SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Douglas v Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board [2015] QSC 310
PARTIES:
TRENT DOUGLAS
(applicant)
v
THE SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND REGIONAL PAROLE BOARD(respondent)
FILE NO/S:
BS No 6009 of 2015
DIVISION:
Trial Division
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT:
Supreme Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
2 November 2015
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
23 October 2015
JUDGE:
Peter Lyons J
ORDER:
Application dismissed.
CATCHWORDS:
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – GENERALLY – where, on 23 September 2014, the applicant was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, and immediately released on parole subject to, inter alia, the condition that he not commit an offence – where, on 8 December 2014, the defendant was charged with trafficking offences relating to conduct which occurred between 1 August 2013 and 30 January 2014, and those charges are unresolved – where, in January 2015, the applicant was charged with further offences – where, on 29 January 2015, the respondent made a decision to suspend the applicant’s parole for an indefinite period – where the respondent referred to the trafficking in its statement of reasons and in a letter to the applicant – where the statement of reasons noted that the respondent based its decision on “the interests of community safety” and referred to, inter alia, family concern about the applicant’s behaviour – where the applicant submitted that the respondent took a “blanket approach” when dealing with the suspension of his parole – whether the respondent’s power under s 205 is enlivened if a charge is brought during the parole period, notwithstanding that the offending conduct occurred earlier – whether circumstances existed for the respondent’s exercise of the power to suspend the applicant’s parole – whether the respondent improperly exercised its power by failing to take relevant considerations into account – whether the respondent improperly exercised its power by rigidly applying a policy without giving weight to the merits of the case – whether the respondent’s exercise of power was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could so exercise the power
Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 3, s 205.
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 20, s 23, s24.McQuire v South Qld RCCB [2003] QSC 414, applied.
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40, applied.Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6, cited.
COUNSEL:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf.
A R Nicholas for the respondent.
SOLICITORS:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf.
Crown Law for the respondent
On 23 September 2014, the applicant was convicted of two offences (2014 convictions) and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longer of which was for a term of 18 months. He was immediately released on parole.
On 29 January 2015, the respondent made a decision to suspend the applicant’s parole order for an indefinite period (suspension decision). On four subsequent occasions, the…
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- Case
- [2015] QSC 310
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with determining whether the respondent's power under section 205 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) was triggered by the charges brought during the parole period, whether the circumstances justified the suspension, and whether the respondent improperly exercised its discretion. The court found that the respondent’s decisions were based on the applicant's potential to commit further offences, not solely on the unresolved charges, and that the respondent had considered some individual circumstances, albeit insufficiently. The court concluded that while the decisions were questionable, they were not so unreasonable as to warrant setting them aside under the Act.
The court ultimately dismissed the application, finding that none of the grounds for review were substantiated. The court noted that the respondent had taken into account some individual factors but did not sufficiently address the merits of the case in light of the applicant's progress in rehabilitation and time spent in custody. However, the court found that the decisions, though questionable, were not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have made them. Consequently, the application for a statutory order of review was dismissed.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It follows that this ground is not made out.Rigid policy and failure to give proper consideration to exercise of power One of the stated grounds for a statutory order of review is that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the statute under which the decision was purported to be made[41]. That ground includes “an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case”[42]. If the applicant’s contentions were made out, there would be a basis for making a statutory order of review.[41] See s 20(2)(e) of the JR Act.[42] See s 23(f) of the JR Act. The applicant pointed out that the respondent’s letter of 21 May 2015 (conveying the last of the confirmatory decisions) made express reference to the unresolved charges[43]. That letter is amongst the material identified in the SOR as the material on which the respondent made its findings[44]. These charges were also referred to in the Parole Board Report dated 15 January 2015[45], also part of the material on which the respondent’s finding of fact were based[46]. I am therefore prepared to accept that the outstanding charges were taken into account, and particularly in relation to the most recent of the confirmatory decisions.[43] Cheng exhibits p 25; see also p 40.[44] Cheng exhibits p 28.[45] Cheng exhibits p 53.[46] Cheng exhibits p 28. Obviously enough, the respondent was entitled to take these charges into account. Such charges provide a ground under s 205(2)(c) of the JR Act on which an occasion arises for the suspension of a parole order. However, the applicant conceded that the material before the Court contained no other evidence of the policy for which he contended. The fact that the charges were taken into account is, in my view, by no means sufficient to establish such a policy. The material before me is not sufficient to permit me to infer the existence of such a policy, or that the decisions were made without reference to the merits of the case. I have already pointed out that the SOR includes the applicant’s correspondence amongst the material on which the respondent’s findings of fact were based; and that the first of the reasons reflects some consideration of that correspondence. In addition, it is apparent from the second of the findings referred to earlier that the respondent gave some consideration to the 2015 drug offences and the contravention offence, and the relationship (obviously of the former) with the offence which led to the parole order. It follows that this basis for review is not made out.Unreasonableness (including absence of evidence) As mentioned earlier, one ground for a statutory order for review is that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the statute under which the decision purported to be made[47]. That extends to an exercise of power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could so exercise the power[48]. No other basis on which an order might be granted by reference to unreasonableness has been identified, or is apparent to me.[47] See s 20(2)(e) of the JR Act.[48] See s 23(g) of the JR Act.