DPP v Esso (Asutralia) Pty Ltd
[2003] VSC 406
•8 September 2003
| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
CRIMINAL DIVISION
No. 1484 of 2000
| DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS |
| v |
| ESSO (AUSTRALIA) PTY LTD |
---
JUDGE: | Cummins J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 8 September 2003 | |
DATE OF RULING: | 8 September 2003 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | DPP v Esso (Australia) Pty Ltd | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2003] VSC 406 | |
---
Crimes Compensation – s.85B Sentencing Act 1991 – Applications pursuant to s.85C(1)(a) Sentencing Act 1991 for leave to commence compensation proceeding out of time – Considerations applicable – Applications granted.
---
APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Applicants | Mr D. Hore-Lacy Q.C. | Maurice Blackburn Cashman |
| For the Respondent Esso (Australia) Pty Ltd | Mr D. Curtain Q.C. and Mr S. O'Meara | Middletons |
HIS HONOUR:
I have applications before me on behalf of each of the applicants, Haydn James Ward, now aged 16 and a half years and Katlyn Elizabeth Ward, now aged 15 years to apply pursuant to s.85D Sentencing Act 1991 for extension of time for instituting s.85B compensation proceedings, such applications being out of time. The convictions of the respondent were made on 28 June 2001. Under the Act, by s.85C(1)(a)applications for compensation pursuant to s.85B should have been filed within a year. They were filed some eleven months after that, namely 23 May 2003. Under s.85D(2) a Court may extend time for making application, before or after the statutory period of one year expires.
I have read Mr James Ward's affidavits in support of each of the applications, being sworn 22 May 2003 and in particular paragraph 7 thereof in each instance; and given the longitudinal effects upon the children as deposed to in the medical and psychological material, I consider that it is proper and appropriate to grant leave under s.85D(1) for the filing out of time and making out of time of these applications.
Mr Curtain, on behalf of the respondent company, very properly in my view, neither opposed nor supported the applications for leave out of time, but left it in the discretion of the court. There is no prejudice to the respondent company accruing from the granting of leave. In all the circumstances I consider, applying the criteria implicit in the Act, that it is proper and appropriate to grant the applications in each instance and I do so.
0
0
0