DORRACOTT & DORRACOTT
[2020] FamCA 23
•23 January 2020
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DORRACOTT & DORRACOTT | [2020] FamCA 23 |
| FAMILY LAW – SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE – Interim – wife seeking $27,000 per month – husband by consent orders assuming financial responsibility for mortgages and larger liabilities – amount sought by wife excessive – application refused. FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Sole Use And Occupation – wife’s application in relation to a holiday home refused – husband’s application for one weekend per month granted. FAMILY LAW – NON-REPORTABLE THERAPY – application granted. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 72(1), 75(2), 77, 114 |
| Astbury v Astbury (1978) 4 Fam LR 395 Belcher & Gardener [2019] FamCA 205 Deiter v Deiter [2011] FamCAFC 82 Eaby & Speelman [2015] FamCAFC 104 Hall v Hall (2016) 257 CLR 490 Hall v Hall [2015] FamCAFC 154 In the Marriage of Mitchell (1995) 19 Fam LR 44 Maroney & Maroney [2009] FamCAFC 45 Marvel v Marvel (2010) 43 Fam LR 348 Pollard & Nordberg [2019] FamCA 365 SS & AH [2010] FamCAFC 13 |
| APPLICANT: | Mr Dorracott |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Dorracott |
| FILE NUMBER: | MLC | 2711 | of | 2019 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 23 January 2020 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Melbourne |
| PLACE HEARD: | Melbourne |
| JUDGMENT OF: | The Honourable Justice Wilson |
| HEARING DATE: | 14 January 2020 |
REPRESENTATION
| COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: | Mr G Dickson of One of Her Majesty’s Counsel |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: | Kenna Teasdale Lawyers |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Ms R Wheeler |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Kennedy Partners |
Orders
The wife’s application for interim spousal maintenance in paragraph 12.2 of her application in a case dated 13 December 2019 is dismissed.
The wife’s applications for child support in paragraph 12 of her application in a case filed 13 December 2019 are dismissed.
The parties and the children X born … 2005 and Y born … 2007 (“the children”) attend non-reportable family therapy with such suitably qualified practitioner as is nominated by the wife, such therapy to take place no less than once each month and commencing within fourteen (14) days of the date of these orders.
The wife’s application for sole use and occupation of B Street, C Town in paragraph 6 of her application in a case dated 13 December 2019 is dismissed.
Until the trial of this proceeding or further order the husband is permitted to access and use the property at B Street, C Town on the first weekend of each month from 5pm on Friday until 9am on Monday.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Dorracott & Dorracott has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT MELBOURNE |
FILE NUMBER: MLC 2711 of 2019
| Mr Dorracott |
Applicant
And
| Ms Dorracott |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
By application in a case filed on 13 December 2019 the wife sought an array of property orders against the husband. In his response dated 9 January 2020 to the wife’s application in a case the husband sought his own array of orders, mostly property, with one application relating to parenting.
This case came before me at 3pm on 14 January 2020 when I was sitting in the Judicial Duty List. I was told that as a result of earnest negotiations conducted for most of the day, counsel for the parties had reached some form of accommodation in partial resolution of the issues that fell for determination. They asked for consent orders to be made on certain matters thereby disposing of those matters but they said several other issues were at large. In accordance with counsels’ request I made consent orders on 14 January 2020. Those consent orders were as follows –
1.The parties do all things and sign all documents to refinance the three CBA mortgages ending …24, …88 and …22 (“the mortgages”) on the following basis –
a.the parties seek that each such mortgage be converted to interest only;
b.if interest only mortgages are not offered upon the refinancing, then the parties are to take up the best available rate offered on a principal and interest basis; and
c.the husband meet the costs of the refinance.
2.The wife deposit her inherited funds held in the bank accounts in her name into one of the parties’ joint offset accounts ending …95 and/or …51 (such account to be at her election) or in the alternative, at her election and provided she is able to do so, she may establish a new offset account connected to the C Town mortgage and deposit her inherited funds into that account, with the husband to facilitate the establishment of said new offset account at the wife’s expense and for the avoidance of doubt, the requirement to place the funds into offset account(s) shall apply to any refinanced facilities.
3.The husband is restrained from drawing upon the offset accounts ending …95 and …51, the new offset account connected to C Town (if and when opened) and the mortgages ending …24, …88 and …22.
4.The husband shall pay –
a.all rates, insurances (including contents), land tax, water rates and other like outgoings associated with the Suburb D, C Town and E Town properties;
b.family health insurance at the current rate; and
c.the mortgages (refinanced or otherwise).
5.Pursuant to s 124 of the Child Support Assessment Act, the husband shall pay –
a.by way of non-periodic child support, private school costs (including but not limited to tuition fees, uniforms, camps, clothing and equipment for camps, and excursions) for X at F School; and
b.by way of non-periodic child support, private school costs (including but not limited to tuition fees, uniforms, camps, clothing and equipment for camps, and excursions) for Y at G School;
and such payments are not to be credited against any administrative assessment of child support in force from time to time.
6.In relation to the wife’s CBA credit card –
a.parties each pay $12,500 towards the CBA credit card;
b.the husband’s supplementary CBA credit card is to be cancelled and he is restrained from using it; and
c.the wife shall thereafter pay the balance owing on the CBA credit card each month as and when it falls due.
7.The husband shall produce the documents set out in annexure B of the wife’s application in a case filed 13 December 2019, if not already produced and if within his possession, power or control, including partnership documents and any contractual agreement or otherwise regarding points and/or calls on points and/or reduction or increase in points.
8.The parties attend a mediation with either Mr Peter Young One of Her Majesty’s Counsel or Mr Stephen Thackray in the second half of March 2020.
9.The parties instruct H Group as single expert witness to value the C Town, Suburb D and E Town properties at the parties’ joint expense.
The main arena of debate between 3pm and 5pm on 14 January 2020 was threefold, namely –
a)whether to make orders as sought by the wife for the husband to pay her on a monthly basis spousal maintenance of approximately $27,000;
b)whether an order for non-reportable therapy should be made; and
c)whether an order should be made conferring on the husband an order for sole use and occupation of a holiday home in C Town.
In broad compass (to the details I descend in the passages below) the parties’ respective positions on each of the three main contested issues may be shortly stated.
On the issue of spousal maintenance the wife contended that her usual lifestyle with which in happier times the husband had agreed involved regular monthly outgoings of the sums she presently seeks. In response the husband argued (broadly) that by operation of the consent orders to which he had agreed, he was assuming responsibility for the payment of most of the wife’s ongoing and recurrent financial commitments and so the sum she now seeks is unreasonably excessive.
On the issue of non-reportable therapy, the wife submitted that no useful purpose would be served in making such an order as the children’s relationship with the father has deteriorated to such an extent that the therapy contemplated would fail. Conversely, the husband urged me to make the order he sought in an endeavour to salvage some glimmer of the children’s relationship with their father.
So far as the order for sole use and occupation of the holiday home in C Town was concerned, the wife submitted that she and the children regularly use that property, they regard it as a safe environment and the husband should look elsewhere when spending his recreational time. The husband said the wife and children’s primary residence is in Suburb D, they cannot use two places concurrently, he seeks only one weekend per month and the children’s anger towards him will not be altered by his use or non-use of the holiday home.
In the passages below I have exposed my path of reasoning for the orders that I make, including a comparison of the competing evidentiary positions on point.
Synopsis
For the reasons that follow –
a)I dismiss the wife’s application for interim spousal maintenance in view of the other consent orders to which the husband agreed;
b)I make an order for non-reportable family therapy
c)I dismiss the wife’s application for sole use and occupation of C Town and
d)Until the trial of this proceeding or further order I make an order that the husband is to have sole use and occupation of the C Town holiday home for the first weekend of each month
A short recital of relevant facts
Many submissions in this application were disputed yet certain basic facts were agreed. Those in the latter category may be shortly stated as being –
a)the parties commenced to live together in 1991, they married in 2001 and they separated in August 2018;
b)at all relevant times the husband has been a partner in a professional firm and is 48 years of age;
c)at all relevant times the wife has not worked since the birth of the couples’ eldest child, although the wife has qualifications to work in the field of administration in which she worked when the couple first met;
d)the couples’ children (a son born in 2005 and a daughter born in 2007) attend private schools;
e)the parties’ former matrimonial home is in Suburb D, they own a holiday residence in C Town and under a will the wife was devised real estate in E Town, although I was told the E Town property is unimproved land; and
f)since the parties separated the husband has been living in rented accommodation.
This proceeding was commenced in March 2019. On 3 April 2019 a registrar of this court made consent parenting orders conferring equal shared parental responsibility upon the parents, providing for the children to live with the mother and for them to spend time with their father each Sunday and Wednesday for two and a half hours in the absence of their mother. Beyond those orders, this was the only occasion on which this case had been before the court. Counsel informed me that the children’s relationship with their father is tense.
Each party made a detailed affidavit on which each relied in relation to financial issues. Several facts were contested. On the hearing of an interlocutory application as was this, where the factual matrix is untested and it is in an embryonic state, the judge determining the application is necessarily constrained to a large extent. The determination of those disputed facts must await the trial of the litigation yet it is necessary to proceed on some informed basis recognising that until a full trial where parties are cross examined and detailed findings of fact will be made, it is neither necessary nor desirable to make anything but the most circumscribed findings about disputed factual matters. In Pollard & Nordberg[1] I addressed this issue having reviewed the learning at intermediate appellate level in the following terms –
70.In Marvel v Marvel[2] the Full Court addressed the complications that presented themselves when on an interim hearing the court is called upon to make findings of fact on disputed evidence. The Full Court embraced the cautioning remark sounded in SS & AH[3] where it was held that findings made at an interim hearing should be made with great circumspection.
71.In Deiter v Deiter,[4]a differently constituted Full Court held that interim hearings are necessarily truncated hearings and a court must be cautious to avoid being drawn into contentious trial issues. Instead, the court should look for agreed issues, care arrangements prior to separation, current circumstances of the parties and the children and the parties’ respective proposals.
72.In Eaby & Speelman[5] the Full Court held that frequently the judge must do the best he or she can by weighing the probability of competing claims and assessing the likely impact on the children in the event that a controversial assertion is relied upon or rejected. The decision in Banks & Banks[6] was to like effect as was the decision in Salah & Salah.[7]
73.In Redmond & Redmond[8] the Full Court held that guidance is often provided by independent expert evidence, even where on an interim contested hearing significant disputes exist in relation to the evidence on which reliance will be placed.
[1] [2019] FamCA 365.
[2] (2010) 43 Fam LR 348.
[3] [2010] FamCAFC 13.
[4] [2011] FamCAFC 82.
[5] [2015] FamCAFC 104.
[6] [2015] FamCAFC 36.
[7] (2016) 56 Fam LR 299.
[8] [2014] FamCAFC 155.
An undisputed fact in this case was the husband’s status as a partner in a professional firm. It is true, the evidence revealed that his partnership drawings fluctuated but it can safely be said that his income was very considerable and that over a sustained period, by reason of that high income this family enjoyed a luxurious lifestyle. It must be recorded that in his capacity as a member of his firm, the wife’s evidence revealed that the husband worked over a sustained period devoting long hours to his clients as is often the case in professional callings, thereby devoting his time to his clients ahead of his family. I make no criticism of the husband for doing that and record that comment merely to explain the genesis of the large sums of money that are in issue in this case.
As is common in large firms of professional service providers (especially solicitors and accountants), in this case the husband’s firm operated a service company through which the wife was paid regular amounts on which the wife was assessed for income tax purposes. No dispute emerged in relation to the wife’s entitlement to receive those payments or their characterisation as income assessable in the wife’s hands.
The wife deposed to the husband’s income. She offered no documentary verification of the sums she mentioned. She did not say how she was capable of giving evidence about his earning of $1.1m in the 30 June 2016 financial year and $1.4m in the 30 June 2017 financial year. However, she did say that according to his bank statements (not identifying them) for the first three months of the current financial year the husband earned income that will amount to an overall financial year end figure of $1.6m. She said the husband had use of a credit card for entertainment, travel and associated expenses.
The wife gave evidence in her 12 December 2019 affidavit of her personal circumstances. They were as follows –
a)she is 51 and is engaged in home duties;
b)she was diagnosed with breast cancer in late 2014 in respect of which she underwent a partial mastectomy and radiation treatment, after which in December 2017 she underwent a bilateral full mastectomy and reconstructive surgery, she is now in remission undergoing six monthly check-ups;
c)she and the husband have two children – a son aged 14 and a daughter aged 12, each of whom attends a private school in one of Melbourne’s eastern suburbs; and
d)after what the wife called violent incidents, they separated.
When the couple met, the wife then worked in the administration industry, although she gave no evidence of her qualifications or training nor even what role she performed in the administration industry. She said she stopped working in 2005 on the birth of the couple’s first child.
The wife deposed to the husband’s work patterns and related issues. She said –
a)between 2011 and the end of 2016 he lived primarily in Brisbane while working on a large work matter, returning to Melbourne periodically;
b)while the husband ascended the promotional ladder within his firm she undertook what she said was virtually all of the shopping, cooking, cleaning, gardening, trades arranging, house renovations, landscaping and gardening; and
c)in 2013, following her cancer diagnosis she and the husband purchased their first property at C Town making consequential changes to their lifestyle.
The wife deposed to a family company, J Pty Ltd, the trustee of a trust called J Trust, of which she and the husband were and remain directors and shareholders.
The asset position of the parties is substantial. It can be recorded in the following manner –
a)the former matrimonial home in Suburb D, the registered proprietor of which is the wife, estimated to be valued at $3m in which the net equity is approximately $1.5m;
b)the wife’s superannuation in the sum of $6,970;
c)the current holiday home owned by J Pty Ltd in C Town said to be valued at $1.9m, burdened with a mortgage of $1,252,000 thereby deriving a net equity of approximately $648,000;
d)inherited cash at bank of about $125,000;
e)inherited shares valued at about $40,000;
f)inherited unimproved land at E Town the net equity of which is said to be $480,000; and
g)inheritances from one of the wife’s uncles ($20,000), from another uncle ($39,864) and from her mother ($1,410,882).
She said she has a credit card debt of $22,367.
The wife deposed to the usual course of events in the pattern of her receipt of distributions from the husband’s firm’s service trust. She said that was and had been treated as income. She said that until 5 October 2018 all income (hers and his) was deposited into their joint account. She said the husband began diverting some of his own income into an account with K Bank in his sole name between October and December 2018. She said the entirety of the husband’s income was paid into the K Bank account rather than being paid into the joint account between January and March 2019 and that the regular monthly amount of $5,300 being her income was paid into the joint account. She said that by early January 2019 a little over $120,000 was in their joint accounts and, based on other sources of available cash, together they had $165,000 in available funds by that date. The wife said the husband had almost $280,000 in his K Bank account. The wife narrated the ebbs and flow of funds in the joint account up to March 2019. Between March and August 2019 the wife deposed to encountering difficulties in ensuring all mortgages were serviced. She said solicitors became involved.
Under the heading “current position” the wife made a collection of allegations. In no special order she stated –
a)$30,000 of the husband’s net monthly receipts are paid into the joint account per month;
b)she applies $20,000 of that amount to meet joint fixed expenses in relation to their properties;
c)she has been left with very little to meet day-to-day living expenses once she disburses $20,000 per week on joint fixed expenses;
d)she has been put in a position by the husband that she must deplete her capital in order to meet day-to-day expenses;
e)she has $1.26m remaining;
f)by contrast the husband has $277,000 in his account; and
g)she said the husband’s document disclosure and production was defective.
She addressed her request for sole use and occupation of the C Town property. She said she and the husband were directors of and shareholders in J Pty Ltd. She said the C Town property was very important for her and the children. She pointed to significant tension between the husband and her in relation to her use of the C Town property. She said she feels intimidated and bullied by the husband in his approach to C Town. She sought orders excluding the husband from C Town.
She said the former matrimonial home required urgent repairs. An examination of the works described between paragraphs 82 and 87 of her affidavit indicated that not all of the activities there described were accurately characterised as urgent works.
The wife conceded in her affidavit that she and the husband enjoyed what she called a “good standard of living during our relationship”. That description was selectively understated. Their standard of living was very high. She complained that $50,000 of her capital had been depleted. She said her monthly expenditures approximate $50,000.
Having regard to the consent orders reached on 14 January 2020 it became unnecessary to address seriatim the matters alleged by the wife so as to extract the husband’s response. In essence, upon Mr Dickson QC announcing that the consent minutes had been agreed, Mr Dickson submitted –
a)the wife satisfied the threshold for a spousal maintenance application;
b)a spousal maintenance application depended on, among other things, the reasonableness of the expenses for which payment is sought;
c)here, while the husband and wife enjoyed a lavish lifestyle in happier times, that did not mean that the wife was entitled to that precise lifestyle upon the parties’ separation; and
d)having regard to the interim consent orders made, no ongoing need existed for the husband to meet the expenses which the wife persisted in claiming.
Mr Dickson QC focused on several amounts that the wife argued were recurrent, notwithstanding the making of the interim consent orders. He highlighted the wife’s assertions that she continued to expend on a weekly basis amounts on food ($1,000), gas ($180), telephones ($275), car maintenance ($150), car parking ($200), medical costs ($880), gardening and cleaning ($460) and hairdressing ($420). Mr Dickson submitted that many of those expenses were overstated by the wife or were unreasonable in any event, weekly car parking expenses of $200, weekly medical expenses of $880, weekly hairdressing expenses of $420, weekly telephone expenses of $275, weekly gardening and cleaning expenses of $460 being choice samples he said.
Mr Dickson said the wife’s weekly expenses no longer were $27,000 consequent upon the making of the interim consent orders. He pointed out that the wife will continue to receive the regular amount she has historically received by way of regular distributions from the husband’s firm.
So far as child support issues were concerned, Mr Dickson submitted –
a)departure applications are ordinarily dealt with at trial, rather than on an interlocutory application where the evidence is contested;
b)upon the husband addressing school fees, this application was not a child support application in reality; and
c)it fell to the applicant wife to demonstrate why the statutory regime did not apply and here, the applicant wife had failed to show all that she needed to show.
In addition, the husband sought an order for non-reportable therapy. He said his relationship with his children was in an advanced state of deterioration and that unless steps were set in train at once, the outlook for his rapport with the children was bleak. The wife said that no useful purpose would be served in undertaking the non-reportable therapy as the children seriously disliked their father.
Consideration
This case came before me when sitting in a Judicial Duty List. By definition, it was an interlocutory application in which the evidence is incomplete and untested. Single judges have been admonished for going beyond the limit of factual investigations on the hearing of interlocutory applications. In Pollard & Nordberg[9] I drew together some of the more important authorities that have cautioned judges hearing interlocutory applications to exhibit circumspection in relation to factual findings prior to the trial of the proceeding. I shall not repeat what I said at paragraph 12 above.
[9] [2019] FamCA 365.
No real dispute arose in this case that the husband had taken on significant financial obligations upon his consenting to the interim orders. That much seemed readily apparent. The question then became one of whether the wife was left in a position that she was able or unable to support herself adequately so as to warrant the making of orders pressed by Ms Wheeler. Guidance of applicable legal principles has been given by the decision of the High Court in Hall v Hall.[10] There, in addressing s 77 of the Family Law Act on an interim application, the High Court held that two pre-conditions must be met. First, it must appear to the court that a party to the marriage “is in immediate need of financial assistance”. Second, it must be “not practicable in the circumstances to determine immediately what order, if any, should be made”.
[10] (2016) 257 CLR 490.
In this case very little beyond assertion existed in relation to large weekly amounts claimed by the wife. In particular, the sums claimed on a weekly basis for food ($1,000), gas ($180), telephones ($275), car maintenance ($150), car parking ($200), gardening and cleaning ($460) and hairdressing ($420) were unsubstantiated. Those expenses could be met from the regular distribution from the husband’s firm. Of spousal maintenance claims generally, applying the early decision of Astbury v Astbury,[11] the High Court in Hall v Hall held as follows –
The wording of s 72(1), it has been noted, seems to imply that each party should attempt to support himself or herself where that is reasonable having regard to the matters referred to in s 75(2).
[11] (1978) 4 Fam LR 395.
In essence, the central issue for me was whether, in view of the interim consent position having been reached, the evidence before me “demonstrates that the wife is able to support herself adequately”. That was the test propounded in paragraph 30 of the judgment of the plurality in Hall v Hall applying the decision of the Full Court in Hall v Hall.[12]
[12] [2015] FamCAFC 154 at [150].
In my view she is.
Counsel drew to my attention the decision in Maroney & Maroney.[13]That was a fact-specific case having no general application. I drew no guidance from it. However, in relation to the point pressed by Ms Wheeler that the wife should not be required to reach into her accumulated capital merely to meet maintenance sums claimed, the observations of the Full Court in In the Marriage of Mitchell[14] are useful guides. Several points emerged from that decision. The first is the observation about one party adequately supporting himself or herself in view of s 75(2). The court held as follows –
Thus, the question whether the applicant can support herself “adequately” is not to be determined by reference to any fixed or absolute standard but having regard to the matters referred to in s 75(2) and more specifically the paragraphs of that subsection identified above.
Nor is that question to be determined upon a “subsistence” level, as earlier cases under State maintenance legislation suggested.
[13] [2009] FamCAFC 45.
[14] (1995) 19 Fam LR 44.
Here, I have taken into account the wife’s evidence about her health complications that are now in remission.
The second point from Mitchell goes to Ms Wheeler’s submissions in this case that the family enjoyed a high standard of living. On that point, the following was said in Mitchell –
It is also necessary in determining this issue to have regard to the standard of living of the parties and the financial circumstances of the other person: s 75(2)(b) and (g). The days are long gone when it is necessary for an applicant for maintenance to use up all of her assets and capital in order to satisfy the requirement that she is unable to support herself “adequately”. Where the line is to be drawn will depend upon the circumstances of individual cases.
While the wife may here be entitled to seek a spousal maintenance order, I prefer the observations in Hall v Hall about the state of the evidence to the effect that the wife is now able to support herself adequately. She is. Her application for orders in the nature of maintenance orders beyond those the subject of the consent orders fails.
That left the sole use and occupation of the holiday home application. It must be remembered that the C Town home is a holiday home. The wife and children seem to have a deep attachment to it. But by definition, they are unable to live in it permanently. The wife seeks orders the effect of which will be the exclusion of the husband from C Town. Beyond the wife’s wish, she has offered very little to support her application. The husband seeks the use of it one weekend per month.
The learning on sole use and occupation is tolerably straight forward. I examined it in Belcher & Gardener.[15]The relevant legal principles may be shortly stated. They are –
19.It is accepted that the relevant source of power to make an order for sole use and occupation is s 114 of the Family Law Act. The Full Court decision in In the Marriage of Davis[16] provides ample authority for the point. In that case, the Full Court held that the relevant criteria to be established are as follows –
a) the means and needs of the parties;
b) the needs of children;
c) the hardship to either party or to the children; and
d)where relevant, conduct of one party which may justify the other party in leaving the home or in asking for the expulsion from the home of the first party.
[15] [2019] FamCA 205
[16] (1976) 1 Fam LR 11,522.
As to the means and needs of the parties, the C Town property is significant to each emotionally yet neither could seriously contend that either “needs” to reside there. Their election to use it is purely recreational.
As to the needs of the children, again, based on the wife’s evidence the children have an emotional attachment. Yet they live in Suburb D so they do not use the property as their primary residence. I am unable to see why their wishes should predominate for each weekend. The husband has offered for them to use C Town three out of four weekends per month. That is sufficient.
The children and the wife will be occasioned no hardship by not using the C Town property every weekend.
No suggestion was made that any conduct disentitling any party from using the C Town property was relevant.
I am not persuaded that the wife is entitled to the order she seeks for the sole use and occupation of the C Town property for each weekend. I say that by application of the legal principles set out immediately above.
I dismiss the wife’s application for sole use and occupation of C Town.
The husband sought an order in the nature of a sole use and occupation order for one weekend per month until the trial of this proceeding.
I make an order that until the trial of this proceeding or further order the husband is permitted to use the holiday home at B Street, C Town on the first weekend of each month from 5pm on Friday until 9am on Monday.
On the subject of non-reportable therapy, it is desirable in my view that every avenue be explored in the best interests of the children to promote a relationship between the father and the children. I will make an order for non-reportable therapy in terms of paragraph 1 of the father’s response to an application in a case dated 9 January 2020.
There remains the issue of child support. The consent orders have addressed any real concerns, it seems to me. In my view having regard to the undertaking of the payment of school fees by the husband, and other expenses, the sums claimed in paragraph 12 of the wife’s application evaporated. I dismiss the wife’s applications for child support in paragraph 12 of her application in a case filed 13 December 2019.
I certify that the preceding fifty-two (52) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Wilson delivered on 23 January 2020.
Associate:
Date: 23 January 2020
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