DOUGLAS and CITY OF WANNEROO - [2014] WASAT 4

JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

STREAM: COMMERCIAL & CIVIL

ACT: DOG ACT 1976 (WA)

CITATION: DOUGLAS and CITY OF WANNEROO [2014] WASAT 4

MEMBER: MS N OWEN-CONWAY (MEMBER)

HEARD: 4 NOVEMBER 2013

DELIVERED : 8 JANUARY 2014

FILE NO/S: CC 1081 of 2013

BETWEEN: MICHELLE DOUGLAS
Applicant
AND
CITY OF WANNEROO
Respondent

Catchwords:

Dog Act Review of refusal to exempt applicant from keeping only two dogs on property Section 26 Dog Act 1976 (WA)

Legislation:

City of Wanneroo Animals Local Law 1999, cl 14
Dog Act 1976 (WA), s 26, s 26(5)(b), s 26(6)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 17, s 24, s 27(1), s 29(3)
State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), r 10

Result:

Reviewable decision set aside

Summary of Tribunal's decision:

The applicant made an application for exemption from the limitation of keeping only two dogs on her property. The respondent refused on the basis that the applicant's German Shepherds have a history of barking, straying and a minor attack. The evidence relied upon was an objection, and earlier complaints. The objecting neighbour was not called to give evidence. There was persuasive evidence that the objecting neighbour had indiscriminately complained about the applicant, her husband, her family, her horses and her dogs. The Tribunal placed no weight on the objecting neighbour's objection and the complaints. The instances of the German Shepherds straying predated substantial refencing and regating of the property. The Tribunal concluded that the new fencing and gating substantially diminished the likelihood of the applicant's dogs straying in the future.
The Tribunal also concluded that the positioning of the German Shepherds in an internally fenced and gated compound away from the objecting neighbour would diminish reasonable complaints about barking.
The Tribunal further concluded that the additional dog, a Maltese male, was to be kept in the applicant's home and would have no or little impact on the welfare and behaviour of the applicant's German Shepherds and horses. The applicant's property measured approximately 16,000 m².
The Tribunal set aside the respondent's decision and in substitution granted the applicant the exemption to permit her to keep three dogs on her property.

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant: In person
Respondent: Mr I McDowell and Ms K Frick (Acting as Agents)

Solicitors:

Applicant: In person
Respondent: City of Wanneroo

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Nil

REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:

Introduction

On 15 August 2013, Ms Michelle Douglas (applicant) of No 21 Lee‑Steere Drive, Mariginiup in Western Australia made an application for a review of a decision by the City of Wanneroo (respondent) concerning her application to accommodate a third dog (Maltese) on her property. At a meeting of the respondent on 25 June 2013, the respondent made a decision to refuse to grant the applicant an exemption from the statutory limit of having two dogs registered and residing on her property (German Shepherds). That decision is the reviewable decision and the subject of the application. The reviewable decision was communicated to the applicant by letter dated 5 July 2013 (Exhibit 3 page 42).

Jurisdiction

The application is made pursuant to s 26(5)(b) of the Dog Act 1976 (WA) (Dog Act). By reason of s 17 of the State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA) (SAT Act), this matter falls within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction.
The review of the reviewable decision is to be by way of a hearing de novo and the Tribunal's review of the decision is not limited to the information that was before the respondent as the original decision‑maker, regardless whether that new information existed at the time of the reviewable decision (see: s 27(1) of the SAT Act). By reason of the power conferred by s 29(3) of the SAT Act, the Tribunal may affirm, vary or set aside the reviewable decision and in the latter case may substitute its own decision. Both parties were directed to file documents, and statements of issues, facts and contentions, and both parties were afforded the opportunity to lead evidence at the final hearing, cross‑examine any witnesses who gave evidence at the final hearing, and make submissions to the Tribunal.

The material before the Tribunal

The respondent filed a statement of issues facts and contentions (Exhibit 3) and a bundle of documents filed pursuant to s 524 of the SAT Act which includes:
1)Statement of reasons.
2)Customer request dated 14 March 2012.
3)Letter from Mr Priddle dated 14 March 2012.
4)Customer request dated 11 August 2012.
5)Customer request dated 11 December 2012.
6)Customer request dated 13 December 2012.
7)Dog attack report dated 13 December 2012.
8)Customer request dated 13 December 2012.
9)Customer request dated 7 January 2013.
10)Applicant's application dated 11 February 2013.
11)Letter to adjoining neighbour dated 14 February 2013.
12)Letter to Mr Priddle dated 14 February 2013.
13)Mr Priddle's objection dated 18 February 2013.
14)Applicant's reply dated 8 March 2013.
15)Property inspection report dated 18 April 2013.
16)Customer request dated 7 March 2013.
17)Letter to the applicant dated 10 April 2013.
18)Letter to the application dated 4 June 2013.
19)Report to Council dated 25 June 2013.
20)Council resolution dated 25 June 2013.
21)Council letter dated 5 July 2013.
22)Customer request dated 5 August 2013.
23)Copy infringement dated 6 December 2012.
24)Copy caution dated 16 December 2012.
The bundle of documents is referred to as Exhibit 4. In addition the respondent provided an aerial map of the applicant's property and the adjoining properties which shall be treated as part of Exhibit 4.
The applicant filed the following documents:
1)Application dated 15 August 2013 ‑ Exhibit 1.
2)Letter received by the Tribunal dated 1 August 2013 ‑ Exhibit 2.
3)Mr Douglas' affidavit in the Magistrate's Court proceedings 880/13 ‑ Exhibit 5.
4)Violent Restraining Order application ‑ Exhibit 6.
5)Letter from Ms Fitch – adjoining neighbour – Exhibit 7.
At the hearing, both the applicant and her husband, Mr Joel Douglas, gave evidence and each was cross-examined. The respondent produced no oral evidence at the final hearing.

The statutory framework

Relevantly, s 26 of the Dog Act provides:
(1) A local government may, by a local law under this Act ‑
(a) limit the number of dogs that have reached 3 months of age that can be kept in or at premises in the local government's district; or
….
(2) A local law mentioned in subsection (1) ‑
(a) may limit the number of dogs that can be kept in or at premises to 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 only; and
(b) cannot prevent the keeping in or at premises of one or 2 dogs that have reached 3 months of age and any pup of either of those dogs under that age; and
(c) cannot apply to dogs kept at premises that are licensed under section 27 as an approved kennel establishment; and
(d) cannot apply to dangerous dogs (declared) or dangerous dogs (restricted breed).
(3) Where by a local law under this Act a local government has placed a limit on the keeping of dogs in any specified area but the local government is satisfied in relation to any particular premises that the provisions of this Act relating to approved kennel establishments need not be applied in the circumstances, the local government may grant an exemption in respect of those premises but any such exemption ‑
(a) may be made subject to conditions, including a condition that it applies only to the dogs specified in the exemption; and
(b) cannot authorise the keeping in or at those premises of ‑
(i) more than 6 dogs that have reached 3 months of age; or
(ii) a dog under that age unless it is a pup of a dog whose keeping is authorised by the exemption;
and
(c) may be revoked or varied at any time.
(4) A person must not keep in or at any premises, not being licensed under section 27 as an approved kennel establishment ‑
(a) in the case of dogs that have reached 3 months of age, other than dangerous dogs (declared) or dangerous dogs (restricted breed), more than the number of dogs than the limit imposed under ‑
(i) a local law mentioned in subsection (1); or
(ii) an exemption granted under subsection (3);
or
(b) more than ‑
(i) 2 dangerous dogs (declared); or
(ii) 2 dangerous dogs (restricted breed); or
(iii) one of each of those kinds of dangerous dogs,
that have reached 3 months of age; or
(c) any pup, of a dangerous dog (restricted breed), that is under 3 months of age.
…
(5) Any person who is aggrieved ‑
(a) by the conditions imposed in relation to any exemption under subsection (3); or
(b) by the refusal of a local government to grant such an exemption, or by the revocation of an exemption,
may apply to the State Administrative Tribunal for a review of the decision.
(6) An application under subsection (5) cannot be made later than the expiry of a period of 28 days after the day on which a notice of the decision is served on the person affected by that decision.
Relevantly, cl 14 of the City of Wanneroo Animals Local Law 1999 (Local Law) provides:
A person shall not keep or permit to be kept on any premises more than:
(a)2 dogs over the age of 3 months and the young of those dogs under that age; or
(b)6 dogs over the age of 3 months and the young of those dogs under that age if the premises are situated on a lot having an area of 4 hectares or more,
unless the premises are licensed as an approved kennel establishment or have been granted exemption pursuant to section 26 (3) of the Dog Act and have planning approval under the town planning scheme.

The time of the application

The respondent made the decision to refuse the applicant's application at its meeting on 25 June 2013. The respondent informed the applicant of its decision by letter dated 5 July 2013. That letter states that the applicant had 28 days 'from the date of this notice' to 'appeal' the decision to this Tribunal. Section 26(6) of the Dog Act provides that the applicant has 28 days 'after the day on which a notice of the decision is served' on the affected person to make an application for review. The respondent's letter contains inaccurate information about the lodgement of an application for review in this Tribunal.
There is no specific evidence concerning the date on which the applicant was 'served' with the notice of refusal, being the letter of 5 July 2013. The applicant's application for review was received by this Tribunal on 15 August 2013 and signed on 10 August 2013. There was no objection to the applicant's application being lodged apparently outside of the 28 day period allowed by s 26(6) of the Dog Act. The Tribunal cannot be sure whether the application was lodged outside the 28 day period as there is no evidence of when the applicant actually received the letter of 5 July 2013. However, assuming that it was received by the applicant before 19 July 2013, the application filed on 15 August 2013 is outside the time allowed by s 26(6) of the Dog Act and an extrusion is required.
By reason of r 10 of the State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), the Tribunal has the discretion to extend the time for the making of an application, notwithstanding that the time for making an application is fixed by the SAT Act or the enabling Act (in this case the Dog Act). Given that there is no objection and it is not clear when the notice of the reviewable decision was served on the applicant, the Tribunal, of its own initiative, shall order an extension of time to and including 15 August 2013 for the making of the application for review.

The facts and evidence

The applicant resides at No 21 Lee-Steere Drive, on approximately 16,000 m². The applicant has two German Shepherds and several horses on the property. The applicant has acquired a make Maltese as well.
On 11 February, the applicant wrote to the respondent seeking permission for a third dog to be kept at the applicant's property. The applicant described the third dog as 'an indoor Maltese lap … dog' (page 20 of Exhibit 4).
On 14 February 2013, the respondent, through its officers, wrote to the applicant's neighbours and raised the issue that the applicant had applied to have more than two dogs on her property (page 21 and 22 of Exhibit 4). The letter was sent to Mr Anthony Priddle the immediate neighbour to the applicant at No 29 Lee-Steere Drive, and to an unnamed resident at No 15 Lee‑Steere Drive.
On 18 February 2013, Mr Priddle and Ms J Jones of No 29 Lee‑Steere Drive, completed a form (page 23 of Exhibit 4) in which they object to the applicant's application to keep more than two dogs on her property because of 'excessive noise', being barking, and:
We are led to believe there have already been complaints made on numerous occasions regarding the two dogs already at the address[.] Granting permission for a third dog would only cause issues which would lead to problems.
The Tribunal notes that pending this application, the applicant's third dog (the Maltese) is currently kept at the applicant's premises. The Tribunal notes there is no objection by Mr Priddle and Ms Jones to the third dog's behaviour.
In response to being notified that there was an objection to her application, the applicant correctly guessed that the objection had come from Mr Priddle at No 29 Lee‑Steere Drive. In her letter received by the respondent on 12 March 2013 (page 24 of Exhibit 4), the applicant refers to difficulties that she and members of her family have had in dealing with Mr Priddle, and identifies instances of his 'physical and verbal abuse'. She refers to:
1)Verbally abusing myself and my husband on a number of occasions.
2)Reaching into our property with a stick and beating our dogs.
3)Reaching into our property with his leg and kicking my dog.
4)Throwing a plastic cone over the fence and hitting our 14 year old daughter as she played on her quad.
5)Teasing our dogs.
6)Keeps calling the RSPCA no less than seven times with all sorts of accusations all of which were unfounded[.]
In addition, the applicant refers to a number of incidents that occurred before she had had any dogs as follows:
1)Feed shed broken into a number of times and horse feeds tampered with.
2)Horse fly rugs and winter coats stolen and or slashed with a knife.
3)Horse found lying on the ground one morning with the straps of its coat tied round its four legs and genitals.
There is no evidence before the Tribunal that the respondent was engaged in any of the events referred to in 1, 2 and 3 before the applicant housed her two German Shepherds.
The applicant and her husband gave direct evidence of their relationship with Mr Priddle and how it has deteriorated, and together they gave evidence to support the allegations referred to in 1 to 6 of the applicant's letter received on 12 March 2013 (page 24 of Exhibit 4).
The applicant also produced to the Tribunal a Violence Restraining Order (VRO) application (Exhibit 6) that was listed for hearing on 16 August 2013 issued by Mr Douglas against Mr Priddle. However, the application was not granted. Mr Douglas gave evidence that he was unable to attend the hearing because of his duties with the Australian Defence Force. The application for the VRO is accompanied by an affidavit by Mr Douglas (Exhibit 5). In his affidavit Mr Douglas refers to the following events, which events Mr Douglas gave oral evidence at the final hearing:
a)In December 2012, Mr Priddle's back fence fell over due to bad state of repair and as the dividing fence is connected to the back fence, it fell over with it. As a consequence Mr Douglas' and the applicant's German Shepherds strayed onto Mr Priddle's property. Mr Priddle called the respondent and the applicant was fined. The applicant and Mr Douglas were of the view that Mr Priddle knew that the dogs belonged to the applicant and could have returned them but instead chose to complain to the respondent, which resulted in a fine.
b)In 2011, Mr Douglas saw Mr Priddle put his leg through the back fence to kick one of the German Shepherds.
c)On 11 August 2013, the applicant's daughter was playing with her horses and German Shepherds in the back field and saw Mr Priddle come to the fence and proceed to take photographs of them.
d)In November or December 2012, Mr Priddle was leaning over the fence, shouting abuse at the applicant's daughter and demanding that Mr Douglas do something about the dogs.
e)Mr Priddle has used abusive language when speaking to the applicant alone and also in the presence of her children. Mr Priddle had also used abusive language to Mr Douglas.
f)In 2011, Mr Douglas heard Mr Priddle and his partner arguing, and his and the applicant's German Shepherds began to bark. He witnessed Mr Priddle leaning over the boundary fence with a large piece of wood trying to hit one of the dogs, and succeeding to some extent.
g)In 2010, whilst the applicant's daughter was riding her quad bike on the applicant's property, someone threw a traffic cone from Mr Priddle's property over the fence and hit his daughter.
The applicant gave evidence that Mr Priddle was abusive towards her, and threatening in his speech. Mr Douglas gave evidence that Mr Priddle had berated him about the German Shepherds and said that he (Mr Priddle) would 'sort' them out if Mr Douglas did not. The applicant gave evidence that in 2008 to present, Mr Priddle has repeatedly reported the applicant and Mr Douglas to the RSPCA about various things concerning the applicant's and Mr Douglas' horses and dogs, which resulted in a number of enquiries being undertaken by the RSPCA. Both the applicant and Mr Douglas gave evidence that none of Mr Priddle's complaints to the RSPCA resulted in an action by the RSPCA.
The applicant and Mr Douglas gave this evidence to tend to establish that Mr Priddle's objection made to the respondent and referred to in his response on 18 February 2013 (page 23 of Exhibit 4) was not based on fact and was made without foundation. The applicant's and Mr Douglas's evidence tends to establish that Mr Priddle behaved unreasonably towards the applicant and her family, and the objection was yet another instance of his unreasonable behaviour consistent with his unfounded allegations made to the RSPCA and his provocation of the applicant's dogs referred to above. The applicant led this evidence to diminish the weight of the objection by and statement of Mr Priddle. The credibility of Mr Priddle's objection and its foundation therefor was in issue.
The respondent did not call Mr Priddle to give evidence in this matter.

Mr Priddle's evidence

The Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence of Mr Priddle is not reliable to the extent that it has been provided by way of hearsay evidence in the objection and standard.
There is clearly a longstanding disagreement and ill feeling between the two neighbours. Whether this is caused by the conduct of Mr Priddle is unclear. The only direct evidence is that given by the applicant and Mr Douglas. On the evidence before the Tribunal, Mr Priddle's aggression towards the applicant and her family appears to be general and is not limited to her two dogs. The applicant and Mr Douglas's evidence establishes that Mr Priddle behaved in a provocative manner when taking photographs of their daughter riding her horse and in speaking to the applicant and Mr Douglas. Mr Priddle has also complained about the applicant's horses. The Tribunal found the applicant and Mr Douglas to be truthful witnesses and accepts their evidence about their conversations and dealings with Mr Priddle. The Tribunal finds that no weight should be attached to the allegations of Mr Priddle and his objection to the applicant having a third dog on her property.

The respondent's contention that the applicant is not a careful and responsible dog owner

The respondent's officer's statement to the respondent (pages 34–36 of Exhibit 4) states that the respondent's records reveal that prior to this application being made, four complaints had been received by the respondent regarding the German Shepherds kept at the applicant's property. One complaint was a barking dog complaint that was resolved in June 2012. The Tribunal notes that this was a complaint concerning Mr Priddle. In January 2013, there was a report that two German Shepherds were out wandering the street, but when the respondent's rangers arrived, the dogs were back on their property. In December 2012 both German Shepherds were involved in a 'minor' dog attack that resulted in two cautions and two infringements. In September 2012, both German Shepherds 'jumped the fence' at the front of the applicant's property. This resulted in infringements and poundage, as the dogs had been captured and taken to animal care centres.
As to the incident in September 2012 when it was said that the dogs had jumped the fence, the report notes that the dogs had jumped the fence at the front of the house and that the fence to the front of the property was not adequate to contain the dogs.
It is to be noted that as at the date of the final hearing, the applicant had completely re-fenced the property and the German Shepherds, for the large part, are fully contained in a large internally fenced and gated area along the northern boundary of the applicant's property. Mr Priddle's property adjoins the applicant's property along the southern boundary of the applicant's property (see map, Exhibit 4). The photographs taken by the respondent (pages 28‑29 of Exhibit 4) show the large iron front gates to the applicant's property and, the internally gated and fenced compound where the German Shepherds are now kept at the rear of the property. The photographs also show and confirm Mr Douglas' evidence that the entire boundary of his and the applicant's property has been re‑fenced and re-gated. The Tribunal finds that prior to the re‑fencing and re‑gating of the property, the fences were in poor condition and were, in part, insufficient to retain the German Shepherds on the applicant's property. The previously poor fencing is likely the cause of the incidents where the German Shepherds escaped their confines. The Tribunal finds that the applicant's property has been substantially re-fenced and re-gated to a high standard and is more than sufficient to restrain the German Shepherds from escape. The Tribunal also finds that as the German Shepherds have been relocated to a compound along the northern boundary of the applicant's property, the incident of Mr Priddle having any basis to complain about the German Shepherds or to provoke them has diminished very considerably. The Tribunal also notes the letter from Ms Katrina Fitch received by the Tribunal on 2 October 2013 (Exhibit 3). Ms Fitch is the applicant's northern boundary neighbour and is close to the new compound where the German Shepherds are kept on the applicant's property. She states:
…since we have moved in 8 weeks ago at no time have the dogs proved themselves to be a nuisance or a threat. Our bedrooms are actually on that side of our house and not once have we been disturbed by their barking or encountered any kind of nuisance.
Therefore we would like to state that we have no objection whatsoever to our neighbours having a 3^rd dog and hopefully you will take into consideration the possible cause, if the dogs have in fact been a nuisance.
The statement by Ms Fitch is consistent with the applicant's evidence, Mr Douglas' evidence and the photographs of the gates, fences and dog compound taken by the respondent. This statement tends to support the applicant's assertion that Mr Priddle's objections are without foundation, and further supports their contention that the applicant's property has now been re‑fenced and re-gated to avoid the German Shepherds straying. This evidence also tends to suggest, contrary to the assertion by the respondent that the applicant is a careful owner of dogs. The Tribunal finds, contrary to the assertion by the respondent, that the applicant and her husband are careful dog owners who are sufficiently concerned about their responsibilities under the Dog Act to re-fence and re-gate their property to a very high standard.
The Tribunal rejects the respondent's contention that the applicant has a history of allowing the German Shepherds to stray which is indicative of poor control qualities on her part. The Tribunal finds that the applicant is a careful dog owner and takes great care in the control of her animals generally. The new fencing, dog compound and gates will in the Tribunal's view reduce the incidence of the German Shepherds straying. The Tribunal finds that the German Shepherds do not bark excessively.
The respondent referred to an incident in September 2013, but conceded that there was no material that was before the Tribunal concerning that incident. There was therefore no evidence of an incident in September 2013 after the new fencing, dog compound and gates had been installed.
The respondent also raised one further point that as at the date of the hearing the applicant had not renewed the registration of the German Shepherds, due on 4 November 2013 for the year commencing 1 November 2013.
The applicant gave evidence that she had been ill with influenza and had not undertaken the payment which was due on the final hearing day.
The Tribunal does not consider this event to be indicative of conduct by the applicant that is dismissive of the rules and regulations concerning the control of dogs on her property.
The Tribunal accepts the applicant's evidence that she had not re‑registered or paid the re‑registration of her German Shepherds because she had been ill and does not use online account payments. The respondent's contention that the applicant's delay in re-registering her German Shepherds establishes that she is not a careful law‑abiding dog owner is rejected by the Tribunal.

Consideration

The Tribunal considers that greater weight should be placed upon the fact that since the incidents that had been the subject of earlier complaints, the applicant's property has been completely and substantially re-fenced and re‑gated to a very high standard, and that the dogs are well cared for, well maintained and secure. The Tribunal also considers, as stated, that no weight should be placed on the objection and basis of objection to the application by Mr Priddle. The Tribunal concludes that the contention that the applicant is not a responsible dog owner because, as at the final hearing the applicant had not re-registered her German Shepherds (due later that same day) is not evidence of any significance in considering whether the applicant is a responsible dog owner.
As stated, the respondent's Local Law does not identify any factors to be taken into account in assessing or approving an application for an exemption from the restriction of keeping only two dogs on premises. The Tribunal finds than none of the dogs on the applicant's premises is a dangerous dog. The German Shepherds are well maintained and the property is more than adequately fenced and gated to contain the German Shepherds and the Maltese. The Tribunal finds that the applicant's property is sufficient (16,000 m²) to accommodate the health and wellbeing needs of the German Shepherds, the hens and the Maltese. There is no evidence of any misconduct by or in relation to the Maltese. The Tribunal finds that the likelihood of any of the applicant's dogs straying has been diminished and the applicant's dogs are unlikely to create a nuisance resulting in any complaints by any reasonable neighbours. The Maltese is to be kept in the home, by and large, and there is no evidence that the additional dog will have any significant impact on the wellbeing and behaviour of the applicant's German Shepherds and horses.
There is no reason, in the Tribunal's view, why the applicant's application for an exemption from the restriction limiting the keeping of two dogs on the applicant's property made on 11 February 2013 should not be granted. For these reasons, the Tribunal shall set aside the reviewable decision to refuse the applicant's application and shall substitute its own decision to grant the applicant's application.

Orders

The Tribunal makes the following orders:
1.Pursuant to rule 10 of the State Administrative Tribunal Rules 2004 (WA), the time for making the application for review by the applicant is extended to and including 15 August 2013.
2.The decision of the respondent refusing the applicant's application for an exemption under s 26 of the Dog Act 1976 (WA) to permit the applicant to keep one additional dog at her place of residence at No 21 Lee‑Steere Drive, Mariginiup is set aside with the following decision substituted.
3.The applicant is granted the exemption sought on the following conditions:
(a)The exemption applies only to the Maltese White Terrier Male, referred to as Deano, and once any of the dogs currently kept at the applicant's property is deceased, sold or disposed of, the exemption ceases to have effect.
(b)The exemption will cease to have effect from the date of any conviction for any offence relating to the Dog Act 1976 (WA) in respect of either the dogs or any person in charge of those dogs.
(c)The subject property must be kept clear of all animal excreta using proper disposal methods.
(d)Adequate cover and protection is to be available for the dogs at all times.
(e)The dogs are to be adequately confined in accordance with the Dog Act 1976 (WA).
(f)Access is to be given to the Council for an annual inspection of the dogs, or more regularly if the Council so determines.

I certify that this and the preceding [40] paragraphs comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.
___________________________________
MS N OWEN-CONWAY, MEMBER