FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| DORNEY & DORNEY | [2007] FMCAfam 617 |
| FAMILY LAW – Property settlement – gambling losses – where wife asserts that her losses did not exceed $10, 000, but where finding that losses amounted to approximately $170,000 – where no evidence that wife's gambling was pathological in nature – where wife simply denied of the quantum of the losses and that she had a serious gambling problem – where court required to determine quantum of wife's gambling losses – standard of proof regarding quantum of gambling losses – consideration of guidelines in Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092 – whether wife should bear the entirety or some other proportion of her gambling losses – whether husband acquiesced in wife's gambling losses – whether husband had a duty to protect wife from any weakness of character that might have predisposed her to financial irresponsibility. |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
| Aleksovski (1996) 20 FamLR 894 Baxendale (2006) FamCA 883 Brandt (1997) 22 FamLR 97 Brice (2007) FamCA 170 Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 Browne v Green (1999) FLC 92 C & C (1998) 23 FamLR 291 Chorn & Hopkins (2004) FLC 93-204 Kennedy & Cahill (unreported – 1996) Appeal No NA44 of 1995. Judgment date: 8 August 1996 Clauson (1995) FLC 92 Collins (1990) 14 FamLR 563 Crampton (2006) FLC 93-269 D & D (2005) FamCA 35 De Angelis (1999) 30 FamLR 304 Dickson (1999) 24 FamLR 460 Donnelly (2000) FamCA 387 Farmer & Bramley (2000) 27 FamLR 316 Ferraro (1993) FLC 92-335 Gill (1984) 9 FamLR 969 Hickey (2003) FamCA 395 Kowaliw (1981) FLC 91-092 Lee-Steere (1985) FLC 91-626 Levinson (2003) FamCA 937 McMahon (1995) FLC 92-606 Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 110 ALR 449 Norbis (1986) FLC 91-712 Omacini (2005) FLC 93-218 OSF & OJK (2004) FLC 93 Pastrikos (1980) FLC 91 Plummer & O’Connor (1998) FamCA 53 Prestwich (1984) 9 FamLR 1069 Russell (1999) FLC 92-877 Townsend (1994) FLC 92 VJ & CJ (1997) 22 FamLR 166 Waters & Jurek (1995) FLC 92 Whitely (1996) FLC 92 |
| Applicant: | MS DORNEY |
| Respondent: | MR DORNEY |
| File Number: | MLM 8254 of 2006 |
| Judgment of: | Walters FM |
| Hearing date: | 15 June 2007 |
| Date of Last Submission: | 15 June 2007 |
| Delivered at: | Melbourne |
| Delivered on: | 12 September 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr Scriva |
| Solicitors for the Applicant: | Gleeson & Co |
| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr Houlihan |
| Solicitors for the Respondent: | Ballards Solicitors |
ORDERS
The husband pay to the wife’s solicitors, the sum of $148,313.00 (“the payment”) on or before the 12 day of November 2007 (“the date”).
Contemporaneously with the payment:
(a)the wife do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be required to transfer to the husband at the expense of the husband all of her right, title and interest in the real property situated at and known as W (“the real property”); and
(b)the husband indemnify the wife against all payments and liability pursuant to any mortgage and…
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- Dorney and Dorney [2007] FMCAfam 617
- Case
- [2007] FMCAfam 617
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine whether financial losses incurred by one party during the marriage should be shared, and if so, under what circumstances. It considered the principle established in Townsend, which was discussed in Chorn & Hopkins, and noted that Townsend was concerned only with assets existing at the time of separation. The court also referred to the general principle in Kowaliw that the economic fruits of a marriage should be shared, but questioned whether the converse should also apply to financial losses. It concluded that such losses should be shared unless one party had acted recklessly or negligently, or had intentionally reduced the value of matrimonial assets.
In its decision, the court held that the wife's gambling losses should not be shared since they were incurred well before the separation. However, it ordered that certain assets and liabilities be divided equally between the parties, with specific instructions on the payment of a sum of money and the transfer of property interests. The court also stipulated that each party should bear their own legal costs and dismissed the wife's application in its entirety.
Orders
Orders of the court
1.
The husband pay to the wife’s solicitors, the sum of $148,313.00 (“the payment”) on or before the 12 day of November 2007 (“the date”).
2.
Contemporaneously with the payment:
(a) the wife do all such acts and things and sign all such documents as may be required to transfer to the husband at the expense of the husband all of her right, title and interest in the real property situated at and known as W (“the real property”); and
(b) the husband indemnify the wife against all payments and liability pursuant to any mortgage and all apportionable rates, taxes and outgoings of or with respect to the real property of whatsoever nature and kind.
3.
In the event that the whole of the payment has not been made by the date then the real property be forthwith sold altogether out of Court (“the sale”), and upon completion of the sale, the proceeds of the sale be applied:
(a) first to pay all costs, commissions and expenses of the sale;
(b) secondly, to discharge the mortgage and any other encumbrance affecting the real property;
(c) thirdly, so much of the payment as is then outstanding (together with interest thereon at the rate set out in the Family Law Rules, adjusted monthly from the date) to the wife; and
(d) fourthly, the balance to the husband
4.
Pending the payment or completion of the sale:
(a) the husband have the sole right to occupy the real property and, during such right of occupation, the husband pay all instalments pursuant to the mortgage and all rates and taxes and like apportionable outgoings of the real property as they fall due;
(b) the parties hold their respective interests in the real property upon trust pursuant to these orders; and
(c) neither party encumber the real property without the consent in writing of the other party.
5.
Each of the husband and the wife shall be entitled to recover 50% of the loan of $20,000.00 made by the parties to J and N.
6.
Each of the husband and the wife shall be entitled to recover 50% of the loan of $60,000.00 made by the parties to C and C.
7.
Unless otherwise specified in these orders, and save for the purposes of enforcing any monies due under these or any subsequent orders:
(a) each party be solely entitled to the exclusion of the other to all superannuation and other property (including choses-in-action) owned by or in the possession of such party as at the date of these orders;
(b) monies outstanding to the credit of the parties in any bank account are to become the property of the husband;
(c) insurance policies remain the sole property of the owner named therein;
(d) each party be solely liable for and indemnify the other against any liability encumbering any item of property to which that party is entitled pursuant to these orders; and
(e) any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is hereby expressly severed.
8.
Each party pay his/her own costs of and incidental to the within proceedings.
9.
The application of the wife filed on 7 June 2005 otherwise be dismissed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Chorn & Hopkins (2004) FLC 93-204, the Full Court said:[41]It is important to bear in mind, and indeed it should be emphasised, that in Townsend the Full Court was concerned only with the situation where between separation and the hearing of property settlement proceedings, one party has disposed of an asset which could be described as “a matrimonial asset” in the sense that it was an asset which was owned by one or both of the parties at separation and in which the other party would have an legitimate interest…(emphasis added)[41] At paragraph 21 Although the Full Court in Chorn & Hopkins later said that it would refer to “the principle which emerges from Townsend”[42], it does not appear to have done so in a clear and an ambiguous fashion. Still, it did observe that Townsend “…was concerned only with the distribution of ‘matrimonial’ property in existence at separation”[43].[42] See paragraph 21[43] See paragraph 31. I conclude from the discussion of Townsend in Chorn & Hopkins that Townsend is of little assistance in the present case, because the wife’s gambling losses were incurred well before the parties separated in 2004. In Kowaliw, Baker J said (at page 76,643-4):Marriage is for most couples an economic partnership. Married couples live together and work together with the ultimate object of purchasing a home, paying it off, acquiring other assets with the overall object of attaining a higher standard of living. The reported decisions in respect of applications for settlement of property under sec.79 of the Act are unanimous that both parties should share the economic fruits of a marriage, having regard to the provisions of sec. 79(4) and sec. 75(2), although not necessarily equally.Is not, however, the converse equally sustainable? In other words, should not financial losses incurred by parties to a marriage or either of them, whether incurred jointly or severally, be shared by them in the same manner as the financial gains?As a statement of general principle, I am firmly of the view that financial losses incurred by parties or either of them in the course of a marriage whether such losses result from a joint or several liability, should be shared by them (although not necessarily equally), except in the following circumstances:(a)where one of the parties has embarked upon a course of conduct designed to reduce or minimise the effective value or worth of matrimonial assets, or(b)where one of the parties has acted recklessly, negligently or wantonly with matrimonial assets, the overall effect of which has reduced or minimised their value. In Browne v Green (1999) FLC 92-873, the Full Court said:While care should probably be taken … not to elevate Baker J's statement (in Kowaliw) to "a principle", we are nonetheless satisfied that it is certainly is a well-accepted guideline within the jurisdiction which has received the endorsement of successive Full Courts. I refer, as well, to the discussion of Kowaliw in Omacini (2005) FLC 93-218.