceedings, especially in cases involving serious charges such as murder.

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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