Dossis v Andreadis (No 3) - [2012] SADC 111

District Court of South Australia
(Civil)
DOSSIS v ANDREADIS (NO 3)
[2012] SADC 111
Reasons for Ruling of His Honour Judge Slattery (ex tempore)
31 August 2012
PROCEDURE - MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURAL MATTERS
Application by Plaintiff to amend Statement of Claim shortly before trial - application refused.

DOSSIS v ANDREADIS (NO 3)
[2012] SADC 111

Interlocutory application by the plaintiff, FDN58, made specially returnable to me today seeking leave by the plaintiff to amend her Statement of Claim in the form annexed to the affidavit of Ross Kirk Richards, affirmed 30 August 2012 FDN 59. For the reasons that follow I dismiss the application. I reserve the question of costs to the trial commencing on 3 September 2012.
The background of this matter is as set out in the reasons which I have published, 17 August 2012 and 23 August 2012. In those reasons I detailed the history of the matter and the attempts that have been made to maintain contact with the defendant for the purposes of ensuring this matter proceeded to trial on 3 September2012.
On 24 August 2012 at 2.43 pm the court sent by email to the defendant, a copy of my judgment of 23 August 2012, a copy of the sealed minutes of order, dated 23 August 2012 and a letter from the court with hard copies which were sent to the defendant’s postal address.
The court received a response from the defendant by email on Saturday, 25 August 2012 at 2.08 pm. The email reads relevantly as follows: ‘I Dimos of the family Andreadis have already notified the court that it is my wish not to contract.
I will not contract with the court nor will I contract with any order made by the court. I do not consent to any order being made. Any attempts to force me to contract will be considered an act of slavery under the Criminal Code Act 1995 s 268.10 - crime against humanity - enslavement for both the court and the barristers/solicitors.
The courts may not create a contract for the parties. When the parties have no expressed or implied agreement on the essential terms of a contract, there is no contract. Courts are only empowered to enforce contracts, not to write them, for the parties.
Any order or contract created or made by the court without my consent shall be unenforceable for to form a contract there must be mutual assent which essentially means that the parties to the contract must actually agree to the terms and must actually want to enter into a contract. No-one can ever force you to enter into a contract.
I do not consent to being contacted about the matter any more. Stop the harassing phone calls, emails, letters and stop trying to extort money from me without a judiciary order’.
On 27 August 2012 the court received a letter from the defendant via registered post. The letter enclosed a copy of the sealed minutes of order that were sent by the court to the defendant on 24 August 2012. The letter identifies that the defendant is aware of the District Court, alleges that it is a private company incorporation. It then alleges that the defendant is a private individual and that he is not subject to the laws, bylaws or any regulations of ‘your private company, nor any other company/corporation’. It goes on to indicate in para 1 that he is neither an employee nor a contractor and that the rules of the court ‘inferentially’ apply only to employees and contractors.
It goes on to say that he is not: ‘... subject to any other acts which have not received royal assent nor carried the legitimate royal seal ...’.
The defendant then goes on to say that he is prepared to accept the court’s (companies) invitation to the trial upon it being proved to him that he is an employee of the court and that he has been in active service of the court. He goes on to say in para 3 that a failure to provide that documentation will be an act of perjury and that as he has not been charged with any crime and he has not been summonsed to appear in the court’s place of business and as he has not been provided with any undisputed evidence (that) the plaintiff Athina Dossis has suffered any injury, then his schedule of fees is attached.
On 29 August 2012 the court forwarded to the defendant a further letter. It referred to the letter from the defendant to the court of 27 August 2012, and after referring to the fact that Mr Andreadis had referred to the trial of 3 September 2012, reiterated to Mr Andreadis that there was a directions hearing today at 9.15 am, that it was necessary for Mr Andreadis to attend the directions hearing and for him to put any submissions to me as he saw fit to make. The letter reiterated that the court would telephone him at that time to make contact with him for the purposes of the directions hearing and asked him to raise any matters before the court that are pertinent to him at that time.
On 29 August 2012 at 7.15 pm Mr Andreadis responded to the court’s letter of 29 August sent at 4.18 pm which reads relevantly as follows: ‘I Dimos of the family Andreadis say that: “Nowhere in my letter which your company received by registered post from me dated 27 August 2012 do I state or make reference to the following paragraph as stated by you. “In your letter you mention a number of issues concerning the trial to commence before of this Court next Monday, 3 September 2012.”
My letter did not raise any issues concerning the trial nor did in any way confirm a trial commencement date, this being Monday, 3 September 2012. Any attempt by your company to force me to attend your place of business, this being the District Court of South Australia will be under duress.
Any attempt by your company to force me, a private individual, to contract without consent or order costs against a private individual without consent will be seen as an act of slavery’.
At the hearing today I asked for an all-courts call to be made for Mr Andreadis. There was no appearance. I then also asked my assistant to make a call to Mr Andreadis’s mobile phone number from the court. The telephone call went to message bank and a message was left for Mr Andreadis to make contact with the court at a number that was given to him.
I am satisfied that a copy of the interlocutory application of the plaintiff of 30 August 2012 and the supporting the affidavit of Mr Richards, FDN59, was forwarded urgently to Mr Andreadis at his address yesterday, 30 August 2012. At 9:09 pm last evening the defendant sent a letter to the court that enclosed a copy of the correspondence from the plaintiff’s solicitor concerning the urgent ex parte application before me today that was issued by them on behalf of the plaintiff. Apart from identifying the plaintiff’s solicitor’s correspondence the defendant’s letter is in almost identical terms to the letters from the defendant to the court of 25 and 27 August 2012 that I have referred to above.
In my view, one of the amendments proposed to the Statement of Claim (para 4) as disclosed in the affidavit of Mr Richards is a matter that the court must be satisfied is properly understood by Mr Andreadis and that, subject to any explanation given to him, is a matter that may require consideration to be given to the amendment to any defence that Mr Andreadis has filed in this action. I was of the same view about the proposed amendments to para (i) of Part 2 of the pleading. The deletion of any claim is a matter for the plaintiff at trial as are the causes of action arising on the material facts proved at trial. Aggravated damage does not fall within that general principle. In those circumstances, if the plaintiff pressed her application to amend the Statement of Claim, then it was my view that an opportunity may have to be given to the defendant to give consideration to the amendment of his Defence. Some time will be required for that. It was my view that between now and the commencement of trial there was insufficient time for that to occur.
Consequently I have formed the view that it would work an unfairness to the defendant if the court acceded to the application made by the plaintiff on that topic without an adjournment of the trial date. I then informed the plaintiff that if she pressed the application then the trial of 3 September 2012 would need to be adjourned in fairness to the defendant.
In the circumstances, the plaintiff did not press her application.
I will hear Mr Andreadis in relation to any question of costs concerning that application at the trial of the matter commencing on Monday next, 3 September 2012.