| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 1486 of 2005
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS | Appellant |
| v | |
| HEATHER KATHLEEN O’ROURKE | Respondent |
---
JUDGE: | BELL J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 27 February 2006 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 27 February 2006 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v O’Rourke | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2006] VSC 150 | |
---
Criminal law – road traffic offences – driving under the influence – “prescribed concentration of alcohol” – “any concentration of alcohol” – elements of offence – particulars of offence – appeal – error of law - Road Safety Act 1986, ss 3(1), 49(1)(b) and (f), 52(2).
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr C. Beale | Stephen Carisbrooke, Acting Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Respondent | Mr W. Walsh-Buckley | Andrianakis (Stephen) & Associates |
HIS HONOUR:
On 19 May 2005 a magistrate dismissed drink driving charges brought by the police against Heather O'Rourke. The basis of his Honour's decision was that there was no evidence upon which Ms O'Rourke could be convicted of the charges brought against her. His Honour upheld a no case submission made by counsel for Ms O'Rourke to that effect.
Drink driving is a serious social evil as counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Beale, correctly submitted. There was evidence before the magistrate that Ms O'Rourke had been driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.175 per cent. In the case before the magistrate it was not contended that that reading was inaccurate. I view with considerable cause for concern the fact that Ms O'Rourke may have been driving with a blood alcohol content of that level. Nonetheless it is my duty, as it was the magistrate’s, to determine whether or not, on the case brought by the prosecution, she was capable of being convicted of the charges brought against her.
The first charge brought against Ms O'Rourke was:
"The defendant at Malvern East on 20/12/05 did drive a motor vehicle while more than the prescribed concentration of alcohol was present in her blood being any concentration of alcohol whatever (alleged reading 0.175)."
The charge and summons described this offence to be an offence against s.49(1)(b) of the Road Safety Act 1986. The offence was further described in the charge and summons in these terms:
"Drive while exceeding P.C.A. (.00 per cent) 86/127 s.49(1)(b)."
The second charge brought against Ms O'Rourke was:
"The defendant at Malvern East on 20/12/03 did within three hours after driving a motor vehicle, furnish a sample of breath for analysis by breath analysing instrument pursuant to s.55 of the Road Safety Act 1986 and the result of the analysis recorded or shown by the breath analysing instrument indicated that more than prescribed concentration of alcohol being any concentration of alcohol was present in her blood and the concentration of alcohol indicated by the analysis to be present in her blood was not due solely to the consumption of alcohol after driving or being in charge of the motor vehicle…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read DPP v O'Rourke and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2006] VSC 150
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered that the particulars of the offence should accurately reflect the elements of the offence as set out in the statute. The Road Safety Act 1986 specifies different penalties for driving with any concentration of alcohol compared to driving with the prescribed concentration of 0.08 grams in 100 millilitres. The court held that the particulars of the offence, which only stated "any concentration of alcohol," did not correctly identify the specific offence under the Act. This led to an error of law in the particulars of the charge, which was considered to be a fundamental defect. Consequently, the conviction was quashed, and the matter was remitted to the Magistrates' Court for rehearing with correct particulars.
The Supreme Court concluded that the error in the particulars of the offence was an error of law, and therefore quashed the conviction. The matter was remitted to the Magistrates' Court to be reheard with the appropriate particulars that correctly reflected the elements of the offence under the Road Safety Act 1986. The court did not make any further orders regarding the proceedings in the Magistrates' Court.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi