DPP v Brazel - [2003] VSC 95

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

Not Restricted

AT MELBOURNE

CRIMINAL DIVISION

No.1401 of 2003

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

GREGORY JOHN BRAZEL

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JUDGE:	CUMMINS J.
WHERE HELD:	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING:	14 February, 14 March 2003
DATE OF SENTENCE:	28 March 2003
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	DPP v BRAZEL
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2003] VSC 95

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CRIMINAL LAW – sentence – murder – execution – crime unsolved – accused voluntarily coming forward after 18 years and confessing – plea of guilty – considerations applicable – Sentencing Act 1991 ss 14(2), 16(1), 16(1A), 16(3B), 17(1) and 18(1) – R. v. Rumpf (1988) VR 466 – R. v. Rich (2002) VSCA 17 – life imprisonment – minimum term set.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Director	Mr W. Morgan-Payler Q.C. with Mr R. Elston	Kay Robertson, Office of Public Prosecutions
For the Accused	The accused in person

HIS HONOUR:

Mr Brazel, this is the third time I have sentenced you for murder.

On this occasion you have pleaded guilty to the murder at Mordialloc on 20 September 1982 of Mrs Mildred Hanmer. The crime was the execution for money of an innocent woman, and as such must be met by severe punishment. Mrs Hanmer at the time of her death was 50 years of age. Her death and its then known circumstances left her two daughters, then aged 13 and 11 years, devastated and bereft of their mother, and the daughters suffer from your crime to this day.

The crime for nearly 20 years remained unsolved. Then, wholly of your own decision and volition, you came forward to police and confessed your involvement in the crime. Subsequent intensive police and forensic investigation demonstrated that in confessing your part in the crime you were telling the truth. Having myself reviewed all the evidence, I am affirmatively satisfied of your truthfulness. The fact that you have now, wholly of your own volition, come forward, told the truth and solved the crime weighs significantly in your favour on the matter of sentence. Your late actions, however, do not undo the terrible effects of the actions you took in 1982.

The deceased and her husband, Mr Richard Hanmer, resided at Mount Eliza with their two daughters in 1982 whom as I have said were then 13 and 11 years of age. The deceased met her husband when he was visiting his first wife at the Frankston Community Hospital, where she (his first wife) was gravely ill. The deceased was a nurse at that hospital. Mr Hanmer’s first wife died and later the deceased and Mr Hanmer married. There was one child, a son, of Mr Hanmer’s first marriage, and who was 27 years of age at the time of the killing.

The deceased and Mr Hanmer were the proprietors of a hardware and giftware business at 77 Warren Road, Mordialloc which they had purchased in 1981. As part of that business, and operating at those premises, was a State Savings Bank agency and…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading DPP v Brazel

Details

AGLC: MacEwan Shaw v Shaw [2003] VSC 95
Case: [2003] VSC 95
Decision Date: 28 March 2003

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of the Director of Public Prosecutions v Brazel involved a long-unsolved murder case in which the defendant, Brazel, confessed to the crime 18 years after it occurred. Brazel voluntarily came forward and pleaded guilty, leading to sentencing proceedings before the court. The primary legal issue was to determine the appropriate sentence for the murder, considering the defendant's voluntary confession and plea of guilty after a significant period of time. The court had to consider various statutory provisions and case law to arrive at a suitable sentence.

The court examined sections 14(2), 16(1), 16(1A), 16(3B), 17(1), and 18(1) of the Sentencing Act 1991. It also referred to the cases of R. v. Rumpf (1988) VR 466 and R. v. Rich (2002) VSCA 17. The court had to weigh the gravity of the crime, the delay in confessing, and the defendant's voluntary surrender as mitigating factors. It also needed to consider the need for deterrence and the protection of society as aggravating factors. The court considered that the delay in confessing and the voluntary surrender were significant mitigating factors, but it also had to acknowledge the gravity of the crime.

After carefully considering all the circumstances, the court determined that life imprisonment was the appropriate sentence for the murder. The court set a minimum term for the imprisonment, reflecting the seriousness of the crime while also taking into account the mitigating factors. This decision recognised the defendant's voluntary confession and plea of guilty, as well as the need to balance the various considerations under the Sentencing Act 1991 and relevant case law. The court's reasoning and outcome demonstrated a balanced approach to sentencing in cases where the accused voluntarily comes forward after a long delay.

Orders