DISTRICT COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Dover v Mercantile Mutual Insurance (Aust) Ltd & Ors [2005] QDC 160
PARTIES:
BRIAN JOHN DOVER
Plaintiff
v
MERCANTILE MUTUAL INSURANCE (AUSTRALIA) LTD
First Defendant
and
GREGORY JAMES McCOSKER
Second Defendant
and
STATE OF QUEENSLAND
Third Defendant
FILE NO/S:
BD1004/2002
DIVISION:
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court, Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
10 June 2005
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
19 May 2005
JUDGE:
McGill DCJ
ORDER:
Applications dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
PRACTICE – Want of prosecution – delay - whether breach of implied undertaking to proceed expeditiously
UCPR r.5(4).
COUNSEL:
A J Macklin for the plaintiff
R C Morton for the second defendant
M J Burns for the third defendantSOLICITORS:
Keith Scott and Associates for the plaintiff
McInnes Wilson for the second defendant
Crown solicitor for the third defendant.
In this matter there are two applications, by the second and third defendants, to dismiss the plaintiff’s action for want of prosecution. Both applications are based on r 5, and are seeking the exercise of the power in r 5(4) to impose appropriate sanctions if a party does not comply with the implied undertaking to proceed in an expeditious way. It was submitted that the plaintiff had failed to comply with that implied undertaking.
There is a specific statutory power in this court to dismiss an action for want of prosecution if two years have passed since the last step.[1] Neither defendant sought to rely on this power, on the basis that there had been, less than two years ago, a mediation pursuant to an order of the court, which was the last step in the action. On 28 April 2003 I ordered, by consent, that the parties proceed to participate in and act reasonably and genuinely in a mediation, in the usual form. The date fixed was 19 June 2003. On 23 June 2003, the mediator appointed by that order filed a certificate that the procedure had finished and the parties had not resolved their dispute. My order of 28 April 2003 provided among other things that the proceeding was stayed until six business days after the mediator’s certificate was filed or further earlier order. I am content to proceed on the basis that in those circumstances the mediation was a step in the proceeding for the purposes of s 85(2), and accordingly the power conferred by that section is not available.
[1]Supreme Court of Queensland Act 1991 s 85.
It was not submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that, in the light of the express terms of s 85, this court did not have power under the UCPR to dismiss for want of prosecution unless there had been a period of two years since the last step was taken. There is authority that the power in r 5(4) extends to dismissal of a proceeding.[2] That matter concerned a proceeding in the Supreme Court, but it has subsequently been said that this power of dismissal is also conferred on the District Court.[3] On the other hand,…
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- Case
- [2005] QDC 160
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue the court had to determine was whether the appellant's delay in prosecuting the claim against the respondent constituted a breach of an implied undertaking to proceed with reasonable expedition. The court also needed to consider whether the respondent had waived any right to object to the delay. The court had to balance the principle of expedition in litigation against the need to allow parties reasonable time to prepare their cases.
The court held that the appellant's delay in prosecuting the claim did not amount to a breach of an implied undertaking to proceed expeditiously. The court found that the delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances and that the respondent had not objected to the delay in a timely manner, effectively waiving any right to do so. The court also noted that the delay did not prejudice the respondent's ability to defend the claim.
The court dismissed the applications, finding that the appellant had not breached any implied undertaking to proceed with reasonable expedition and that the respondent had waived any right to object to the delay. The court's decision was based on the principle that the delay must be unreasonable and prejudicial to the opposing party for it to amount to a breach of an implied undertaking to proceed expeditiously.
Orders
Orders of the court
Applications dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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