DPP v Selway (Ruling no 20)

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No. 1524 of 2004

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
v
DAVID MAXWELL SELWAY

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Ruling No. 20

JUDGE:

CUMMINS J

WHERE HELD:

Melbourne

DATE OF HEARING:

5 May 2007

DATE OF RULING:

5 May 2007

CASE MAY BE CITED AS:

DPP v Selway

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2007] VSC 250

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Criminal law and procedure – murder – further application for discharge of jury, on ground of jury’s questions – questions do not offend Dyers v R [2002] 210 CLR 285 - application refused.

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APPEARANCES:

Counsel Solicitors
For the DPP Mr M Gamble, SC
Ms S Pillai
Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused

Mr P Faris, QC
Mr I Hayden

Rainer Ellinghaus

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HIS HONOUR:

  1. I have before me a second application by learned senior counsel Mr Faris for the discharge of the jury.  The application has helpfully been articulated by an email overnight which I will place on the court file.  Mr Faris at least in part in his oral submissions to me this morning relies upon that submission, and for that reason also I will place it on the file.

  1. I refuse the application to discharge the jury.

  1. The jury retired to consider its verdict at 2.45 pm on Friday 4 May 2007.  At 5.25 pm the jury sent out two written questions.  I sent the jury away for the night, essentially to give counsel the opportunity to consider the questions.  Overnight by email, and orally when we resumed this morning, Saturday 5 May shortly before 9.00 am, Mr Faris applied for the discharge of the jury, which application I refused.  I have just brought the jury into court and given them the direction appended to this Ruling as Annexure “A”.  I now state my reasons for refusing the application to discharge the jury.

  1. In Ruling No. 19 I refused a defence application to discharge the jury based upon what Mr Gamble put to the jury late on Monday afternoon as stated in transcript and which he then recanted on Tuesday morning.  That is a matter of record.  It is rehearsed in Ruling No. 19.  I then directed the jury in unequivocal terms completely to disregard the assertion of Mr Gamble on the Monday night and which he recanted on the Tuesday morning and I have no doubt the jury would accept and act upon that direction.  I append to this Ruling, as Annexure “B”, that jury direction.

  1. Mr Faris, for very understandable forensic reasons, commenced his final address on Wednesday morning with a strong attack upon Mr Gamble having made the proposition that Mr Deering was a co-murderer and his then withdrawing it.  In my directions to the jury I had made it entirely clear that Mr Gamble's Monday afternoon assertion must be completely put aside by the jury.  At no stage have I suggested to the jury that Mr Faris' strong attack on Mr Gamble's incorrect statement - as I called it "totally wrong"…

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Details
Case
[2007] VSC 250
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case involved the Director of Public Prosecutions versus Selway, a matter heard in the High Court of Australia. The dispute centred on the defendant's application for the jury to be discharged on the basis that the questions they posed during deliberation were improper. Selway argued that the questions were so inappropriate that they breached the principles set out in Dyers v R, which provide guidelines for acceptable jury inquiries.

The court was tasked with determining whether the jury's questions warranted a discharge, specifically assessing if they offended the principles articulated in Dyers v R. The legal issue revolved around interpreting these principles and applying them to the specific context of the jury's questions to ascertain whether there was sufficient cause to discharge the jury. The court had to balance the defendant's right to a fair trial with the procedural integrity of the jury's deliberation process.

After examining the jury's questions in detail, the court concluded that they did not contravene the criteria established in Dyers v R. The questions were deemed to be within the bounds of permissible inquiry, and the jury's process was not fundamentally flawed. Consequently, the application for discharge was denied. The court's reasoning emphasised the importance of allowing juries to seek clarification on matters that are relevant to their understanding of the case, so long as these inquiries are not misdirected or prejudicial.

The court ordered that the jury's deliberation would continue, and no discharge would be granted. This ruling affirmed the integrity of the jury process while ensuring that the defendant's rights were protected within the established legal framework.

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