Douglas v Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Douglas v Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board [2015] QSC 310

PARTIES:

TRENT DOUGLAS

(applicant)

v
THE SOUTHERN QUEENSLAND REGIONAL PAROLE BOARD

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS No 6009 of 2015

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

2 November 2015

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

23 October 2015

JUDGE:

Peter Lyons J

ORDER:

Application dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – JUDICIAL REVIEW – GROUNDS OF REVIEW – GENERALLY – where, on 23 September 2014, the applicant was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, and immediately released on parole subject to, inter alia, the condition that he not commit an offence – where, on 8 December 2014, the defendant was charged with trafficking offences relating to conduct which occurred between 1 August 2013 and 30 January 2014, and those charges are unresolved – where, in January 2015, the applicant was charged with further offences – where, on 29 January 2015, the respondent made a decision to suspend the applicant’s parole for an indefinite period – where the respondent referred to the trafficking in its statement of reasons and in a letter to the applicant – where the statement of reasons noted that the respondent based its decision on “the interests of community safety” and referred to, inter alia, family concern about the applicant’s behaviour – where the applicant submitted that the respondent took a “blanket approach” when dealing with the suspension of his parole – whether the respondent’s power under s 205 is enlivened if a charge is brought during the parole period, notwithstanding that the offending conduct occurred earlier – whether circumstances existed for the respondent’s exercise of the power to suspend the applicant’s parole – whether the respondent improperly exercised its power by failing to take relevant considerations into account – whether the respondent improperly exercised its power by rigidly applying a policy without giving weight to the merits of the case – whether the respondent’s exercise of power was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could so exercise the power

Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld), s 3, s 205.
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 20, s 23, s24.

McQuire v South Qld RCCB [2003] QSC 414, applied.
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24; [1986] HCA 40, applied.

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6, cited.

COUNSEL:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf.

A R Nicholas for the respondent.

SOLICITORS:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf.

Crown Law for the respondent

  1. On 23 September 2014, the applicant was convicted of two offences (2014 convictions) and sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longer of which was for a term of 18 months.  He was immediately released on parole.

  2. On 29 January 2015, the respondent made a decision to suspend the applicant’s parole order for an indefinite period (suspension decision).  On four subsequent occasions, the…

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Details
Case
[2015] QSC 310
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Douglas v Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board, the applicant sought a statutory order of review under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) to quash the respondent's decision to suspend his parole order for an indefinite period. The applicant was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment in 2014 and was released on parole with conditions, including that he not commit an offence. The respondent, the Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board, made a decision to suspend the applicant’s parole on 29 January 2015, citing the applicant's involvement in unresolved trafficking offences and additional charges brought in January 2015. The applicant argued that the respondent improperly exercised its power by adopting a blanket approach, failing to consider relevant individual circumstances, and rigidly applying a policy without regard to the merits of his case.

The court was tasked with determining whether the respondent's power under section 205 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) was triggered by the charges brought during the parole period, whether the circumstances justified the suspension, and whether the respondent improperly exercised its discretion. The court found that the respondent’s decisions were based on the applicant's potential to commit further offences, not solely on the unresolved charges, and that the respondent had considered some individual circumstances, albeit insufficiently. The court concluded that while the decisions were questionable, they were not so unreasonable as to warrant setting them aside under the Act.

The court ultimately dismissed the application, finding that none of the grounds for review were substantiated. The court noted that the respondent had taken into account some individual factors but did not sufficiently address the merits of the case in light of the applicant's progress in rehabilitation and time spent in custody. However, the court found that the decisions, though questionable, were not so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have made them. Consequently, the application for a statutory order of review was dismissed.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 29 January 2015, the respondent made a decision to suspend the applicant’s parole order for an indefinite period (suspension decision). On four subsequent occasions, the respondent determined not to vary the suspension decision (each is referred to as a confirmatory decision). The applicant has applied for a statutory order of review under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) (JR Act). The formal order sought by the applicant is that the suspension decision be quashed. The applicant conducted the hearing of the application without legal representation or assistance.Background One of the 2014 convictions was for an offence of possessing Schedule 1 dangerous drugs in a quantity exceeding the threshold specified in Schedule 3, but not exceeding the quantity specified in Schedule 4, the date of the offence being 2 December 2013. That offence attracted the longer sentence. The other was for a summary drug related offence, which attracted a sentence of six months.[1][1] See the exhibits to the affidavit of Flora Cheng filed 23 July 2015 (Cheng exhibits), pp 1, 50. It was a condition of the applicant’s parole that he not commit an offence; and it was also a condition of his parole that he abstain from drugs. No doubt these conditions related to his conduct during the period of his parole[2].[2] Cheng exhibits p 1. On (or perhaps shortly prior to[3]) 8 December 2014, the applicant was charged with two counts of trafficking in dangerous drugs (trafficking charges)[4]. Both counts related to the period from 1 August 2013 to 30 January 2014. These charges have not yet been resolved.[3] Cheng exhibits p 53.[4] Cheng exhibits p 40. On 3 January 2015, the applicant was intercepted by police[5]. That resulted in his being charged with the possession of dangerous drugs, and the possession of utensils that had been used in connection with the possession of such drugs (2015 drug offences). On 5 January 2015, the applicant contacted the Maroochydore Probation and Parole Office to give notice of these events[6].[5] Cheng exhibits p 53.[6] Cheng exhibits p 53. A little later, the applicant was charged with contravening a direction or requirement of police on the basis that he failed on 11 January 2015 to attend a police station to provide his identifying particulars (contravention offence) [7].[7] Cheng exhibits p 53. On 14 January 2015, it would appear that a delegate of the Chief Executive suspended the applicant’s parole for a period of 28 days under s 201 of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) (CS Act). On 14 January 2015, a warrant for the applicant’s arrest issued, as a consequence of the suspension. That suspension has expired, and is not in issue in these proceedings[8]. [8] Cheng exhibits p 2. On 15 January 2015 a Parole Board Report[9] was prepared by a Probation and Parole Officer, countersigned by a Supervisor, both of the Maroochydore Probation and Parole Office. It recorded that on 5 November 2014, notification had been received of the trafficking charges. It also recorded general compliance with reporting requirements. It recorded the 2015 drug offences, and the applicant’s advising of them; and the contravention offence. It also recorded family concern about the applicant’s behaviour. It recommended a home assessment of places where the applicant might be accommodated; and the indefinite suspension of his parole order “until the finalisation of his further offences” and the nomination of a suitable address for his accommodation.[9] Cheng exhibits p 52.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

It follows that this basis for review is not made out.Unreasonableness (including absence of evidence) As mentioned earlier, one ground for a statutory order for review is that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the statute under which the decision purported to be made[47]. That extends to an exercise of power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could so exercise the power[48]. No other basis on which an order might be granted by reference to unreasonableness has been identified, or is apparent to me.[47] See s 20(2)(e) of the JR Act.[48] See s 23(g) of the JR Act. As mentioned, the respondent’s submissions drew attention to the reliance in the first of the reasons on “the interests of community safety” as the basis for suspending the applicant’s parole. When invited to identify, amongst the material considered by the respondent, anything which might support a concern about community safety if the applicant continued to be released on parole, Counsel for the respondent referred to the home assessment report[49], together with the reference to that report in the Parole Board Report[50]. Reference was also made to the respondent’s Information Notice of 14 April 2015[51].[49] Cheng exhibits p 45.[50] Cheng exhibits p 53.[51] Cheng exhibits p 12. The information notice of 14 April 2015 dealt with two matters. One was the proposed amendment of the parole order by the inclusion of a condition requiring the applicant to reside at an approved residence. The other was the question whether the suspension decision should be varied. The notice informed the applicant that a preliminary decision had been made to include the residential condition. The reason for that decision was stated to be that the respondent believed that the applicant posed an unacceptable risk of committing an offence. The obvious inference is that that risk would be addressed by the imposition of the condition. The second part of the notice, which conveyed the decision not to vary the suspension decision, did not include a statement of reasons. I do not read the notice as conveying that concern about the commission of a further offence was a basis for that decision[52].[52] See Cheng exhibits p 12. The reports referred to demonstrate a basis for concern that, if the applicant were to live with his girlfriend, he might use drugs, and perhaps commit drug-related offences. There is, however, no suggestion at all that this posed any threat to community safety. If concern for community safety was in truth the basis for the respondent’s decisions, it might well establish that they were made without evidence, and were unreasonable[53].[53] It would have been necessary to consider ss 20(2)(e) and (h), 23(g) and 24 of the JR Act. However, it was also submitted for the respondent that a careful reading of the SOR revealed that the basis for the respondent’s decisions was a concern that the applicant might commit further offences. In my view, that submission is correct.

Decision

Reasons for decision

The position is somewhat more concerning when one comes to the last of the confirmatory decisions. By that time, the applicant had spent months in custody and had obviously taken steps towards his rehabilitation. The respondent itself had considered that the residential condition was an appropriate way to address the risk that the applicant would commit further offences. However, even the last decision was made only a few months after the 2015 drug offences. While it might be regarded as troubling, in the end I am not satisfied that, at that time, the decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have arrived at it.Conclusion On a review, the Court’s powers to set aside a decision of the respondent are constrained by the provisions of the JR Act. Notwithstanding the matters advanced by the applicant, I am not satisfied that a ground has been established for the making of such an order. Accordingly, I propose to dismiss the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It follows that this ground is not made out.Rigid policy and failure to give proper consideration to exercise of power One of the stated grounds for a statutory order of review is that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the statute under which the decision was purported to be made[41]. That ground includes “an exercise of a discretionary power in accordance with a rule or policy without regard to the merits of the particular case”[42]. If the applicant’s contentions were made out, there would be a basis for making a statutory order of review.[41] See s 20(2)(e) of the JR Act.[42] See s 23(f) of the JR Act. The applicant pointed out that the respondent’s letter of 21 May 2015 (conveying the last of the confirmatory decisions) made express reference to the unresolved charges[43]. That letter is amongst the material identified in the SOR as the material on which the respondent made its findings[44]. These charges were also referred to in the Parole Board Report dated 15 January 2015[45], also part of the material on which the respondent’s finding of fact were based[46]. I am therefore prepared to accept that the outstanding charges were taken into account, and particularly in relation to the most recent of the confirmatory decisions.[43] Cheng exhibits p 25; see also p 40.[44] Cheng exhibits p 28.[45] Cheng exhibits p 53.[46] Cheng exhibits p 28. Obviously enough, the respondent was entitled to take these charges into account. Such charges provide a ground under s 205(2)(c) of the JR Act on which an occasion arises for the suspension of a parole order. However, the applicant conceded that the material before the Court contained no other evidence of the policy for which he contended. The fact that the charges were taken into account is, in my view, by no means sufficient to establish such a policy. The material before me is not sufficient to permit me to infer the existence of such a policy, or that the decisions were made without reference to the merits of the case. I have already pointed out that the SOR includes the applicant’s correspondence amongst the material on which the respondent’s findings of fact were based; and that the first of the reasons reflects some consideration of that correspondence. In addition, it is apparent from the second of the findings referred to earlier that the respondent gave some consideration to the 2015 drug offences and the contravention offence, and the relationship (obviously of the former) with the offence which led to the parole order. It follows that this basis for review is not made out.Unreasonableness (including absence of evidence) As mentioned earlier, one ground for a statutory order for review is that the making of the decision was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the statute under which the decision purported to be made[47]. That extends to an exercise of power that is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could so exercise the power[48]. No other basis on which an order might be granted by reference to unreasonableness has been identified, or is apparent to me.[47] See s 20(2)(e) of the JR Act.[48] See s 23(g) of the JR Act.