Dorrian and Anor v Rushlyn Pty Ltd and Anor (No.2)

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FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

DORRIAN & ANOR v RUSHLYN PTY LTD & ANOR (No.2) [2013] FMCA 159
CONSUMER LAW – COSTS – Offer to settle before commencement of litigation – offer of compromise.
Trade Practices Act 1974, ss.51AD, 52
Federal Magistrates Court Rules 2001, rr.1.05, 6.12, pt.2 of sch.3
Federal Court Rules 2011, r.25.14
Dorrian v Rushlyn Pty Ltd [2013] FMCA 101
BHP Billiton Ltd v Parker (2012) 113 SASR 206
Dye v Commonwealth Securities Ltd (No. 2) [2012] FCA 407
Facton Ltd v Seo (2011) 91 IPR 135
Mobile Innovations Limited v Vodaphone Pacific Limited [2003] NSWSC 423
Hughes v Western Australia Cricket Association Inc (1986) ATPR 40–748
First Applicant: COLIN EDWARD DORRIAN
Second Applicant: SHARRON MAY DORRIAN
First Respondent: RUSHLYN PTY LTD (ACN 061 269 690)
Second Respondent: ROBERT MARK JAMES
File Number: ADG 222 of 2010
Judgment of: Cameron FM
Hearing date: 5 March 2013
Date of Last Submission: 5 March 2013
Delivered at: Sydney via videolink to Adelaide and Melbourne
Delivered on: 13 March 2013

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicants: Mr M. Hoile
Solicitors for the Applicants: Belperio Clark
Solicitors for the Respondents: Mason Sier Turnbull

ORDERS

  1. The first respondent pay seventy-five per cent of the applicants’ costs of the proceedings against the first respondent and of the cross claim, those costs to be taxed in accordance with Part 40 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

  2. The applicants’ costs incurred before 11.00am on 8 June 2011 be taxed on the party and party basis.

  3. The applicants’ costs incurred at and from 11.00am on 8 June 2011 be taxed on the indemnity basis.

  4. The applicants pay the second respondent’s costs, those costs to be taxed in accordance with Part 40 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
AT ADELAIDE

ADG 222 of 2010

COLIN EDWARD DORRIAN

First Applicant

SHARRON MAY DORRIAN

Second Applicant

And

RUSHLYN PTY LTD (ACN 061 269 690)

First Respondent

ROBERT MARK JAMES

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

  1. These reasons concern the costs to be ordered consequent upon the judgment in Dorrian v Rushlyn Pty Ltd [2013] FMCA 101 (principal decision”).

  2. The applicants brought a number of claims against the respondents which were determined in the principal decision. In brief, the applicants were successful in proving that the first respondent had breached the franchise agreement which it had entered into with them in 2009 and that, by breaching the Franchising Code of Conduct (“Code”), it had also breached s.51AD of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (“TPA”). Although no damages were awarded for the breach of the Code, judgment for the first respondent of $658,993.40 was ordered, made up of $545,792 damages for breach of contract and $113,201.40 for pre-judgment interest. Additionally, the first respondent’s cross claim against the applicants, for payment of the outstanding portion of the purchase price under the franchise agreement, namely $150,000, was dismissed.

  3. Several of the applicants’ allegations against the first respondent were unsuccessful, most relevantly their allegations…

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Details
Case
[2013] FMCA 159
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Dorrian and Anor v Rushlyn Pty Ltd and Anor (No.2) involves a dispute between the applicants and the respondents concerning the awarding of indemnity costs. The applicants sought costs under the indemnity principle, claiming they were entitled to a full recovery of their legal costs due to their success in the litigation. The respondents argued against this, contending that the applicants had not been entirely successful in all claims and that their costs should not be fully indemnified.

The legal issues before the court were whether the applicants were entitled to indemnity costs under the principles of Calderbank and FCR 25.14, and if so, what weight should be given to the early offer to resolve the dispute and the subsequent success of the applicants on certain claims. The court had to consider the effect of the early offer, the success on some but not all claims, and the timing of the respondents' disclosure of relevant documents.

The court found that the applicants were entitled to indemnity costs, taking into account the early offer to resolve the dispute and the applicants' overall success. The court considered the presumptive effect of the Rules Offer and the terms of FCR 25.14, which provide that indemnity costs should be awarded if the applicant obtains a judgment that is more favourable. The court also acknowledged the applicants' success on the breach of contract cause of action and their complete success in defeating the cross claim. The court concluded that these factors justified awarding indemnity costs, albeit with a discount to account for the applicants' partial success on the Franchising Code claim.

The court made a single order in favour of the applicants, awarding them indemnity costs with an appropriate discount, reflecting their overall success in the litigation.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

They submitted that, in exercising its discretion, the Court should give particular weight to:35.1the early offer to “resolve the position” by the applicant’s letter of 17 May 2010 before any legal costs were incurred at all;35.2the “presumptive effect” of the Rules Offer made in June 2011, and to the terms of FCR 25.14, which provide that it takes effect if the “applicant obtains a judgment that is more favourable”. The wording supports a view that the indemnity costs award should flow by reference to the ultimate “judgment” obtained, without being unduly distracted by the common and ordinary aspect of litigation that the applicants did not succeed on all issues;35.3the fact that the applicants were entirely successful on the breach of contract cause of action, which was the focus of their letter of 17 May 2010;35.4the fact that the applicants were entirely successful in defeating the cross claim;35.5the fact that with respect to the Franchising Code claim, the applicants succeeded in establishing non-disclosure (Reasons [240]), but did not obtain ultimate relief, because the applicant Mr Dorrian was honest enough to put his evidence no higher than that he would not have gone ahead “without a satisfactory explanation” (Reasons [246-247]). Another litigant may have claimed – and could hardly have been contradicted – that he would definitely not have gone ahead upon learning that which was not disclosed;35.6the fact that disclosure of documents by the respondents which related to and enabled the non-disclosure claim was only made months overdue on the doorstep of the court. This deprived the applicants of the chance to properly investigate the reasons for non-renewal of the 14 franchises. The applicants made their choice not to seek an adjournment and are bound by it. A consequence was that the applicants did not have time to organize proof of the reasons for the non-renewal of the franchises. As above they are bound by the consequences of not seeking an adjournment to which they were clearly entitled, but the respondents’ failure to make timely discovery is a relevant factor to weigh in the scales to counter any claim the respondents may make that the applicants failed on the Franchising Code claim. The applicants submitted that to the extent that the Court considered it just that there be some recognition of the applicants’ less than complete success on all causes of action against the respondents and in order to avoid the potential difficulties posed on a taxation by “cross-orders”, the Court might make a single order in favour of the applicants with an appropriate discount. The respondents submitted that no special costs order should be made in respect of the email of 17 May 2010. They submitted that their failure to accept the offer was not unreasonable, particularly in circumstances where the offer had not been made in the context of litigation or foreshadowed litigation. They submitted that their failure to accept an offer to settle an unlitigated dispute should not entitle the applicants to indemnity costs. It was submitted in relation to the substance of the offer that it did not assert a right to terminate the franchise agreement or raise any of the other causes of action later relied upon by the applicants, it was not expressed to be a Calderbank offer and did not put the first respondent on notice that if it was not accepted reliance might be placed on it in an argument on costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established