Doumbouya and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review)
[2021] AATA 880
•15 April 2021
Doumbouya and Secretary, Department of Social Services (Social services second review) [2021] AATA 880 (15 April 2021)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number: 2021/1098
Re:Lisa Doumbouya
APPLICANT
AndSecretary, Department of Social Services
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner
Date:15 April 2021
Place:Perth
The Tribunal refuses to grant the Applicant’s application to extend the time for the making of an application to the Tribunal for review of the AAT1 Decision dated 10 July 2019, because the Tribunal is not satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so pursuant to s 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
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Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner
CATCHWORDS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – extension of time – factors that are relevant when considering an extension of time – awareness of appeal rights and explanation for delay – length of delay – prejudice to the Respondent and general public – merits of the substantive application – whether alternative avenues of relief available to the Applicant – Tribunal not satisfied extension of time reasonable in all the circumstances – application for extension of time refused
LEGISLATION
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) – ss 2A(b), 2A(d), 9(1)(d), 29(1)(d), 29(2), 29(7)
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth)
Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth)
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth) – s 32CCASES
Angelakos v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2007) 100 ALD 9
Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 42 ATR 118
Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441
Crook and Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2007] AATA 1253
Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541
Hickey v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 47 ALR 517
Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344
Kuljic v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1994) 33 ALD 121
Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411
Re Hamilton and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2011) 121 ALD 202
Re Johnson and Commonwealth [1990] AATA 1
Re Kim and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 155
Re Mulheron and Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 23 ALD 309
Re Rollins and Principal Member of the Veterans’ Review Board (2011) 54 AAR 91
Seiler and Others v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 48 FCR 83
Sherwood and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] AATA 682
Tanoski and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] AATA 353
VQSL and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] AATA 294
Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 42 ATR 371SECONDARY SOURCES
Guide to Social Policy Law: Family Assistance Guide – para 6.4.1.30
REASONS FOR DECISION
Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner
15 April 2021
THE APPLICATION
The Applicant is seeking to apply for review of a decision of the Social Services and Child Support Division (AAT1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (Tribunal) dated
10 July 2019 (AAT1 Decision).
The AAT1 Decision affirmed the following three decisions (R2/Annexures B and C) of an Authorised Review Officer (ARO) of Services Australia (Centrelink), regarding the Applicant’s entitlement to Family Tax Benefit (FTB):
(a)a decision dated 5 July 2013 to reject the Applicant’s FTB lump sum claims for the financial years 2006/2007, 2007/2008, 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 (Decision 1); and
(b)a decision dated 24 January 2017 to not pay additional FTB for the 2012/2013 financial year (Decision 2) and for the 2013/2014 financial year (Decision 3).
BACKGROUND
The Applicant was notified of the AAT1 Decision in a letter dated 17 July 2019 sent by email (A3). The letter stated that the Applicant could apply to the Tribunal for a second review of the decision, but stated that, “[t]here are time limits for making an application for review (28 days after giving of the document setting out the terms of the AAT’s decision)”.
However, it was not until 25 February 2021 that the Applicant filed an application seeking review of the AAT1 Decision in the General Division of the Tribunal (AAT2), and an extension of time to apply for the review. An extension of time application was required because the 28-day time limit for filing the application had expired and at the time the Applicant’s application was filed it was 1 year, 6 months and 11 days late.
The Respondent opposes the extension of time.
An interlocutory hearing to determine the extension of time application was held on
8 April 2021. The Applicant represented herself and the Respondent was represented by Mr Tsao from Services Australia. The parties appeared by telephone.
THE ISSUE
The issue is whether the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to extend the time within which the Applicant’s application to the AAT2 to review the AAT1 Decision may be made.
RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Prescribed Time
A person seeking review of a decision must lodge an application with the Tribunal within the prescribed time of 28 days (ss 29(1)(d) and 29(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act).
Extension of Time
Section 29(7) of the AAT Act provides that:
The Tribunal may, upon application in writing by a person, extend the time for the making by that person of an application to the Tribunal for a review of a decision (including a decision made before the commencement of this section) if the Tribunal is satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so.
Section 29(7) of the AAT Act does not set out any principles which the Tribunal can refer to in order to be “satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances” to extend the time for making an application. However, relevant principles which the Tribunal may apply in assessing whether it is reasonable to grant an extension of time have been judicially considered.
A frequently cited authority is Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Minister for Home Affairs and Environment (1984) 3 FCR 344 (Hunter Valley), in which the Federal Court considered whether to grant an extension of time to allow the applicants to bring an application for judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) (ADJRA). In Hunter Valley, Wilcox J (at 348–9) set out principles that were intended to be “non-exhaustive guidelines” (see Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 42 ATR 118, 126–7 [32]–[34] per Hill J (Brown)) which may be relevant when considering whether to grant an extension of time. As stated by Wilcox J (at 348), the principles were intended “… to guide, not in any exhaustive manner, the exercise of the court’s discretion”.
These principles are substantially like those applied in decisions concerning s 29(7) of the AAT Act such as Re Mulheron and Australian Telecommunications Corporation (1991) 23 ALD 309 (Mulheron). In Mulheron at 314–15 [17]–[18], President O’Connor J applied the following principles considered by Deputy President Todd in Re Johnson and Commonwealth [1990] AATA 1 (Johnson):
(a)Prima facie proceedings commenced outside the prescribed period will not be entertained. An extension of time will be granted, however, if it is proper to do so.
(b)It is relevant whether the applicant rested on his rights or took action to make the decision-maker aware that the decision was being contested.
(c)Any prejudice to the respondent that would be caused by granting the extension of time is relevant.
(d)Any wider prejudice to the general public in terms of disruption to established practices is relevant.
(e)The merits of the substantial application are relevant.
(f)Fairness of granting the extension of time as between the applicant and other persons in a like position is relevant.
Some flexibility is permitted in applying the principles. In Mulheron, President O’Connor J stated, at 314 [18], that “[t]he balancing of these factors will depend on the individual case”. Thus, the facts and circumstances of a specific case may warrant attention being given to one or more of the principles over others, some of which may be less relevant, or not relevant at all. In Zizza v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 42 ATR 371, 376 [13], the Full Court of the Federal Court, when discussing the principles set out by Wilcox J in Hunter Valley, observed that: “[i]t would be an error to regard the summary as complete, or to treat each of the 6 principles it contains as necessarily applicable to any particular application for extension of time, especially an application under different legislation”.
Additionally, whether an applicant has an acceptable explanation for the delay will be relevant, but “… there is no rule that such an explanation is an essential pre-condition” to the success of the application for an extension of time (Comcare v A’Hearn (1993) 45 FCR 441, 444).
CONSIDERATION
Length of delay
As noted above at paragraph [4], the Applicant was 1 year, 6 months and 11 days late in lodging her application for review of the AAT1 Decision.
The Tribunal notes the following statement of French J (as he then was) in Seiler v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 48 FCR 83, 96. His Honour stated the following in the context of an extension of time application for review under the ADJRA:
The exercise of the discretion to extend time … must be informed by the purposes served by the statutory limitation and associated dispensing power. The limitation is directed to achieving certainty and finality in administrative decision-making. In the ordinary course, where a reviewable decision is taken, and the review procedure is not instituted within the prescribed period, the decision-maker is entitled to proceed on the basis that the decision stands and will not be called into question by way of judicial review. Finality and certainty are not ends in themselves, but means to the end of efficient administration.
The length of the delay of 1 year, 6 months and 11 days is significant. To grant an extension of time after such a delay may be inconsistent with the necessity of certainty and finality in administrative decision-making. This weighs against the Tribunal exercising its discretion to grant an extension of time.
Awareness of appeal rights and explanation for the delay
The Applicant was sent a letter by email dated 17 July 2019 attaching the AAT1 Decision which, as mentioned in paragraph [3] above, explained the 28-day period for making an application for further review.
At the interlocutory hearing on 8 April 2021, the Applicant agreed that she received the letter and was aware that she had 28 days to make an application for further review. She stated that she was trying to access a copy of her 2006/2007 FTB claim from the “MyGov” website which she needed for her appeal but had difficulty accessing it. The Applicant explained that she thought that there would be “no point” proceeding with her appeal unless she could obtain a copy of the document. The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant genuinely believed that this document was relevant to her review.
However, the document that the Applicant was trying to obtain, being a copy of the Applicant’s 2006/2007 FTB claim from the “MyGov” website, relates to a different claim made on 14 November 2006 (A4) that was not relevant to a review of the AAT1 Decision. A decision regarding this claim was made on 18 November 2006. The decision was that the Applicant was not entitled to any extra FTB (R2, Annexure F). However, that decision was not reviewed by an ARO, or by the AAT1 and therefore it is not currently before this Tribunal. That is, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to review it.
Nevertheless, the Tribunal finds that unsuccessfully trying to obtain a copy of a document that the Applicant genuinely thought was relevant to a further review is not a satisfactory explanation for the delay. As was noted by Mr Tsao during the interlocutory hearing, the Applicant could still have lodged an appeal on time and could have kept trying to obtain a copy of the document. Therefore, the Tribunal finds that this consideration weighs against the Tribunal exercising its discretion to grant the extension of time.
Prejudice to the Respondent or the General Public
The Tribunal is of the view that the Respondent would not be prejudiced by the extension of time being granted. However, the absence of prejudice is not itself enough to justify the granting of an extension (Lucic v Nolan (1982) 45 ALR 411 at 416; Hickey v Australian Telecommunications Commission (1983) 47 ALR 517 at 523 cited in Hunter Valley at 349).
As noted by Deputy President Todd in Johnson at [19] (see paragraph [12] above), any wider prejudice to the general public in terms of disruption to established practices is also a relevant consideration for the Tribunal in considering whether or not to grant an extension of time. The Tribunal further notes that an objective of the Tribunal is to provide a mechanism of review that “promotes public trust and confidence in the decision-making of the Tribunal” (s 2A(d) of the AAT Act). If lengthy extensions are granted by the Tribunal, this confidence may be undermined. Fairness as between the Applicant and other persons in a like position is also relevant. Other Applicants who have lodged applications out of time have previously been denied review by the Tribunal, and others may not have sought review at all because the statutory time limit has passed.
In addition, a further objective of the Tribunal is to provide a mechanism of review that is “fair, just, economical, informal and quick” (s 2A(b) of the AAT Act). The 28-day time period set out in s 29(2) of the AAT Act is consistent with the achievement of that objective. However, in this case the delay is 1 year, 6 months and 11 days, which is, in the Tribunal’s opinion, a considerable delay and therefore inconsistent with that objective. The Tribunal finds that the wider prejudice to the general public weighs against the granting of the extension of time.
Merits of the substantive application
In Kuljic v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1994) 33 ALD 121 von Doussa J relevantly stated, at 122, that:
One of the principal considerations to be addressed in deciding whether it is fair and equitable in all the circumstances to extend time is whether the merits of the proposed appeal are such that if an extension of time is granted there is some prospect of success in the appeal. If a consideration of the merits indicates that there is no question to be agitated on the appeal, and there is no prospect of success, it would be futile to grant an extension of time and most unjust to the respondent to subject the respondent to the costs of defending a pointless appeal.
The Tribunal is not required to undertake a substantive review of the merits of the application but rather should assess whether the Applicant has an arguable case (Brown at 131 [56]).
The Tribunal has previously declined to grant an extension of time to an applicant in cases where it considers the applicant would have little prospect of success at a substantive hearing of the matter (see, for example, Re Rollins and Principal Member of the Veterans’ Review Board (2011) 54 AAR 91 (Rollins) and Re Hamilton and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2011) 121 ALD 202).
With respect to Decision 1, the Applicant lodged her FTB claims for the income years between 2006 and 2010 after the allowable deadlines (R2, para [52]). At that time, the legislation did not allow for any discretion to be exercised to extend the time for lodging a claim. The Respondent noted several decisions which explain this lack of discretion (R2, para [55]). In Crook and Secretary, Department of Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2007] AATA 1253 at [15]–[16] the Tribunal stated:
The only finding I can make on the proved facts before me is that Mr Crook’s claim for past FTB payments for the 2003/2004 financial year was made on 12 July 2006 — twelve days after the period when a claim could be made. This means Mr Crook’s claim was out of time and so he was not entitled to receive past payments for FTB for 2003/2004, as a matter of law.
It is also unfortunate for Mr Crook that the FAA Act does not give me any discretion to extend the time limits for lodging an “effective claim” for FTB for 2003/2004.
Similarly, in Sherwood and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2012] AATA 682 at [9]–[10] the Tribunal stated:
On 29 December 2011, the applicant lodged her claim for a lump sum payment of FTB for the 2008–2009 financial year. The operation of s 10(2) of the Act has the consequence that a claim for a lump sum payment of FTB for the 2008–2009 financial year has to be made by 30 June 2011 to be an effective claim. However, the claim was lodged on 29 December 2011 and, therefore, is not an effective claim under the Act.
The applicant has quite properly acknowledged that the FTB claim was not lodged in accordance with s 10(2) of the Act. In her written application to this Tribunal for review, she remarked: “I accept that my claim does not comply with s 10 of the Admin Act”. The reason why the applicant has lodged the application is to see whether there is any discretion to waive the time limit imposed by s 10(2) of the Act. In her own words, she is “seeking a relaxation of this Law in order to receive monies I am entitled to”. However, s 10(2) of the Act does not confer any discretion upon the Secretary to extend the time within which a person can lodge a claim. I have also considered that other legislation which is part of social security law, such as the Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth), does not confer any such discretion upon the Secretary.
In Tanoski and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] AATA 353 the Tribunal stated, at [14]–[15]:
… subsection 10(2A) of the FAA Act makes it clear that the Secretary may only exercise the special circumstances discretion for a twelve month period, that is from the beginning of the second year after the end of the relevant financial year to the end of that second year.
For example, where an applicant failed to apply for FTB for the 2012-2013 financial year by 30 June 2014, the Secretary may only exercise the special circumstances discretion for the one year period from 1 July 2014 to 30 June 2015.
Also, in VQSL and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2017] AATA 294 at [29]–[30], the Tribunal stated:
… VQSL submitted an application for FTB for 2012-2013 on 15 July 2015 which was beyond the end of the second year.
The Tribunal is sympathetic to VQSL and her circumstances, and cognisant of the significant financial ramifications of the 2012-2013 FTB claim being lodged out of time. However, there is no discretion that can be enlivened in the circumstances prevailing in this matter.
As the Applicant lodged her claims after the allowable deadlines and given the lack of discretion on the part of the Tribunal, the Applicant does not have an arguable case if the matter proceeded to an AAT2 review.
With respect to Decision 2 and Decision 3, the legislation in force at the time of those decisions did allow for time to be extended. Specifically, the reconciliation time is the time when an assessment is made under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) so long as the person lodged their income tax return within the first income year after the relevant year. The Secretary can, however, extend the time if the Secretary is satisfied that there were special circumstances that prevented the person from lodging their income tax return before the end of that first income year (A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 (Cth), s 32C).
The case law and Tribunal decisions also refer to the difficulty in precisely defining “special circumstances”. However, a common observation is that special circumstances will be “unusual or uncommon”. In Angelakos v Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations (2007) 100 ALD 9, 17–18 [33] Besanko J stated:
There is less risk of overstatement if the words “unusual” or “uncommon” are emphasised. Those words indicate, correctly in my view, the fact that there must be something that distinguishes the case from the ordinary or usual case. It may not be easy to postulate the ordinary or usual case other than in quite general terms and, in doing so, close attention must be given to the particular statutory context.
In Groth v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1995) 40 ALD 541, 545 Kiefel J (as she then was) explained that special circumstances would be such as to distinguish an applicant’s situation from “the usual or ordinary case”:
The phrase “special circumstances”, it has been said, although imprecise is sufficiently understood not to require judicial gloss: Beadle’s case ... it is sufficient to observe that it would require something to distinguish Mr Groth’s case from others, to take it out of the usual or ordinary case. That was, I consider, the only enquiry to be undertaken in this case. It would of course follow that if one were to conclude that something unfair, unintended or unjust had occurred that there must be some feature out of the ordinary.
In the Applicant’s situation, special circumstances are only relevant to Decision 2 and Decision 3, which relate to the 2012/2013 and 2013/2014 income tax years, because for the 2006/2007 through to the 2008/2009 income tax years the legislation did not provide for any discretion to extend the time.
The Applicant’s evidence was that in February 2011, after experiencing medical conditions in 2010 due to her pregnancy, she gave birth to a premature baby after a two-week stay in hospital. She spent every day at the hospital for several months before the baby was released from hospital. In a written submission the Applicant also stated that she started seeing a psychiatrist following the birth of her child due to mental health issues. When asked at the hearing, the Applicant agreed that her medical issues were improving by the end of 2011. The Tribunal also notes the Applicant’s evidence at the hearing and in her written statement that she was running a business whilst caring for her five children which had also contributed to her falling behind with her tax affairs.
The Applicant also gave evidence at the interlocutory hearing that she gave her accounting documentation to her accountant for the 2009/2010 income tax year (email submission dated 8 April 2021). However, from late 2011 to mid-2012, the Applicant had difficulty obtaining her accounting documentation from her bookkeeper and her accountant. Her bookkeeper had experienced health issues and had gone overseas for medical treatment, and later the bookkeeper’s business went into administration. The Applicant equated the difficulty she had obtaining documentation from her accountant to a “loss of information by fire or theft” (email submission dated 8 April 2021). Her evidence was that in 2011, she was trying to get her tax affairs “back on track”. She followed up her accountant to find that he had passed away, and despite making attempts to retrieve her documentation, his widow would not release it. The Applicant was not able to access the information held by her accountant’s widow until the accountant’s business was sold to another accounting firm in approximately March 2012.
The Tribunal sympathises with the Applicant who has clearly had a difficult time with the birth of a premature baby, her own health issues, running a business and caring for children. She also experienced difficulties resulting from the death of her accountant, problems with her bookkeeper and falling behind with her tax affairs. The Tribunal observes, however, that the claim deadlines were 30 June 2014 and 30 June 2015, and that the issues with obtaining her accounting documentation from her accountant and bookkeeper related to earlier income tax years. The Applicant was trying to organise her finances from the end of 2011 and had access to her accounting records from approximately mid-May 2012.
The Applicant’s health issues were also improving by the end of 2011.
Further, even if these circumstances occurred closer to the relevant claim deadlines, it is unlikely that a combination of health, family, business difficulties and difficulties in obtaining the documents from her bookkeeper and accountant would be sufficiently unusual or uncommon as to constitute special circumstances. Additionally, even if the circumstances could be regarded as special circumstances, there is no corroborating evidence to indicate that they prevented the Applicant from lodging her income tax returns by the relevant claim deadlines.
There was, however, some evidence before the Tribunal regarding circumstances that contributed to a delay in the completion of the Applicant’s income tax returns for the 2014 and 2015 financial years. Firstly, the Tribunal notes an email from the Applicant to her bookkeeper dated 16 June 2018 that refers to the 2013/2014 income year. In this email the Applicant refers to her bookkeeper losing some of the Applicant’s financial data relating to her 2013/2014 income tax return which was accidentally deleted and not properly backed up by the bookkeeper (R2, Annexure A). Additionally, the Applicant stated that there was a delay in completing her income tax returns for the 2014 and 2015 financial years due to the operation of the “MYOB” business accounting software. She explained that she was told by her bookkeeper that due to the operation of the “MYOB” business accounting software each financial year needed to be completed sequentially. This meant that she could not complete her accounting for subsequent years so that her claims would not be late, and then go back to settle the accounting for the previous years (email submission dated 8 April 2021).
The Tribunal makes the general observation that a failure by an accountant to lodge documents on time (including due to negligence) will not ordinarily constitute special circumstances (6.4.1.30 of the Family Assistance Guide) because it is the responsibility of the taxpayer to make sure they lodge their tax return on time. The Tribunal is of the view that issues with accounting software, or with a negligent or incompetent bookkeeper are of a similar category. The final responsibility rests with the taxpayer to manage their own tax affairs, including keeping copies of important documentation and completing income tax returns for previous years to ensure that the returns for subsequent years are not late. Consequently, the Tribunal finds that these circumstances are unlikely to constitute special circumstances.
For these reasons, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant is likely to have limited prospects of success if the matter were to proceed to a substantive hearing. This weighs against the Tribunal exercising its discretion to grant an extension of time.
Alternative avenues of relief
When considering an extension of time application, the Tribunal will often have regard to whether there are any alternative avenues of relief available to an applicant (see, for example, Rollins at 94–5 [18] and Re Kim and Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] AATA 155 at [48]).
The Respondent concedes that refusing the extension of time would have the effect of denying the Applicant relief. There are no other avenues of relief available to the Applicant.
With respect to the Applicant’s 2006/2007 FTB claim made on 14 November 2006 that is not currently before the Tribunal (for the reasons explained at paragraph [20] above), the Applicant could seek an internal Centrelink review by an ARO. However, that review may be precluded by the Applicant being out of time, because she had 52 weeks from the date she was advised of the decision (being on or around 18 November 2006) to seek such a review.
The lack of alternative avenues of relief weighs in favour of the Tribunal exercising its discretion to grant an extension of time.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Tribunal is not satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to extend the time to allow the Applicant to seek review of the AAT1 Decision. Although the “alternative avenues of relief” consideration weighs in favour of granting an extension of time, it is outweighed by the following considerations which weigh against exercising the discretion to do so. These are:
(a)the length of the delay of 1 year, 6 months and 11 days, which is substantial;
(b)the Applicant was aware of her appeal rights and the 28-day period in which to lodge an application for review;
(c)the Applicant’s explanation for the delay. Specifically, she could have proceeded to lodge an application for review whilst seeking access to the document she thought she needed;
(d)although there is limited to no prejudice to the Respondent should the Tribunal grant the extension of time, the Tribunal has taken into account the public interest in having finality and certainty in administrative decision-making, and fairness to other applicants in a like position who may have been denied relief, or who may not have sought it in the first place due to the statutory time limit; and
(e)the Applicant does not have an arguable case if the matter were to proceed to a substantive hearing.
DECISION
For the reasons outlined above, the Tribunal refuses to grant the Applicant’s application to extend the time for the making of an application to the Tribunal for review of the AAT1 Decision dated 10 July 2019, because the Tribunal is not satisfied that it is reasonable in all the circumstances to do so pursuant to s 29(7) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth).
I certify that the preceding 49 (forty -nine) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member Dr M Evans-Bonner
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Associate
Dated: 15 April 2021
Date of hearing: 8 April 2021 Applicant: Self-represented Representative for the Respondent: Mr T Tsao, Services Australia
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