| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 9429 of 2007
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS (On behalf of Peter Dolheguy) | Appellant |
| v | |
| MARYLA JUCHNOWSKI | Respondent |
---
JUDGE: | Kyrou J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 26 May 2008 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 3 June 2008 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Juchnowski | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2008] VSC 181 | |
---
Appeal under s 92(1), Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) – dismissal of speeding charge under rule 20, Victorian Road Rules on the ground that the basis upon which the applicable speed limit is to be determined under rules 21 to 25 was not proved.
Scope of s 81(2), Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic) – proceedings for an offence to which s 66 of that Act applies where s 81(2) and a certificate under s 83A are relied upon to prove speed limit – whether Ciorra v Cole [2004] VSC 416 applies.
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Appellant | Mr T Gyorffy | Solicitor for Public Prosecutions |
| For the Respondent | Mr W J Walsh-Buckley | Stephen Andrianakas & Associates |
HIS HONOUR:
Introduction and summary
This is an appeal under s 92(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic) (“MC Act”) from a final order made on 15 October 2007 by the Magistrates’ Court at Melbourne, dismissing a speeding charge against the respondent, Maryla Juchnowski. The appellant is the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”), who has brought the appeal on behalf of the police informant, Peter Dolheguy.
The learned Magistrate dismissed the charge on the ground that the basis upon which the applicable speed limit is to be determined is a fact which must be proved by the prosecution and that that fact had not been proved.
For the reasons set out in this judgment, I have concluded that the learned Magistrate erred in law and that the appeal should be allowed.
Facts
Ms Juchnowski was charged with a contravention of rule 20 of the Victorian Road Rules, which relevantly provides as follows: “A driver must not drive at a speed over the speed-limit applying to the driver for the length of road where the driver is driving”. Rules 21 to 25 of the Road Rules set out the basis upon which the speed limit for a length of road is determined. For example, rule 21(1) provides that the speed limit applying for a length of road to which a speed limit sign applies is the number of kilometres per hour indicated by the number on the sign. Rule 22 deals with speed-limited areas, rule 23 deals with school zones, rule 24 deals with shared zones and rule 25 deals with default speed limits.
It is alleged that on 7 October 2006 at 3.58 pm, Ms Juchnowski was the driver of a vehicle travelling west on Flinders Street and that, at the intersection with William Street, she drove over the 50 kilometres per hour speed limit applicable to that length of road. The detected speed of the vehicle…
Continue reading DPP v Juchnowski
Sign in free to access the full text
- AGLC
- Director of Public Prosecutions v Juchnowski [2008] VSC 181
- Case
- [2008] VSC 181
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issues before the court were the interpretation and application of section 92(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1989 (Vic), which pertains to the dismissal of charges, and section 81(2) of the Road Safety Act 1986 (Vic), which governs the proof of speed limits in proceedings for road traffic offences. The court had to determine whether the defendant's challenge to the proof of the speed limit was valid under these sections and whether the lower court's reliance on Ciorra v Cole [2004] VSC 416 was appropriate.
The court examined the statutory framework and concluded that the lower court's decision to dismiss the charge was not supported by the correct interpretation of the relevant provisions. It held that the basis for determining the speed limit under rules 21 to 25 was adequately proved, and that the precedent set by Ciorra v Cole did not apply to the facts of this case. The appeal was allowed, and the charge against the defendant was reinstated.
Consequently, the court ordered that the original speeding charge against the defendant be reinstated, and the matter was to be returned to the Magistrates’ Court for further proceedings in accordance with the law.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Full text does not contain this section.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Full text does not contain this section.