Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2004] AATA 646
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No. N2002/1103
VETERANS' APPEALS DIVISION ) Re RAYMOND CHARLES DORE Applicant
And
REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Senior Member M D Allen Date15 June 2004
PlaceSydney
Decision The decision under review is affirmed.
(Sgd) M D Allen
...................................Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
VETERANS’ ENTITLEMENTS – claim for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) – not satisfied on balance of probabilities Applicant suffered PTSD as causative events not experienced by veteran - mere apprehension of an event happening does not equate to threatened death or injury - necessity for some actual event to have occurred – claim for Anxiety State rejected as unable to ascertain time of clinical onset so as to conform to Statement of Principles – requirement that clinical onset be within two years of stressor
Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 – s 6C, ss 120(1), (3), (4) and (6), s 120A
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
Repatriation Commission v Hancock (2003) 37 AAR 383
Benjamin v Repatriation Commission (2001) 70 ALD 622
Gerzina v Repatriation Commission [2004] FCAFC 96
Repatriation Commission v Budworth (2001) 116 FCR 200
State of New South Wales v Seedsman [2000] NSWCA 119
Repatriation Commission v Keeley (2000) 98 FCR 108
Lees v Repatriation Commission [2002] FCAFC 398
Repatriation Commission v Cornelius [2002] FCA 750
Repatriation Commission v Hill [2002] FCAFC 192
REASONS FOR DECISION
15 June 2004 Senior Member M D Allen 1. By application made on 5 August 2002, the Applicant sought review of a determination by the Respondent as affirmed by a Veterans' Review Board (“VRB”) that rejected his claim to have the condition described as post traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) attributed to his war service.
2. Other conditions were also claimed by the Applicant at that time but the only matter pursued before this Tribunal was that of PTSD.
3. The Applicant had service in Malaya with the 111 Light Anti Aircraft Battery, Royal Regiment of Australian Artillery from 9 June 1964 to 30 May 1996. Of that period, originally only the period between 23 October 1964 to 21 November 1964 was eligible service under the Veterans’ Entitlements Act 1986 (“VEA”). Pursuant to amendments to the said Act by the Veterans’ Affairs Legislation Amendment (Budget Measures) Act 2000 Schedule 4, the Applicant’s eligible service was between the periods 17 August 1964 to 31 May 1965 as and from 1 January 2001. This amendment does not effect eligibility criteria but would have affected the rate of pension to be paid to the Applicant had he been successful in his application.
4. As the Applicant had operational service as that term is defined in section 6C VEA, the standard of proof in this matter is that mandated by subsections 120(1) and (3) VEA. That is to say that the Tribunal shall grant the Applicant’s claim unless it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination. The Tribunal…
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- AGLC
- Dore and Repatriation Commission [2004] AATA 646
- Case
- [2004] AATA 646
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was tasked with deciding whether Dore had suffered PTSD due to events experienced during his service, and if his Anxiety State was linked to a stressor within the two-year period stipulated by the legislation. The court also had to consider whether the mere apprehension of an event occurring was sufficient to qualify as a causative event under the law. The determination hinged on the interpretation of statutory provisions and the weight of evidence provided by Dore.
The court held that Dore's claim for PTSD was not substantiated because he had not experienced the necessary causative events as defined by the legislation. The court clarified that mere apprehension of an event does not equate to the threatened death or injury required to establish PTSD. Furthermore, the court found that Dore's claim for Anxiety State was also unsuccessful as there was no clear evidence to ascertain the time of clinical onset relative to the stressor, thus failing to meet the legal criteria. The court relied on previous case law to support its findings, particularly the necessity for actual events and the specific timeframes for the onset of conditions.
The final orders of the court were to affirm the decision under review, rejecting Dore's claims for both PTSD and Anxiety State.
Orders
Orders of the court
The decision under review is affirmed.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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